The Regulation of Insider Dealing: An Applied and Comparative Legal Study towards Reform in the UAE. by Albelooshi, Abdulsalam
 1
The Regulation of Insider Dealing: 
An Applied and Comparative Legal Study towards Reform in 
the UAE. 
 
Submitted by Abdulsalam Albelooshi, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in Law, August 2008. 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and 
that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and 
that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by 
this or any other University. 
 
 
(signature)--------------------------------- 
 
 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin 
Rashid Al Maktoum, the UAE Prime Minister and Vice-President, and Ruler of Dubai. His 
vision inspired me to strive for excellence. 
I would like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Mr. Robert Drury for his 
enthusiastic supervision. 
I am indebted to my family and friends who have been understanding and supportive. 
I am deeply grateful to my wife and my daughters Shaima, Jawaher and Alhanoof. Without 
their support this thesis would not have been possible. 
 
 
 
 3
ABSTRACT 
Insider dealing on the basis of inside information has been identified as an action against 
the principle of equal access to information for all those who need such information to 
make investment decisions. This thesis examines the regulation of insider dealing in 
financial markets. It analyses in particular the problem of the regulation of insider dealing 
in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the shortcomings of this regulation and how it can be 
improved. The primary objective of the thesis is to offer reasonable recommendations for 
the reform of insider dealing in the UAE. There have been controversies regarding whether 
insider dealing should be regulated, the basis of such regulation and the form in which the 
law should intervene. This thesis has attempted to provide its own approach to the problem 
of insider dealing. This approach forwards the proposition that allowing insider dealing on 
the basis of inside information is against the principle of equal access to information and it 
is detrimental to market transparency. Based on this proposition, the thesis investigates the 
shortcomings of the current regulation of insider dealing in the UAE. Following this the 
applied study, which consists of a questionnaire and interviews conducted in the UAE, 
provides a clearer picture of the current regulation in the country. The study aims at 
measuring opinions and attitudes of investors and other experts towards the basis and 
effectiveness of the regulation of insider dealing in local markets in the UAE.  This is 
followed by a legal comparative study. This is both a ‘macro-comparison’ and a ‘micro-
comparison’ between the regulation of insider dealing in the jurisdictions of the US, the UK 
and the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The ‘macro-comparison’ draws 
conclusions from comparing the broader systems of regulation in the three jurisdictions. 
The ‘micro-comparison’ concentrates on a functional comparison between the specific rules 
related to insider dealing. The legal comparative study is combined with the information 
generated by the applied study. Together these provide solutions (represented as 
recommendations) for the reform of the UAE larger system of regulation, and amendments 
to the rules related to insider dealing. 
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Introduction 
For a thesis as an academic project, planning has a high priority. In particular, the strategy 
and goals in any project have to be specifically determined. The aim of this thesis is that the 
objectives should be achieved through answering the research questions. For this reason, it 
is initially necessary to determine the problems, objectives and methodology. 
The subject of insider dealing is the core problem examined in this thesis. Insider dealing 
has been identified as an area affecting equal opportunities for investment in financial 
markets. It is generally accepted that insider dealing should be banned. Recent discussions 
show a readiness to regulate against it. Nevertheless, the form in which the law should 
intervene is still an area of debate. Over recent years, various methods have been employed 
to try and prevent this activity. The policy of regulation has been directed towards certain 
objectives for proposed legislation. In this regard, emphasis has been placed on different 
policies and forms of legal interference; for example; a criminal regime deterring the act of 
insider dealing, or an administrative regime empowering the regulator to face insider 
dealing and market abuse and enforce a disclosure system. Insider dealing as a problem has 
generated various legal solutions, but it seems that all forms of legal interference are 
needed in order to build an efficient system of regulation. A critical analysis of each form 
of legal interference reveals its individual shortcomings, but it has rarely been suggested 
that a certain form should be completely abandoned. The solution seems to be to keep all 
forms of legal interference and highlight areas of priority. 
Policy considerations have focused on different regulations for insider dealing. The initial 
results of adopting different sanctions are not encouraging, but the argument remains that 
regulation can be applied in certain cases. The classic argument is that the immorality of the 
act and the harm caused to the general public are amongst the factors supporting the use of 
criminal sanctions. Thus, it seems to be a popular method. By enforcing criminal sanctions, 
for example, the goals are both deterrence and just punishment. However, there are 
arguments against criminal sanctions. The main one is that deterrence and punishment 
cannot be met due to difficulties in actual enforcement. The modern trend is towards 
empowering the regulator to face market-place problems, a method which is efficient in 
deterring insider dealing. An efficient regulator with clear regulatory priorities helps 
maintain a transparent market. Recent codes of conduct, disclosure requirements and civil 
or administrative penalties are all methods which have been used to control insider dealing. 
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Criminal sanctions seem to be the last and most severe course of action. Studying insider 
dealing regulations critically focuses attention on both its shortcomings and advantages.   
This helps in the further understanding of regulation and practice. Analysing the details of 
the long experience of those countries that first identified and faced insider dealing will add 
to the arguments and form part of the basis for recommendations. There are necessary 
lessons to be learnt by developing countries (which are in a race against time to make 
progress) from the experience of developed countries. However, the regulations should be 
perceived not as a problem in itself, but rather as a response to a problem. In other words, 
understanding the problem of insider dealing and the policy of its regulation is the first step 
in discussing the law of insider dealing. 
In the UAE, at a time when great attention is being directed on the economy of the country 
and on developing related laws and regulation, it seems prudent to direct academic efforts 
to the same areas. In doing so, this thesis will endeavour to investigate the problem of the 
regulation of insider dealing in the UAE, the shortcomings of this regulation and how it can 
be improved. In addition to examining the immense body of thought in the area of insider 
dealing, we will forward a contribution of our own on the subject. Insider dealing has been 
an area of interest for researchers for many years. Examining this area through a thesis, 
with the added dimension of the UAE, will be a valuable input to the current debate. In its 
structure and plan, this thesis will endeavour to be original and insightful. Insider dealing is 
a problematic legal area and consequently it has attracted the attention of jurists who have 
tried to propose different solutions to meet the needs of complex regulatory requirements. 
This has led to the problem that insider dealing stimulates different views. A combination 
of both applied and legal comparative methodologies in this subject will therefore provide a 
useful resource for the legal profession, and in particular the legal profession in the UAE 
and those connected to it.  As far as I am aware, this will be the first such research focusing 
on the UAE. It will add value to make reasonable recommendations which can be sent to 
the agencies specializing in the regulation of the financial markets of the country. 
The objective of the thesis should be clearly determined. Consideration of the fact that 
there is already a considerable body of academic work in the subject suggests that the thesis 
has to be directed to a certain objective which promises an original contribution. In broad 
terms, the aim of the thesis is to develop a holistic understanding of the regulation of 
insider dealing in financial markets. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective of the thesis is to 
reach reasonable recommendations for reform of insider dealing regulation in the UAE. It 
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may be expedient to state that the objective of this thesis can be achieved through achieving 
the following subsidiary steps:  
- Examining the extent and nature of insider dealing in real life in the UAE financial 
markets. 
- Exploring what its effects on the financial markets are. 
- Considering the shortcomings of the current rules directed to regulating insider 
dealing. 
- Looking at the way in which the law and regulation can be improved to prohibit 
insider dealing. 
- Answering whether the rules of the Dubai International Financial Centre are a good 
example of reform in local market regulation. 
- Learning lessons from the experiences of developed countries in the area, in 
particular the UK and the US. 
- Investigating the meaning of ‘insider’ and ‘inside information. 
- Determining how to empower the regulators to enforce the rules. 
- Working out what sort of punishment is appropriate to deter insider dealing. 
- Determining what the relationship is between the rules directed to prohibit insider 
dealing and those directed to timely disclosure. 
- Seeing how insider dealing can be kept to minimum by improving the rules of 
disclosure. 
An essential element of the plan is its research methodology. In this thesis, this is 
specially designed to be an appropriate vehicle for attaining the planned objectives. The 
research methodology is a combination of applied social study and comparative law 
methods. 
One of the research methods used in this thesis will be the comparative law approach.  
Studying different legal systems requires comparing the ways in which each system 
provides a solution to the legal problem at hand. The results of this comparison will be used 
as recommendations for UAE law. The comparative law method of the study can be split 
into two sections, corresponding to the nature of legal studies. Firstly, a literature review is 
used as the main method of collating information. This will be effected by examining 
academic resources from the comparative jurisdictions, and using them in support of the 
arguments in the study. Secondly, as this area of law is continuously changing, there will be 
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a need to scrutinize all new drafts, statutes and proposals, and even news from enforcement 
agencies. 
Setting the objective of the thesis as one of looking at the problem of insider dealing in the 
UAE, we aim to contribute to the body of academic thought in the area. Such a contribution 
seems to be appropriate to the UAE, where the law lacks sufficient academic input, 
especially in the area of insider dealing. Thus, the method of applied study seems 
appropriate for collecting more information concerning the UAE law to sustain the 
arguments of this study. It is felt that the combination of the two methods is the best way of 
achieving the objectives of this thesis. 
It should be made clear that in law we have a distinct concept of research methodology. 
There is a distinct legal methodology for solving legal problems. A mere legal discussion of 
a problem involves, for instance, interpretation, case law and comparison. The difficult task 
is in attempting to combine social science research methodology with legal methodology to 
construct a comprehensive thesis. It is true that socio-legal thought has developed 
considerably in recent years, but legal thought still uses a unique research methodology in 
argumentation. In this thesis, the researcher will attempt to combine legal methodology 
(which is comparative law methodology) with applied social science methodology. The 
applied social science methodology will be discussed in the chapter which deals with 
applied study, while the comparative law methodology will by discussed in the chapter 
which addresses the comparative regulation of insider dealing. 
The structure of the thesis is rationally designed to represent the problem, the 
methodology and the objective. The thesis commences with a literature review which 
examines theories concerning the regulation of insider dealing. This is important for 
introducing the premises of the study. The specificities of the problem and the law of 
insider dealing regulation in the UAE will then be identified. The situation in the UAE is 
then investigated in more depth through the applied study. This provides for identification 
of the dimensions of the problem of insider dealing in the UAE from investors’ and 
experts’ points of view. The applied study aims at supplying a reality perception of the 
problem. If the issue is accurately diagnosed by the applied study, it can be discussed with 
insight. This is followed by the second method in the thesis which is an examination of the 
comparative regulation of insider dealing. The comparison is a device for providing 
solutions to the problems raised by the applied study. The jurisdictions chosen for 
comparison are those of the US, the UK and the Dubai International Financial Centre 
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(DIFC). The comparative study is divided into two main chapters. The first looks at the 
background of comparative jurisdictions to gain an understanding of the wider picture of 
the regulation. The second comparative chapter provides a detailed functional comparison 
of the rules directed at insider dealing in the three jurisdictions. The structure of the study 
reaches a peak by introducing recommendations for reform of the law and system in the 
UAE. In the light of this vision, the chapters constituting the thesis are as follows: 
Chapter 1: the problem of insider dealing and the policy of its regulation. 
Chapter 2: the problem and law of insider dealing in the UAE. 
Chapter 3: applied study: opinions and attitudes of investors and other experts 
towards the regulation of insider dealing in the local markets in the UAE. 
Chapter 4: comparative regulation of insider dealing. 
Chapter 5: functional comparison of the regulation of insider dealing. 
Chapter 6: recommendations. 
Conclusion. 
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Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a literature review. Specifically, it aims to discuss critically 
the theories concerning the problem of insider dealing and the policy regarding its 
regulation. Much of the academic literature has concentrated on the debate as to whether 
insider dealing should be regulated or not, and the debate has centred on the justifications 
which underlie regulation. Such justifications vary from legal grounds to ethical and 
economic considerations. By reviewing the theoretical background the aim is to identify the 
most appropriate theoretical approach to the subject of the regulation of insider dealing. 
The theoretical background is considered the dominant factor in understanding this subject. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part contains a critical examination of the 
different grounds used to justify regulating insider dealing. These are: fairness and the 
ethics of insider dealing; economic arguments for and against the regulation; the protection 
of investors and confidence in the market; and international regulatory standards as 
justification for regulation.  
The second part of the chapter introduces a discussion on how the legal theories have been 
used to justify regulating insider dealing in both common law and UAE law. This part 
provides a critical discussion of the competence of general legal rules to provide a ground 
for regulating insider dealing. It introduces a comparative discussion between common law 
and UAE law in regard to three main legal grounds. These are: ‘fiduciary duties’, 
‘misappropriation’ and ‘misrepresentation’. This part concludes by showing the 
shortcomings of the general legal rules.  
One argument forwarded is that insider dealing is largely a financial market problem and 
should be regulated in the market place. My view, which will be supported throughout the 
discussion, is that insider dealing is largely a financial market problem. This is apparent in 
the justifications underlying the regulation, especially economic arguments for regulation 
protection of market efficiency and protection of investors. The chapter also argues that, 
since general legal rules are not competent to solve the problem on their own, the best 
solution to insider dealing is regulation. 
The policy of regulation is considered the dominant factor in any legal examination of 
insider dealing. Clarifying the underlying policy justifications stimulates other related 
questions, especially the debate as to whether or not regulation of insider dealing is justified 
and required. In discussing the policy of regulation it should be observed that such a policy 
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has been influential in forging the law and regulation of insider dealing. The chapter 
concludes by showing some examples how policies and justifications of the regulation of 
insider dealing may differ from one jurisdiction to another. 
Part 1 Should insider dealing be regulated at all? 
Any literature review should concentrate on the core academic contributions made in the 
area of the regulation of insider dealing. Specifically, the theories about insider dealing are 
directed to the academic debate about whether insider dealing should be regulated or not.  
The evolution of the debate 
It appears that the debate as to whether insider dealing should be regulated was generated 
by two important events. First, the use of the ‘fairness’ concept to justify the regulation in 
the US by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the courts. Second, 
Professor Manne’s book Insider Trading and the Stock Exchange,1 which is given credit for 
stimulating the debate regarding the ethics and economics of insider dealing. 
The debate was stimulated by the first SEC and court’s decisions in the US prohibiting 
insider dealing. In the case of In re Cady Roberts & Co.2 the SEC based its decision to 
prohibit insider dealing on grounds of ‘fairness’. This is apparent in the SEC’s wording 
“…special obligation has been traditionally required of corporate insiders… Analytically, 
the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving 
access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness 
involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable 
to those with whom he is dealing”.3 (My emphasis) 
In the case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. the court also based its decision to prohibit 
insider dealing on grounds of ‘fairness’. This is apparent in the court’s wording “…to 
prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities transactions 
generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges …the Rule 
[meaning Rule 10b-5] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities 
                                                 
1 HENRY MANNE Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press, 1966). 
2 In re Cady Roberts & Co. 40 SEC 907 (1961). This case is explained below under heading: The ‘disclose or 
abstain rule’.   
3 In re Cady Roberts & Co. 40 SEC 907 (1961). p.912. 
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marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access 
to material information”.4 
From the above-mentioned cases it is apparent that there has been support for the legal 
norms to regulate insider dealing. One of the most important logical premises used was that 
insider dealing is unfair. This assertion on legal thought techniques could be questioned, 
because lawyers utilize legal techniques to address problems like insider dealing. These 
techniques are not in themselves justification for regulating insider dealing, at least from a 
non-legal point of view. It is also necessary to work from convincing arguments when 
legislation is adopted to regulate insider dealing, and this is the case in most of the 
jurisdictions introducing such regulation. In other words, the problem is whether there is 
any principle underlying the justification for regulating insider dealing. 
Professor Manne, the leading defendant of insider dealing, argued that insider dealing 
should not be regulated at all and criticised the legal theory grounds for regulating insider 
dealing as being hypocritical and self-righteous. He argues that there has been no careful 
analysis of the subject. Lawyers only depend on the meaning of words, previous decisions 
and other legal techniques. He believes that in the absence of a sufficient economic 
analysis, the attitude of the debate turns to moralistic and emotional issues instead of ones 
of logic.5 To counter the criticisms of Professor Manne, there should be careful 
consideration of other disciplinary thoughts. In specific terms, there have been two main 
non-legal approaches to the regulation of insider dealing: namely the ethics and the 
economics of insider dealing. 
Therefore, we will discuss the wider issues of the ethics and economics of insider dealing 
first. Then, we will turn to legal theories to see the legal techniques in regulating insider 
dealing. 
Fairness and the ethics of insider dealing 
As was indicated above, the first judicial precedents to prohibit insider dealing were based 
on the grounds of ‘fairness’ and ‘equality of access to information’. The ‘disclose or 
abstain’ rule which was adopted in the cases of Cady and Texas Gulf Sulphur. This rule was 
based on the rationale that there is inherent unfairness when one party takes advantage of 
information which is not available to the other party and that all investors in a market 
                                                 
4 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). at 848. 
5 HENRY MANNE ‘In Defence of Insider Trading’ (1966) 44 Harvard Business Review 113. p.113. 
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should have relatively equal access to material information. Thus, according to this view, 
the regulation of insider dealing is largely based on the premise that “insider dealing is 
unfair”. In order to maintain fair transactions, parties to a market contract or investors in the 
market should have equal access to information. Since insider dealing contradicts equal 
access to information, it is considered to offend the notion of fairness. ‘Fairness’ as a 
concept has been resorted to as a justification for regulating insider dealing. The general 
public feels that insider dealing is immoral and unfair. There is strong public feeling on the 
issue, although such feelings can be questionable because public thinking about what 
insider dealing really means is inaccurate and mixed with other feelings. Thus, although 
regulators and legislatures cannot disregard the strength of public opinion, it is not wise to 
depend primarily on it in regulating insider dealing. One of the indications that public 
opinion is not a sufficient justification is that outsiders to the business usually hold stronger 
feelings about the unfairness of insider dealing than others. This may indicate that public 
attitude to insiders is mixed with jealousy. It could be argued that outsiders’ strong feelings 
are not due to insiders making profits, but rather they object to insiders’ taking advantage of 
the position which they have been given compared to the general positions of other 
investors.6 
Many lawyers do base their judgment that insider dealing should be regulated on the 
principle of ‘fairness’. One of the main advocates of this view is Schotland.7 Fairness is a 
legal concept, which is used by legal theorists in a more sophisticated way than the public 
thinks. Lawyers urge for equal positions in bargaining. The legal philosophy of fairness 
considers it unfair when insiders have an advantage and a better bargaining position than 
outsiders because of their access to non-public information. On this line of reasoning, 
probably the most viable justification underlying the regulation of insider dealing is 
‘equality of information’. This attempts to justify the regulation of insider dealing on the 
basis that there should be ‘equality of information’ for all the parties to a transaction or all 
dealers in the market. Information as to the basis of decisions made by investors should be 
equally available to all investors. Thus, all traders owe a duty to the market either to 
disclose or abstain from dealing based on non-public corporate information. This approach 
is compatible with the need to make public as much information as possible so investors 
                                                 
6 B. RIDER and H.L Ffrench The Regulation of Insider Trading (London: Macmillan, 1979). pp. 1-2. 
7 ROY A. SCHOTLAND ‘Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market’ (1967) 
53 Virginia Law Review 1425. 
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will be equally informed. One of the main functions of financial markets is to disseminate 
information. It is particularly the nature of financial markets which makes information 
disclosure crucial for investors. Allowing insider dealing contradicts the ethos of equality 
of information and the duty to disclose information to the market. Improper delay of 
disclosure would be more likely if insider dealing was allowed. Thus, as timely disclosure 
is an objective for market regulation, any incentives for disclosure delay should be 
outlawed.8 
Equality of information as an approach to regulating insider dealing has attracted its share 
of criticism. Professor Henry Manne,9 in his criticism of the ethics of insider dealing, 
challenged the opinion that the practice is unfair by describing it as “an anonymous lady 
law student who in a classroom discussion of the subject, stamped her foot and angrily 
claimed, ‘I don’t care: it’s just not right’”.10 In this scientifically unacceptable example, 
Manne tried to argue against the ethics of insider dealing. He thinks that fairness is a 
respected concept, but is difficult to determine. He thinks that fairness is a vague term 
which cannot even be defined, let alone be used as an argument for regulation. However, 
those who think that insider dealing is unfair reject these contentions. They think that 
Professor Manne ignore the fact that that ‘fairness’ is the dominant premise underlying our 
understanding of the law. It is natural common sense that determines that a trustee 
benefiting from the trust is ‘unfair’; also, that a party’s making misrepresentation to the 
other party in a transaction is ‘unfair’. It is also common-sense that not disclosing material 
information is ‘unfair’. The contention that our sense of fairness is ‘vague’ (and this is 
probably the case with any concept) does not mean that we misinterpret what is ‘fair’ and 
what is ‘unfair’ in, for instance, a contractual relationship.11 
Although fairness appears to be an issue of common-sense in discussions of the law, there 
should be careful discussion of Professor Manne’s arguments. In challenging the ground of 
fairness in regulating insider dealing he depended on two grounds which seem to counter 
the assertions on fairness: 
The first ground of Professor Manne’s criticism is that the inequality in bargaining 
positions between the parties in a share transaction or between investors in the market is an 
                                                 
8 ROY A. SCHOTLAND ‘Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market’ (1967) 
53 Virginia Law Review 1425. p.1448. 
9 HENRY MANNE Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press, 1966). 
10 ibid., p.14. 
11 See KIM LANE SCHEPPLE ‘“It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading’ (1993) 56 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 123. pp.125, 151. 
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inevitable fact. He sees that no law or regulation can ensure equality of bargaining position. 
Manne sees that there is always inequality in terms of information between the parties in 
share transactions. The stock market, according to him, is an information exchange: “The 
different amount of profit and different individuals will reflect their different degrees of 
sophistication and the reliability of their information. The stock market is, par excellence, 
the arbitrator of the value of the information”12. Hetherington, who is an advocate of this 
view, also argues that there is always unevenness of ‘strength’ between the parties in a 
share transaction. It is normal that one party has more knowledge than another. He 
maintains that there is no ‘insurer’ against the inequality of information between the parties 
in a share transaction.13 
This argument of Manne can also be refuted on a sound logical ground. The contention that 
there is inevitable inequality between the parties of a share transaction does not justify why 
one party cannot have access to the information that the other party has.14 It is correct to say 
that there are uncertainties in maintaining equality, especially in opportunities in financial 
markets. However, this argument is not to assert that complete equality should be reached. 
It is rather to not allow a corporate official to take advantage of his position for his own 
gain. Thus, to be more accurate, the demand is for ‘equal access to information’, which 
does not necessarily mean that parties to a securities transaction should have ‘equal 
information’. If we advocate the ‘equality of information’ approach, it does not mean that 
we demand the unattainable proposition that the parties to a transaction should have ‘equal 
information’. A theory of equal access to information is to protect disadvantaged parties in 
financial markets or to a contract.15 Fairness, in this sense, is said to be required in equality 
of bargaining positions; though there are areas of inequality which cannot properly be 
maintained by legal intervention. 
The second ground of Professor Manne’s criticism of fairness is that insider dealing is not 
made at the expense of anyone and there is no proof that insider dealing causes any harm. 
This argument has been put forward as, “insider dealing is a victimless crime”. It is wrong 
to assume that persons who deal with insiders before disclosure of important information 
would not have dealt if the insiders were not another party. In anonymous market dealings, 
                                                 
12 HENRY MANNE Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press, 1966). p.47. 
13 J.A.C. HETHERINGTON ‘Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law’ (1967) 4 Wisconsin Law Review  720. 
14 B. RIDER and H.L Ffrench ‘Should Insider Trading be Regulated? Some Initial Considerations’ (1978) 
SALJ 79. p.84. 
15 KIM LANE SCHEPPLE ‘“It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading’ (1993) 56 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 123. p.125. 
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the insider deals with a person as a result of the random matching of orders. This person 
would have dealt anyway at the same market price at the same moment in time. This 
reflects that the other party to insider dealing is not misled or harmed by the insider and 
there is no unfairness to him.16 
Manne thinks that insider dealing constitutes a very small proportion of active securities 
trading. There is almost no influence from insider dealing on the market price of actively 
traded stocks. Manne distinguishes between two groups of outsiders: short-term traders 
who trade in response to price changes, and long-term investors who do not trade because 
of short-term fluctuations in prices. He argues that regulating insider dealing is to protect 
only short-term speculators, rather than long-term investors. When there are insiders in the 
market with good news they represent a higher demand, so on the other hand there are 
sellers who are induced by the high demand from insiders. Manne states that the identity of 
the sellers and the nature of their decision-making are important factors when we analyse 
whether the benefits from insiders are made at the expense of the sellers. Sellers who would 
not trade but for the insiders’ activities are those ‘short-term’ traders or ‘speculators’. They 
are more likely to buy or sell depending on recent changes in securities prices. In this 
group, the shareholders who do not deal at all are not harmed by the insider. Rather, they 
benefit from the increase in market value if they hold their shares. Insider dealing results in 
a gradual increase in the market prices of securities in a way which reflects the correct 
value of the security. The result of this is to reduce the average loss and therefore the group 
of selling shareholders would benefit. The second group of ‘investors’ depends on 
‘fundamental’ factors to select stocks, and they do not usually buy or sell because of short-
term fluctuations in securities prices. An investor selling for personal reasons would most 
probably do so even if there was a potential rise in market prices. Moreover, insider dealing 
arguably benefits such a seller by increasing the market price of the share.17 The same view 
is adopted by Hetherington,18 who thinks that there are certain situations in which an 
outsider may be harmed. The first is where he dealt as a response to the price change and he 
sold at a time when the market price was lower than it would have been were the 
information disclosed. Suppose that an outsider sold his securities, induced by the activities 
of the insider, when the market price was £10. Following this, the price rose to £15. It can 
                                                 
16 HENRY MANNE Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press, 1966). pp.98-101. 
17 HENRY MANNE ‘In Defence of Insider Trading’ (1966) 44 Harvard Business Review 113. p.114. 
18 J.A.C. HETHERINGTON ‘Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law’ (1967) 4 Wisconsin Law Review  720. 
p.723. 
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be said that the insider caused the outsider’s loss of profit of £5. The second situation is 
where the outsider would not have sold if he/she had access to the information that the 
insider possessed. Hetherington thinks that the situations in which the outsider loses 
because of the insider dealing are ‘absolute odds’. He thinks the chances that the outsider 
has lost because of the insider’s activities are ‘improbable’ and not worth any serious 
concern. 
Manne and Hetherington’s contentions in this regard can be answered in more that one 
way. They do not pay attention to the situation where the insider deals while in possession 
of negative information. In random market dealing it can be expected that the investor 
would already trade at the market price with any other anonymous party. However, where 
the insider deals while in possession of negative information, it cannot be said that only the 
short-term speculator is hurt. In fact, he is likely to suffer least if he deals at an early stage 
of the gradual negative change in the stock price. Thus, the question remains: is it fair to 
allow an insider to pass his loss to another, or even to take advantage of non-public 
information for personal gain?19 
There is one more response which renders Manne’s and Hetherington’s arguments weak. It 
is wrong to simplify the matter and distinguish traders by two types: short-term and long-
term. There are rather more sophisticated traders, the so-called ‘information traders’. This 
group of traders constitutes investment analysts who are employed by banks and brokers, 
and other investors such as fund managers who are more sophisticated than the average 
individual investor. This group is considered the most important category of traders, since 
they employ their expertise and depend on the disclosed information to lead the trade. If 
insider dealing is allowed, it is expected that ‘information traders’ will lose to insiders, 
since they do not have the same access to information as insiders. Allowing insider dealing 
would benefit insiders at the expense of ‘information traders’ who employ their expertise 
and their research efforts to discover the correct price. The result would be that 
‘information traders’ would hold back from the market, resulting in negative effects on 
market efficiency.20 
All things considered, Manne’s and Hetherington’s hypotheses seem to be rather weak and 
to simplistic. It is difficult to say that investors can be distinguished into two classes and 
                                                 
19 B. RIDER and H.L Ffrench The Regulation of Insider Trading (London: Macmillan, 1979). p.3. 
20 Z. GOSHEN AND G. PARCHOMOVSKY ‘On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in 
Information’ (2001) 87 Virginia Law Review 1229. pp.1242-3. 
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that the decision of each class is predictable. In fact, if the price rose because of insider 
dealing, a number of investors would sell their securities while other investors might decide 
to anticipate for a further increase. It is not accurate to say that only short-term traders react 
to the price change. Long-term traders, such as fund managers and sophisticated investors, 
also monitor any changes in the price of securities. It does not seem proper to argue that a 
certain group of investors would be harmed because they act in a certain way. 
Having introduced more than one ground on which Manne’s arguments can be refuted does 
not mean that his theory is rendered completely unsound. The difficulty with the ‘fairness’ 
principle remains whether it is the harm done, rather than only the taking of advantage of 
inside information, which makes the conduct unfair. The difficulty in the ‘fairness’ 
argument remains that it is hard to rationalize insider dealing regulation on the grounds of 
the harm done to the shareholder or the person with whom the insider randomly deals. 
Moreover, it is difficult to identify the harm done to other institutions, such as issuers to 
which the inside information relates or to the market in which the insider deals. 
Depending on ‘fairness’ has to be rationalised on practical grounds. One of these is the 
harm caused by it. However, empirically addressing the harm caused by insider dealing is 
thought to be difficult, because insider dealing as sophisticated financial conduct is difficult 
to detect. The ‘dark figure’ containing the nature and number of real incidents is thought to 
be high. Despite the enhancement in regulation and enforcement, detected incidents do not 
apparently represent the real problem; they seem to be the tip of the iceberg. There are 
likely to be shortcomings in any attempt to identify and measure the problem empirically. 
There have been attempts to address the harm caused by insider dealing. It has been 
claimed that the practice affects the interests of the corporate issuer when its shares are 
subjected to insider dealing. The perceived harm could be greater to the management of a 
company, where the person who manipulates inside information is at the same time a 
director, officer or even an employee. In such a situation the very confidence in the 
management of the company may be questioned. The integrity of a company may be 
shaken when it is assumed to be an ‘insiders’ company and this leads to instability and 
difficulties in securing finance. As a consequence of questioning the confidence and 
integrity of the management, the harm could extend to the value of shares of the company 
in the market. Regulating insider dealing also prevents the delay or manipulation of inside 
information by those who are supposed to disclose such price-sensitive information. 
Permitting insider dealing will confuse those whose duty it is to disclose information. It 
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would also have an adverse impact on the internal decision-making and efficiency.21 
According to this view, the harm done to the issuer is the basis of legal liability for insider 
dealing. Nevertheless, their arguments appear to be rather insignificant. If insider dealing 
had negative effects on the reputation of the corporation (and this is probable) the solution 
would be an internal penalty on the insider. Inside information could emerge outside the 
corporation, as is the case in takeover bids. In such cases, if an ‘outsider’ uses the inside 
information related to the corporation it is not likely that his act is detrimental to the 
reputation of the corporation or to its internal efficiency. 
Although it is argued as vague, ‘fairness’ as a concept would lead us to the conclusion that 
it is unfair when the insider deals while privileged by information acquired by virtue of his 
position or a relationship. One important response to Manne’s arguments is that the 
‘fairness’ principle should not be narrowly interpreted as equivalent to the protection of 
investors. It is maintained that ‘fairness’ as a principle is equivalent to a public policy. That 
is, the concept of fairness can be depended on even if there is no actual harm to the 
particular investor. If it is expected that insider dealing will be harmful, not necessarily to a 
particular investor but rather to the market as a whole, for reasons of public policy, such 
acts should be regulated. This was apparent in the views of a writer who made his point in 
the same year Manne put forward his ideas. He said: “If the action of the insider is declared 
unlawful it does not follow that the conduct should remain unpunished merely because the 
particular investor dealing with the insider is not prejudiced. Sanctions such as criminal 
penalties or a civil liability could be imposed”22. 
Insider dealing as entrepreneurial compensation 
Manne maintains that his main argument is not the price effect of insider dealing. He claims 
that the main argument is that allowing insider dealing is the only effective means of 
compensating entrepreneurs.23 He distinguished between corporate managers and 
entrepreneurs. Managers’ tasks, he thinks, do not include innovations. Their work is a mere 
service which includes operating the firm normally. Since their work is predictable, a salary 
can be sufficient compensation. Manne thinks that entrepreneurs’ work includes 
innovations. They provide innovative contributions to the productivity of the firm. Their 
                                                 
21 ROBERT J. HAFT ‘The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation’ 
(1982) 80 Michigan Law Review 1051. p.1071. 
22 B. A. GOODMAN ‘Insider Trading Without Disclosure-Theory of Liability’ (1965) 28 Ohio State Law 
Journal 472. p.476. 
23 HENRY MANNE Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press, 1966). pp.110-6. 
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tasks result in producing valuable information for the firm. Manne argues that allowing 
insider dealing is the only appropriate means of compensating entrepreneurs so that they 
will be given an incentive to produce more information. A predetermined salary may not 
reflect the service provided by the entrepreneur, since it does not reflect the value of the 
innovation. Manne argues that only allowing entrepreneurs to buy securities prior to a 
public disclosure, and to sell them after the price rises following the disclosure, is the 
appropriate method to value his innovation.24 
Carlton and Fischel25 advocate the same view. They argue that advanced salary agreements 
fail to compensate for innovations. Allowing insider dealing enables agents to receive their 
compensation. Insider dealing provides more accurate valuing of agents’ innovations than a 
salary. It is argued, therefore, that more incentives should be provided for agents to produce 
information. 
Manne pointed out that his main argument is that allowing insider dealing is the only 
effective means of compensating entrepreneurs. It is surprising that Manne concentrated on 
what seems the weaker component of his theory. There are several grounds on which 
Manne’s argument can be refuted. The most important appears to be that he ignored the 
property right of the firm to the information. A firm’s property right to information is based 
on the same principle as that which asserts that a company can own intangibles such as 
trade marks and commercial secrets. If it is established that a firm has a property right to 
the information produced inside the firm, or at least that the insider is entrusted not to use 
such information, then it is wrong to propose that the use of such information should be 
allowed as the only appropriate means of compensation. The firm’s property right to the 
information is the premise on which the ‘misappropriation theory’ in the US is based.26 
Schotland27 also rejects Manne’s argument on more than one ground. He thinks that the 
company can assess its managers and employees. A company can evaluate the tasks are 
required from an employee and provide an appropriate salary for his/her work. A company 
is best placed to evaluate whether or not an employee is expected to provide innovative 
ideas. Schotland also thinks that insider dealing is not necessarily a better compensation 
                                                 
24 HENRY MANNE Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press, 1966). pp.116-9. 
25 CARLTON, DENNIS W. AND FISCHEL, DANIEL R. ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading’ (1983) 35 Stanford 
Law Review 857. pp. 869-871. 
26 ‘Misappropriation theory’ is explained below under the heading: ‘Misappropriation’ theory.  
See BAINBRIDGE, STEPHEN ‘Insider Trading’ in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics III (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham, U.K.,2000). pp.781, 791-4. 
27 ROY A. SCHOTLAND ‘Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market’ 
(1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 1425. 
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than a salary. Even if the insider is allowed to use inside information, the compensation he 
receives will be limited to the wealth he has. An insider may also have limited experience 
in the position of the company and the stock market. Allowing him to deal on the basis of 
inside information is not necessarily a better compensation than other guaranteed 
compensations such as salaries and commissions. Schotland also thinks that it is difficult to 
restrict trading to those who produce the information. Other agents and employees may deal 
on the basis of inside information without having provided any innovative services. 
Another criticism to Manne’s thesis produced by Rider and Ffrench is that he does not 
explain why insiders should be permitted to benefit from producing negative news. 
Allowing insiders to deal on the basis of negative inside information allows them to evade 
losses whether the company succeeds or not. If a manager was behind a loss to the 
company, why should he be able to avoid a personal loss by allowing him to sell his 
securities before the information is made public?28 
The effect of insider dealing on transparency, informativeness and 
efficiency of the market 
Probably the most important area of the debate about regulating insider dealing is the 
inquiry into the effect of insider dealing on the market. If it is thought that insider dealing 
has effects on the transparency and efficiency of the market, then it should be regarded as a 
public policy to regulate it. However, there is an academic debate regarding the effects of 
insider dealing on the market. Advanced attempts to analyse the effects of insider dealing 
on financial markets have been made by economists. Economic theories depend on the 
concept of the importance of information to the market. In order to understand the 
importance of information in the marketplace, it is vital to indicate the role of financial 
markets and the mechanism through which they work. Therefore, before discussing the 
effects of insider dealing on the market there should be a short introduction. 
The role of financial markets is primarily to allocate resources to those corporations which 
offer the best investment opportunities. Financial markets are known as an important 
method for a country to drive its economy and accelerate economic growth. One of its 
important roles is to operate as an intermediary for both the private and public sector 
entities to raise capital and finance productive projects. Financial markets are expected to 
be an efficient method for private sector expansion and public sector infrastructural 
                                                 
28 B. RIDER and H. L Ffrench ‘Should Insider Trading be Regulated? Some Initial Considerations’ (1978) 
SALJ 79. p.90. 
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development. Simplifying it, the main role of financial markets is to act as an intermediary 
to improve the allocation of resources in the most productive economic projects. In fact, 
financial markets are essential as intermediaries, since they play an important role in the 
optimal allocation of resources. This has its important impact on macroeconomics, for even 
if a country has savings its growth can be underdeveloped if its financial system fails to 
allocate these savings where they can have the optimal impact on the economy.29 
Stephens and Beck-Dudley introduced an important thesis in the area of the relationship 
between insider dealing and the Efficient Market Theory.30 They explained the importance 
of financial markets and the role of information in such markets. One important 
classification of financial markets is the ‘primary market and secondary market’. In brief, 
the difference is that primary markets facilitate the issue of new securities, the so called 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) while secondary markets allow for dealing in existing 
securities. The primary market allows financing new corporations and projects which 
would otherwise be costly if financed by creditors such as banks. On the other hand, one of 
the main characteristics of the secondary market is ‘liquidity’, which gives the investors the 
opportunity to turn their securities back into cash: ‘to liquidize securities’. If ‘liquidity’ 
were not possible, investors would be uninterested in buying securities; this may be true 
even in primary markets. Thus, a secondary market has a complementary role in attracting 
investors to participate in business by dealing in securities. Such investments are attracted 
by the special characteristics of the secondary market. One important quality of a secondary 
market should be its ability to allow investors to observe the value of securities. This could 
be achieved through the economic powers of investors’ supply and demand, which move 
the price of the securities. In this respect, investors depend on information (either related to 
the issuer or observed from market information) to make decisions to buy or sell. 
Consequently, another important quality of a secondary market is the presence of sufficient 
‘liquidity’, which is a main element in an active market. Investors are also attracted by the 
‘liquidity’ possibility, which entices them to purchase and sell securities.31 
The secondary securities market, its role in allocating resources and its systematic nature in 
assessing the value of securities, are all important for the economy. Informed prices of 
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securities benefit the economy, whereas prices which do not reflect market information 
may lead to incorrect value. The consequence of this is direct dealing in false prices. The 
decisions made by investors are important because they affect the allocation of financial 
resources to better investments, which in turn raises the growth rate of the economy and 
vice versa. Dysfunction may lead to a misallocation of resources, sending wrong signals to 
the rest of the economy and causing over-investment in a negative way in the 
macroeconomics.32 
It is this point which requires financial markets to be efficient. Where financial markets are 
efficient the prices reflect the true value of the securities, which means the prices reflect all 
the available information. Price informativeness is important in order to allocate financial 
resources optimally. In an efficient capital market, savings are allocated to productive 
investment in a way benefiting both borrowers and lenders. Such markets are described by 
the efficient market hypothesis. There are also the general conditions thought to be 
necessary for an efficient market. Such conditions can be summarized: a large number of 
individuals and entities should be seeking information which randomly comes to the 
market, and investors should adjust security prices to reflect the new information.33 
It is hypothesized that there are various levels of efficient market. The levels differ 
according to the information which is assumed to reflect prices. There can be weak, semi-
strong and strong models of efficient markets. What is important here is the hypothesis of 
the strong model; prices should reflect not only all public information, but also information 
known only by corporate insiders and/or stock exchange specialists. However, in reality 
this assumption is not plausible.34 
From an economic perspective, the Efficient Market Hypothesis poses the question of the 
importance of regulation in financial markets. In reality financial markets are not perfect, as 
hypothesized by financial theories. Parties to transactions are not necessarily equally 
informed. It is true that disclosure of information is not free, but rather costly to the issuers 
who spend resources to meet disclosure requirements. The same is true of the financial 
analysis of information which means that those who spend resources for research are better 
informed. It has been suggested that the measure of the informativeness of the price system 
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depends on the number of investors who are informed.  When informed investors observe 
positive information they bid securities price up, and the so called “market information” 
(the number and volume of trades) is made publicly available. This means that uninformed 
individuals will be informed through the market system. This is, however, done imperfectly 
by the market system. As Grossman and Stiglitz point out, there will always be investors 
who are ‘in economics terms’ less informed. A slight information imperfection is 
inevitable, and this should be taken into consideration.35 Thus, in reality it is difficult to say 
that a certain price reflects all the available information, a fact which means that there could 
be imperfect or even non-existent markets. The economics of information in financial 
markets makes them more prone to risk than other markets. It is at this point that regulation 
is used to create the necessary conditions for a financial market to execute its intermediary 
role effectively. Regulations in this sense are supposed to force entities to disclose 
information; otherwise they would not perform this costly task. This is supposed to inform 
investors in making their decisions, which in turn limits the systematic risk of creating an 
imperfect or non-existent market.36 
Economic arguments for and against the regulation insider dealing 
Having introduced the importance of financial markets, of information and of the 
importance of information to an efficient market, it should be indicated that such economic 
hypotheses can be used for and against the regulation of insider dealing. It will, therefore, 
be prudent to introduce the best-known arguments and evaluate their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
One challenge put forward against the market efficiency argument by Stephen Bainbridge37 
is that if the aim is to place investors on an equal footing in terms of having access to inside 
information, the rules governing insider dealing are not the proper method to achieve this 
aim. It is said that equality of information would be reached by legally compelling issuers 
to disclose the information likely to affect prices on a timely basis. Insider dealing is taking 
advantage of non-public information to be in a better dealing position. Thus, disclosure 
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requirements could be designed to keep to a minimum non-public price sensitive 
information in such a way that the opportunities for exploiting such information would be 
reduced. Disclosure requirements are a better solution than regulating insider dealing in 
order to achieve informativeness in the market. This leads to a questioning of the efficiency 
of regulating insider dealing, and supports the argument that the problem is better dealt 
with by continuous disclosure requirements. Stephen Bainbridge thinks that effective 
regulation of insider dealing requires rules relating to the timely disclosure of material 
information. In this regard, the equality of information theory has been criticised. It has 
been argued that prohibiting insider dealing on such a ground would not lead to an 
advanced disclosure system. This argument was put forward in the US, where the law had 
been unwilling to obligate issuers to disclose material non-public information. It was 
therefore rightly asserted that, irrespective of permitting insider dealing or not, the investors 
will not have the same access to information as insiders unless there is a system of timely 
disclosure.38 
Nevertheless, such criticism was accurate according to the position in the US, where there 
was no obligation on the issuers to make timely disclosure of inside information. While we 
advocate the concept that disclosure rules are the primary method of reaching market 
informativeness, we also think that the regulation of insider dealing has a preventive role. 
To be more specific, in practice not all events are clear, nor can they be announced 
immediately. Where there is an unexpected and significant event, the issuer needs more 
time to elucidate the situation. Otherwise, an immediate announcement might cause false, 
non-detailed or misleading disclosure. There is always a period of time before the 
information inside the corporation is approved and ready for disclosure. In addition, there 
are circumstances in which the issuer is exempted from making a timely disclosure, if it is 
thought that such disclosure would be detrimental to the legitimate interests of the issuer. 
This means that in such circumstances the information should be kept confidential.39 It is 
these circumstances which are crucial for insider dealers, and therefore the regulation of 
insider dealing is essential to prevent misuse of information during this period. Thus, 
regulation of insider dealing has a preventive role in market informativeness. Disclosure 
rules alone are insufficient to achieve informativeness in the market. They could be rather 
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easily breached. There is a probability that insiders could avoid prompt disclosure to exploit 
information for their own benefit, especially where they are in an influential position in 
management. They can also send ambiguous disclosures and signals to create market 
uncertainty for their own benefit.40 This means that the regulation of insider dealing is 
essential since it complements disclosure rules. 
Manne based his economic arguments against regulating insider dealing on the importance 
of information to market efficiency. He argues that insider dealing acts as a replacement for 
the public disclosure of inside non-public information. He argues that when insiders deal on 
the basis of inside information they gradually bring the market price to a more realistic 
informed level. The proposition is that uninformed investors will be informed through 
‘market information’, in other words, through the number, volume and trend of trades. He 
contends that a gradual adjustment is better than violent price fluctuation. He also indicates 
that insider dealing does affect price movements in certain circumstances in which insider 
dealing noticeably influences market trends, especially prior to the announcement of 
takeover offers. Manne suggests that the market is divided between those who deal 
according to available public information and those who possess inside information. 
Assuming the reliability of inside information, insider dealing should be allowed as insiders 
become the leading market influences. Insider dealing will induce others to deal in the same 
trend in the particular security; this will allow the market price to be more informed. Manne 
argues that insider dealing is an effective economic way to release information into the 
market. Insider dealing results in showing the real price of a share, and indirectly draws 
inside information into the market.41 
Manne’s argument is based on the concept that insider dealing changes the price to the 
correct price. This is an example of what Gilson and Kraakman call a ‘derivatively 
informed trading mechanism’.42 This mechanism is thought to move prices through two 
steps. First, insiders begin trading, but their trading has only a slight effect on the price. 
Second, other investors in the market react to the insider’s trades by trading in the same 
direction, which results in the price gradually moving in the right direction. However, 
Gilson and Kraakman point out that derivatively informed trading functions slowly and 
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sporadically. Therefore, it is unlikely that allowing insider dealing will have much effect on 
the market efficiency.43 
The hypothesis of insider dealing influence on the market price is questionable. There are 
circumstances, like the period prior to an announcement of a takeover offer, where insider 
dealing is influential. But it is debatable whether this is the usual trend or an exception. 
Manne’s argument regarding the degree and influence of insider dealing on market 
efficiency is theoretical, and has attracted many economic studies examining its validity.  
Microeconomic studies have been carried out to analyse the influence of insider dealing on 
price movement. Addressing insider dealing empirically has not provided a clear-cut 
answer as to whether to regulate insider dealing or not. On the contrary, economic studies 
have widened the argument and provided more questions than answers. It is beyond the 
purpose of this thesis to analyse the results of all these studies. However, analysing the 
most important studies will reveal the debate. 
In particular the main hypothesis tested by microeconomic studies is that “insider dealing 
moves the price of the security to the informative price had the information been 
disclosed”. In an early study, Hsiu-Kwang Wu44 concluded that speculative trading by 
insiders may be economically beneficial and restrictions may be harmful to the economy. 
However, he made it clear that “The fundamental principle of securities regulation – full 
disclosure – is not questioned here”45. We should note that this study was conducted in the 
US at a time when issuers were not obligated to make timely disclosure of inside 
information. The other point which we emphasise is that Hsiu-Kwang Wu regarded full 
disclosure as a fundamental principle. Therefore, if he had been asked whether the 
combination of insider dealing and timely disclosure rules contributes to market efficiency, 
it is probable that he would have reached a different conclusion. 
On the other hand, other economists concluded that the above-mentioned hypothesis is not 
correct and that regulating insider dealing is necessary for an efficient market. Fishman and 
Hagerty46 concluded that, under certain circumstances, insider dealing causes less efficient 
stock prices. This is due to the adverse effect of insider dealing on competition in the 
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market and this deters others from acquiring information. Khanna47 also decided that 
insider trading reduces information collection by uninformed investors; consequently, 
allocation efficiency is reduced. Insider dealing reduces the informational content of 
securities prices and the use of information termed as ‘sub-optimal’. It is important to 
emphasise that these two studies sustain a fundamental principle: the availability of 
information to all investors is a better means of achieving market efficiency. Assuming, for 
the sake of argument, that insider dealing moves prices in the right direction, in the long 
term it is expected that uninformed investors’ inability to acquire information is detrimental 
to the market. This was proved empirically by Fishman and Hagerty, and Khanna. 
A third opinion also appeared: that insider trading may hurt or help markets and that this 
depends on the different characteristics of these markets. According to this view, the 
controversy still exists and there is no single “best” answer.48 
The economic debate continues to be unsettled, even in the primary investigation of the 
effect of insider dealing on market prices. There is no one single answer in microeconomics 
to the effect of insider dealing. Three important empirical studies have been used to support 
the argument that the practice significantly changes the security market price, and in the 
right direction. These studies are Meulbroek (1992)49 Cornell and Sirri (1992)50 and 
Chakravarty and McConnell (1997).51 The importance of these studies was furthered when 
they were referred to in legal literature as evidence for allowing insider dealing due to its 
positive effect on prices. The three studies have some elements in common. In the three 
cases, collected data were from cases of illegal trading by insiders. In each case the insider 
was a buyer. Generally, the three studies concluded that there is a correlation between 
insider trading and the increase in the prices of the related securities. Thus, insider dealing 
positively affects price discovery in a more informative trend. 
Chakravarty and McConnell (1999)52 in a reverse finding study, challenge the three afore-
mentioned studies and the assumption that insider dealing moves stock prices. Their new, 
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more appropriate, test was whether insider dealing has a different effect on prices than non-
insider (uninformed investors) dealing. In their study of the effects of an insider (Ivan 
Boesky) trading on the stock price change, they found that the effects of Boesky’s 
purchases and the purchases of others (outsiders) were not distinguishable from one 
another. An important public policy message was sent by this study: the three 
aforementioned studies cannot be depended upon to legalize insider dealing.53 
The disagreement between the above studies, given that the same writers happened to 
change their conclusions, evidently indicates that empirical microeconomic studies have 
not solved the effects of insider dealing. The study of Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) 
has had very important results. They investigated a real case of insider dealing in which the 
material information was non-public. The only means available to disseminate this 
information was through the questionable “effect of inside information on the price”. 
However, their extensive study concluded that the trade of the insider is not distinguishable 
from that of other uninformed traders. Therefore, the efficiency of insider dealing in 
moving the price of the security to reflect the inside information is ambiguous, and cannot 
be used as the basis for deregulating insider dealing. It should be said that solving the 
economic debate on the basis of empirical findings in this area, as in other areas, is 
unattainable. 
Although there have been controversies regarding the findings of economic studies, it can 
be said that the argument that insider dealing should be allowed is weak. This is because it 
is observed that economists do not question the fundamental principle of disclosure which 
underlie financial market regulation. On the contrary, they have always called for a system 
of obligatory disclosure in order to maintain an informed and efficient market. Those who 
argue that insider dealing should be allowed, base their argument on the hypothesis that it is 
a form of disseminating information into the market. However, it is not proven that indirect 
disclosure through insider dealing is more efficient than direct disclosure of the information 
into the market. It should also be noted that most of the studies were conducted in the US, 
where full disclosure of inside information is not required by the law. In other jurisdictions, 
where the law requires disclosure of similar information to the public, there is no place for 
the argument that insider dealing is a means to disseminate such information. It should also 
be clear that those who call for regulating insider dealing do not argue that there should be 
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absolute prohibition. Their case (and this is applied in most jurisdictions) is that dealing by 
insiders is legitimate when they do not possess inside information.54 In practice, their 
legitimate dealings provide a form of signal which is followed by other investors in the 
market. 
Protection of investors and confidence in the market 
Another rationale for regulating insider dealing is that investors should be protected in 
order to maintain confidence in the market. The maintenance of the integrity of the market 
is vital to its efficiency. Investors’ rights should be protected by efficient regulation, 
especially their right of equal access to information. If investors perceive that the market is 
unfairly favoring insiders, they will not direct their investment into the market.55 It is, 
therefore, an eminent view that protecting ‘investor confidence’ is a sufficient justification 
for regulating insider dealing. The negative effects of insider dealing on confidence (or, 
more precisely the perceived negative effects) are argued to be a convincing justification 
for regulation. 56 In this regard, Rider and Ashe indicate that “… the main (if not only) 
convincing justification for controlling insider dealing is that it has a perceived, adverse 
impact on confidence”.57 This view alters the underlying reasoning, from looking for any 
direct effects on the financial markets or the issuers of securities to the perception of 
investors. If investors think that insider dealing is unfair they will be pushed away from 
financial markets. For the financial markets to be effectively operated, confidence and 
integrity in them is required. Investors will only direct their funds into the market when 
they think that it is reasonably fairly managed and regulated. This approach is of the 
opinion that if investors perceive insider dealing as being unfair, economic justification is 
not required. In any case, economic findings here are ambiguous. In this regard, regulating 
insider dealing is appropriate as an intervention by the authorities to protect confidence in 
the integrity of the market. Although the common man’s perception is likely to be criticised 
by scholars of jurisprudence, advocates of this view argue that such criticism is not 
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important. It is the perception and conduct of the ordinary investor which is important here, 
and this has the greatest influence on the financial market.58 
If the public perception of the capital market is negative, investors will direct liquidity to 
alternatives, which will lead to difficulties for corporations in securing borrowing. Capital 
markets play a major role in allocating resources and confidence in them can be fragile. So 
the goal of regulation ought to be maintaining investors’ confidence and, ultimately, the 
integrity of capital markets. Such an argument is supported by the fact that there is a link 
between confidence and market integrity. Evidence for such a link is apparent in the US 
crash of 1929, and  investors’ retreat to banks and savings institutions.59 
Confidence in market integrity as a fundamental has been used by different authorities in 
the US. Apparently, it is a common argument between different legal theories attempting to 
prohibit insider dealing. There has been agreement that unless insider dealing is regulated, 
investor confidence in the integrity of markets will weaken, leading to negative effects in 
the depth and liquidity of dealings.60 
One difficulty with this line of reasoning is in ‘justifying’ the ‘investor confidence’ 
rationale. Investor confidence as a rationale was criticised as an emotional and sentimental 
force which is thought to be speculative. According to this opinion, if there is a basic 
confidence in the integrity of the market, the additional effect of insider dealing on 
confidence is speculative. Therefore, justifications based on ‘protecting investor 
confidence’ are said to be unsophisticated, and the relationship between insider dealing 
prohibition and investor confidence is a ‘myth’.61 ‘Investor confidence’ has also been 
criticised because it gives rise to the ethical question of insider dealing. Although this can 
be dealt with by explaining ‘investor confidence’ from a social perception (rather than a  
philosophical one) this social perception is uncertain; people think that insider dealing is 
unfair, but may do it if there is a strong temptation.62 
However, it is still true that in practice negative investor perceptions can be the result of 
insider dealing. Such perceptions might be irrational, but this view cannot be defended as 
long as there is a reason for them. Investors consider it their right to have ‘equal access to 
                                                 
58 B. RIDER AND M. ASHE Insider Crime: The New Law (Bristol: Jordans, 1993). p.6. 
59 JOHN W. BAGBY ‘The Evolving Controversy over Insider Trading’ (1986) 24 American Business Law 
Journal 571. p.579. 
60 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT ‘Rereading "Cady, Roberts": The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading 
Regulation’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 1319. p.1325. 
61 ibid., pp. 1327-8. 
62 ibid., p.1326. 
 42
information’. Thus, their lack of confidence is rational if insiders are allowed to be 
advantaged over other investors to use inside information. Thus, investor confidence is not 
necessarily an emotional force. Rather it is based on the rational expectation of investors 
that the regulatory system should treat all investors equally in terms of access to 
information. It is not essential, and may be unattainable, to prove empirically the link 
between allowing insider dealing and investor confidence. Legal theory, after all, is more 
familiar with principles than with empirical findings. Therefore, the regulation of insider 
dealing is thought to protect the rights of investors. It is an important device to maintain the 
confidence and integrity of the markets. 
International regulatory standards 
In the era of international financial markets there is the possibility of regulatory 
competition. It is possible for investments to switch to markets with insignificant 
regulation. Regulated entities take into consideration the costs of regulatory requirements; 
for instance, requiring a certain accounting standard costs the issuer. The cost of regulatory 
requirements is an incentive for investments to switch to markets with lower costs for 
regulatory requirements. This results in regulatory bodies involving themselves in negative 
competition to reduce regulation in order to attract investments. This trend is called “race to 
the bottom”. It may result in allocating investments to risky markets, an issue which is of 
concern at international regulatory level. It is also possible that regulatory bodies “race to 
the top”. Investments are attracted by highly regulated markets which limit ‘systematic 
risk’. Market participants accept the heavier regulatory framework if their benefits exceed 
the costs involved. Thus, regulatory bodies may race to the top regulatory standards to 
attract investments. Markets with high standards of regulation are perceived as excellent 
markets. This results in forcing other markets to introduce more regulation to sustain their 
position.63 An example of this trend is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US. This was 
introduced in 2002, following accounting scandals. Although the act involves costly 
requirements of disclosure and accounting, it has sustained the position of the American 
markets, which still attract investments. We think that another example is the Dubai 
International Financial Centre’s (DIFC) race to the top regulation to build its reputation. 
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Through cooperation, financial regulatory authorities have helped to define standards and 
codes of good practice which can be accepted at an international level. This is considered 
advantageous, because it helps countries with emerging capital markets to implement 
standards, when dealing with or through the market, that other financial institutions and 
investors consider secure. It also encourages foreign investment and helps the international 
mobility of capital.64 However, it is possible that the implementation of standards and codes 
leads to negative results. Regulations may have advantages or shortcomings, the perception 
of which is limited. Thus, it is thought that diversity of regulatory regimes should be 
encouraged. Markets are in competition and they would not ‘race to the bottom’, they 
would not necessarily implement the regime which is least restrictive if diversity of 
regulatory regimes was encouraged.65 
Increasing international economic integration has its effects on regulation. Financial 
markets in integrated economies are brought closer in terms of regulatory standards. Where 
regulation is standardized, financial services providers and investments may extend their 
activities internationally. To liberalize the financial sector, national financial regulation 
should reflect international standards. This is the function of the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) the association of national securities regulators, Self-
Regulatory Organizations and exchanges. The IOSCO issues recommendations to member 
authorities or regulatory bodies to absorb the principles of securities regulation. In 1998 
IOSCO introduced the “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation”, consisting of 
30 principles. These principles can be divided into three primary objectives of securities 
regulation and supervision: investor protection; market fairness, efficiency and 
transparency; and the limitation of systematic risk. These principles are to be absorbed in 
relation to various regulation and supervision areas. Some examples are: the obligations of 
securities issuers; the requirements for market participants and intermediaries; and the 
licensing and monitoring of exchanges and other trading systems.66 
The IOSCO is a voluntary association of national authorities and regulatory bodies; 
therefore, it is only capable of issuing recommendations. However, in 2003 the organisation 
introduced a detailed methodology in order to assess individual regulatory systems. This 
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method allows for grading members according to their implementation of IOSCO 
principles. It gives the recommendations of IOSCO a quasi-mandatory character. The 
purposes of grading regulatory systems are to provide a benchmark for self-assessment of 
regulatory systems, and to provide information for use by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund in their Financial System Assessment Programmes. 
The international regulatory competition, or the need to gain an international reputation for 
national financial markets, has been an incentive to regulate insider dealing. It was 
perceived that insider dealing is an curious problem in the US. The SEC’s efforts at 
regulation and enforcement in this area were considered to be rather harsh. However, this 
attitude has changed; now regulating insider dealing is the general trend internationally. It 
can be said that there is an international consensus on adopting rules prohibiting insider 
dealing. The trend to regulate is challenged by the histories of various countries. Some 
countries have no history of regulating insider dealing.67  
Allowing for the historical lack of concern in many countries, there has to be incentives to 
regulate insider dealing. Recent changes in the financial world appear to be sufficient 
reason to regulate insider dealing. Some of these reasons are competitive pressures, 
financial markets internationalization and technological developments.68 
There is competition at an international level to attract foreign investment; the 
internationalization of financial markets is an aspect of this. This explains the regulatory 
competition, and the ‘race to the top’ or ‘race to the bottom’. Technological development 
has furthered the notion of internationalizing financial markets. Online dealing is an 
example of the formerly unexpected growth in cross-border transactions. Continuous 
technological development has also contributed to the multiple listing of securities and 
online dealing in a way that has significantly raised the levels of investment in financial 
markets. There is empirical evidence of high growth in the number of investment accounts 
in stockbrokerage firms, the number of transactions and the overall volume of dealings. The 
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characteristics of the investor population and trends in dealing are also different.69 At the 
same time, there is a probability that opportunities for insider dealing have increased. 
These facts have been considered in the Market Abuse Directive,70 which emphasizes the 
role of technological development in market abuse and insider dealing. It states: “New 
financial and technological developments enhance the incentives, means and opportunities 
for market abuse: through new products, new technologies, increasing cross-border 
activities and the internet”.71 
Advances in technology are also reflected in enforcement and monitoring efforts. Market-
monitoring systems have been advanced. Former systems used to identify abnormalities in 
the market and alert regulators for the purposes of investigation. Their function was only 
one of detecting abnormalities, without further information for investigation. New systems 
have been introduced which facilitate the unification of trading and information sources. 
This has helped to give signals to regulators and has provided the information required for 
investigation. Efforts are continuing to introduce new systems for cross-market monitoring 
activities. There are also attempts to innovate more sophisticated and integrated information 
systems for online dealing, monitoring, electronic filing and electronic disclosure.72 
International competition in attracting foreign investment has been an aspect of 
international financial markets. There had been efforts to advance securities regulation and 
prohibit insider dealing, in order to attract both domestic and foreign investment, as long as 
three decades ago.73 It is logical that the level of competition should significantly increase 
over time. Consequently, the efforts to maintain confidence in markets by prohibiting 
insider dealing have advanced. 
In recent times, the pressure towards more regulation has been present at both domestic and 
international levels. Insider dealing at international level is considered inconsistent with the 
principle of transparency in financial markets. Pressure to adopt standards which are 
supposed to protect foreign investors has been experienced on markets at an international 
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level. 74 The protection of financial institutions and individuals has been recently seen as an 
international duty, since any collapse will have effects at an international level. Countries 
which are recognized as not having taken sufficient steps in regulating insider dealing may 
endanger confidence in their financial markets. 
Part 2 Legal theories in regulating insider dealing 
In this section we will discuss the development of legal theories in regulating insider 
dealing, disregarding whether such a development is based on consideration of other 
disciplinary areas; for example, economic arguments which might indicate that insider 
dealing is a micro-economic problem.  The discussion reveals how legal thought has 
depended upon the assertion of the legal principles on which judgments were based. This 
discussion is directed to the legal theories which may or may not provide a ground for the 
regulation of insider dealing, both in the common law jurisdictions and UAE jurisdiction. 
This section also makes a comparative analysis of the prospects for depending on general 
legal provisions to prohibit insider dealing in the UAE. Such provisions have never been 
used there, although they were the only available ground when there were no formal 
financial markets. It is important to review these general provisions, at least in theory, in 
order to find out whether they provide a sound basis for prohibiting insider dealing. 
Depending on general legal provisions to prohibit insider dealing in the UAE is difficult, as 
is the case in common law. Nevertheless, it is important to review these general provisions 
in order to discover whether they provide convincing legal grounds for regulating insider 
dealing. 
The classical concept was to attach fiduciary obligations to the insider. This concept 
depends on the fact that directors owe fiduciary duties to the company. However, directors 
owe fiduciary duties to the company or to the shareholders collectively, but not to the 
shareholders individually. In the same way, directors’ obligations are enforced on behalf of 
the shareholders collectively, not individually. Directors owe no general fiduciary duties to 
individual shareholders when carrying out transactions with such shareholders. In the 
common law the leading authority is Percival v. Wright,75 in which the directors purchased 
shares from the company’s shareholders without disclosing information regarding 
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negotiations which were taking place for selling the shares at a higher price. The directors 
were held to be under no duty to disclose inside information to individual shareholders 
which would have allowed them to sell at a higher price. It was held that a director owes no 
fiduciary obligation of disclosure when he deals with shareholders individually rather than 
through his company. This case has been a matter of controversy, because it does not seem 
to be fair to allow directors to profit from inside information which is not available to the 
other party in the transaction. 
In spite of this controversy, the authority in Percival v. Wright has not been over-ruled by 
any court in the common law. But there were challenges to this decision,76 as in the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in Coleman v. Myers.77 In this case, a father and son were the only 
directors of a family company. They worked out a plan to acquire the company through 
another company owned by the son. As directors, they recommended to the family 
company shareholders to accept a takeover offer from the son’s company. In their advice 
they failed to disclose to the shareholders the real value of the company assets and capital 
dividends. The shareholders contended that their shares were under-valued and then 
acquired by Myers, who concealed the true value of the company’s assets. 
It is important to indicate that at the court of first instance Mahon J criticised Percival v. 
Wright as being wrongly decided. It should not be followed because it contradicted 
contemporary commercial morality. He stated: “In New Zealand, as in other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, nothing has been done by the legislature to vary or abolish 
the effect of the decision in Percival v. Wright and this general reluctance on the part of 
legislatures to intervene in the matter may be explicable by the difficulty in constructing the 
appropriate statutory formula”.78 
However, the Court of Appeal decided that Percival v. Wright was correctly decided on its 
facts. The decision of the court depended on the special circumstances of Coleman v. 
Myers, in the light of which it must be read. The shareholders traditionally relied on 
directors for information and advice, which made the latter under a fiduciary duty to advise 
shareholders when negotiating their share transactions. The court decided that when a 
director deals with an individual shareholder while in possession of material inside 
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information, he is in the “special facts” of the case under a fiduciary duty to disclose any 
material information which the shareholder may use in making his decision. 
The theory of fiduciary duty relies on assuming the presence of a fiduciary relationship 
between two parties, where one party is committed to the other by a fiduciary duty. The 
fiduciary relationship obliges one party to maintain sufficient care to meet his duties and to 
act in a loyal manner to do the tasks he undertakes on behalf of the other party. The 
jurisprudence in the UAE is familiar with the concept of fiduciary relationships. The 
Federal Company Law No. 8 of 1984 (FCL 1984) contains more than one article in which 
the directors of a company are assumed to owe a fiduciary duty towards the company. 
Article (108) of FCL No. 8 of 1984 states that79 it is not allowed for any chairman or 
member of the board of directors, without preceding permission from the general meeting 
annually renewed, to participate in any work which conflicts the interests of the company 
nor to practice trade in the same area of activity of the company, either for his own account 
or for another. Directors’ fiduciary duties are also emphasised in Article (109) which states 
that a member of the board of directors, who has an interest conflicting with that of the 
company in an act being decided by the board, must inform the board and state it in the 
report of the meeting. He is also not permitted to vote in the decision to take such an act. 
The provisions banning directors from participating in activities which may result in a 
conflict of interests is based on the concept of the fiduciary duties of directors.  
Use of the concept of directors’ fiduciary duties can be justified on another ground. In 
general, the legal jurisprudence in the UAE regards the board of directors as the agent of 
the company and they are obliged to represent it and protect its interests.80 Article 221 (2) 
of the Commercial Transactions Law No. 18 of 1993 states that the agent shall maintain the 
interests of the principal, and must ensure that preventive measures have been taken to 
safeguard such interests and shall provide his principal with the particular information on 
the condition of the market within the area of his activity. It can be said that the director as 
an agent is obliged to protect the interests of the company wherever there is a conflict of 
interests. 
Although it is clear that the director is in a fiduciary relationship with the company, it has 
not been decided whether the director is in a similar relationship with shareholders 
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individually. A similar difficulty is found in Common Law. Thus, if a director bought or 
sold shares from a shareholder, it is not clear whether he is obliged to disclose any inside 
information in his possession. 
According to the notion of breach of fiduciary relationships, insider dealing regulation is 
derived from identifying that a precise legal relationship has been breached. Legal authority 
tried to consider corporate insiders as fiduciaries who owe a disclosure duty based on a pre-
existing relationship. Insider dealing regulation has been justified on the ground that the 
insider is in a position of trust; he/she should be legally liable when breaching the trust for 
his/her personal gain. In this regard, the insider should be liable to return any profit he/she 
has made due to his/her breach of trust. The notion of harm in this sense is understood to be 
in breaching the trust, rather than looking for any perceived harm to any other party.81 
However, the problem with this line of reasoning is that it is only applicable to situations 
where there is a former fiduciary relationship between the source of information and the 
insider. Thus, the pre-existing relationship raises an obligation of trust, the breach of which 
is a justification for insider dealing regulation. A person can be held liable, according to 
this approach, only when he is a fiduciary. Nevertheless, a considerable number of those 
likely to deal while in possession of inside information are not in a fiduciary relationship. 
The problem here is that a person can be an insider if he/she has access to the inside 
information or the information is passed to him/her from an inside source. In other words, 
the issue is whether liability can arise where those who misuse inside information are not 
fiduciaries. Therefore, although the fiduciary approach constitutes a reasonable legal 
ground for the liability of fiduciaries, it is limited as an approach for regulating other forms 
of insider dealing and solving other related problems.82 
It is obvious that in common law any challenge to outlaw insider dealing has been 
discontinued when faced by Percival v. Wright. To prohibit insider dealing there had to be 
legislative intervention. In the US, Common Law development has been diverted to 
legislation as reflected in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. The adoption of these Acts has not directly regulated insider dealing. Regulating 
insider dealing in the US has been developed by the SEC and judicial precedents. In 
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particular, the prominent legal problem has been in finding the ground for liability for those 
‘outside’ the corporation who misuse inside information. Therefore, different legal theories 
have been used to determine the definition of insiders, and therefore to apply accepted legal 
norms. Courts have used their interpretative authority to develop the law prohibiting insider 
dealing, especially Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.83 From this point, the vast bulk of law 
scholarship on insider dealing in the US has emerged.84 To avoid the gap which allows 
non-fiduciaries to escape liability, there has to be other grounds for liability than breach of 
fiduciary duties. 
Another theory which attempts to provide a ground for the regulation of insider dealing is 
the ‘misappropriation theory’. The regulation of insider dealing has been justified on the 
basis that it regards information as a property belonging to the issuer of the securities. In 
fact, this is the current position in the US. Any person’s use of the information for his or 
another’s personal benefit would amount to contradicting the owner’s interests. In this 
regard, insider dealing is a misappropriation of the inside information which is the property 
of its source. This justification has been proposed in the US as the ‘misappropriation 
theory’. However, the inside information will only be considered in the US as a property 
when it is misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary relationship.85 Hence, the argument 
arises in this approach that not merely misusing information is a justification for liability; 
there should also be a determination of what information and in which circumstances it 
should not be misused. In other words, in order to hold an individual liable for any 
misappropriation, there should be an obligation on the individual not to misuse the 
information. This kind of obligation is usually founded on a fiduciary relationship, but the 
fiduciary duty here is quite different. The ‘insider’ need not owe the duty to the other party 
with whom he deals, nor has he to owe the duty to the issuer of the subjected securities. The 
duty is owed to the source of the information.86 There has been another explanation for 
such a duty. This attempts to attach the obligation to the information in a way where 
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anyone who possesses it, with a knowledge that its transfer is in breach of a fiduciary 
obligation, will also be under a fiduciary obligation not to misappropriate it.87 
In the UAE, in an identical concept to the misappropriation theory, Article (322) of FCL 
No. 8 of 1984 stipulates a punishment of imprisonment or a fine upon each manager, 
member of the board of directors, member of a supervisory board, consultant, expert, 
accountant or his assistant, or anyone delegated to investigate the company, who divulges 
that which has reached him by virtue of his work in the company secrets, or who abuses 
such secrets to bring benefit to himself or to another person. This ban represents the 
importance of ‘business secrets’, which gained protection in the UAE from a wide range of 
insiders. Article (322) expressly mentions the insiders who are banned from abusing the 
company’s secrets. Therefore, this ban is limited and cannot be used to prevent secondary 
insiders who are not in a relationship with the company mentioned in Article (322) and who 
obtain a company secret. It should be mentioned that the aim of Article (322) is to protect 
the company’s secrets, not to regulate insider dealing. The scope of inside information is 
different from that of secrets. Inside information is information which is not generally 
available and, in most of the cases, ought to be disclosed; in these characteristics it can be 
different from secrets. A public company has commitments to shareholders, investors and 
creditors. It has to disclose inside information regularly. The only situation in which a 
company can preserve information from disclosure is in circumstances in which the 
company has reasonable grounds for thinking that disclosure will affect its interests; these 
could be ‘secrets’. 
The ‘misappropriation’ theory brings into question the legal issue of considering 
information as property. Information in general has not been recognized as a form of 
property, but there have been attempts to distinguish certain types of information as worthy 
of the label of ‘property’. There has been recognition of information which is of a 
transactional value to those who collate, develop or process it, but accepting it as property 
is controversial.88 There has been a demand for a statutory misappropriation law to protect 
this types of information. On the other hand, recognizing information as property has been 
rejected on the grounds that this will allow a private monopoly of information which ought 
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also to be available to the public.89 It is noted that these arguments are related to corporate 
inside information. The principle that inside information has to be disclosed is not absolute. 
There are situations in which the law allows non-disclosure if it is for the benefit of the 
issuer. For example, a company’s future plans, which should be kept secret for a period of 
time, because they will lose their value if known to the company’s competitors.    
It has been observed that the recognition of information as property is important to sustain 
the misappropriation theory. However, assuming that the issue of property right to 
information is solved, there still arises the problem of determining the issues of ownership 
and possession. Misappropriation theory is criticised because it assigns ownership of non-
public information to an employee or principal, and ignores the wider range of 
relationships. This suggests that the public shareholders may also have a right to such 
information.90 In fact, our discussion of the US law will indicate how the SEC and the 
courts, in adopting the ‘misappropriation theory’, departed from the purpose of regulating 
insider dealing. The main problem of this theory is that it attaches no importance to the 
protection of the other party in the transaction, or to the protection of investors in the case 
of dealing in a market. In addition, this theory provides no answer regarding the importance 
of disclosing material non-public information to the other party in the transaction. 
Therefore, the misappropriation theory pays no attention to the real reason behind 
regulating insider dealing: informativeness of transactions and of the market. 
Another ground for the regulation of insider dealing is ‘equality of information’. This 
ground was reflected in the ‘disclose or abstain’ rule in the US. The SEC maintained that 
one aim of the Securities Exchange Act 1943 was to put investors on an equal footing in 
terms of access to corporate information. On this basis, the SEC in the case of In re Cady 
Roberts & Co. ,91 held liable a broker who had access to inside information and dealt on the 
basis of such information. The legal basis was the ‘disclose or abstain rule’, which is 
clearly based on equality of information. The SEC ruled that the broker who possessed 
material non-public information should have disclosed such information or abstained from 
dealing until the information was made public. The SEC ruling in Cady was supported by a 
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federal circuit court in the case SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.92 The court reasoned in its 
judgment that all investors trading in the marketplace should have equal access to material 
information.93 
An equivalent ground to ‘equality of information’ can be identified in UAE law in the 
provisions relating to misrepresentation. Misrepresentation is a defect of will which allows 
the misrepresented party to request nullification. Article (185) of the Civil Transactions 
Law No. 5 of 1985 defines misrepresentation as where one of the contracting parties 
deceives the other by fraudulent means, saying or acting, which leads the other party to 
consent to what he would not otherwise have consented to. It appears that there are four 
conditions for an act to be misrepresentation: 1- the use of fraudulent means; 2- the 
deceiving party’s connection with the misrepresentation, in other words he acted by 
fraudulent means or he knew that another did so; 3 -the misrepresentation shall be the cause 
of the other party’s consent; and 4- gross cheating resulted from the misrepresentation, as 
the misrepresented party could not require nullification for a slight difference in price.94 
Article (186) states that deliberate silence concerning a fact or a circumstance shall be 
deemed as misleading to a person who would not have made the contract had he known that 
fact or circumstance. The contracting party may be obliged to disclose information to the 
other party in regard to the transaction. The provenance of such an obligation could be the 
law or the nature of the contract.95 
Accepting the general provisions in regard to misrepresentation in UAE law, the question 
is, could the insider be regarded as making a representation to the other party? In general, 
an insider does not disclose important information to the other party who would not have 
made the contract had he known that information. His silence could be regarded as a 
fraudulent means pushing the other party to consent. It can be argued that transactions of 
securities are of a special nature. This is because in such transactions the disclosure of 
related information is essential for the other party to make a decision. 
The misrepresentation theory seems to provide a sound ground that can be used against 
both primary and secondary insiders, wherever they do not disclose important information 
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of a securities transaction to the other party. However, even the misrepresentation theory is 
limited in covering marketplace dealings. In most securities transactions the counter party 
is undetermined, as the electronic system randomly matches supply with demand. Only in 
limited situations, like Over the Counter (OTC) markets, can the two parties be determined. 
Misrepresentation in the UAE can only be a ground for a civil action. Where the 
misrepresented party takes the action he is challenged to satisfy the above-mentioned four 
conditions. Article (185) requires that the misrepresentation shall be the cause of the other 
party’s consent. This is likely to be proved in private company share transactions preceded 
by negotiation. In market transactions, the two parties do not meet each other. The buyer or 
seller in the market may have done so regardless of the misrepresentation. Article (185) 
also addresses misrepresentation resulting in gross cheating. If the insider possesses good 
news, he buys securities from another who makes a profit by the transaction; it is difficult 
for the other party to prove any gross cheating. Overall, provided that most of the 
difficulties are in proof of misrepresentation, in theory there is no convincing argument 
why ‘misrepresentation’ should not be a sound ground for a civil action. 
All things considered, the ‘equality of information’ theory seemingly provides a valid 
ground in law for the regulation of inside information. Having introduced the most 
dominant legal theories which may provide a legal basis for the regulation of insider 
dealing, it can be said that the ‘equality of information’ theory appears to be the most 
relevant. This theory appears to be the premise of market informativeness, which in turn 
requires effective regulation of insider dealing and disclosure. 
The discussion also involved investigating whether a sound legal theory can be devised 
from the general legal provisions of UAE law. It should be mentioned here that there is no 
known judicial precedent which challenges the applicability of these provisions to dealings 
in securities. In UAE jurisdiction, securities regulation does not regulate insider dealing 
outside the regulated market. Thus, the plaintiff may challenge the insider’s liability, 
depending on any general provisions available, whether ‘fiduciary duties’, 
‘misappropriation’ or ‘misrepresentation’. However, the jurisprudence in the UAE has not 
developed in this area. Thus, although general provisions can be depended on in theory, in 
practice for an action in this area there is little potential for success. 
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Market regulation of insider dealing 
Having introduced the main general legal rules which could be related to insider dealing, it 
is apparent that there is no general rule which can be depended on to regulate insider 
dealing. This is the situation in common law as well as in UAE law. However, there are 
legal norms which underlie these general laws. Any regulation of insider dealing introduced 
should be based on accepted legal principles. The most appropriate principle seems to be 
that of the ‘equal bargaining positions’ of the parties to a contract. Based on this principle, 
it can be said that there should be ‘equal access to information’ for all those in the market 
who need such information to make investment decisions. 
It seems prudent to discuss the problem of insider dealing in the light of financial market 
regulation. Insider dealing is largely a financial market problem, because of the fact that 
almost all the transactions in securities or other financial investments take place in the 
financial market. It is, therefore, not surprising that in most of the jurisdictions insider 
dealing is a market place activity, the best solution for which is confronting it by financial 
market regulation. Regulation in the marketplace has the role of the law in society. If we 
agree on the proposition that the law is about protecting interests, we can argue that 
regulation has an identical role in the market. If we are to look at the interests which are 
protected by the regulation of insider dealing, three main areas can be identified: protection 
of the market, of investors and of information. Legal systems and financial market 
regulation in different countries vary in their treatment of these interests.96 
In any ordinary market for goods or services the law provides the framework governing 
transactions. This had been the case in financial markets for a long time. However, 
financial markets have developed to an extent where the general law is inadequate to 
govern the complex transactions in the marketplace. One important area in which the 
general law seems insufficient governs the severe dependence of investors on asymmetry of 
information. We have discussed the shortcomings of the general law in obligating a party to 
disclose material information to the other party. The general law is even limited in 
obligating the director to disclose material information to individual shareholders when 
they deal with him. Iain MacNeil97 stresses the importance of regulation for financial 
market. He gives an example where a small group of shareholders own and manage a 
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company. If they decide to raise more capital through a public offering, the situation will be 
that their knowledge of the company is superior to that of the new investors. In this case, 
depending on the general provisions of the contract law would result in very limited 
disclosure of information. Contract law, as we have discussed, may not require full 
disclosure of material information to the other party. It is at this point that regulation 
intervenes to maintain a standard of information disclosure; such a standard is special to 
financial markets. Otherwise, there will be parties who lack access to the material 
information necessary for them to make the investment decision. 
One important observation made from the above discussion is that there is a point of 
resemblance between the regulatory obligation to disclose material information into the 
market and the general law obligation to disclose information to the other party. It could be 
argued that a merit of ‘equality of information’ underlies the obligation in both cases. On 
this line of reasoning, arguing that particular regulation should be dedicated to confronting 
the problem of insider dealing does not mean that we depart from legal norms. On the 
contrary, the demand for regulatory intervention to obligate information disclosure and 
prevent insider dealing has its origin in conventional legal theory. The closest related 
theoretical background seems to be that of ‘equality of information’. At this point, the 
argument is that there is a need for rigorous regulation because of the special nature of 
financial markets. 
It is acknowledged that regulation is an important component of financial markets in order 
to maintain confidence and govern market activities. Thus, regulatory systems have their 
different approaches to regulation, but they have main areas in common on which to 
concentrate. One of the most important areas is to assure market transparency through 
imposing a system of obligatory disclosure and, at the same time, preventing activities such 
as insider dealing and market abuse which affect market transparency. The maintenance of 
a transparent market is essential to protect the integrity of the market, the informativeness 
of the investment prices, the protection of investors and, in general, the protection of the 
necessary confidence in the market. 
Examples of policies of regulation 
In the US there has been a struggle with different theories to justify prohibiting insider 
dealing and to draw the scope of such a prohibition. The ‘disclose or abstain’ rule was 
based on the rationale of equality of information. However, this rule was rejected by the 
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courts and the current adopted rationale is that insider dealing is ‘misappropriation’ of 
inside information. It appears that the ‘misappropriation theory’ does not reflect the aims of 
the federal securities acts, especially that of disclosure, and the protection of investors and 
of the market.98 In the UK, introducing legislative prohibition is based on the rationale of 
equality of information, protection of investors and of the market. The shift from the former 
notion of depending on general legal theories had been through implementing the European 
Community Directive on Insider Dealing.99 This Directive in its turn adopted a rationale of 
ensuring the smooth operation of the market and protecting investor confidence, which 
would be weakened by insider dealing. The Directive includes provisions which define the 
conduct subject to prohibition. Moreover, in an attempt to show that it is derived from an 
underlying philosophy, the Directive indicates that the objective of regulation is to ensure 
the protection of investor confidence and to place them on an equal footing. The Directive 
in its preamble signifies the importance of secondary securities markets in the economy, 
emphasizing that efforts should be directed to regulating such markets to ensure their 
smooth operation. Investor confidence, the Directive states, is an important element in the 
smooth operation of secondary markets. Protecting investor confidence includes an 
assertion that investors are placed on an equal footing in terms of information. The 
preamble of the Directive states:  
“…Whereas the secondary market in transferable securities plays an important role 
in the financing of economic agents; 
Whereas, for the market to be able to play its role effectively, every measure should 
be taken to ensure that market operates smoothly; 
Whereas the smooth operation of that market depends to a large extent on the 
confidence it inspires in investors; 
Whereas the factors on which such confidence depends include the assurance 
afforded to investors that they are placed on an equal footing and that they will be 
protected against the improper use of inside information; 
Whereas, by benefiting certain investors as compared with others, insider dealing is 
likely to undermine that confidence and may therefore prejudice the smooth 
operation of the market; 
Whereas the necessary measures should therefore be taken to combat insider 
dealing…”100 
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From this preamble it is apparent that philosophies of regulation have been replaced by 
practical rationales. In a sense, the concept of equality in the market is clearly the guiding 
principle, along with the principle of protecting investor confidence in the market. A 
similar attitude has been apparent in the UK in the discussions of bills. In the Committee 
stage of the Companies Bill 1980, Mr. Cecil Parkinson MP indicated that “people who 
involve themselves in insider dealings are in the process of destroying confidence in the 
market”. In discussing the Criminal Justice Bill, Earl Ferrers stated that “in order to operate 
successfully, those markets require investors to have confidence in their fairness. Insider 
dealing destroys that confidence”.101 In discussions on the same bill, Members of 
Parliament accepted the justification set out by the Government, that it is based on the 
importance of the securities markets and the protection of investor confidence in their 
fairness. Insider dealing prohibition is based on its negative effects on confidence.102 
It seems that the philosophy on which regulating insider dealing is based results in the 
scope of the regulation. In the UK, the central justification was protecting confidence in the 
integrity of the market. This amounted to a departure from the traditional concept of 
regarding insider dealing as a breach of fiduciary relationships. Therefore, under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 (as we shall see) there is a wider scope for the definition of 
insider and inside information. It is not necessary for the insider to be under a fiduciary 
obligation arising out of a fiduciary relationship with the issuer of securities or the source 
of information. The notions of fiduciary duties, director duties and confidential information 
are taken from a company law perspective. They have been replaced by notions of 
protecting confidence in market fairness. Under the fiduciary model, insider dealing 
regulation would be directed to the relationship between the insider and the company to 
which he owed a fiduciary duty, while under a market regime approach the concentration is 
on the relationship between insiders and other parties and traders in the market. The 
difference between the two approaches means that there is a relationship between the 
underlying rationale and the category and scope of adopted regulation.103 
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The same line of rationale was apparent in adopting the Market Abuse Directive.104 Here, 
the preamble adopts a market protection approach, which depends on the role of 
transparency for public confidence, and therefore on the efficiency of the market. It states 
that:  
“Whereas… (2) An integrated and efficient financial market requires market 
integrity. The smooth functioning of securities markets and public confidence in 
markets are prerequisites for economic growth and wealth. Market abuse harms the 
integrity of financial markets and public confidence in securities and derivatives. 
(12) Market abuse consists of insider dealing and market manipulation. The 
objective of legislation against insider dealing is the same as that of legislation 
against market manipulation: to ensure the integrity of Community financial 
markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. It is therefore 
advisable to adopt combined rules to combat both insider dealing and market 
manipulation… 
(15) Insider dealing and market manipulation prevent full and proper market 
transparency, which is a prerequisite for trading for all economic actors in 
integrated financial markets”.105 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt mainly with questions of the justifications underlying the regulation 
of insider dealing. However, in the second place it has answered the question of whether to 
depend on general legal rules or to introduce regulation of insider dealing. It can be argued 
that the legal, ethical and economic grounds of the regulation of insider dealing can be read 
in the light of the practical principles of financial market regulation. Emphasis should be 
given to the importance of financial market regulation as an umbrella under which insider 
dealing will be examined. In this regard, insider dealing is assumed to have negative effects 
on an informed market, on transparency and on confidence in the market, and that 
international standards require its regulation. The modern trend shows a departure from the 
consideration of insider dealing as a breach of fiduciary relationship to a consideration of 
insider dealing as largely a market place problem. Hereinafter, the thesis will concentrate 
on the regulation of insider dealing in financial markets. This chapter has attempted to 
discuss the relevant legal, ethical and economic theories. Seemingly, the prevalent rationale 
for the regulation of insider dealing is that it is against ‘equality of information’. This is 
because ‘equality of information’ as a principle has its origins in legal norms, it is ethically 
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prevailing and, most importantly, it is a premise for market transparency and 
informativeness. ‘Equality of information’ as a principle is far more important in financial 
markets than in any other market of goods or services. The theories of market efficiency 
and market informativeness, and practical needs such as those to protect the market and the 
investors and to implement international standards, all provide the premises for the 
arguments in this study. Probably the most important result of submitting ourselves to the 
‘equality of information’ and ‘market informativeness’ approaches is that of accepting the 
proposition that disclosure should be regarded as the main method of market 
informativeness, while regulating insider dealing is a preventive method. In more specific 
terms, the prevailing premise seems to be that if the aspiration is ‘equal access to 
information’, the regulation of insider dealing is to serve a preventive function which is to 
discourage inequality of information.  
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Introduction 
The second chapter is more specific than the first, in that it discusses the problem of insider 
dealing regulation in the UAE. This chapter aims at investigating both the law and history 
of the development of financial market regulation. Specifically, it analyses the 
shortcomings in the regulation of insider dealing in the UAE.  It should be noted that the 
efficiency of any legal interventionist policy is better evaluated if it is reviewed in the light 
of an understanding of the socio-economic nature of the problem. In the UAE, the 
development of financial markets through more than one stage and the deteriorations reflect 
the inconsistency of regulation. This chapter also functions as a theoretical background to 
the applied study, raising a hypothesis which needs to be tested. 
This chapter examines the transmission from informal to formal securities markets. It will 
provide a history of financial markets in the UAE, representing the difference between the 
two stages; how absence of regulation forged the economics of the informal market and 
how regulation has played a major role in the economics of the formal markets. 
The establishment of formal markets was properly represented in promulgating the law 
establishing the markets and the regulating authority. Federal Law No.4 of 2000 
Concerning the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority and Market was adopted. 
In this regard, this chapter briefly analyses the rules relating to the regulation of insider 
dealing, emphasizing their shortcomings. 
The history of financial markets in the UAE 
A succinct introduction to the history of financial markets is necessary in order to 
comprehend financial market regulation in the UAE. This discussion aims at identifying the 
importance of both regulation and absence of regulation in the economics of financial 
markets. The evolution of financial markets in the UAE can be traced in two crucial stages. 
The first stage is the informal and unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) market which had 
operated in the absence of any bourse and regulation. The second stage is the formal market 
since formal bourses and regulation have been introduced. 
The informal and unregulated over-the-counter market 
Securities have been traded in the UAE since the 1970s; nevertheless, the trading was 
accomplished through an informal and unregulated OTC market until the year 2000. In the 
1970s the increase in oil prices resulted in the flourishing of other aspects of the UAE 
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economy. Local governments, individuals and families established a number of companies 
at this time, before the introduction of company law. Share exchange at that time was 
limited and there was no brokerage.106 
In 1982 there were serious attempts to establish a securities market. Unfortunately, such 
attempts stopped for several reasons, the most significant being the deterioration of the 
neighbouring Kuwait financial market. This deterioration had impacts on UAE investors 
and companies.107 
In the following period, the UAE experienced economic deflation. In spite of the 
introduction of Federal Company Law Number 8 of 1984 (FCL 8(1984)) the actual 
application of the law took several years. Due to the economic deflation and shareholders’ 
need for liquidity, there was little trading in shares. In the same period three financial 
brokers were established, one in Sharjah and two in Abu Dhabi.108 
The economy of the UAE flourished again in 1988. Securities markets again appeared as 
essential to investment revenue. There was a society of active traders speculating in 
securities. By this time, FCL 8 (1984) had been applied and legal-financial awareness was 
raised. Accordingly, the Abu Dhabi National Bank established an index for securities prices 
in 1988; this was the first index in the UAE. It began with indicating the prices of 22 of the 
most active issuers of securities, which constituted 95% of securities traded in the market. 
There was active trading in the securities of 26 issuers, the market price of which was 
Dh21.4bn109 by the end of 1988. This market price increased to Dh36.1bn by the end of 
1994. 110 
In 1995 new corporations were established following a 10-year halt. In the period between 
1993 and 1998, 15 companies were floated. Consequently, there was an increase in the 
number of investors and speculators. There was also an enhanced corporate performance, 
and encouraging financial results and dividends. All these factors resulted in rises in the 
prices of securities. Intensive speculation reached a peak in September 1998. Informal 
statistics indicate that the market price of traded securities was around Dh51bn at the 
beginning of the 1998. The market price had soared to Dh182bn by August 1998, and then 
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it declined sharply to Dh161bn in September 1998. While the book value of traded 
securities was only Dh16.6bn, it was distributed to different sectors as follows: 51% banks, 
44% services and 5% insurance.111 
Investors and dealers realised by mid-September 1998 that securities were over-priced and 
that intensive speculation had created a bubble. Uncertainty regarding a fair price pushed 
investors to liquidise their portfolios as soon as they could. The large volume of offers 
caused deterioration in the total market price to Dh88.8bn by the end of 1998. Apart from 
inhibiting new corporations from issuing initial securities, the formal response was 
disappointing at the time. The deteriorating trend continued in the following two years. By 
the end of 1999 there was trading in 46 issuers’ securities and the number of brokers had 
risen to 50. However, confidence in the market had been dented, causing a decline in the 
total market price to Dh80.3bn by the end of 2000.112 
It is significant that, in the absence of a formal market, the informal market was enormous 
compared to other financial markets in Arab countries. At the end of 1998 the informal 
market in the UAE was the second in total market volume in Arab countries, after the Saudi 
market. There are informal statistics which show the bubble in securities prices because of 
the increased liquidity.113 
A significant volume of trading was conducted in an informal market with an absence of 
essential financial regulation. Proper pricing of securities (which depends on corporate 
performance) disclosure and market mechanisms, were unattainable. Securities pricing 
depended on rumours and ‘cattle behaviour’, as unaware traders follow the trend. There 
was so much ignorance because some never thought that there would be a decline in prices. 
The only thought was that prices only rise. Absence of regulation and ignorance were 
exploited by some experienced traders, some of them coming from neighbouring regulated 
markets. They abused every aspect of the informal market to benefit from it. In the absence 
of regulation and a competent authority, most of the actors could not be held liable. 
The International Monetary Fund, in its report regarding Financial System Stability 
Assessment in the UAE,114 commented that:  
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The absence of effective regulation and reliable and accurate market information, 
combined with the closely held nature of many of the publicly held companies, 
created a perception that the market was susceptible to abuse by insiders as well as 
other forms of market malpractice.115 
 
The report also added that: 
During 1997 and 1998, the UAE securities markets were characterised by extreme 
price volatility. It was believed that market manipulation and insider dealing 
contributed to this condition …116 
 
It is worth considering what a local writer sees: that the financial deterioration of the 
summer of 1998 should have been predicted for several reasons.117 In addition to local 
investment, there was a liberal economic and investment policy which allowed foreign 
investment. Both these entered the informal market as investment revenue. However, in an 
absence of essential financial regulation it should have been clear that the fragile informal 
market would collapse. There was a need for a body of laws and regulations to govern the 
business. In particular, there was a need for maintaining a system which provided 
information for all investors. There was an absence of any system which governed 
disseminating information and the prevention of exploitation. The only possible way of 
obtaining information was through general meetings. However, there was also an absence 
of proper, efficient general meetings, which should have examined corporations’ accounts 
and discussed their business. Accountancy principles were not properly applied. The causes 
of the 1998 deterioration can be summarised under the umbrella of lack of detailed 
applicable financial laws and regulations. 
In this fragile informal market, the above-mentioned factors resulted in the spread of 
misconduct which caused the crash and further reflected on the national economy. There 
was increasing demand for securities, especially those which had been newly issued and 
supported by governmental contributions. Emaar Properties PLC was the main example. 
This demand was compounded by a false market caused by artificial dealings. The price of 
securities soared to unrealistic levels, peaked in the summer of 1998 and declined sharply 
when investors realised that the securities were overpriced. It is undeniable that there was 
actual abuse of the unofficial securities market. This is an acknowledged fact, even though 
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there was no investigation. After all, there were no specific legal rules which could have 
been applied to market abusers. 
The informal market deterioration in the summer of 1998 provides a ground for the 
argument that insider dealing and other market misconducts are common in markets which 
are not governed by stringent regulation. The main aspect of the informal market was the 
absence of any disclosure system, which would have provided equal access to information 
for all investors. The following actions which led to the crash were common and not 
prohibited by the law.118 Certain writers, purportedly financial experts, misled investors, 
either intentionally or unintentionally through their analysis and predictions regarding the 
prices of securities. Some analysts contributed by urging small investors to participate in 
dealings. The recommendations of analysts who have columns in UAE newspapers 
influenced inexperienced investors. Because investors were individuals, and some of them 
had insufficient knowledge of investment, they followed unreliable analysis and there was 
considerable loss when they purchased securities at peak prices. 
There was also misconduct by registered and unregistered brokers, who found in the 
situation a profitable opportunity. Most of the brokers had no understanding of the situation 
of issuers. Big investors also exploited the situation by contributing to the spread of 
rumours. Some of them passed such rumours through brokers, sometimes paying them in 
order to raise to the prices of their securities. When prices reached unrealistic levels, most 
of the big investors sold their portfolios to small investors who were unaware of the game 
being played.119 
The delay until 2000 in the establishment of financial markets seems to have been a 
defective decision. The reasons for such a delay are difficult to justify. Establishing a 
financial market had been a vision for both local and foreign investors, but when it was 
planned to start in the early 1980s the Kuwait financial market crash prevented its opening. 
In the early 1990s the plan was on the table again, encouraging the flourishing economy of 
the country at that time. However, uncertainty and hesitation delayed the establishment of a 
financial market. Following this, the plan was set back by the Second Gulf War and (in the 
late 1990s) a the crash in Asian economies. These provided further excuses for delay and 
taking more time to make a decision. However, the crash in the UAE in the summer of 
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1998 provided a sufficient trigger for reconsidering establishing a financial market. It was 
following this crash that the UAE authorities decided to establish an effective regulatory 
regime to improve market mechanisms and protect its integrity.120 
Justifications for the delay in establishing a regulated market seem, on the face of it, to be 
unconvincing because such a delay was the reason for the crash in the UAE in summer 
1998. The crash in the Kuwait financial markets should have been a reason for moving 
forward the plan to establish a regulated market, rather than for delaying it. The financial 
markets in Kuwait were influential in the UAE economy, since there had been UAE 
investment in Kuwait, the leader in the financial market of the Gulf countries. Furthermore, 
the Kuwait Securities Market is based in a neighbouring country that has a similar socio-
economic background and similar characteristics to the UAE. 
Financial market regulation in different countries has mainly been triggered by financial 
crises. Authorities in all countries should assess the experience of recognized financial 
regimes to introduce an investment policy based on sufficient regulation and competent 
authority. In detailed discussions of the experiences of other countries there are two 
important principles.121 First, financial market regulation in any country reflects the 
economic priorities of that country. The financial policy should take into consideration the 
economic and human resources of the country. For example, the economic priorities of a 
wealthy country with a small population similar to the UAE are the distribution of its 
wealth. In this regard, the characteristics of wealth and population in the UAE are very 
similar to those of Kuwait. Secondly, studies should aim to find how to advance the 
regulatory system of the country to reduce any systematic risk. There should be evaluation 
and improvement of the country’s financial system and regulations. In the UAE it can be 
said that a large volume of individuals’ wealth traces a limited number of investment 
opportunities. As mentioned above, this has resulted in over-investment in financial 
markets. This leads to the proposition that in a country similar to the UAE financial markets 
constitute important investment revenue. It follows that the authorities should pay 
consideration to providing markets with rigorous regulation to protect investors and their 
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investments. Providing a transparent market, which will provide essential investment 
revenue for wealthy individuals, corporations and public institutions, is essential to the 
UAE.  In this respect, it is recognised that financial markets are important to the economic 
development of the country. It remains true that the transparency and efficiency of the 
markets determine whether they aid or hinder economic development.122 
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The launch of formal financial markets 
In 2000 His Highness the UAE President issued Federal Law No.4 of 2000 to set up a 
public competent authority to regulate financial markets. This was the “Securities and 
Commodities Authority” (SCA). The new formal market regime was a turning point in the 
financial sector in the UAE. Following the set-up of the SCA, formally regulated financial 
markets were introduced. The Ruler of Dubai issued Decree No.14 of 2000 for the 
Establishment of the Dubai Financial Market (DFM). This market was established as the 
first formal financial market in the UAE, and had certain objectives, the most important of 
which was to create a fair, efficient and transparent marketplace that served the interests of 
investors and the national economy. The DFM aimed to regulate the process of trading in 
securities in a manner that protected the interests of investors from unfair and improper 
practices.123 The Ruler of Abu Dhabi issued Law No. 3 of 2000 Concerning the 
Establishment of the Abu Dhabi Securities Market (ADSM) as the second formal market in 
the UAE. This market was aimed at regulating securities transactions in a manner that 
ensured market transparency, fairness and quality service.124 The authorities in Dubai took 
a further step in initiating financial markets: the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC) 
was created to establish a commodity market place in Dubai. Under the DMCC, it was 
planned to establish a market infrastructure, technology and a full range of facilities for 
gold and precious metals, diamonds and precious stones, and energy and other commodities 
industries. The centre was launched in 2002 as a strategic initiative to provide an 
investment venue through new markets. The objectives of the DMCC included the 
initiation of a dedicated market place for commodities in Dubai. The Dubai Gold and 
Commodities Exchange (DGCX) was established in 2005 under DMCC. An international 
commodities derivatives market, the DGCX offered a selection of commodities 
commencing with gold futures. 
The most important national markets are the two stock markets of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
The year 2000 saw the launch of the two predominant formal financial markets in the UAE. 
Years of delays and speculation were ended by the establishment of the DFM and ADSM. 
The authorities were convinced that there would be a movement to halt the deterioration 
                                                 
123 Decree No.14 of 2000 for the Establishment of the Dubai Financial market. Article 4. 
124 Law No. 3 of 2000 Concerning the Establishment of Abu Dhabi Securities Market. 
 70
that caused considerable losses in the UAE over-the-counter market, and consequently 
investors’ withdrawal of their investments. During the years 2000-2001 the new markets 
showed poor results, but this later proved a temporary trend. Both markets failed to send 
positive messages during their first years; daily trading volumes on both markets rarely 
exceeded US$1m.125 The poor results of the first years were due to shaken confidence in 
the market which could be traced back to the crash of 1998. Then, the speculative bubble in 
the OTC market attracted a large number of smaller investors, and some of them borrowed 
to buy shares. The crash of 1998 resulted in a loss of small investors’ wealth because the 
value of their portfolios could not cover their debts. Investors needed more time to return, 
since they had lost both wealth and confidence.126 
The trend of the first years proved to be temporary. The financial markets maintained 
investors’ confidence and enhanced the mechanism of trading. This is supported by the 
results of 2005. It was indicated in the IMF report that:  
Capital markets in the U.A.E. have posted strong growth in 2005, driven by ample 
liquidity, strong macroeconomic growth, low interest rates, and strong corporate 
performance.127 
 
The value and volume of securities traded in both markets in the UAE led the regions 
capital markets. In 2005, the volume of trading in the DFM and the ADSM increased by 
132% and 69% respectively compared to the previous year.128 The two markets reached a 
peak in November 2005. Following this there was a sharp decline, so that by the end of 
April 2006 the volume of trading in the DMF and ADSM had fallen by about 55% and 40% 
respectively from their peak in 2005. The decrease was thought to be due to a sharp 
correction in market prices caused by overvaluation during the year 2005.129 
The sharp decrease in the two markets sent confusing messages in terms of their volatility 
and risk assessment. Some attribute the trend to the inconsistency of regulation relating to 
finance. It is thought that one reason for the sharp correction was investors’ liquidation of 
their positions to fund subscriptions for Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). The over-
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subscription of IPOs was due to their under-pricing by the Ministry of Economy, which by 
law sets the price rather than allowing a fair market value.130 
It is vital to analyze the causes of the sharp correction and volatility in the two financial 
markets. Regulations and decisions should be developed in the light of the maintenance of 
market stability. There are major causes of the shortcomings in the two markets. Analysts 
believe that small investors with wealth from oil-driven public spending created an 
overpriced market.131 The vast increase was also attributed to oil price rises, low interest 
rates and Gulf investors’ preference for domestic markets. However, individual investors 
constituted the majority in the two markets in the UAE. These markets had built their trades 
largely on sentiment, causing uncertainty in the markets.132 
This brings into question the efficiency of the two local financial markets in the UAE. This 
question was unwelcome to investors when there were sharp increases, because whether the 
securities were over-priced or not everyone was benefiting. There was some evidence of a 
bubble in the securities markets of the UAE in 2005. Although surveys were meagre (in 
itself this was a problem) but when available they gave adequate warning. The third HSBC-
MEED Middle East Business Confidence Survey (MEBCS) makes interesting reading. In 
this survey, 740 business leaders were asked questions about the current valuation of their 
domestic economies. In the UAE 50% of the panel thought that the financial markets were 
over-priced and that there was a bubble. In fact, it is thought that there was a bubble, but for 
several reasons such a situation was thought to be justified. The high oil prices and 
production level of the country provided confidence for the economy to move ahead. As a 
result, there were high expectations of corporate growth and earnings.133 
A financial market bubble was a consequence of a complex of economic factors. For the 
purposes of this study it is important to ask whether the level of disclosure and abnormal 
activities such as insider dealing contributed to inefficiency in the financial markets. It was 
believed that the UAE markets were not clean and that market abuse and insider dealing 
contributed to market inefficiency. In the Dubai Financial Markets, the securities of Emaar 
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PLC dominated the market, even though it was thought that “Trading in Emaar has often 
been controversial, with allegations of insider trading in 2006 when an unexpected 
withdrawal of bonus shares was preceded by a 4.5% fall in the stock price. Since 2005, 
Emaar’s stock price has fallen from around Dh50 ($14) a share to around Dh10”.134 In fact, 
the UAE markets were launched without taking into consideration a high standard of 
regulation to sustain their efficiency. There are meagre scientific grounds to support this. 
An important paper by Jay Squalli135 aimed to test for market efficiency in the DFM and 
ADSM, using daily indices between 2000 and 2005. As the UAE embraced an open 
economy policy and assumed international financial standards, it needed highly structured 
financial markets. It was important, therefore, that the financial markets operated 
efficiently. The paper suggested that there was high market volatility and a potential 
bubble.136 The concern was that if market prices were consistently rising before going 
down, there could be a sharp correction which would result in heavy losses or even a 
market crash. In fact, the estimated sharp correction occurred during the year 2006 and was 
combined with heavy losses. As was mentioned previously, there could be a series of 
causes of a bubble.  It is important for this argument if a regulatory shortcoming is one of 
them. The paper recommended the authorities to take a leading role in regulating abnormal 
financial activities. It stated: “In the meantime, an inefficient Bull market could suffer 
overinflated stock prices, speculation and insider trading, all potentially intensified by 
herding behaviour”137 The paper also recommended complete transparency in corporate 
financial reporting and the adoption of legislation consistent with international standards. 
It is logical to raise the question of the extent to which the recent regulation has been 
practical in solving inherited problems in the UAE markets.  This is especially so in the 
areas which have long been considered weakly regulated, such as limited investor 
protection, the absence of insider dealing laws and disclosure requirements.138 Officials 
have to face this question if they are serious in their agenda of promoting the country’s 
markets and economy. 
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One trend which is noticeable in the UAE markets is that they are dominated by individual 
investors. The law permits four sectors to hold shares in the UAE companies. These are: 
individuals, companies, governmental institutions and other sectors. In relation to the 
securities listed in the Abu Dhabi Securities Market, statistics show that in 2001, 
individuals owned more that 61% of the total number of securities. In terms of the volume 
of securities individuals owned about 43% of the volume of the listed securities.139 
Therefore, a large percentage of the investors in the UAE markets are thought to be 
individual short-term speculators. Individual investors’ dependence on sentiment and 
herding to make their investment decisions resulted in a volatile market. The current 
situation of individual investor domination is detrimental to the market in terms of volatility 
and risk. The authorities in the UAE should work to attract institutional investment into the 
markets. For the purpose of this thesis, the question that should be asked is: what measures 
have been adopted to protect individual investors and to maintain a system of equal access 
to inside information? If this task is not achieved by the current regulation, the efficiency 
and informativeness of the market will be questioned. Underscore in the efficiency of 
financial markets may result in negative effects on the rest of the country’s economy, as 
happened in 1998. 
Shortfall in the enforcement of the timely disclosure and insider 
dealing regulation 
The problem of underachievement in enforcing the disclosure regulation following the 
establishment of the formal system is obvious. The promulgation of the laws establishing 
the SCA and the markets, and the regulations introduced by the SCA have not represented 
an efficient device for reaching the required transparency. The specific difficulty has been 
in the departure from the old corrupt situation where public corporations did not disclose 
material information but rather such information was the monopoly of directors, executives 
and their acquaintances. It is thought that the problem of monopolising and concealing 
material information from shareholders and investors has not been solved. There is no 
evidence that the current regulation of insider dealing has been a deterrent to insiders 
dealing on the basis of inside information and making investment decisions ahead of other 
investors. Insiders can use inside information for their personal benefit by dealing in the 
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related securities and making a profit or avoiding a loss. In a business atmosphere where 
insiders exploit their powers to delay disclosure, the shortfall in disclosure and the 
concealment of information is detrimental to the market and investors. In the absence of a 
high level of transparency and disclosure, the emergent markets in the UAE depend on 
rumours. This means a high degree of systematic risk, market inefficiency and investor 
losses because decisions are made on the basis of incomplete information. It is a common 
situation in an emergent market, but this is not to propose that it cannot be faced by the 
authorities. The timely disclosure system should be stringently enforced in order to 
maintain a fair market for all investors. This should result in a more efficient and informed 
market. The aim of the disclosure system should be clearly determined: that is, the 
dissemination of all the material information into the market to enable investors to make 
informed investment decisions. Investors direct their investment to transparent markets in 
which the obligatory disclosure system ensures that they are put on an equal footing in 
terms of information. If insiders are not deterred from exploiting their positions and 
concealing and monopolising material non-public information, it does not auger well for 
transparent markets which benefit the economy of the country. It is on this line of reasoning 
that the SCA should have a stringent attitude towards enforcing the rules relating to insider 
dealing and timely disclosure. The SCA is required to take the necessary measures and 
procedures to maintain investors’ rights of equal access to information. It is also required to 
deter insider dealing and to raise the level of transparency closer to international standards. 
In this regard, the SCA should have introduced its policy for enforcing the regulations. 
However, the fact is that the SCA seems to be lenient on breaches and its warnings do not 
amount to more than a slap on the wrist. In UAE markets there is still no rigorous 
enforcement of the regulations. Some justify this by claiming that these markets are 
emergent. Nevertheless, this does not provide an answer to why unclear rules were 
dedicated to the complicated problem of insider dealing. Also, it does not explain why the 
authorities in the UAE have not adopted a clear policy for reform.140 
Timely disclosure as a system was not known in the UAE before the establishment of the 
SCA and formal markets. The public corporations were only subjected to annual and 
quarterly disclosure under the Federal Company Law Number 8 of 1984. One problem with 
the timely disclosure system is that the related rules are unclear. This is a common problem 
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in the Regulations as to Disclosure and Transparency promulgated by the Securities and 
Commodities Authority.141 The other problem is that the SCA has not been stringent and 
transparent in enforcing the timely disclosure rules. The SCA should have concentrated on 
the timely disclosure system at least to the extent it has concentrated on the quarterly 
disclosure system. 
Investment professionals still think that issuers have to disclose more information in order 
to direct share prices to be fairer. This is essential in order to maintain an efficient market. 
This call came following warnings from the SCA to issuers who did not meet the deadline 
for disclosing quarterly results. If we agree that quarterly disclosure was a basic and very 
straight-forward obligation on public companies even before the establishment of the SCA, 
it is difficult to see how issuers will comply with an advanced timely disclosure system, 
when they still do not meet the basic requirements of quarterly disclosure. It is thought that 
in the UAE financial markets, when predicting an issuer’s position, analysts face scarcity of 
information. It seems that issuers do not disclose adequate timely information. There is 
demand for substantial reform of corporate governance, specifically in relation to disclosure 
requirements. The disclosure system is emergent, which means that UAE local markets are 
still prone to systematic risks because share prices do not necessarily reflect inside 
information. An effective system of disclosure of information is the most important method 
of disseminating important information into the market.142 
The question then is: what constitutes a practical method to compel issuers to disclose 
information? It was seen that when the SCA implemented more rigid controls on issuers by 
imposing fines on companies, the disclosure of quarterly results improved. The proportion 
of issuers complying with the schedule and disclosing quarterly results improved 
significantly from the beginning of 2006. This was due to the SCA threat of imposing fines 
for failure to meet deadlines to publish quarterly results. On average, 75% to 80% of the 
issuers published their quarterly results within the 30-day period in the first half of 2006. In 
the first half of 2005 only 60% to 70% of the issuers published within the same deadline.143 
It can be said that it is a basic obligation for issuers to disclose the quarterly results. In other 
words, it cannot be considered an achievement when issuers do disclose their quarterly 
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results. The SCA has been successful in enforcing this obligation. However, the SCA’s 
announcement that the percentage of issuer disclosure of quarterly results in the first 
quarter of 2007 was 100% can be regarded as misleading propaganda. It is true that this 
was the first time since formal markets were established that all the issuers disclosed their 
quarterly results within the legal deadline.144 The SCA announcement would be considered 
as misleading if it was in any other developed system. This does not help solve the 
underachievement in disclosure in an emergent market. It is clear that the SCA has not 
answered the crucial question regarding whether issuers meet their obligation of timely 
disclosure of inside information. The SCA, apparently, has not introduced a realistic 
method to measure issuers’ meeting their obligation of timely disclosure. 
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The law of securities markets in the UAE 
The transmission from informal to formal securities markets was properly represented in 
promulgating the law establishing the markets and the regulatory authority. First of all, 
Federal Law No.4 of 2000 Concerning the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority 
and Market was adopted. Federal Law No.4 of 2000 constituted the premise for 
establishing formal local securities and commodities markets and the establishment of the 
Securities and Commodities Authority as the regulatory body. Article (2) of Federal Law 
No.4 of 2000 states: 
A public authority with the name of the “Securities & Commodities Authority” 
shall be established in the State’s capital. It shall enjoy juristic personality and 
financial and administrative independence, and shall have the supervisory and 
executive powers necessary to perform its functions according to the provisions of 
this law and the regulations issued in implementation thereof. It shall be adjunct to 
the Minister. 
 
In Article (3), Federal Law No.4 of 2000 determines general objectives for establishing the 
authority.  It states: 
The Authority shall have as its purpose the achieving of the following objects:  
1 - To provide the opportunity to invest savings and funds in Securities and 
Commodities in a manner that serves the interest of the national economy, secures 
the integrity and accuracy of transactions, ensures interaction of the forces of supply 
and demand in order to determine prices and protection of investors by establishing 
the bases for sound and just dealings between the various investors. 
 2 - To develop investment awareness by conducting studies and presenting 
recommendations.  
3 - To work to secure financial and economic stability. 
Federal Law No.4 of 2000 also grants the Securities and Commodities Authority the 
necessary powers to achieve its objectives. The most important is empowering it to 
promulgate and enforce regulations. Article (4) determines the areas which can be regulated 
by the authority and the procedure for adopting such regulations. It states: 
First: In the achieving of its objects, the Authority may exercise the following 
powers: 
(1) To propose the regulations as to the following, to be issued by resolution 
of the Council of Ministers:  
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(a) Regulations concerning its functioning.  
(b) Regulations concerning the licensing and monitoring of the 
Market.  
(c) Regulations concerning the acceptance, listing, and canceling or 
suspending the listing of any Securities or Commodities from being 
traded in the Market. 
(2) To make the following regulations, in consultation and coordination with 
the Markets licensed in the State:  
(a) Regulations concerning the functioning of the Market.  
(b) Regulations concerning Brokers and the regulating of their 
functions and the cessation thereof.  
(c) Regulations concerning trading, clearances, settlement, transfer of 
ownership and custody of Securities.  
(d) Regulations concerning membership of the Market. 
(e) Regulations concerning disclosure and transparency. 
(f) Arbitration regulations in disputes arising from trading in 
securities and commodities.  
(3) To form specialist technical committees, and to specify the scope of their 
work and the remuneration therefore.  
(4) To be in contact with international markets in order to obtain and 
exchange information and know-how, and to join relevant Arab and 
international organizations and federations.  
(5) To perform all other acts which assist the achieving of the Authority's 
objects or the exercise of its powers pursuant to the law. 
Second: Markets licensed in the State may propose amendments they deem 
appropriate to the regulations provided for in this Article. 
The initial impressions of the Federal Law No.4 of 2000 were positive in sense that it 
introduces an authority which has legal capacity and financial and administrative 
independence. The Securities and Commodities Authority was initiated to form the 
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competent authority promulgating regulations governing wide areas. More specifically, 
there was explicit empowerment of the authority to:145 
- adopt and enforce the necessary rules to regulate brokers; 
- accept and list the securities and commodities to be traded on the markets; 
- regulate the trading; 
- oversee the clearance and transfer of the ownership of securities; 
- establish a control system for the markets; establish an arbitration regime that would 
settle disputes arising from the trading of securities and commodities;  
- form specialised technical committees to cancel or suspend trading in securities or 
commodities in order to protect investors;  
- and temporarily suspend brokers or cancel licenses issued to them or to companies 
listed on the markets. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the fundamental responsibilities were clearly 
determined. On the contrary, in a very vital area such as disclosure, it was not clear from 
the beginning whether it would be the competence of the board of directors of the market or 
the SCA.146 
To ensure that the SCA was empowered to issue and enforce regulations, Federal Law No.4 
of 2000 dedicated Chapter Two to ‘The Organs of the Authority and their Competences’.  
Article (6) of the Federal Law No.4 of 2000 states that: 
The Authority shall be administered by a board of directors formed by resolution of 
the Council of Ministers having as Chairman the Minister and as members:  
1 - Two members representing the Ministry,  
2 - Two members representing the Ministry of Finance & Industry,  
3 - One member representing the Central Bank, and  
4 - Four members being persons of experience and competence nominated by the 
Minister, in coordination with the Minister of Finance & Industry. 
The competences of the board of the SCA are determined in Article (12) which states: 
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The Board of Directors shall exercise the following competences:  
1 - To ensure that the regulations mentioned in Article 4 of this Law are applied.  
2 - To receive notifications and complaints relating to the activity of the Market or 
Brokers and take appropriate resolutions thereon according to the provisions of this 
Law and the regulations issued pursuant thereto.  
3 - To require the Market and Brokers to submit balance sheets, profit and loss 
accounts, and annual financial statements audited by an accredited auditor, within 
one month following the end of the financial year.  
4 - To require the Market to take the necessary measures for disclosure by the 
companies whose Securities are listed therein of any substantial developments 
occurring in such companies.  
5 - To ensure transparency and disclosure as prescribed in this Law and the 
resolutions implementing it. 
6- To issue the requisite resolutions concerning approval of membership of the 
Market and trading in securities and commodities in accordance with the provisions 
of this Law and the regulations issued pursuant thereto.  
7 - To undertake all other acts which assist the Board in achieving the objective of 
the Authority. 
In the year 2000, the UAE Federal Cabinet issued three Resolutions in implementation of 
Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 Concerning the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority 
and Market. These three Cabinet Resolutions are: Cabinet Resolution No.11 the 
Regulations as to Market Licensing and Supervision; Cabinet Resolution No.12 the 
Regulations as to the Listing of Securities and Commodities; and Cabinet Resolution No.13 
the Regulations as to the Functioning of the Securities and Commodities Authority.147 
Cabinet Resolution No.13 contains important provisions in regard to the mechanism of 
regulating financial markets through the SCA. It ascertains the objectives of the SCA and 
delegates it the necessary powers to supervise and control the operation of securities 
commodities markets in the UAE. There is apparently repetition in determining the 
objectives of the SCA; these had already been mentioned in Federal Law No. 4 of 2000. 
However, this Resolution indicates important objectives of the SCA. The targeted 
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objectives seem to be close to those set by the international principles of securities 
regulation. Thus, it can be said that the law determined ambitious objectives for the SCA. 
Whether the system has been stringent in achieving these objectives or not is another issue. 
Article (7) of the Cabinet Resolution indicates that the SCA shall have as its purpose the 
achieving of the following objects: 1) To provide a suitable climate for the investment of 
savings and funds in securities and commodities in a manner that serves the interest of the 
national economy, secures integrity of transactions and protects investors. 2) To work to 
secure financial and economic stability. 3) To protect holders of securities, investors and 
the public in a manner that secures integrity and accuracy of transactions. 4) To regulate, 
develop and monitor the securities and commodities markets. 5) To develop investment 
awareness by conducting studies and presenting recommendations. 
Cabinet Resolution No.13 also authorizes the SCA to regulate the listing of securities and 
commodities, to determine the fees required, to regulate brokers, and to organize and 
control the disclosure of information regarding securities. It is empowered to conduct all 
other functions to carry out its objectives.148 In particular, Article (8) of Cabinet Resolution 
No.13 delegates powers to the SCA. There is repetition in mentioning the powers, since 
Article (4) of Federal Law No.4 of 2000 mentioned the powers of the SCA. In turn, this 
article repeats the above-mentioned powers. It indicates that in the achieving of its objects, 
the SCA has the power: 1) To propose and make regulations as provided for in the Law. 2) 
To supervise and monitor the functioning of the markets. 3) To license markets and brokers 
and authorize the listing of securities and commodities for trading in the market. 4) To 
determine, in consultation with the markets, the fees charged in order to implement the 
provisions of the Law and the regulations issued pursuant thereto. 5) To remove brokers 
from the registers of the brokers licensed in the market. 6) To regulate and monitor the 
disclosure of information relating to securities. 7) To form specialist technical committees 
and to specify the scope of their work and the remuneration thereof. 
Cabinet Resolution No.13 also determined the main organs of the SCA and their 
competences. There is also apparent repetition in determining the organs of the SCA and 
their competences, since Federal Law No.4 of 2000 had already achieved this task. Article 
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(11) of Cabinet Resolution No.13 provides for “10” competences of the board of directors 
of the SCA. One essential competence is to take receipt of information laid and complaints 
made relating to the market or to brokers, and to take the appropriate decisions thereon, 
including the ordering of investigations to be made and the imposing of penalties in 
accordance with the provisions of the Law and the regulations issued pursuant thereto. 
The establishment of the SCA aimed to avoid the vacuum which formerly existed, and 
which caused uncertainty in the marketplace in the period of the informal unregulated 
market. In general, it can be said that the SCA is a statutory regulating authority. Federal 
laws delegated powers to the SCA, appointed its administrative bodies and outlined its 
objectives. The SCA is supposed to regulate financial services in the Abu Dhabi Securities 
Market (ADSM) the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) and the Dubai Gold and Commodities 
Exchange (DGCX). However, certain basic issues remain unclear. One significant source of 
deficit which can be easily identified when looking at Federal Law No.4 of 2000 and the 
implementing Cabinet Resolutions, is the repetition of the objectives and powers of the 
SCA. The Cabinet should have promulgated detailed regulation to implement the Federal 
Law rather than repeating similar provisions. It is apparent that at this stage there were no 
rigorous studies of comparative laws and regulations. The result has been the establishment 
of a regulator which is not adequately empowered by the law to achieve its objectives.  This 
is especially so taking into account that the aim was to provide a suitable climate for the 
investment in a manner that served the interests of the national economy, secured the 
integrity of transactions and protected investors. In specific terms, there appears to be a 
need for more powers delegated to the SCA in relation to the supervision, investigation and 
enforcement of the regulation. 
Although the competences of the SCA are repeated and the powers thereon are not 
specified, an important competence which may be uncommon for an emergent regulator 
was introduced. This is in Article (11) of Cabinet Resolution No.13, which empowers the 
SCA to handle complaints made relating to the market or to brokers and take the 
appropriate decisions thereon, including the ordering of investigations to be made and the 
imposition of penalties. In fact, imposing of penalties is an important weapon, and is seen 
as the most important competence of a modern regulator. There are demands to further the 
SCA powers in this area. There are calls to delegate judicial powers to the SCA to probe 
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and investigate crimes relating to the financial and stock market sectors. Financial crimes 
should be faced by a sophisticated unit, which has sufficient delegated powers to 
investigate crimes of a complicated nature. Legal and stock exchange experts have called 
for combating financial market crimes to protect the markets of the country. There are 
threats that criminal elements, who can misuse and manipulate the markets for their own 
benefit, can endanger the financial system. It is thought that it is time to protect financial 
markets and the interests of investors. An important method of achieving this is thought to 
be the enhancement of the capabilities of the regulator to detect effectively and investigate 
highly sophisticated crimes.149 
An area which is not clearly determined by the law is the separation of the powers of the 
SCA from those of the markets. The ADSM and DFM still have powers in relation to the 
listing of securities. They also have authority for handling the entrance of brokers and the 
listing of securities in the markets. They set listing standards and accept listings of 
securities. The problem is that the law has not specifically delegated powers to the markets. 
The regulatory powers of the SCA and the stock markets are not clearly defined in law. In 
this situation, it is not clear whether the continuous obligations of the listed company are 
owed to the market, or to the authority, or both. Also, the requirements for listing securities 
are not comprehensively determined in the law. This may result in listing securities of 
issuers that are not viable in terms of compliance to an acceptable level of disclosure and 
transparency. In practice, the bureaucratic arrangements and administrative decisions are 
used as alternatives in areas which are not determined by the law. This is another area in 
which the board of directors of the SCA needs to reach temporary decisions to distinguish 
between the powers of the markets and those of the SCA.150 However, the problem remains 
that the authority to accept listing being in the hand of the markets means that the SCA has 
less control over issuers. 
Another problem is that financial services in the UAE are regulated by a number of 
authorities. In fact, the UAE does not have a single financial services regulator. The Central 
Bank of Union (CBU) is the regulator responsible for regulating banking and investment 
business. It is therefore responsible for licensing and authorising financial intermediaries 
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and investment companies. The CBU authorities are determined by Federal Law No. 10 of 
1980, Concerning the Central Bank, the Monetary System and Organisation of Banking. 
The CBU is empowered to promulgate regulations to govern areas within its authority. 
However, in relation to the regulation of financial services, the CBU has not developed its 
traditional functions. One example is that it has not introduced a system of publishing all 
the regulations to the public.151 The Ministry of Economy is in charge of implementing 
company law and corporate governance provisions. It supervises the promotion of 
corporations and regulates Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). It also regulates insurance 
business. One shortcoming in financial services regulation, which is apparent in the SCA, 
CBU and Ministry of Economy, is that in many areas the promulgated regulations are not 
sufficiently detailed.152 
The SCA was established in 2000 to act as the supervisory authority over the financial 
markets. However, the point which was not considered was the overlap between the 
responsibilities of the two formerly existing authorities and the SCA. The powers of the 
authorities engaged in financial services regulation need to be clearly defined, in particular 
more powers should be delegated to the SCA.153 Compared to the CBU and the Ministry of 
Economy, the SCA is a more modern authority. When there was a transition from informal 
to formal financial markets, there should have been a delegation of the necessary powers 
from the CBU and Ministry of Economy to the SCA. In order to maintain a sound 
regulatory system, the SCA should have been specifically delegated the powers of licensing 
and supervising financial intermediaries and investment companies, and of supervising 
IPOs. 
The Ministry of Economy does not have a clear policy towards financial markets. It acted 
with shortcomings with regards to promotions and IPOs which are connected to a sound 
secondary market. In particular, the Minister of Economy restricted the growth of the 
markets by requiring that all public offerings should include a minimum of 55% of the 
company’s shares. This requirement has discouraged the floating of many family-owned 
corporations. As a solution, the Federal National Council has promulgated an amendment 
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to Federal Company Law No. 8 of 1984. The amendment allows a minimum listing of 30% 
of the company shares. This is expected to encourage floating of family-owned companies 
because it allows the family to retain control over the company.154 Another area which has 
also been criticized is the Ministry of Economy’s pricing of IPOs. The Ministry ignored fair 
pricing of the shares through the market powers of supply and demand, and adopted a scale 
of one share equals one Dh. By under-pricing the issued securities to Dh 1, the Ministry of 
Economy encouraged a huge oversubscription. This meant that there was a substantial 
liquidation of shares in the secondary market, a fact which resulted in a sharp market 
decline in the year 2006.155 To resolve this problem, the Ministerial Council of Services, in 
its Decision No. 3/3 of 2007, transferred the authority to supervise the prospectus for public 
offers from the Ministry of Economy to the SCA.156 The problem remains that this is a 
cosmetic change. The government has not promulgated the law governing public offers and 
IPOs. 
Another area which seems to be unsound is the relationship between the SCA and the 
CBU.157 It was not until the end of the year 2006, that Federal Law No. 10 of 1980, 
Concerning the Central Bank, the Monetary System and Organisation of Banking was 
amended to transfer the authority to register and supervise brokers from the CBU to the 
SCA.158 This transfer of authority is expected to give the SCA more powers to supervise 
trading in the markets. However, it should also be said that this is a cosmetic change. There 
is still neither a clear policy nor a comprehensive body of law for registering and 
supervising the various financial services institutions; for example, financial intermediaries, 
investment banks and investment consultation services. 
Insider dealing regulation in local financial markets in the UAE 
Insider dealing regulation in local financial markets in the UAE consists of three articles 
under the Regulations as to Disclosure and Transparency promulgated by the Securities and 
Commodities Authority. These three articles are: 
Article (37): 
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Pursuant to Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 concerning the Emirates Securities & 
Commodities Authority and Market, any person shall be liable to imprisonment for 
a period of not less than three months and not more than three years and a fine of 
not less than one hundred thousand (100,000) Dirhams and not more than one 
million (1,000,000) Dirhams, or either of these penalties, if he:  
1. Furnishes any data, or proffers any declaration or information being untrue 
and such as to affect the market value of the securities and an investor's 
decision to invest or otherwise.  
2. Deals in securities on the basis of unpublicised or undisclosed information 
he acquired by virtue of his position.  
3. Spreads tendentious rumours regarding the selling or buying of shares.  
4. Exploits unpublicised information which could affect the prices of securities 
to achieve personal benefits.  
Any dealing or transaction effected on the basis of the preceding shall be null and 
void. 
Article (38): 
The chairman and the members of the board of directors of a company whose 
securities are listed in the Market and its general manager and any of its employees 
shall be liable to imprisonment for a period of not more than three years and a fine 
of not less than one hundred thousand Dirhams and not more than one million 
Dirhams, or to either of these penalties, if he effects dealings through himself or 
through others in any transaction in the securities of the company, before disclosing 
to the Market the purchase or sale transaction, the quantities and prices thereof, and 
any other information required by the Market, and the obtaining of the approval of 
the Market's board of directors for such transaction. Any transaction not effected 
pursuant to such disclosure shall be null and void. 
Article (39): 
Any chairman and any of the members of the board of directors of any company or 
any of its employees who exploits his inside information as to the company in the 
purchase of shares or the sale thereof in the Market shall be liable to imprisonment 
for a period of not less than three months and not more than three years and a fine of 
not less than one hundred thousand Dirhams and not more than one million 
Dirhams, or either of these penalties. Any transaction so effected shall be null and 
void. 
 
Preliminary Observations on the three Articles: 
It is appalling that such poorly drafted articles are designed to deal with such a complex act 
as insider dealing. It appears that no constructive criticism will suffice and no cosmetic 
changes to these articles will work. The matter is compounded by introducing criminal 
offences while the law sets no clear definition of the punishable act. 
According to Article (37) a person may face imprisonment for three years or a fine of one 
million Dirhams for acts unclearly defined by the law. Article (37) Para (2) makes it an 
offence for a “person” to deal in securities on the basis of “unpublicised” or “undisclosed” 
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information he acquired by “virtue of his position’’. In addition, Article (37) Para (4) makes 
it an offence for a “person” to “exploit” “unpublicised information” which “could affect the 
prices of securities” “to achieve personal benefits”. However, the drafters of the article did 
not introduce any definition or guides as to the necessary terms. 
What is the definition of “person”? Is he only a natural person? Is he a legal person, for 
example a company, liable under this article?   
What is the definition of “unpublicised” or “undisclosed” information? The two terms are 
not synonymous, since “or” means that fulfilling one criterion is sufficient. Neither of the 
terms is defined or brought under guidelines. The drafting of the articles pays no 
consideration to any of the complicated situations which may be faced in defining “inside 
information”. The two terms are rather strange, and cannot be compared to the definition of 
“inside information” in recognized jurisdiction in order to reach a reasonable definition. 
What is meant by “by virtue of his position”? Are directors only liable? What about 
employees and people who have access to information because of their profession, for 
example lawyers and accountants? 
Article (37) Para (4) also provides no definition of “exploits” and “unpublicised 
information”. It should be clear what actions comprise “exploitation”, for example 
disclosing the information to a third party or inducing him to trade on the basis of the 
information. It is bizarre that the drafters remembered in this paragraph to state that the 
information “could affect the prices of securities”. It is also inexplicable why there must be 
a personal benefit. Insiders may seek indirect benefits by establishing networks to exchange 
inside information. 
Article (39) is clearer in determining liable insiders. It provides a list of primary insiders. 
These are the chairman, the members of the board of directors, the general manager and 
any of the employees of the company as insiders. The drafters were not even capable of 
introducing a viable term for the institution to which insiders belong. They used “of a 
company whose securities are listed in the Market”, a sentence which could easily be 
replaced by the more precise term “issuer”. The last term should also be brought under 
clear definition. This article also utilizes the term “inside information”. This is another 
example of ambiguity, since in three articles three different terms are used for the same 
thing. Another shortcoming of the article is that of the scope of the prohibition. It only 
prohibits exploiting inside information by dealing in securities. Disclosing such information 
to a third party, for example, is not prohibited under this article. 
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It is apparent without even studying the provisions of these articles in detail that this law is 
poorly drafted. The three articles are drafted without taking into account basic legal 
principles to be observed in codification. The gross deficits do not appear to be capable of 
correction by cosmetic changes. 
The regulation of timely disclosure in the UAE 
The regulation of timely disclosure in local financial markets in the UAE consists of three 
articles under the Regulations as to Disclosure and Transparency promulgated by the 
Securities and Commodities Authority. These three articles are: 
Article (33): 
The company or entity whose securities have been listed in the Market shall notify 
the Authority and the management of the Market of any significant developments 
affecting the prices of such securities upon learning of the same, such as 
catastrophes, fires, mergers, the issue of new securities, the discontinuance of a 
production line, voluntary liquidation or lawsuits filed by or against the company 
affecting its financial position. 
The board of directors of the Market shall have the right to publish any statement in 
respect of such developments in the local press and other media it deems 
appropriate. 
Article (34): 
A company or entity whose securities have been listed in the Market shall, when so 
requested, publish any explanatory information which relates to its circumstances 
and activities and is such as to secure the integrity of transactions and the 
confidence of investors. 
If any change occurs in a significant matter contained in a previously published 
press announcement, such entity or company shall issue a press announcement 
reflecting the actual situation after the change, the subsequent press announcement 
to be issued in the same newspaper or newspapers as contained the earlier 
announcement. 
Article (35): 
It shall be permissible for the entity or company not to issue a press announcement 
regarding any given information, if its senior management has reasonable grounds 
to believe that the revealing of such information will lead to serious damage to its 
interests, and there has not been, nor will be, any dealing in its shares by members 
of its board of directors and executive managers and their relatives to the first 
degree on the basis of the information not announced to the public, provided that the 
company furnishes to the director of the Market such information and data, 
requesting him to consider them confidential until the grounds which gave rise to 
that no longer subsist. The director of the Market may, in coordination with the 
Authority, accede to such request or compel the company to announce the 
information and data. 
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The criticisms of the rules directed to insider dealing seem to be applicable to the rules 
directed to timely disclosure. It is apparent that the Regulations as to Disclosure and 
Transparency promulgated by the Securities and Commodities Authority are poorly drafted. 
Articles (33) and (34) used “the company or entity whose securities have been listed in the 
Market” to indicate to the “issuer” who is obliged to disclose inside information. Article 
(33) required the issuer to notify the SCA and the market of “any significant developments 
affecting the prices of such securities”. In fact, it is unclear whether the effect should be 
‘probable’ or ‘definite’. Significant developments may not be represented in the market 
price of the securities, especially where the related security is a bond. However, the change 
may affect the value of the issuer or its position. In this article it is not said whether the 
changes or developments affecting the “value” rather than the market price of the securities 
should be disclosed. Another shortcoming is that the article does not state clearly the time 
in which disclosure should be made. Stating that “upon learning of the same” is not clearly 
determining the reasonable time in which disclosure is required. 
Article (33) used some non-exhaustive examples of events in which the issuer should make 
timely disclosure. This is a positive characteristic of the article, since it provides clarity and 
guidance for the issuers. Another positive characteristic in this article is giving the market 
the right to publish any statement in respect of disclosed information. 
Article (34) is directed to circumstances in which the issuer is requested, by the market for 
example, to publish any explanatory information which relates to its circumstances and 
activities. This article aims at providing a basis for the market to request the issuer to 
disclose explanatory information. This may be necessary to inform the market and 
investors, especially when there is a need to answer rumours in the market. However, it 
would have been proper to clarify when the burden is placed on the issuer to identify the 
existence of inside information and to disclose it. There is also no mention of the issuer’s 
liability in relation to “selective disclosure”. 
Article (35) provides an exemption where issuers can delay disclosure of information. This 
exemption is essential to protect the business. However, there is a significant deficit in the 
article. Where the issuer is allowed not to disclose the information, it should keep it 
confidential in order to prevent insider dealing activities. This article, however, only 
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requires that “…there has not been, nor will be, any dealing in its shares by members of its 
board of directors and executive managers and their relatives to the first degree….” This 
means that there is no clear obligation to protect the information from being used by 
employees, or from being disclosed to a third party other than relatives to the first degree. 
This is a gross shortfall which indicates that inside information is not sufficiently protected 
by the SCA regulations. 
One difficulty with studying these provisions is that there is neither legal guidance nor a 
clear policy adopted by the SCA which may shed light on how the related provisions will 
be interpreted and enforced. In addition, there has not been any judicial precedent in 
relation to these provisions which would pave the way for interpretation. Therefore, the 
only viable method of holistically studying the rules relating to insider dealing in the UAE 
is to compare them to their equivalent in other jurisdictions. 
Conclusion 
One main aim of this thesis is to recommend new rules. It is planned to achieve this 
through the functional comparison in Chapter 5. The recommended rules will be outlined in 
the final chapter, ‘recommendations’. This chapter has indicated the shortcomings, while 
the comparative legal study will propose solutions. 
This chapter has attempted to provide a background history to the development of financial 
market regulation in the UAE. The following assumptions can be derived from the 
discussion in this chapter. The informal unregulated market stage was ended by an 
economic deterioration which had effects on the rest of the economy of the country. There 
are clear indications that, in the absence of regulation, insider dealing and other market 
abuse contributed to the deterioration in 1998. The establishment of the SCA and formal 
financial markets was a turn-point in the history of regulation. However, the inexperienced 
regulatory system may have shortfalls in the areas of transparency and protection of the 
market and investors. It seems that regulations are still very much behind international 
standards. The conundrum is that the current regulations do not appear to constitute an 
efficient system which will deter insider dealing and enforce issuers to make timely 
disclosure. Based on the history of financial markets in the UAE, it is also assumed, that 
rigorous regulation is the main method in maintaining an informative, transparent and 
efficient market. Although an attempt was made to support these assumptions throughout
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the chapter, it seems proper for the applied study to provide more certainty regarding these 
hypotheses. 
In regards to the deficits in the rules relating to insider dealing, it seems that there should be 
a fresh construction of new rules. This will be the main task of Chapters 4 and 5. The aim is 
to recommend a new drafting of these rules. This, however, will be appropriate following 
the applied study, which investigates the problem and the comparative legal study aimed at 
providing a solution. 
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Introduction 
This chapter is an applied study which aims at defining the nature of the practical problems 
related to insider dealing on the ground. It makes a contribution to the discipline of insider 
dealing by filling the gap caused by a shortage of academic resources in the UAE. The 
applied study, comprising questionnaire and interviews, provides the grounds for testing 
hypotheses and supporting the arguments raised in the preceding chapters. In this regard, it 
will be of great value to consider the attitude of investors and experts as valid indications of 
the current status of regulation. Applied methodology is a realistic approach to identifying 
the issues relating to the regulation of insider dealing in the UAE. It should support the 
theoretical background in the earlier chapter and raise the practical problems relating to 
insider dealing in the UAE. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first deals with the research methodology 
of the applied study. This section discusses the plan of the study in terms of determining 
research questions, hypotheses and research methods. The second part of the chapter 
discusses the results and analysis of the applied study. It provides a representation and brief 
discussion of the results of both the questionnaire and the interviews. The chapter ends with 
a summary of the results of the applied study.  
Research Methodology 
Setting the goal of the thesis as looking at the problem of insider dealing in the UAE from 
an empirical and comparative law perspective, the aim is to contribute to the body of 
knowledge in this area. Such a contribution seems to be appropriate if it is made to UAE 
law, which at present lacks sufficient academic contributions. One way in which we intend 
to make a contribution is by conducting field research.  
This is essential, since there is a shortage of academic resources in UAE insider dealing law 
and a need for more information to sustain the arguments of the thesis. The applied study 
aims at identifying the opinions and attitudes of both investors in the UAE local markets 
and experts in regulation or regulatory bodies. The results of the applied study should be 
helpful in drawing a clear picture of the current regulatory situation in general, and the 
regulation of insider dealing in the UAE in particular. It should be noted that it has been 
decided that the applied study should only be conducted in the UAE.  This is because we 
need to concentrate on making a contribution in an area which has not adequately been 
covered by studies. The UK and US jurisdictions do not lack studies and research. Another 
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reason is to save time, effort and money directed to the study by concentrating on one 
country. 
On this basis, this chapter contains a detailed outline of research methodology and the 
results and analysis of the applied study. It explains the planning of the methodology and 
methods. It also explains in detail the steps taken in practice to conduct the questionnaire 
and interviews. Following this, the second half of the chapter is dedicated to the results and 
analysis of the applied study. 
Research questions 
The field research must be able to generate important information in regard to the nature of 
the problem of insider dealing. It must add to our academic understanding in order to 
answer the thesis questions in the following areas:  
What is the extent and nature of insider dealing in real life?  
What are its effects on the securities markets? 
Should insider dealing be prohibited? 
Is UAE law sufficient to prevent insider dealing? 
How can the law and regulation be improved to prohibit insider dealing? 
Are the rules of the DIFC a good example for reform in local market regulation? 
What is the meaning of ‘insider’ and ‘inside information’?  
How can the competent authority be empowered to enforce the rules? 
What sort of punishment is appropriate to deter insider dealing? 
What is the relationship between the rules directed to prohibit insider dealing and those 
directed to market abuse and timely disclosure? 
Hypotheses 
The applied study will test the following hypotheses: 
1- Primary grounds for regulating insider dealing. Insider dealing should be regulated:  
- It is against ‘equality of information’ and is detrimental to market transparency 
and informativeness. 
- To protect investors’ rights and their confidence in the market. 
- To meet the call for financial market regulation being moved closer to 
international standards. 
2- Secondary grounds for regulating insider dealing. Insider dealing should be regulated 
because: 
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- It is unfair. 
- It has negative effects on the economic efficiency of financial markets. 
- It has negative effects on the economy of the country. 
- It has negative effects on attracting liquidity into financial markets. 
- It has negative effects on attracting foreign liquidity into financial markets. 
3- Specific to the UAE: the regulation of insider dealing should be reformed because: 
- It contributed to market deterioration in the summer of 1998 in the UAE 
unofficial securities market. 
- Insider dealing contributed to the bubble in 2005, which was followed by a 
sharp correction in 2006 in the local financial markets in the UAE. 
- Transparency and disclosure should be developed in local financial markets in 
the UAE. 
- The current law prohibiting insider dealing in local financial markets is unclear 
and it is not practically enforced by the authorities. 
- Criminal prosecutions are inefficient and the SCA should be empowered to 
administer fines. 
Research methods 
It should be clear that in law we have a distinct concept of research methodology. There is a 
distinct legal methodology in solving legal problems. A mere legal discussion of a problem 
involves interpretation of (among other things) case law and comparison. The difficult task 
is in attempting to combine social science research methodology with legal methodology to 
produce a comprehensive thesis. It is true that socio-legal thought has developed 
considerably in recent years, but legal thought still has a unique research methodology used 
in argumentation. The important question is: what has this to do with this thesis? The 
answer is that in this thesis the researcher is attempting to combine legal methodology, 
which is comparative law methodology, with social science methodology. It would have 
been less demanding if we had conducted the interviews and questionnaire, and directly 
introduced the data into the thesis. However, the researcher preferred to introduce a 
summarized discussion of the research methodology. 
There are two main approaches in research methodology; qualitative and quantitative. 
Qualitative research is appropriate for an in-depth study of the research phenomena. This 
approach involves investigating the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions of the research phenomena, 
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whereas quantitative approach involves investigating the ‘what’, ‘where’, and ‘when’ 
questions. Qualitative methodology is suitable for focused samples rather than large 
samples. On the other hand, quantitative methodology is appropriate for investigating the 
research phenomena by employing a numerical approach to the collection and analysis of 
data. In other words, quantitative methodology is used to measure mathematically the 
research phenomena. This is through collecting data from a large sample, using survey 
methods and employing mathematical models to test research hypotheses.159 
Methodology refers to the rationale which underlies the research, while methods are 
developed to be applied in the light of the methodology. In practice, interviewing is the 
commonest method used in qualitative methodology, whereas the questionnaire is 
commonly used in quantitative methodology. It is also practical to combine quantitative 
and qualitative methods within the same research. The information provided by quantitative 
methods can be explained in depth by further qualitative methods.160 
The importance of planning for the research methodology and methods lies in providing the 
scientific ground for conducting the research. In this sense, the researcher has to rationalize 
why he chooses one method rather than another for collecting information. The researcher 
has to make a decision to choose the appropriate research methodology. There are 
important factors which determines the appropriate strategy; to name but a few, the kind of 
information to be collected, and where and when to collect it. The research methodology 
should be determined in the light of the nature of the research problem and the information 
needed to solve the problem. To make it simpler, the researcher has to decide what 
approach he will take to conduct the research, yet the chosen approach should be 
appropriate to the problem investigated. 
Our preliminary intention, provided there is a lack of academic resources, was to collect 
more information to answer the questions in the thesis. We have decided to combine both 
questionnaire and interviews to collect and analyse the necessary information to answer the 
study questions. 
Having said that combining interviews and questionnaires is appropriate for this study, it 
should be mentioned that the methods should be tailored to fit the nature of the problem 
under study. In this study the aim was to measure attitudes of investors towards current 
                                                 
159 NIGEL GILBERT Researching Social Life (London 2nd: Sage Publication, 2001). pp.32-4. 
160 ibid., p.33. 
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regulation. This was furthered by conducting interviews which provided in-depth expert 
opinion on the regulation of insider dealing. 
Questionnaire 
The first method used was the questionnaire, which was directed to investors. It does not 
seem consistent to ask investors to provide information regarding why and how insider 
dealing is regulated. However, it seems proper to measure the opinions and attitudes of 
investors towards the regulation. For this task, a questionnaire is more appropriate, since it 
is a study of the trends and opinions of investors. The questionnaire is suitable for 
measuring the attitudes of investors towards insider dealing, disclosure, transparency and 
other related points. The questionnaire employed scales where investors were asked to 
specify their level of agreement.161 The opinions and attitudes of investors are important to 
support the hypothesis of the study. They also provide an insight into the current situation 
of marketplace regulation. 
The questionnaire as a method has several advantages.162 It provides information at a low 
cost in time and money. It also allows the researcher to collect information from many 
people and the answers can be easily analysed. The questionnaire also provides respondents 
with the desired anonymity. There are no questions regarding personal information. This 
aims to make respondents freer when responding to the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
also avoids interviewer bias. All these factors make it an appropriate method for testing our 
ideas regarding the regulation of insider dealing. 
The researcher explained why the information was being collected through attaching a 
‘Letter of Consent’, a ‘Letter from the Supervisor’ and an ‘Abstract of study’ with the 
questionnaire. In addition, the cover page contained outlines of the research and of the 
rights of respondents.163 These measures were important for proving credibility and 
increasing the response rate.   
The questionnaire was peripherally developed through writing down the broad aims of the 
thesis. Research questions also provided a basis for the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was conducted following the second year of study. This meant that the researcher had a 
general view of the ideas that needed to be tested. The first step was brainstorming through 
                                                 
161 NIGEL GILBERT Researching Social Life (London 2nd: Sage Publication, 2001). p.91. 
162 BILL GILLHAM Developing a Questionnaire (London: Continuum, 2000). pp.5-8. 
163 Details of adopted ethical research principles were explained to the participants through the sent letters and 
the cover page of the questionnaire. See Appendix 2: translation of the questionnaire (English); and Appendix 
4: translation of letter of consent (English). 
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writing down the research questions and dividing them into specific questions which could 
be included in a questionnaire. The researcher also made use of the financial media in order 
to gain an insight into the issues which face investors in UAE financial markets. 
The questionnaire was piloted on a reasonable basis, since saving time was critical. The 
researcher used some important comments from academics.164 The next step was in the 
field, where the researcher asked three appropriate investors on the trading floor of Abu 
Dhabi Financial Market to go through the questionnaire. Watching them and noting their 
inquiries was an important test for the questionnaire. This exercise provided important 
observations in terms of the layout of the questionnaire, its clarity and how the respondents 
perceived the questions. All the observations were taken into account in redefining the 
questionnaire. 
Two main concepts were considered in this questionnaire. First, the length of questionnaire 
was kept to minimum; since investors’ time is valuable they would not have responded to a 
long questionnaire. Second, there were no personal questions asked in the questionnaire. It 
did not seem necessary to test variables of age, education and income.  Testing the 
correlation of such variables was not part of our objective. The kind of questions we asked 
were directed to certain kinds of answers. That is to say ‘opinion questions’, which required 
scaled or ranked responses.165 
The final draft of the questionnaire was divided into three sections. In Section 1 the 
respondents were asked to rank five principles of financial market regulation in order of 
importance, 1 being the most important and 5 being the least important. The ranking 
question was directed to exploring the relative importance of the principles. In Section 2 the 
respondents were asked to select from amongst ten negative aspects of financial markets 
which they thought were applicable to the markets in the UAE. This question aimed to 
identify the issues which investors complain about in the markets. Section 3 contained the 
key questions in the questionnaire. These questions were of ‘scale response’ design. The 
scale was of five degrees (strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, 
strongly disagree). At the end of each question the respondent was asked to provide 
comments, if any, supporting his/her choice or presenting further opinions. This section 
was directed to the main task of the questionnaire which was measuring the attitudes of 
                                                 
164 The comments were provided by the Supervisor Mr Robert Drury and Professor Anne Barlow from the 
School of Law. 
165 BILL GILLHAM Developing a Questionnaire (London: Continuum, 2000). p.34. 
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investors to the regulation of insider dealing. Asking for comments aimed at the reasons for 
their attitudes. The nature and organization of questions were taken into consideration. The 
questions were ordered from general to particular. There was a fair diversification in 
question types. Several questions of different types were directed to measure investors’ 
attitudes to the regulation of insider dealing. 
There is a body of rules in research methodology which determines how to choose a 
sample. When it came to sampling, the researcher selected a ‘simple random sample’. The 
research population was investors registered in the local financial markets: the Abu Dhabi 
Securities Market and the Dubai Financial Market. As of August 2007, the number of 
registered investors was as follows: in the Abu Dhabi Securities Market the number of 
registered investors was 8552166 and in the Dubai Financial Market the number of 
registered investors was 4008.167 This meant that the total research population was around 
12500 investors. 
The size of the sample was to be determined through two factors. First, a larger sample 
means decreased standard errors. The larger the sample, the more representatively it reflects 
the research population. Second, the cost of money and time was also considered. This 
meant that the size of the sample had to be reasonable according to these two factors.168 
The appropriate way was to use conventional statistical calculations. With a research 
population of 12500, the researcher decided on a ‘confidence level’ of 95% and a sample of 
200. According to the statistics table the ‘confidence interval’ was therefore 6.87. This 
meant that if 60% of the sample responded that insider dealing should be regulated, there 
would be a 95% (which is the confidence level) certainty that the true percentage of the 
population who would have said the same was between 53.13% (60 – 6.87) and 66.87% (60 
+ 6.87) where 60 is the percentage in the response and 6.87 is the ‘confidence interval’.169 
Therefore, a sample of 200 seemed appropriate for this study. 
Following the decisions regarding the type and size of sampling, the researcher commenced 
with the field work. He contacted the Abu Dhabi Financial Market and the Dubai Financial 
Market to seek help with sampling and distribution of the questionnaire.170 The two 
markets had data related to the registered investors. One difficulty was that information 
                                                 
166  Reported by the Market Awareness Department, Abu Dhabi Securities Market. 21-Aug-07. 
167  Reported by the Research and Market Relation Department, Dubai Financial Market. 21-Aug-07.  
168 ARLENE FINK How to Sample in Surveys (London 2nd: Sage Publication, 2003). p.34. 
169 ibid., pp.43-9. 
170 The researcher would like to thank the Market Awareness Department, Abu Dhabi Securities Market and 
the Research and Market Relation Department, Dubai Financial Market for their assistance. 
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regarding investors was confidential and the list of their names could not be disclosed. 
Therefore, the researcher depended on assistance from the administrative staff of the two 
markets to distribute the questionnaire. The researcher asked them to distribute the 
questionnaire to every 60th name on the list of registered investors. Thus, for example, 
numbers 1, 60, 120, 180 and so on, were chosen.171 
The initial response rate was 66%. Thus, the researcher decided to do face-to-face 
questionnaire with eligible investors on the trading floor of the two markets. This exercise 
raised the response rate to 78%, a figure which was thought to be adequate for the study 
purposes.  
Interviews 
The second method used was interviews. Choosing the interview method can be supported, 
since it allows the researcher to investigate the case in depth, recognizing its complexity 
and its context. Interviewing is appropriate for studying an organization, a policy or a 
process.172 Interviews allow the researcher to collect information from various and in-depth 
perspectives regarding one particular case. It is a suitable method for understanding the 
complexities of the problem. It also allows the researcher to discover the informal realities 
of an organization or a process.173  
Interviews are appropriate for investigating the problem of why and how insider dealing 
should be regulated. The case here is the problem of insider dealing as perceived by 
experienced individuals in the field. Information regarding this problem can be collected 
through how and why questions. The study is of a kind which requires detailed 
investigation of the problem of insider dealing in practice, and how regulation can be 
harmonised with real life. Therefore, the study depends on how and why investigation to 
collect information regarding insider dealing from the perspective of those who have the 
necessary expertise. Such experience is gained by being responsible for introducing and 
enforcing the rules. Interviews are appropriate to answering in-depth questions in the 
study.174 
                                                 
171 This is the result of 12500 (number of registered investors) divided on 200 (sample size). 
172 PUNCH, KEITH F. Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approches (London: Sage 
Publication, 2004). p.144. 
173 DAYMON, CHRISTIAN AND HOLLOWAY, IMMY Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and 
Marketing Communications (London: Routledge, 2002). pp.105-6.  
174 For a discussion see YIN, ROBERT K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods: Third publication. 
Applied Social Research Methods Series, Volume5 (London: Sage Publication, 2003). 
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In employing interviews, the aim was to collect more privileged information to answer the 
thesis questions and to support the findings of the questionnaire. The findings will also be 
verified by comparison with academic writing on insider dealing, to identify the experience 
of other jurisdictions in regulating it. 
Although interviews are time and money-consuming, this research is small-scale and 
conducted in an accessible geographical area: my home country, the UAE. This means that 
time and money were managed economically. 
While the questionnaire was more suitable for large numbers, the interviews were directed 
to a small number of interviewees. The choice of interviewees had to be justified. In this 
regard, we ensured that logical reasons underlay the selected interviewees for our study. 
When interviewing officials in the competent authorities and the financial markets there 
was no real choice. There was not a large number of experts, but rather just a few who 
needed to be interviewed. The number of interviewees was limited, for example, to those 
from official authorities who were ‘key’, and we could not afford to miss any. The 
interviews also provided an opportunity to contact important people who may have had 
privileged information. 
Perhaps, the best description of our way of selecting interviewees is ‘purposive’.175 In this 
kind of sampling, the researcher knows the specific informants who are thought to be 
important for information. Thus, the researcher selected the interviewees with a specific 
purpose in mind: it was thought that they were important to the investigation. In our study, 
the interviewees were to make special contributions and they had insight knowledge. Thus, 
deliberately choosing them was justified. Another justification was that the interviews did 
not aim to produce generalizations so much as to produce information based on the 
experience and knowledge of the participants. 
When we planned to interview, for example, officials or experts from the Securities and 
Commodities Authority (SCA) it did not seem necessary to interview a large number from 
that organization. Interviewing one key member of the SCA was representative and useful. 
Therefore, we interviewed the legal consultant to the SCA. The same procedure was 
appropriate for the Abu Dhabi Securities Market and the Dubai Financial Market, where we 
interviewed the legal consultants. From the Dubai Financial Services Authority, the 
Regulator of the Dubai International Financial Centre, we interviewed three key 
                                                 
175 MARTYN DENSCOMBE The Good Research Guide (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998). p.15. 
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anonymous experts.  
It is thought that if the informant trusts the researcher they will disclose more information 
in face-to-face interviews.176 Therefore, it was expected that the interviewees would 
demand that the researcher establish his credibility. First, the researcher contacted the 
organization and asked for the appropriate person to participate in the interview. Second, 
the researcher sent a ‘Letter of Consent’, a ‘Letter from the Supervisor’ and an ‘Abstract of 
study’, either by e-mail or fax.177 Third, there was no personal connection with the 
interviewees. The researcher contacted the organizations to which the interviewees 
belonged to seek access, and they arranged the time and place of the interviews. Fourth, the 
researcher managed to attend at the right time and place and asked the interviewees to read 
the letter of consent. Fifth, the researcher always asked the interviewees’ permission to 
sound record the interviews and all the interviews were recorded. 
When it comes to the structure of interviewing, there are varied dimensions. Interviews can 
be classified into three main categories: structured, semi-structured and unstructured. For 
the purposes of this study, it seemed that the semi-structured interview was the appropriate 
method to collect information from the chosen participants. 
Amongst the various kinds of interviews, we discovered that the ‘elite’ interview was an 
appropriate description of the interviews for our study. The ‘elite interview’ is defined as 
“…when you interview someone in a position of authority, or especially expert or 
authoritative, people who are capable of giving answers with insight and a comprehensive 
grasp of what it is you are researching.”178 It can be confirmed that this is an accurate 
description of the way in which we conducted the interviews. Our aim was to collect 
information from those who had the necessary expertise because they were in charge of 
enforcing insider dealing regulation. Thus, it was proper to say that we aimed to conduct 
elite interviews. This kind of interviewing has special characteristics which made it 
appropriate for the purposes of our study. The interviews were unstructured, which meant 
that the researcher asked a few key open questions and these questions were open-ended. 
The reason was that the interviewees were experts. They contributed to the researcher’s 
knowledge and they even directed the conversation towards what should be asked. This was 
                                                 
176 MARTYN DENSCOMBE The Good Research Guide (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998). pp.110-1. 
177 Details of the adopted ethical research principles were explained to the participants through the letters sent. 
See footnote 163. 
178 BILL GILLHAM Case Study Research Methods (London: Continuum, 2000). pp.63-4. 
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expected of expert interviewees.179 The interviews aimed to explore experiences rather than 
general simple data. The questions were ‘open’ and needed an extended response from the 
interviewees. The interviewees were given sufficient breadth to speak of their knowledge. 
They were disconcerted if faced with a series of questions. On the contrary, they had their 
own structure and reasoning of the problem.180 In fact, bearing in mind that these were elite 
interviews, the researcher raised topics rather than questions. The interviews were practical, 
the aim being to collect information regarding related procedures, documents and other 
people the researcher may have had to interview. 
The elite interviews also had important characteristics which were expected to reflect on 
the result of the analysis. The researcher conducted ten interviews, seven of them were 
sound recorded and fully reported in the transcriptions. This was due to the quality of 
collected information, and its potential for supporting the argumentation. The transcriptions 
were edited and summarized to highlight the contents reasonably significant to the thesis. 
Moreover, due to the interview quality and length it was expected that there would be 
contents which could be directly quoted. This would provide evidence for supporting the 
argumentation of the thesis.181 
 
 
                                                 
179 BILL GILLHAM Case Study Research Methods (London: Continuum, 2000). p.64. 
180 BILL GILLHAM loc.cit. 
181 BILL GILLHAM loc.cit. 
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Results and analysis of the applied study 
The questionnaire 
Since the questionnaire was directed at Arabic speaking respondents, it was written in 
Arabic.  It was translated into English as precisely as possible, taking into consideration 
that there would still be linguistic differences. The questionnaire was collected following 
the second to third week of distribution, to allow respondents adequate time for completion. 
The analysis of the questionnaire was comparatively easy for a social science questionnaire. 
There were no multiple variables which required extensive analysis of correlation. The 
questionnaire aimed at measuring investors’ attitudes towards the regulation of insider 
dealing, without paying attention to variables such as age, income, and gender.  Therefore, 
the researcher decided to use ‘Microsoft Excel’ as a computer programme. This provided 
the necessary computation for the collected data. The data were entered to be processed 
into information that made sense for the purposes of the study.182 
In Section 1 of the questionnaire the respondents were asked to rank five principles of 
financial market regulation in order of importance. They were to give 1 as the most 
important principle, 2 as the next most important principle, and so on. The ranking question 
was directed to exploring the relative importance of the principles. To make sense of the 
collected data, we extracted all the responses (1 to 5) and entered them on an Excel 
spreadsheet. We gave the numerical score (1) where the rank was (1) and the numerical 
score (2) where the rank was (2) and so on. When we added up all of the numerical scores 
for each option, the lowest total was the most important priority in financial market 
regulation, the highest total would be the least important priority in financial market 
regulation, and so on.183 The results of this section are represented in Table 1. 
 
 
                                                 
182 See Appendix 5: questionnaire  numerical scores. 
183 This method has been criticized by mathematicians arguing that it implies an interpretation of scale to say 
it can only represent how much respondents prefer one option to another. However, it has hardly been argued 
that this method is invalid to represent the overall order of preference. A detailed discussion of these 
arguments is beyond the remit of this thesis. 
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Table 1: Ranking of five principles of market regulation. Total numerical scores 
where the lowest total represents the most important priority in financial market 
regulation, the highest total represents the least important priority in financial market 
regulation, and so on. 
 Total numerical 
score. 
Rank  
1- Financial markets should be transparent and issuers should       
make timely disclosure of any inside information. 
336 1 
2- Financial markets should be controlled only by economic factors, 
not by regulations. 
543 5 
3- Insiders should not be allowed to use inside information for their 
own benefit. 
519 4 
4- Investors in financial markets should be put on an equal footing 
and their rights should be protected. 
387 2 
5- There should be an implementation of international standards of 
regulation in the local financial markets of any country. 
420 3 
 
An analysis of the collected data revealed the following results:  
 
Figure 1:  Ranking of five principles of market regulation. 
 
The results show that investors think that the first priority is that ‘financial markets should 
be transparent and issuers should make timely disclosure of any inside information’. The 
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second priority was that ‘investors in financial markets should be put on an equal footing 
and their rights should be protected’. The third priority was that ‘there should be an 
implementation of international standards of regulation in the local financial markets of any 
country’. 
It is surprising that investors thought that the second least important principle was ‘insiders 
should not be allowed to use inside information for their own benefit’. In fact the numerical 
scores show a slight difference between the fourth and the fifth ranked principles. In other 
words, respondents gave the regulation of insider dealing a very low importance. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that the regulation of insider dealing is not important. This 
view is supported by the fact that the results of the following questions show a different 
attitude towards the regulation of insider dealing, where investors paid more attention to the 
practice. Perhaps the most important principle for investors is that the market is transparent 
and issuers make a timely disclosure of any inside information. In any case, this is what 
they require from the market. If it was explained to them that insider dealing may affect 
transparency and delay timely disclosure, they may have selected the regulation of insider 
dealing as a high priority. 
Investors also made ‘financial markets should be controlled only by economic factors, not 
by regulations’ the least important principle in financial markets regulation. In fact this 
principle was introduced to test the hypothesis by some economists that economic factors 
should be considered in regulating financial markets. It tests investors’ preference between 
controlling the market by economic factors or by regulation. The results show that investors 
prefer regulatory intervention to control financial markets. 
Investors prioritised the three most important principles of financial market regulations as 
follows: 
1. Financial markets should be transparent and issuers should make timely disclosure 
of any inside information. 
2. Investors in financial markets should be put on an equal footing and their rights 
should be protected. 
3. There should be an implementation of international standards of regulation in the 
local financial markets of any country. 
In fact, these three principles are the main basis of arguments that insider dealing should be 
regulated in diverse jurisdictions. The first two principles are used by the researcher to 
sustain his argument that there should be further regulation of insider dealing in the UAE. 
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In Section 2 of the questionnaire the respondents were asked to select from ten negative 
aspects of financial markets which they thought were applicable to the local markets in the 
UAE. This question aimed to identify the issues which investors complain about in the 
markets, and to measure relatively the current problems which investors face. (See 
Figures2, 3 below). 
Figure 2:  Negative aspects of local financial markets in the UAE vs. percentage of investors 
who think that such aspects are applicable to the local markets in the UAE.
The market is not 
transparent.
13%
Share prices do not reflect 
the true value.
13%
The level of timely 
disclosure is inappropriate.
9%
There is prejudice between 
investors.
7%
Insiders are not punished for 
insider dealing.
13%
Conflict of interests is 
uncontrolled.
5%
The market can be easily 
abused by bigger portfolio 
investors.
16%
The laws and regulations are 
not clear.
6%
There is no civil remedy for 
plaintiff investors.
11%
There is uncertainty and 
conflict between the powers 
of the authorities regulating 
financial markets.
7%
 
Figure 2:  Negative aspects of local financial markets in the UAE vs. percentage of investors who think 
that such aspects are applicable to the local markets in the UAE. 
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Figure 3:   The percentage of negative aspects in the local financial markets   vs. percentage of 
investors who thought that such aspects are applicable to the local markets in the UAE.
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
The market
can be easily
abused by
bigger
portfolio
investors.
Share prices
do not reflect
the true value.
Insiders are
not punished
for insider
dealing.
The market is
not
transparent.
There is no
civil remedy
for plaintiff
investors.
The level of
timely
disclosure is
inappropriate.
There is
prejudice
between
investors.
There is
uncertainty
and conflict
between the
powers of the
authorities
regulating
financial
markets.
The laws and
regulations
are not clear.
Conflict of
interests is
uncontrolled.
negative aspects
 
Figure 3: 
   
The results show that investors think that the most significant problems in UAE local 
financial markets are: 
1- The market can be easily abused by bigger portfolio investors. 
2- Share prices do not reflect the true value. 
3- Insiders are not punished for insider dealing. 
4- The market is not transparent. 
This means that insider dealing was thought by investors to be a significant problem. In 
fact, it was the third most significant problem in the markets. This shows a different result 
from that in Section 1, where the regulation of insider dealing seemed to be unimportant. It 
is also important to note that the most negative aspect was thought to be ‘the market can be 
easily abused by bigger portfolio investors’. This means that investors think that there is 
‘market abuse’ and they feel that it is a negative aspect which has not been resolved. It is 
the researcher’s view that market abuse and insider dealing both come under the umbrella 
of market misconduct. All such acts need tougher financial markets regulation. 
It is also important that investors think that the second negative aspect was ‘share prices do 
not reflect the true value’. Such a view indicates the emergent level of the market in terms 
of share price informativeness. This may be because investors think that ‘the market is not 
transparent’.  It may also provide an indication that investors think that there is insider 
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dealing and market abuse which affect market transparency and cause uninformative share 
prices. Investors also think that the fifth negative aspect was ‘there is no civil remedy for 
plaintiff investors’. 
However, one result in these findings may undermine this conclusion, although it does not 
completely render it false. Only 9% of investors thought that ‘the level of timely disclosure 
is inappropriate’. This result slightly undermined the general trend of investors’ attitudes, 
considering that 13% of investors believed that ‘the market is not transparent’ and 14% 
believed that ‘share prices do not reflect the true value’. In other words, ‘the level of timely 
disclosure is inappropriate’ was the sixth negative aspect, and this weakened the conclusion 
that the market was not transparent. 
This trend is similar to what experts in local financial markets think of the level of 
disclosure. This was obvious in the interviews. When interviewees were questioned on the 
subject of the level of disclosure, they said that there was sufficient regulation of disclosure. 
However, discussing problems of disclosure in more detail revealed that there were 
shortcomings in the regulations. For example, a common difficulty was: 
  
This is also a problem in our jurisdiction, which is the disclosure of information to 
the media before an official disclosure to the regulator. This is dangerous. The 
news may be published inaccurately and differently from one section of the media 
to another. It may also be written in a certain way, or a part of the information 
which does not reflect the whole may be given.184 
 
Both investors and experts thought that the level of disclosure was acceptable to a certain 
degree. However, when they were asked in more detail, their opinions revealed gross 
shortcomings in disclosure, such as leaking information to the media and selective 
disclosure. 
The last four negative aspects which were thought by investors to be the least applicable to 
UAE markets were: ‘there is prejudice between investors’, ‘there is uncertainty and conflict 
between the powers of the authorities regulating financial markets’, ‘the laws and 
regulations are not clear’ and ‘conflict of interests is uncontrolled’. 
It is surprising that investors do not feel more strongly that ‘the laws and regulations are not 
clear’. In fact, they are not clear even to legal counsels. The interviews show a different 
result, where expert interviewees think that the laws and regulations are not clear. They also 
                                                 
184 TOJAN AL SHURIDEH, Legal Consultant, Securities and Commodities Authority Interview Transcript. See 
Appendix 6,  Interview (3).  
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think that there is uncertainty and conflict between the powers of the different regulators, 
and there is uncontrolled conflict of interests. 
When asked about the clarity of the laws and regulations, Habib Almulla, Former MP 
(Member of the Federal National Council) and Former Chairman of the Dubai Financial 
Services Authority said: 
 
The laws and regulations of the SCA have been issued without prior rigorous 
study. The drafting team constituted non-specialists in financial markets and 
securities regulation. The laws were issued with no comparison with the laws and 
regulations in financial markets in developed countries. This fact resulted in our 
not benefiting from the experiences of other jurisdictions and we wasted a chance 
to avoid the shortcomings of such jurisdictions. There are legal and judicial 
precedents which could have been beneficial if considered in drafting the new 
law. Introducing details of the new law should also have been considered, because 
there are no judicial precedents which can be used as directions by the courts. As 
a consequence, all these factors caused the issuing of superficial laws.185 
 
He also said: 
 
It can be said that there are no legal rules accurately drafted to face the problem of 
insider dealing. There has to be administrative penalties. There have to be civil 
remedies. Proper authority should be given to the SCA.186 
 
The legal advisor of the Abu Dhabi Securities Market agreed that there was uncertainty and 
overlap between the regulatory authorities: 
I agree. In UAE law there is a great overlap between the responsibilities of the 
SCA and the markets. This issue needs to be radically resolved by a federal law, 
which should segregate between the role of the SCA and that of the markets… 
Yes, there is overlap, and this is known by the SCA and the markets.187 
 
One explanation of the difference between the attitude of investors and experts is the 
perspective they take on the problem. Investors look for real results on the floor. Their 
opinion can be indicative of the level of transparency, informative share prices and market 
abuse. They may have little experience of what good quality regulation is and how it can be 
enforced to solve the problems they face. Therefore, on plain legal issues, it could be 
argued that a few expert opinions may provide a better indication than a large number of 
investors’ opinions. 
                                                 
185 HABIB ALMULLA, Former MP (Member of the Federal National Council) and Former Chairman of the 
Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interview (4). 
186 ibid. 
187 MITHKAL OBAIDAT, Legal Advisor, Abu Dhabi Securities Market, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, 
Interview (2). 
 112
In Section 3 of the questionnaire, the questions were designed for a ‘scale response’. This 
section was directed to the main task of the questionnaire: measuring attitudes of investors 
towards the regulation of insider dealing. In analysis, the researcher combined ‘strongly 
agree’ and ‘agree’ because both indicate ‘agree’. The same was done with disagreement. 
This aimed at calculating the average of agreement and disagreement and avoiding 
extravagant trends of investors’ opinions. At the end of each question the respondent was 
asked to provide comments, if any, supporting his/her choice or presenting further opinions. 
Asking for comments aimed at identifying why they have such an attitude, there were a 
number of valuable comments which could provide explanations for numerical quantitative 
results. The results are illustrated by figures which, by design, highlight the percentages of 
responses. 
The questions in Section 3 of the questionnaire were purposely ordered. They began by 
asking investors their opinions regarding insider dealing in general. Then they were 
questioned regarding possible occurrences of insider dealing in the UAE. Following this, 
they were asked regarding possible solutions to insider dealing. 
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There has always been controversy regarding the ethical element in regulating insider 
dealing. Investors were asked and, interestingly, the results showed that 92% of investors 
thought that insider dealing was unfair to other investors who did not have access to inside 
information.  Only 4% of investors disagreed (Figure 4). Some comments given by 
investors provided important indications. Some of the investors commented: “It (insider 
dealing) creates an atmosphere where there is inequality of opportunities”; “There should 
be equality between insiders and shareholders investors”; and “All information should be 
made clear for all investors”. These results are also supported by the findings of the 
interviews: 
 
Interviewer: There are economists who argue that insider dealing should not be 
prohibited. 
Interviewee: Justice requires that regulators are established to provide information 
for all investors at the same time and of the same quality. There 
should not be dissimilarity in informing. Is it fair to allow insiders to 
exploit inside information? Why should other investors lose because 
of them?188 
 
Figure 4:  Do you think that insider dealing is unfair to other   investors who do not have access to 
inside information?
Agree
92%
Disagree
4%
Neither agree nor disagree
4%
 
Figure 4 
  
                                                 
188 TOJAN AL SHURIDEH, Legal Consultant, Securities and Commodities Authority Interview Transcript. See 
Appendix 6, Interview (3). 
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When asked whether insider dealing has negative effects on the transparency of the market, 
86% of investors agreed. Only 2% of investors disagreed, while 12% neither agreed nor 
disagreed (Figure 5). They commented that: “This (insider dealing) causes non-
transparency” and “Because he (the insider) knows the price of the securities depending on 
non-public information”. 
 
 Figure 5:  Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on transparency in financial 
markets?
Agree
86%
Disagree
2%Neither agree nor disagree
12%
 
Figure 5 
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An important hypothesis which needed to be tested was the effects of insider dealing on 
investor confidence. A total of 86% of investors think that insider dealing has negative 
effects on investor confidence in the market, whereas only 8% disagree (Figure 6). One of 
the investors who thought that insider dealing may not have significant effects on the 
economic efficiency of the market said: “We complain when we lose and do not complain 
when we make a profit. But confidence is more important that making a small profit”. We 
asked the legal consultant of the SCA regarding the role of regulations: 
 
Interviewer: What will the rules do? 
Interviewee: They at least sustain confidence in the markets. It will not give the 
chance for everyone to exploit the situation.189 
An anonymous interviewee from the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) also said: 
The financial systems are built primarily on their integrity.   Once they lose their 
integrity you may find that there is a collapse in the financial system. If you look 
at the not-so-recent big collapses in the US during the last ten years, the effect of 
that was a disruption to the confidence in the system.190  
Figure 6:  Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on investor confidence in 
financial markets? 
Agree
86%
Disagree
8%
Neither agree nor disagree
6%
 
Figure 6
                                                 
189 TOJAN AL SHURIDEH, Legal Consultant, Securities and Commodities Authority Interview Transcript. See 
Appendix 6, Interview (3). 
190 ANONYMOUS 2, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
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When it came to the negative effects of insider dealing on the economic efficiency of the 
market, the percentage of agreement declined. Of investors, 63% agreed that insider dealing 
negatively affects market efficiency. One of them commented “It (insider dealing) affects 
the powers of supply and demand in the market”. But it is important to note that 27% of 
investors neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 7). The last result showed that investors were 
unable to provide a certain answer. This is, though, not surprising. As we discussed earlier, 
even financial economists reached controversial results in this regard.  
Figure 7:   Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on the economic efficiency of 
financial markets?
Agree
63%
Disagree
10%
Neither agree nor disagree
27%
 
 
Figure 7 
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When asked whether insider dealing had effects on the economy of the country, 57% of 
investors agreed, whereas only 16% disagreed. Also, a large percentage (27% of investors) 
neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 8). This is justified, as one investor responded: 
“Because the economy of the country is not confined to portfolio management”. It means 
that it is difficult to see the effects of market abuse on the larger economy, except when 
such abuse is significantly serious. 
Figure 8:   Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on the economy of the 
country?
Agree
57%
Disagree
16%
Neither agree nor disagree
27%
 
Figure 8 
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Investors were asked whether they thought that insider dealing has negative effects on 
attracting liquidity into the markets. A total of 72% of investors agreed that insider dealing 
caused liquidity escape, while only 12% disagreed (Figure 9). One of them said: “Because 
of losing confidence capital hesitates entering into the market”.  
Figure 9:   Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on attracting liquidity into 
the financial markets?
Agree
72%
Disagree
12%
Neither agree nor disagree
16%
 
Figure 9 
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Then investors were asked whether insider dealing repelled foreign liquidity from the 
market. Of investors, 71% agreed, while only 4% disagreed. But a large percentage (25% of 
investors) neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 10). Interviews also showed supporting 
results. An anonymous member of the Dubai Financial Services Authority said: 
…when you say that you want to open up the Dubai market, the rest of the world 
will be looking at you.  If there is insider dealing activity they say, ‘why are you 
not doing anything about it? You are advantaging other investors over me, so I am 
not going to invest my money there. 191 
 
Figure 10:   Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on attracting foreign 
investments into the financial markets?
Agree
71%
Disagree
4%
Neither agree nor disagree
25%
 
Figure 10 
 
 
                                                 
191 ANONYMOUS 1, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
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The aforementioned questions were directed to enquire about the negative effects of insider 
dealing. They were followed by asking investors an important question: “do you think that 
insider dealing should be prohibited?” The vast majority of investors (78%) thought that 
insider dealing should be prohibited. Only 12% of investors disagreed and 10% neither 
agreed nor disagreed (Figure 11). This shows the attitude of investors towards insider 
dealing and supports the argument that insider dealing should be regulated. 
 
Figure 11:   Do you think that insider dealing should be prohibited?
Agree
78%
Disagree
12%
Neither agree nor disagree
10%
 
Figure 11 
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The following questions were used to enquire about possible solutions to insider dealing. 
When they were asked whether insider dealing could be dealt with by financial market 
regulation, the majority of investors (74%) agreed, while only 14% disagreed (Figure 12). 
This provides a clear result, since it is supported by other results in the questionnaire. In 
fact, it supports the general attitude of investors who, according to the questionnaire, think 
that insider dealing is a problem they face and regulation should be developed to 
international standards.  
 
Figure 12:   Do you think that insider dealing can be dealt with by financial market regulation?
Agree
74%
Disagree
14%
Neither agree nor disagree
12%
 
Figure 12 
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Another important hypothesis tested by the questionnaire was the necessity of adopting 
international standards. Investors were asked: “do you think that adopting international 
regulatory standards is necessary to advance the transparency of the local financial markets 
in the UAE?” The results were noteworthy. Almost all investors (98%) agreed that 
international regulatory standards should be adopted in local financial markets in the UAE, 
whereas only 2% disagreed. This result shows the importance of adopting international 
standards in financial market regulation. It also provides a solid basis for the argument that 
in the UAE investors want to raise the level of transparency to international levels. In fact, 
this was one of the main reasons for establishing the Dubai International Financial Centre.  
As one interviewee said: 
The reason why a separate financial market was created was that there is no 
financial market between Singapore and London that is aligned with international 
standards. What we do have is some local regional markets; none of these markets 
operates in accordance with international standards.192  
 
 
Figure 13:   Do you think that adopting international regulatory standards is necessary to advance 
the transparency of the local financial markets in the UAE?
Agree
98%
Neither agree or disagree
2%
 
Figure 13 
 
                                                 
192 ANONYMOUS 1, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
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We asked investors whether insider dealing and market abuse contributed to the unofficial 
securities market in the UAE in 1998. Only 10% of investors disagreed, 18% neither agreed 
nor disagreed and the majority (72%) agreed (Figure 14). It is noteworthy that international 
reports confirmed that there was market abuse and insider dealing which contributed to the 
collapse. Perhaps one reason why some investors disagreed was the confusion as to whether 
there was a market at all. One of them commented: “In 1998 there was no financial market 
at all”. It is always difficult to explain to respondents all the details. The question was 
specified by the term “unofficial securities market”. There was a market in 1998 from an 
economic perspective, but it was unofficial and unregulated. One of the investors who 
strongly agreed said: “And absence of laws regulating it (insider dealing)”. 
 
Figure 14: Do you think that insider dealing and other market abuse contributed to market 
deterioration in the summer of 1998 in the UAE unofficial securities market?
Agree
72%
Disagree
10%
Neither agree nor disagree
18%
 
Figure 14 
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We asked investors regarding another important turning point in local financial markets in 
the UAE. The question was: “do you think that insider dealing and other market abuse 
contributed to the bubble of 2005, followed by the sharp correction of 2006 in the local 
financial markets in the UAE?” Only 10% of investors disagreed, 12% neither agreed nor 
disagreed and a significant majority of 78% agreed (Figure 15). This finding supports those 
investors who think that there is no transparency and there is insider dealing activity. These 
respondents agreed when asked whether such factors contributed to the bubble.  
By the word “contributed” in the question, we indicated that insider dealing and market 
abuse were not the only causes, but had only contributed to the bubble. There are, of 
course, other reasons for the bubble. These points could not be explained in more detail, 
because the question had to be as simple as possible. 
One investor who strongly agreed said: “There is no protection in the market; small 
investors are mostly the plaintiffs”. Another who agreed stated: “The other reason is 
withdrawing liquidity from the market”. The latter comment also proves that investors were 
thinking about other causes. 
Figure 15:   Do you think that insider dealing and other market abuse contributed to the 
bubble of 2005 followed by the sharp correction in 2006 in the local financial markets in the 
UAE?
Agree
78%
Disagree
10%
Neither agree nor disagree
12%
 
Figure 15
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Subsequent to the above-mentioned questions, we asked investors: “do you think that the 
current regulations are sufficient for avoiding further deterioration in the local financial 
markets in the UAE?”  Of those asked, 40% of investors disagreed that the current 
regulations were sufficient, whereas 33% agreed. It is important to note that a large 
percentage (27%) neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 16). This may indicate that they 
were uncertain, either regarding the quality of current regulation or the predictability of 
further deterioration. One investor who agreed commented: “They are efficient to some 
extent”. Another who disagreed said: “There should be more regulation benchmarked to 
Malaysian regulation”. 
 
Figure 16:   Do you think that the current regulation is sufficient to avoid further deterioration in the 
local financial markets in the UAE?
Agree
33%
Disagree
40%
Neither agree nor disagree
27%
 
Figure 16 
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It was important to measure investors’ attitudes towards the level of protection of their 
rights in the markets. We asked them: “do you think that investors’ rights are protected in 
the local financial markets in the UAE?” The majority (52%) of investors thought that their 
rights were not protected, 24% agreed that there was protection for their rights, while 24% 
neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 17). The responses may have been affected by 
investors’ different experiences in terms of the protection of their rights. One of them 
asserted: “There is no protection of investors’ rights in the country”. Another maintained: 
“There is no protection at all, especially for small investors”. 
 
Figure 17:   Do you think that investors’ rights are protected in the local financial markets in 
the UAE?
Agree
24%
Disagree
52%
Neither agree nor disagree
24%
 
Figure 17  
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A significant finding was made when investors were asked: “do you think that transparency 
and disclosure should be developed in the local financial markets in the UAE?” Almost all 
investors (98%) agreed, while only 2% neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 18). None of 
the investors disagreed. This noteworthy result also showed the importance of transparency 
and disclosure from the investors’ point of view. The questionnaire measured this 
importance, and in this question it measured the need for more development in transparency 
and disclosure. One of the investors who strongly agreed commented: “The media should 
get involved in the market. The level of issuers’ disclosure obligations should be raised. 
Investors should see the dealings”. 
 
Figure 18:   Do you think that transparency and disclosure should be developed in the local 
financial markets in the UAE?
Agree
98%
Neither agree or disagree
2%
 
Figure 18 
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In Section 2 of the questionnaire it appears that investors do not see the clarity of the laws 
and regulations as a problem in local financial markets in the UAE. A similar question was 
asked again: “do you think that the current law prohibiting insider dealing in the local 
financial markets in the UAE is clear?” Of investors, 40% thought that the law was not 
clear, 31% agreed that it was clear and 29% neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 19). It can 
be said that a majority thought that the law of insider dealing was not clear. One investor 
went further when he commented “There is no law preventing insider dealing”. However, 
to depend on normal investors’ opinions on a complicated legal point in which they have 
little experience is unsound. The results show that 29% of investors neither agreed nor 
disagreed. This probably indicates investors’ lack of knowledge regarding the law. 
 
Figure 19:    Do you think that the current law prohibiting insider dealing in the local financial 
markets in the UAE is clear?
Agree
31%
Disagree
40%
Neither agree nor disagree
29%
 
Figure 19 
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Subsequent to the last question, investors were asked: “do you think that the current law 
prohibiting insider dealing in the local financial markets in the UAE is practically enforced 
by the authorities?” A total of 35% of investors disagreed, 36% neither agreed nor 
disagreed and only 29% agreed (Figure 20). The responses are quite similar to those of the 
last question. Thus, from the results of these two questions it is unsafe to reach a 
conclusion. In these two questions, when asking investors regarding the law and regulation, 
we obtain break down results as indicated in Figures 19 and 20. One explanation why the 
results do not show an assertive opinion by investors is that in practice they do not see the 
whole picture. Investors know their part of the process, but they do not necessarily 
understand the law and regulation of the markets. It can only be said from the earlier 
question that to a certain degree the law of insider dealing is unclear. 
 
Figure 20:   Do you think that the current law prohibiting insider dealing in the local financial 
markets in the UAE is practically enforced by the authorities?
Agree
29%Disagree
35%
Neither agree nor disagree
36%
 
Figure 20  
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One of the basic tenets of the thesis is that disclosure is a practical preventive weapon 
against insider dealing. Investors were asked: “do you think that insider dealing can be 
prevented by raising the level of transparency and disclosure in the regulations?” The 
response shows that a substantial majority of investors (82%) agreed, while only 4% 
disagreed (Figure 21). This result builds on former questions which all prove that 
disclosure is by far the most vital issue for investors, and perhaps for all market 
participants. 
 
Figure 21:   Do you think that insider dealing can be prevented by raising the level of transparency 
and disclosure in the regulations?
Agree
82%
Disagree
4%
Neither agree nor disagree
14%
 
Figure 21 
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The last two questions aimed to measure investors’ opinion regarding the punishment of 
insider dealing. They were asked: “do you think that a criminal trial and punishment is 
effective in deterring insider dealing?” Among investors, 70% agreed amongst them 20% 
strongly agreed. Only 12% of investors disagreed (Figure 22). This may indicate the 
frustrated attitude of investors towards insiders. In general, it is thought that some 
jurisdictions criminalized insider dealing to meet the public’s demand. Yet, it does not 
mean that a criminal punishment is a deterrent, since it is hardly ever applied. Investors’ 
attitudes can be summed up by one of their number. He stated on the use of the criminal 
law: “To protect peoples’ rights from abuse”. 
 
Figure 22:   Do you think that a criminal trial and punishment is effective in deterring insider 
dealing?
Strongly agree
20%
Agree
50%
Disagree
12%
Strongly disagree
0%
Neither agree nor disagree
18%
 
Figure 22 
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In the last question we asked investors: “do you think that fines administered by the SCA 
would be more of a deterrent to insider dealing than a criminal punishment?” The results 
were as follows: the majority of investors (60%) agreed, amongst them 31% strongly 
agreed. Some 16% of them disagreed and 12% strongly disagreed. Those who agreed 
thought that “The fine should be a deterrent”, but they also thought that “The SCA 
currently is unqualified to do it”. Investors who disagreed commented: “Without a trial it 
would not be a deterrent” and “Because the SCA is unable to make a criminal prosecution, 
since it is not qualified to do it”. 
This result is also supported by the interviews. When we asked one interviewee: “is the 
SCA efficient at the present?” he said: “No, I honestly tell you, and record it”. 
 
Figure 23:   Do you think that fines administered by the SCA would be more of a deterrent to insider 
dealing than a criminal punishment?
Strongly agree
31%
Agree
29%
Disagree
16%
Strongly disagree
12%
Neither agree nor disagree
12%
 
Figure 23 
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Interviews 
Hitherto, the analysis has given some indications of the interviews. In fact, the interviews 
were so long that summarising them in less than one subsection may undervalue their 
results. They resulted in more that 5 hours of recordings, the transcripts of which are 
extensive. For example, the transcript of the interview with a team from the DFSA was 
approximately 4500 words; all of it contained important discussions and opinions. 
Therefore, the researcher decided that it would be better if the interviews were spread 
throughout the thesis.193 
The researcher conducted ten interviews, seven of them were sound recorded and fully 
reported in the transcripts. The other three interviews were for the researcher, as they 
provided an insight into the mechanisms for administering compliance and watching the 
markets. The interviewees were from the administrative staff of both local markets.  They 
constituted a beginning for the researcher. The transcripts of the other seven interviews 
contained important discussions and opinions that could be used to support the arguments 
of the thesis. Moreover, due to the quality and length of the interviews it was expected that 
there would be contents which could be directly quoted. This would be useful in providing 
evidence to support the argument of the thesis. 
The first interviewee was Mithkal Obaidat, Legal Advisor to the Abu Dhabi Securities 
Market. The questions in the interview related to the role of the market in enforcing the 
law, his opinion regarding the rules directed to insider dealing and any recommendations 
for reform. 
The second interview was with Abdulla Al Dhaheri a Head of Section in Listing and 
Compliance in the Abu Dhabi Securities Market. The questions in the interview related to 
the role of his section in enforcing the rules on insider dealing, enforcing the regulations of 
disclosure and areas in which they face difficulty that may need further regulation. 
The third interviewee was Tojan Al Shurideh, Legal Consultant to Securities and 
Commodities Authority. The questions in this interview related to the rules dedicated to 
regulating insider dealing. The interview concentrated on how the rules could be interpreted 
and applied, shortcomings in their drafting, and recent amendments, recommendations and 
proposals. 
                                                 
193 All transcripts are included in Appendix 6. 
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The fourth, fifth and sixth interviewees preferred to be simultaneously interviewed and they 
asked for anonymity. Therefore, they were numbered 1, 2 and 3. It can only be said that 
they were DFSA staff. The questions in the interview related to discussing the separate 
jurisdiction of the DIFC, the reasons for establishing it, and how local markets could 
benefit from its regulations and international standards of regulation. 
The seventh interviewee was Habib Almulla, former MP (Member of the Federal National 
Council) and former Chairman of the Dubai Financial Services Authority. The interview 
could not be recorded due to technical problems. Nevertheless, the interviewee provided an 
important outline of opinions regarding a comparison between the DIFC and local financial 
markets, the shortcomings in local financial markets regulations and the principles of any 
amendments. 
A summary of the results of the applied study 
It is important to represent briefly the main results of the applied study, avoiding any 
repetition. It can be said that: 
1- Investors think that the most important priorities of financial markets are; ‘financial 
markets should be transparent and issuers should make timely disclosure of any inside 
information’ and ‘investors in financial markets should be put on an equal footing and 
their rights should be protected’. Almost all investors think that transparency and 
disclosure should be developed in local financial markets in the UAE. They also think 
that insider dealing can be prevented by raising the level of transparency and disclosure 
in the regulations. Another critical result of the questionnaire is that most investors 
think that their rights are not protected in the local financial markets in the UAE. 
2- The issues which investors complain most about in the UAE local financial markets are:  
 Insider dealing was thought to be a significant problem by the investors. 
 The market can be easily abused by bigger portfolio investors. 
 Share prices do not reflect the true value. 
 Insiders are not punished for insider dealing. 
 The market is not transparent. 
3- The applied study showed that most investors and experts think that: 
 Insider dealing is unfair. 
 Insider dealing has negative effects on the transparency of the market, 
investor confidence, the economic efficiency of the market, the economy of 
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the country, and attracting liquidity and foreign investments into the 
markets. 
4- The majority of investors think that insider dealing should be regulated. They think that 
it could be dealt with by implementing international regulatory standards. This is 
supported by the experts who showed consensus that insider dealing should be 
regulated. 
5- The majority of investors think that insider dealing contributed to the deterioration in 
the UAE markets in 1998 and 2006. They also think that the current regulations are 
insufficient for avoiding further deteriorations in the local financial markets. 
6- Most of the investors think that the current law prohibiting insider dealing in the 
financial markets in the UAE is not clear. They also think that the current law is not 
practically enforced by the authorities. The interviews support the view that the laws 
and regulations are not clear and that there is uncertainty and conflict between the 
powers of the authorities regulating financial markets. Expert interviewees explained 
in-depth their opinions in regard to the current regulation of insider dealing. They 
supported our proposition that there are gross shortfalls in the regulation, as was 
explained in the preceding chapter. They also agreed that there should be reform to the 
regulatory system, and that the SCA as a regulator should be more empowered and 
efficient. 
7- Most of the investors thought that a criminal trial and punishment would be effective in 
deterring insider dealing. However, they also agreed that fines administered by the 
Securities and Commodities Authority would be more of a deterrent to insider dealing 
than a criminal punishment. 
Conclusion 
This applied study provides solid ground for testing hypotheses and supporting the 
arguments of the thesis. The fact that the applied methodology is half the story, while the 
other half is a comparative legal study, should be taken into consideration. Thus, the 
applied study has been conducted on a reasonable scale. There should not be over-
dependence on the findings of this study, since they only provide certain indications for the 
research. Only further in-depth applied study in the same area, which is lacking at the 
moment, can verify the results of this study. 
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A summary of the results of the study shows that comparing the opinions of experts with 
those of investors who receive the service provided essential results for the inquiry 
regarding the regulation of insider dealing. 
The analysis of the questionnaire is more straightforward because it is numerical and can 
easily be computed.  In contrast, the interviews were unstructured and resulted in extensive 
transcripts similar to academic articles. The interviews can be depended on as references 
producing qualitative opinions whenever needed in the thesis. 
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Introduction 
This chapter will look at the US, the UK and the Dubai International Financial Centre 
(DIFC) explaining the background to and nature of the systems of each. It will examine the 
general characteristics of the jurisdictions, the main characteristics of the regulatory 
systems and the characteristics of the rules related to insider dealing. Rather than explaining 
such regulation, it will scrutinise the background of the regulation of insider dealing in each 
jurisdiction, aiming to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each system. This 
chapter argues that looking at the general law to find suitable models for comparison is not 
useful. Therefore, it discusses three important factors in each jurisdiction: the general 
characteristics of the jurisdiction, the main characteristics of the regulatory system and the 
characteristics of the rules related to insider dealing. A brief discussion of these three 
factors will explain how the regulation of insider dealing has been formed in each 
jurisdiction. 
The chapter will adopt a ‘macro-comparison’ approach to the regulation of insider dealing 
in the three jurisdictions. This method allows the discussion of the comparative systems in 
outline in order to understand holistically the background and the nature of the systems. 
Thus, in each jurisdiction the chapter will look at the structure of the system and the way in 
which it works, as well as looking at the legislative history. The discussion of each 
jurisdiction will end with a succinct evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
system. 
At the end of the chapter there will be a summary of the main points of comparison of the 
US, UK and DIFC systems for regulating insider dealing. These are classified under the 
following topics: regulatory system, clarity of regulations, criminal/civil sanctions, 
international standards and the policy of regulation. 
In each system, there are issues that have given rise to academic discussion, since the 
problems of each system are distinct and unique. This chapter aims to introduce the three 
systems. However, it concentrates on the problematic issues in each system. It explores 
especially the history of the regulation of insider dealing and emphasis is given to the 
difficulties faced in each jurisdiction. 
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The regulation of financial markets in the US 
It is known that the most significant feature of financial regulation in the US is the 
underlying principle of disclosure. Since the 1930s, the US has worked to provide the 
leading regulatory system which can protect investors and market participants through 
information disclosure. Self-regulation traditionally underlies the financial regulation 
system in the US. Before 1929, there was resistance of federal regulation of the financial 
markets. Stock exchanges then acted as Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs), regulating 
their members. The main federal statutory framework was introduced following the 
financial crisis of 1929; it included the Securities Act 1933, the Securities Exchange Act 
1934 and the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result, 
much of the authorities were left to SROs to regulate day-to-day activities in securities 
markets, though, under thorough monitoring by the SEC.194 
It is considered that the federal securities laws mandated the SEC two types of 
responsibilities. One is administering the system of mandatory disclosure of information 
and enforcing the antifraud provisions. This task aims at providing information equally for 
all the investors. The second type of the SEC responsibilities is regulating securities 
markets. In this regard, the SEC is responsible for regulating securities industry through 
supervising SROs.195 
The US is a unique and large federal country, so the regulation and supervision of financial 
markets is conducted by a large number of regulatory bodies. Self-regulation in the US is 
conducted by exchanges registered with government regulatory bodies such as the SEC. 
The registered exchanges act as Self-Regulatory Organizations; hence they adopt specific 
regulations binding exchanges and market participants. These exchanges are also 
responsible for monitoring compliance with the standards laid down by the rules and 
regulations.196 
SROs can be exchanges, clearing houses or other organizations. The National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD) is an important SRO with the vital task of supervising the 
NASDAQ electronic exchange, over-the-counter (OTC) markets and active individuals in 
securities trading. The NASD makes rules to determine standard trading practices and 
                                                 
194 ANJALI KUMAR, TERRY M. CHUPPE AND PAULA PERTTUNEN The Regulation of Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions: the United States, the European Union and Other Countries (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
c1997). p.16. 
195 WALTER WERNER ‘The SEC as a Market Regulator’ (1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 755. pp.783-4. 
196 ibid., p.16. 
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monitors the compliance of brokers and dealers with such standards. The registered 
exchanges and the NASD as SROs are registered and monitored by federal regulators. 
Therefore, they are obliged to absorb the federal statutory framework and the rules 
forwarded by the federal regulators such as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).197 
The SEC is a federal regulatory body and was established under the Securities Exchange 
Act 1934. As a federal governmental authority, it is delegated powers by the US Congress. 
It is established as a Congressional commission, and thus is required to report regularly to 
Congress. The SEC is delegated powers to make specific rules under the federal securities 
acts. It also supervises the participants in the securities industry; securities exchanges, 
securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors and mutual funds. The supervisory task 
is directed to assure disclosure of market-related information, maintenance of fair markets 
and the combating of fraud. For the SEC to meet its supervisory tasks, brokers and dealers 
have to register with it to obtain permission to deal in securities. The SEC also monitors 
compliance with regulations in regard to new securities issued. There is a systematic 
relationship between the SEC and other SROs. The SEC is the primary regulator and 
supervisor of the US securities markets. Nevertheless, it mandates powers to other SROs. 
The SEC reserves the right to monitor the mechanism of self-regulation and to maintain 
compliance with federal securities laws. While the SROs are responsible for setting 
standards of securities trading conduct, any rules adopted by SROs have to be submitted to 
the SEC for approval. The SEC also has the power to amend any existing rules.198 
The Commodity Futures Trading Committee (CFTC) is also a federal Congressional 
commission equivalent to the SEC. The CFTC is delegated by the authorities to regulate 
and supervise the financial and commodity futures markets. There are also registered SROs 
specializing in the regulation of commodity futures markets. The mechanism of self-
regulation is similar to that applied in securities markets self-regulation. 
In addition to the federal commissions and self-regulatory organisations, each state in the 
US has its own regulatory authority. A state authority is only competent to regulate 
securities trading within the state, not across states.199 
                                                 
197 For a discussion see EDWARD F. GREENE U.S. Regulation of the International Securities and Derivatives 
Markets (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2004). Chapter 1. 
198 ibid, section (1-7). The objectives and powers of the SEC are clearly determined by the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934. 
199 ibid., section (10-73). 
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The regulation of insider dealing in the US 
It seems that early common law principles were not sufficient to prohibit insiders from 
dealing in corporate shares without the disclosure of inside information. However, from the 
1930s there has been a departure from such principles to complex federal regulation of 
insider dealing, the influence of which has resulted in the regulation of insider dealing in 
other countries, though with different legal principles and enforcement levels. It is apparent 
that the USA has developed a unique body of regulations, depending on extra powers given 
to the SEC and legal principles drawn from case law. 
By ‘early common law’ we mean the decision in Percival v. Wright200 which introduced the 
judicial principle that the director of a corporation is not under a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders not to use inside corporate information for its own benefit. This was based on 
the idea that the fiduciary duty of directors was only to the company. This judgment had 
been influential in common law countries before the introduction of any legislation 
overruling it. However, common law development in the USA has been stimulated by the 
legislation. After the stock market crash of 1929 in the United States, Congress 
promulgated the Securities Act 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 1934 as methods to 
restrain abuses and raise accountability.  
There are two distinguishable categories of provisions, from the afore-mentioned two acts, 
that are used to confront the misuse of inside information. The first category which is 
explicitly directed to prohibit insider dealing is found in Section 16(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act 1934. The second category of provisions which are used in prohibiting 
insider dealing are in fact provisions against fraudulent means in dealing in securities. 
These provisions are found in section 17(a) of the Securities Act 1933 and Section 10(b) of 
the Securities and Exchange Act. 
Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 and Section 
17(a) of the Securities Act 1933 
Section 16(b)201 is dedicated to the prevention of the unfair use of information by any 
                                                 
200 Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421. 
201 Securities and Exchange Act 1934, Section 16(b): “Profits from purchase and sale of security within six 
months”. 
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial  
owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any  
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer…involving any such equity 
security within any period of less than six months,…shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, … Suit to 
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or 
by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer … ” 
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beneficial owner, director or officer who may have obtained information from the 
corporation by virtue of his relationship to the corporation. Thus, this section makes illegal, 
except in very limited situations, any profits made in any period of less than six months (the 
period between sale and purchase or purchase and sale) by any directors, officers and 
principal holders (holders of more than 10%) from dealing in the stock of their corporation. 
An insider who breaches this section is strictly liable to the issuer, since the latter can bring 
a suit against the insider to recover the profits made. 
It is apparent that Section 16(b) is a limited provision, as it is aimed at preventing dealing 
by those insiders most likely to have access to important corporate information. There have 
been attempts to extend the term ‘beneficial ownership’, so the insider is deemed to be the 
‘beneficial owner’ of shares owned by individuals close to him. The problem has been in 
determining the limits of ‘beneficial ownership’, where dealing in the stock of the insider’s 
corporation is not done by the insider himself but by persons close to him; for example, 
partners and family members. Attempts have been directed to holding the insider liable in 
such situations even if the dealing is not made in his own name. Such attempts were 
justified on the basis of considering the close person as an ‘alter-ego’ for the insider, who is 
thought to be a direct or indirect beneficiary. In Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co.,202 Mr. 
Whiting was an insider to the company Dow Chemical Co. His wife Mrs. Whiting sold 
some shares of the Dow Corporation during September and November of 1973. This was 
followed by Mr. Whiting dealing in stock option granted to him by the company. The court 
found Mr. Whiting liable under Section 16 (b) since he had received direct benefit from his 
wife’s dealing in stocks. The judgment was based on the ground that Mrs. Whiting was an 
‘alter-ego’ for Mr. Whiting who in turn benefited from his wife’s dealings even if the 
dealings were not in his own name.203 
Nevertheless, it is reasoned that the term ‘beneficial owners’ should be narrowly 
interpreted.204 The arguments are the history of legislation, underlying policies and 
Supreme Court interpretations. Section 16(b) was introduced to function only in a limited 
purpose; this is supported by the deletion of ‘tippee liability’ from this section. Such 
liability was to hold the tippee liable to the corporation for any profits made in six months 
from the disclosure of inside information to him. This deletion indicates that the purpose of 
                                                 
202 Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co. 386 F. Supp. 1130(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975). 
203 Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co. 386 F. Supp. at. 1137. 
204 RICHARD S. LINCER, ‘“Beneficial Ownership” under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1943’ 
(1977) 77 Columbia Law Review 446. pp.448-64. 
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introducing Section 16(b) was to make it limited in scope and to make strict liability arise 
automatically when the section is breached.205 The Supreme Court in Blau v. Lehman206 
confronted the scope of the term ‘beneficial ownership’, but it declined to extend Section 
16(b) beyond the determined scope embodied by the explicit language of the statute. 
The Securities Act 1933, section 17(a) contains a provision which prohibits fraudulent 
means, material misstatement and omission to state material facts in the sale of securities. 
This provision is limited to deceptive selling during the process of distribution of shares. 
Other provisions against insider dealing after the distribution of shares are found in the 
more specialised Securities Exchange Act 1934.207  
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 and SEC Rule 
10b-5 
The main provision used against insider dealing is found in Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934. This section makes it illegal “to use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered, or any securities based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors” .208 
The SEC promulgated rule 10b-5 to implement the above section. This rule states that: “It 
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . .,  
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,  
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or  
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security”. 
It is apparent that these broad anti-fraud provisions are explicitly directed to prohibit fraud 
and misrepresentation in dealing in securities. On the other hand they make no direct 
                                                 
205 ibid., p.450. 
206 Blau v. Lehman 368 U.S. 403 (1962). 
207 LOUIS LOSS ‘The Fiduciary Concept as applied to trading by corporate “insiders” in the United States’ 
(1970) 33 Modern Law Review 34. p.41. 
208 Securities Exchange Act 1934, revised through September 30, 2004. 
 144
indication to insider dealing. This is the point where the SEC and the courts have filled the 
legislative gap, by exercising their authority to reach the important administrative and 
judicial precedents, respectively, prohibiting insider dealing.  In this regard the vagueness 
of the anti-fraud provisions was propounded by the attitude to prohibit insider dealing. The 
anti-fraud provisions were of an ambiguous nature, and while this may be considered as 
flexibility in order to leave room for much interpretation to meet new contrivances, at the 
same time it is a controversial legal method which was broadly interpreted under the ethical 
demand for prohibiting insider dealing.209 
The anti-fraud provisions were rather easily interpreted as being applicable to corporate 
insiders who secretly deal in their own corporation’s stock whilst in possession of inside 
information. In such cases there is a legal acceptance of corporate insider’s liability under 
the basis of fraud. The difficulty remained whether Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could be 
extended to held liable ‘corporate outsiders’ for dealing while in possession of inside 
information. 
The ‘disclose or abstain rule’ 
There was a trend to extend liability under section 10(b) to include ‘corporate outsiders’ or 
‘tippees’. This line of argument was supported by the fact that the Securities Act 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act 1943 were promulgated to confront the type of misconduct 
which contributed to the collapse in 1929. In particular, the Securities Exchange Act 1943 
aimed at putting investors on an equal footing in terms of access to corporate 
information.210 The SEC was in favour of this line of reasoning. In the crucial case of In re 
Cady Roberts & Co.
 
,
211 the SEC held that the provisions of insider dealing do extend to the 
prohibition of ‘corporate outsiders’ from insider dealing. The case was against a broker 
who was informed by an associate in a firm, who was also a director of the issuer of the 
related security, of a dividend reduction in relation to the security. The broker, while in 
possession of the information which had not yet been disclosed to the public, dealt for 
discretionary accounts in the related security. In this case the SEC held that a broker, who 
traded while in possession of non-public information passed to him, is liable under Rule 
                                                 
209 THOMAS C. NEWKIRK AND MELISSA A. ROBERTSON, Speech by SEC Staff: Insider Trading – A U.S. 
Perspective, 16th International Symposium on Economic Crime, Jesus College, Cambridge, England, 19 
September, 1998. p.4. 
210 Comment ‘Detterence of Tippee Trading under Rule 10b-5’ (1971) 38 The University of Chicago Law 
Review 372. p.375. 
211 In re Cady Roberts & Co. 40 SEC 907 (1961). 
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10b-5.The SEC justified such a decision on the ground that the duty or obligation of 
corporate insiders could be extended to those outside the corporation in certain 
circumstances. It appears that the legal basis was the ‘disclose or abstain rule’ which is in 
part based on equality of information. According to this rule there can be ‘temporary’ or 
‘constructive’ insiders who possess material non-public information. They have to disclose 
such information or abstain from dealing until the information made public. The underlying 
premise on which the SEC justified the ‘disclose or abstain’ rule was that the major purpose 
of the Securities Acts was the prevention of fraud, manipulation or deception in connection 
with securities transaction. On this line of reasoning, the SEC extended liability under Rule 
10b-5.212 
The SEC ruling in Cady was supported by a federal circuit court in the case SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co..213 In this case the SEC filed a complaint against Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Company and thirteen of its officers, directors and employees for violating Rule 10b-5. The 
drilling operations of the company resulted in a discovery of a rich ore body. The company 
tried to conceal the discovery. Following the discovery, the defendants dealt in the related 
securities, received options to buy securities and disclosed information related to the 
discovery to others who also dealt in securities. All these actions of the defendants occurred 
while they knew the material non-public information considering the discovery. The court 
based its opinion on the premise that Rule 10b-5 is based in policy on the principle that all 
investors trading on marketplace should have relatively equal access to material 
information.214 The court embraced the SEC reasoning in the case of Cady. Thus, it decided 
that anyone who possesses inside information is obliged either to disclose it or abstain from 
dealing with respect to the information known. The court reasoned that anyone who deals 
while advantaged by inside information is acting fraudently in regards to the interests of 
other buyers and sellers.215 
In the 1980s the courts narrowed the scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The ‘disclose 
or abstain’ rule adopted by the SEC and supported by lower courts was rejected by the 
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Supreme Court. In 1980 in the case Chiarella v. United States,216 the Supreme Court of the 
United States decided that a printer handling corporate takeover bids who deduced the 
identities of the companies and dealt in their stock without disclosing information about the 
takeovers, was held not to have violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The financial printer 
was prosecuted on the grounds that he used information regarding tender offers and a 
merger, and bought stocks in the targeted companies. The Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction holding that dealing on the basis of material non-public information in itself is 
not a breach of the anti-fraud provisions and the printer was not obliged to a duty of 
disclosure to the target shareholders. The court rather embraced the idea that the liability 
under Rule 10b-5 is premised on the duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and 
confidence.217 However, from this case emerged a visionary opinion of Chief Justice 
Burger who dissented on the ground that he would have upheld the conviction depending 
on whether the defendant had ‘misappropriated’ information confidentially passed to him 
by his employer, and used it for his personal benefit.218 The opinion provided a basis for 
later adopting the theory of ‘misappropriation’. 
SEC Rule 14e-3 
The instant response of the SEC to Chiarella was the adoption of Rule 14e-3219 under 
Section 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934. The rule was designed to prohibit 
insiders of the offeror and the target from revealing material information about a tender 
offer to those who are to be expected to trade on the basis of such information. The rule 
also prohibits those ‘outsiders’ who possess material information regarding a tender offer 
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by another person from dealing in the target company’s securities. In this case though, the 
prohibition emerges if the bidder commenced or has taken substantial steps in the 
commencement of the bid. It is apparent that the scope of the rule is limited to information 
related to a tender offer. Moreover, outsiders’ dealing in the target company’s securities 
while in possession of material information is only prohibited when the offeror has taken 
substantial steps in the commencement of the offer.220 
‘Misappropriation’ theory 
Following Chiarella, courts in the US at different levels were confronted by the 
controversies of the ‘misappropriation theory’. According to this theory, ‘corporate 
outsiders’ possessing inside information violate Rule 10b-5 if they deal, because their act is 
a misappropriation of the information they receive through a relationship of trust or 
confidentiality. Due to differing views of the misappropriation theory, there was a split 
between circuit courts. There was also a split between Justices in the Supreme Court 
regarding the theory.221 For the purpose of our study, we investigate the cases of the 
Supreme Court and only the important cases at circuit level. 
In 1981 the Second Circuit adopted the ‘misappropriation’ theory in the case of United 
States v. Newman.
222 It was held that a person may be liable under Rule 10b-5 for dealing 
while in possession of information obtained in breach of a confidential and trust-bound 
relationship. The defendant was held liable due to dealing in securities while in possession 
of material non-public information concerning corporate takeovers that was passed to him 
by two investment bankers. Although the defendant as an ‘outsider’ was not under a 
fiduciary duty towards the shareholders, he was convicted of ‘misappropriating’ inside 
information.  
Three years later there was another significant judicial decision by the Supreme Court in 
Dirks v. SEC.223 A case in which an officer of a brokerage firm received information from 
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insiders of a corporation whose assets were said to be overstated as a result of fraudulent 
practices. The officer discussed the information with a number of his clients who sold their 
shares in accordance with the information they received. The officer also tried to persuade a 
newspaper to write about the allegations but they refused.  Consequently dealing in the 
corporation’s securities was halted after its fall. Thereafter, evidence of fraud in the 
corporation was uncovered and made public. The SEC investigated the officer’s role and 
decided to censure him.  The Supreme Court reversed the SEC’s decision holding that a 
tippee of material non-public information has not violated the federal securities laws by 
passing allegations of fraud to investors. 
Dirks was considerable because it addressed at the time the question of the liability of 
‘tipper and tippee’.224 It was held that tippees are liable if they knew or had reason to 
believe that the tipper violated a fiduciary relationship and the tipper received direct or 
indirect benefit from this breach. In Dirks the tippees were held not liable because their 
tipper received no personal benefit from disclosing the information. The Supreme Court in 
this decision added a new controversial condition to liability in requesting ‘receipt of 
monetary or personal benefit for revealing the information’, a requirement which was 
dissented by Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ. as being with no basis in 
law or policy.225 Another important feature of the Supreme Court decision in Dirks was the 
opinion of Justice Powell in footnote 14.  He explained the concept of ‘constructive 
insiders’ as those who legitimately receive information as underwriters, lawyers, 
consultants and others. These ‘constructive insiders’ may become fiduciaries not simply 
because they possesses non-public corporate information, but rather because they entered a 
special confidential relationship. A condition for such an obligation is that the corporation 
must expect the outsider ‘constructive insider’ to keep the information confidential. In this 
opinion when such a person violates his fiduciary relationship he may be treated as a tipper 
rather than a tippee.226 
The misappropriation theory was again questioned in the Second Circuit in United States v. 
Carpenter,
227 a case of a columnist for the Wall Street Journal whose columns were 
significant in affecting stock prices. He tipped the information in his forthcoming column to 
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a broker dealer in order to share profits made by the advantageous knowledge. The 
columnist was convicted of fraud under Rule 10b-5, and mail and wire fraud. The Second 
Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that misappropriation theory is only valid to the 
conduct of corporate or constructive insiders; it perceived misappropriation as conversion 
of material non-public information by insiders or ‘others’ in dealing in securities. On appeal 
the Supreme Court did not answer the validity of the misappropriation theory when it was 
divided four by four on the convictions under Section 10-b. The mail and wire fraud 
convictions were affirmed. The Court issued no written opinion about misappropriation 
theory, thus, from this case it is indiscernible whether they entirely rejected the theory or 
they rejected applying it to the facts in Carpenter.228 
The misappropriation theory and the scope of insider dealing prohibition were again 
questioned in the case of the United States v. Bryan.229 In this case the director of West 
Virginia Lottery used his position for the award of two big contracts. He was convicted of 
mail fraud and securities fraud for trading, while in possession of non-public information, 
in securities of companies to which he had given contracts. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
held that the securities fraud charge could not be sustained because its basis, ‘the 
misappropriation theory’, is invalid, since it is not complementary to “the language of 
Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court authority interpreting these provisions and 
the purposes of these securities fraud prohibitions”.230 In its reasoning the Court depended 
on the statute’s text and to a subsidiary extent on its purposes.231 Considering the textual 
language, the Court reasoned that misappropriating information in most cases does not 
involve ‘deception’ as required by Section 10(b). Misappropriation of information 
constitutes neither ‘misrepresentation’ nor ‘non-disclosure’. Moreover as the theory does 
not require deception, it raises liability upon the breach of a fiduciary or trust and 
confidential relationship. Furthermore, the theory does not complement the Section 10(b) 
requirement that the conduct be “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities. The 
conduct of misappropriating information from its source is likely to have no connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities. This is apparent in a case similar to Bryan, where the 
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source of misappropriated material non-public information is not a purchaser or seller, and 
not connected or interested in the purchase or sale of securities.232 The Court in addition 
criticized the misappropriation theory on policy grounds in that it fails to afford a basis for 
distinguishing which types of fiduciary, trust and confidential relationships can raise 
liability under Rule 10b-5.233 
The reasoning of Bryan directs the attention to the affiliation between the misappropriation 
theory, the text of Section 10(b) and the Supreme Court precedent. The broad language of 
Section 10(b) and its intended limited purpose makes it difficult to marry it to the 
misappropriation theory. However, the Court disregarded the role of other courts in 
drawing the scope and purposes of the rule.234 
The argument for expanding the anti-fraud provisions in accordance with misappropriation 
theory witnessed its victory when the Supreme Court reversed the decision of an Eight 
Circuit judgment in the case of United States v. O’Hagan.235 O’Hagan was a partner in 
Dorsey and Whitney, a law firm which represented Grand Metropolitan PLC with regards 
to a potential tender offer for the Pillsbury Company’s common stock. O’Hagan did no 
work in the representation, but he learned of the potential deal and began acquiring call 
options in Pillsbury stock which he sold at a profit of more than $ 4.3 million when Grand 
Met made public its tender offer and the price of Pillsbury stock rose considerably. 
O’Hagan argued that his conduct did not amount to fraud because he owed no fiduciary 
relationship to Pillsbury. The Supreme Court rejected his contention and upheld his 
conviction. The Court explicitly adopted misappropriation theory in its words “under the 
complementary “misappropriation theory”, urged on by the Government in this case. A 
corporate “outsider” violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he misappropriates 
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a fiduciary duty owed 
to the source of the information, rather than to the persons with whom he trades” .236 
The Court reasoned that misappropriation meets the statutory requirement that the conduct 
be deceptive. There is deception in non-disclosure of trading activity to the source of 
information by the misappropriator. The Court in addition reasoned that the requirement of 
Section 10(b) that the deception shall be in connection with the purchase or sale of 
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securities is met, since the misappropriator commits fraud not when he obtains non-public 
information, but when he uses the information in dealing in securities. Though the person 
or entity deceived is not the other party in the deal, but is rather the source of the non-
public information. The Court accepted the rationale of ‘treating information as property’ in 
stating that a company’s confidential information qualifies as property on which the 
company holds a right of exclusive use and its misappropriation is identical to 
misappropriating goods or money entrusted to one’s care.237 
O’Hagan was a victory for the SEC, allowing it to extend liability under Rule 10b-5. Since 
O’Hagan, the misappropriation theory has been considered a valid ground to extend the 
scope of prohibiting insider dealing. However, it is still true that case law has gone far in 
expanding Rule 10b-5. It is argued with reason that the misappropriation theory does not 
comport with the language or with the legislative purpose of Section 10b. In this sense, the 
misappropriation theory repeated the same problem of the ‘disclose or abstain’ rule. In 
Chiarella, the ‘disclose or abstain’ rule was rejected because neither the language of 
Section 10b nor the legislative history corresponded to such a broad duty as represented by 
this rule.238 
SEC Rule 10b-5(1) and Rule 10b-5(2) 
There have been other problems in depending on case law to apply Rule 10b-5 on insider 
dealing. One issue that confronted the courts was whether Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 
required that the insider use the inside information or whether the mere possession of inside 
information would be sufficient to hold him or her liable. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits 
held that possession is not sufficient to hold someone liable under Section 10b and Rule 
10b-5.239 
The SEC responded to the problem of possession versus use of inside information by 
adopting Rule 10b-5(1) in 2000.240 The new rule provided a definition of “on the basis”. It 
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states that dealing while being ‘aware’ of the material non-public information is sufficient 
for a dealer to be considered liable to insider dealing under Rule 10b-5. A person dealing 
has an affirmative defence if he/she demonstrates that before becoming aware of the 
information, he/she had entered into a contract, instructed another person to purchase or sell 
the security for the instructing person’s account or adopted a written plan for trading 
securities. 
Another landmark ruling occurred when the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5(2).241 This rule 
provides a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust 
or confidence for the purpose of the “misappropriation” theory. According to this rule, a 
duty of trust or confidence exists in three non-exclusive situations: 1) whenever a person 
agrees to maintain information in confidence, 2) whenever the person communicating the 
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material non-public information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history 
of sharing confidences and this history indicates an expectation of confidentiality, or 3) 
whenever a person receives material non-public information from his or her spouse, parent, 
child, or sibling. 
Evaluation of the regulation of insider dealing in the US 
The discussion of the regulation of insider dealing in the US raises the question of the 
desirability of defining the standard and scope for insider dealing liability. 242 The SEC only 
attempted to adopt secondary definitions in relation to insider dealing. The SEC decided to 
publish clearly defined rules when it adopted Rule 14e-3, which aims to prohibit anyone 
other than a tender offeror or its affiliate from purchasing securities while in possession of 
material non-public information regarding the tender offer. The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5(1) 
defining when trading is considered “on the basis of” material non-public information. It 
also adopted Rule 10b-5(2) defining duties of trust or confidence in misappropriation 
insider trading cases. 
Two of the best scholars in the field, Loss and Seligman, responded more than a decade 
ago, indicating that: 
 
With full appreciation of the advantages of the common law’s ad hoc approach, it 
still seems clear that the jurisprudence on trading while in possession of material 
non-public information has developed to the point where it cries out for the kind of 
philosophic consistency that only studied legislation can provide.243 
  
It seems that the law-making process has been one of avoiding a precise determination of 
insider dealing regulation by statutory law. The degree of dependence on the interpretation 
of the antifraud rule, a method that still has legal shortcomings, is also astonishing. 
Langevoort thinks that it is no longer a convincing argument to say that defining ‘insider 
dealing’ would be under-inclusive and would allow opportunists to escape liability. Any 
rules introduced would provide general standards, not answers to every possible problem. 
Beyond this, legal thought would more easily apply the legal standards to any given facts. 
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Moreover, taking into account the long experience of the SEC in dealing with the problem, 
it can avoid shortcomings in introduced rules.244  
The avoidance of clarity through statutory rules is thought to be a result of possible 
objections to the details. Such objections would be raised from the SEC itself if the rules 
were under-inclusive. The corporate community benefits from insider dealing and so would 
object to further regulation. Thus, it is thought that the SEC benefited from the vagueness 
of Rule 10b-5 by attempting to expand the scope of liability on the basis of the purpose of 
the rule rather than on the basis of its language. According to Langevoort, for the SEC, 
expanding the interpretation of Rule 10b-5 has been easier than any possible political 
confrontation to introduce clear rules would have been.245 
One of the supposed obstacles to introducing clear rules is the debate on federalism. The 
trend of federalism supports transferring powers to federal governments to displace the 
state as the main corporate regulator. The argument in favour of federalism presupposes 
that a federal government is better at setting standards of managerial conduct because it is 
free from the laxity caused by competition between states.246 It is indicated that the SEC as 
a federal regulatory body has attempted to expand the interpretation of Rule 10-b5, 
depending on the general trend of federal securities regulation, to give it a wider scope. It is 
thought that the SEC efforts have influenced the judicial precedents of Rule 10b-5. Such 
influence is apparent in the current misappropriation theory, which represents a wide 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5. Therefore, it can be said that the SEC has responded to the 
difficulty of introducing new federal statutes by benefiting from the vagueness of Section 
10b and Rule 10b-5. 
Is the US system pre-eminent in terms of enforcement? 
This discussion of the regulation of insider dealing in the US concentrates on the judicial 
and administrative interpretation of Rule 10b-5. It can be said that the law of insider dealing 
in the US has been uncertain and similar cases have been handled in different ways. 
However, especially in the area of enforcement, the US regime is argued to be efficient. It 
is said that compared to other developed jurisdictions, the effective enforcement of insider 
dealing regulation has been an advantage of the US regime. This is attributed to the SEC as 
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a capable regulator in terms of authority, personnel and resources. The number of 
successful prosecutions in the US is high compared to that in any other jurisdictions. For 
example, the SEC brought 40 cases in 2000, 57 cases in 2001 and 59 in 2002.247 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the number of successful cases seems small in 
comparison with the number of shares traded or number of transactions in the US financial 
markets, since the US financial markets are the leading markets of the world in terms of 
capital, volume of trading, number of financial instruments traded, number of transactions. 
We attempted to compare the number of successful transactions and the number of shares 
traded in the NASDAQ. The results show that the approximate numbers of shares traded in 
the NASDAQ were 20 billion in the year 2000, 16 billion in 2001 and 16 billion in 2002.248 
This means that there was 1 successful case of insider dealing out of 500 million shares 
traded in the year 2000, 1 out of 280 million in 2001 and 1 out of 270 million in 2002. 
However, this comparison could be invalid for more than one reason. The NASDAQ, 
although the largest, is still only one of several markets in the US. Moreover, the number of 
shares traded may vary considerably from one year to another. In the year 2000 there was a 
bubble in the markets of the US, so the number of shares traded was extremely high. 
Furthermore, a valid comparison would be between the number of successful cases and the 
actual number of insider dealing activities. The latter, however, is an unknown dark 
number. Everything considered, it can be said that the proposition that the US has the best 
record in bringing successful insider dealing cases should not be taken for granted. This 
number seems rather small if compared to the size of financial markets in the US. 
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The regulation of financial markets in the UK 
For a long time, the financial industry in the UK had been based on self-regulation by 
exchanges, especially the rules of The Stock Exchange. The government’s role was to 
introduce the legal framework, which in most cases contained general provisions and which 
were not dedicated to financial markets only. Governmental intervention was limited and 
reserved for situations thought to protect the public interest. The most important reforms of 
the regulatory system were in 1986 and 1997. In both cases the reforms were national 
initiatives not of EU origin as an impetus for reform. 
The 1980s experienced new developments in the financial sector, in a trend necessitated by 
a corresponding change in financial regulation. The concept of the internationalization of 
financial markets surfaced as a result of new economic liberation concepts, lessening 
governmental barriers and increasing international financial co-ordination.  This period also 
experienced a number of financial scandals in the UK, at a time when the government 
policy was to encourage privatization and individual participation. All these resulted in a 
rapid reformation of the financial industry called “Big Bang”.249 The most important 
feature of ‘Big Bang’ was the transformation of the regulation of the financial system into a 
more statute-based activity, through the introduction of The Financial Services Act 1986 
(FSA 1986). The main competent authority established under FSA 1986 was the Securities 
and Investment Board (SIB). The SIB was practically a self-standing commission entrusted 
with the task of recognizing and monitoring self-regulatory organizations (SROs). At the 
time, the main self-regulatory organizations (SROs) were delegated powers to monitor 
respective markets. 
The significant changes in the 1980s did not cover the fundamentals of self-regulation. 
However, the following period proved that SROs worked with evident supervisory 
deficiencies. The most obvious deficiency was that there was decentralization of the 
regulatory powers and the responsibilities of the SROs were undetermined, causing an 
overlap in some areas of responsibility. This resulted in laxity in the SROs. Provided that 
they were funded by members, they competed with each other to increase membership.250 
All these deficits made it clear that the system needed to be reformed. 
                                                 
249 For a detailed discussion of ‘big bang’ transformation see; L. C. B. GOWER ‘“Big Bang” and City 
Regulation’ (1988) 51 The Modern Law Review 1. 
250 See PETER HOWELLS AND KEITH BAIN, Financial Markets and Institutions (London 2nd: Longman, 1994). 
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The UK experienced further reform of the financial regulation system in 1997. The 
predominant principle underpinning the new reforms was an emphasis on statutory 
regulation. Beneath this principle the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was created to 
replace the SIB from 1st June 1998. One main reason for establishing the FSA was to have 
a powerful statutory body responsible for investigating and prosecuting market and insider 
dealing. It was also planned that the FSA will be delegated powers to impose 
civil/administrative fines in addition to the power to bring criminal prosecutions.251 
The FSA did not receive all its powers immediately. The SROs maintained some of their 
regulatory duties until the end of 2001, when they were transferred to the FSA. The FSA 
was delegated its comprehensive current powers by the Financial Service and Markets Act 
(FSMA) 2000. This Act described four regulatory objectives for the FSA: the creation and 
maintenance of market confidence, public awareness, consumer protection and combating 
financial crime. Thus, the current era of financial regulation in the UK is characterized as 
statutory based, and one which delegates regulatory and supervisory powers to a 
governmental authority, namely the FSA. 
The FSA gained extra powers to meet the financial policy of the country. The Bank of 
England Act 1998 transferred to it the responsibility for supervising the banking system. 
The FSA has also been responsible for regulating the mortgage market since autumn 2004. 
In addition, since January 2005 the FSA has been responsible for supervising general 
insurance business. Therefore, this authority is considered a unique financial regulator, 
supervising various sectors engaged in the financial industry. In addition to its 
comprehensive powers, the FSA employs the expertise of market participants through 
involving them in the consultation and decision making processes. This method ensures 
that the advantage of the former self-regulatory system in utilizing market expertise is 
absorbed.252 
 
 
 
                                                 
251 JAMES BAGGE ‘The Future for Enforcement under the New Financial Services Authority’ (1998) 19 
Company Lawyer 194. p.194. Also EDITORIAL ‘The FSA as a Criminal Enforcer’ (2001) 22 Company Lawyer 
97. 
252 DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK ‘Securities Market Regulation: International Approaches’ Monthly Report, 
January 2006. p.44. 
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The regulation of insider dealing in the UK 
Insider dealing activity is not a new issue. There are, especially in the UK, many 
indications that the practice is as old as the Stock Exchange itself.253 The English 
Parliament appointed “Commissioners appointed to look after the Trade of England”; they 
produced a report in November 1696 that points to there being at that time activities similar 
to modern time insider dealing. The Commissioners indicated that they had discovered a 
conduct that was carried out by subscribers of companies who transferred their shares to 
other ignorant buyers. The Commissioners reported that the result of such trading was to 
“prevent the end and design of companies”. This conduct was thought to have a damaging 
impact on the “Trade of England”. The activity was described as follows:  
The pernicious Art of Stock-jobbing hath, of late, so wholly prevented the End and 
Design of Companies and Corporations, erected for the introducing, or carrying on, 
of Manufacturers, to the private Profit of the first Projectors, that the Privileges 
granted to them have, commonly, been made no other Use of, by the First Procurers 
and Subscribers, but to sell again, with advantage, to ignorant Men, drawn in by the 
Reputation, falsely raised, and artfully spread, concerning the thriving state of their 
Stock: Thus the first Undertakes, getting quite of the Company, by selling their 
shares for much more than they are really worth…the management of the Trade and 
Stock comes to fail into unskillful Hands.254 
 
In 1697, the Parliament passed an Act “To Restrain the number and ill Practice of Brokers 
and Stockjobbers”. This should be understood in the light that stock-jobbing had a negative 
meaning at the time.255 Although the perception was to protect the design of the company, 
this conduct appears to have had characteristics similar to those of modern time insider 
dealing. 
However, it took the UK around 300 years to introduce a straightforward prohibition of the 
act of insider dealing. Until 1980, there had been no statutory prohibition of insider dealing 
in the UK except for limited restrictions such as requiring the disclosure of dealing by 
directors. One reason for this attitude was the influential ruling in the leading case of 
Percival v. Wright
256 that a director owes fiduciary duties only to the company as a whole 
and not to individual shareholders. While in the US, the regulation of insider dealing was 
                                                 
253 See HANNIGAN, BRENDA M. Insider Dealing (London 1st: Kluwer Law, 1988). 
254 HOUSE OF COMMONS JOURNALS, 25 November 1696. 
255 E. VICTOR MORGAN AND W.A. THOMAS The Stock Exchange: its history and functions (London: Elek 
Books, 1962). pp.21-24. 
256 Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421. This case was explained in more detail in Chapter 1, see footnote 75. 
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stimulated through the promulgation of the Securities Act 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934, in the UK a statutory intervention had taken considerably longer. 
In 1973, the Conservative government introduced a new Companies Bill. In this Bill, it was 
proposed that insider dealing was unfair and should be made a criminal offence. The 
Government White Paper stated that the objective was to ensure that insiders in possession 
of price-sensitive information should be restricted from dealing until the information were 
made available to the general investing public. However, the Bill was not passed due to the 
defeat of the Conservative government in 1974.257 
The elected Labour Government initiated their own version of the reform of company law. 
The Labour Party Green Paper on the Reform of Company Law 1974 criticized the self-
regulatory supervision of the City; it criticized the Department of Trade for being 
inadequately staffed and also criticized the decision to delegate to the Stock Exchange the 
power to formulate its own rules. The Labour White Paper of 1977 agreed that there were 
no legal sanctions aimed at discouraging insider dealing in the UK. Subsequently, the 
Companies Bill 1978 proposed that it should be a criminal offence for an insider to deal in 
securities while in possession of inside information. The Bill proposed adopting a wide 
definition of an insider as anyone who has inside information.258 However, this Bill also 
failed when the Labour Government was defeated in 1979. 
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 
Following several unsuccessful governmental initiatives, in 1980, Parliament amended the 
Companies Act to allow the introduction of rules prohibiting insider dealing. The 
Companies Act was revised in 1985 and the provisions regarding insider dealing became 
known as the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985.259 The Government 
                                                 
257 GIL BRAZIER Insider Dealing: Law and Regulation (London: Cavendish, 1996). pp.92-3. 
258 ibid., pp.93-4. Also explained in more detail in H. H. MARSHALL ‘Insider Trading’ (1978) 27 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 250. 
259 The rules were as follows: 
Section 1(1) of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985: 
“Subject to section 3, an individual who is, or at any time in the preceding 6 months has been, knowingly 
connected with a company shall not deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of that company if he 
has information which- 
(a) he holds by virtue of being connected with the company 
(b) it would be reasonable to expect a person so connected, and in the position by virtue of which he is so 
connected, not to disclose except for the proper performance of the functions attaching to that position, and 
(c) he knows is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities.” 
Section 9 of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985: 
“For purposes of this Act an individual is connected with a company if, but only if- 
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delegated more powers to enforce the insider dealing provisions under the Financial 
Services Act 1986, sections 173-178.260 The provisions under both the Company Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985 and the Financial Services Act 1986 were repealed. Therefore, a 
detailed discussion of these provisions is not included in this thesis. 
Briefly, it can be said that although the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 was 
a turning point in prohibiting insider dealing, there were deficiencies in several main areas. 
Under this Act, the scope of liability was rather narrow. The dependence on the criminal 
justice system to prosecute insider dealing, which requires a high burden of proof, resulted 
in a very low percentage of convictions. The self-regulatory regime at the time was also a 
reason for inefficiency. The powers delegated to the government by the Financial Services 
Act 1986 resulted only in slight progress being made. Thus, although insider dealing had 
been an offence since 1980, there were no successful prosecutions until the late 1980s.261 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 Part V 
To remedy the narrow provisions of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 
and to implement the European Community Directive on Insider Dealing,262 the UK had to 
introduce new legislation. Thus, the UK introduced the Criminal Justice Act 1993 Part V 
(CJA 1993).263 The new rules replaced the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. 
                                                                                                                                                     
(a) he is a director of that company or a related company, or 
(b) he occupies a position as an officer (other than a director) or employee of that company or a related 
company or a position involving a professional or business relationship between himself (or his employer or a 
company of which he is a director) and the first company or a related company which in either case may 
reasonably be expected to give him access to information which, in relation to securities of either company, is 
unpublished price sensitive information and which it would be reasonable to expect a person in his position 
not to disclose except for the proper performance of his functions.” 
260 KERN ALEXANDER Insider Dealing and Market Abuse: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(Cambridge: ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 222, 2001). 
p.6. 
261 KERN ALEXANDER, loc. cit. 
262 Council Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, OJL 334/30 
(1989). 
263 The most important provisions are in the following sections: 
52- The offence. 
(1) An individual who has information as an insider is guilty of insider dealing if, in the circumstances 
mentioned in subsection (3), he deals in securities that are price-affected securities in relation to the 
information. 
(2) An individual who has information as an insider is also guilty of insider dealing if- 
(a) he encourages another person to deal in securities that are (whether or not that other knows it) 
price-affected securities in relation to the information, knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that the dealing would take place in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3); or 
(b) he discloses the information, otherwise than in the proper performance of the functions of his 
employment, office or profession, to another person. 
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The CJA 1993 represented a departure from the notions of fiduciary duties and of requiring 
a connection between the insider and the source of inside information. Thus, it extended the 
scope of liability for insider dealing. 
However, by introducing the CJA 1993, the UK government ignored the continuous 
complaints about criminal confrontation since it was introduced in 1980. It has been known 
that proving beyond reasonable doubt that someone had dealt on inside information is 
                                                                                                                                                     
(3) The circumstances referred to above are that the acquisition or disposal in question occurs on a regulated 
market, or that the person dealing relies on a professional intermediary or is himself acting as a professional 
intermediary. 
(4) This section has effect subject to section 53 “Defences”. 
 
56- “Inside information”, etc. 
(1) For the purposes of this section and section 57, “inside information” means information which- 
(a) relates to particular securities or to a particular issuer of securities or to particular issuers of 
securities and not to securities generally or to issuers of securities generally; 
(b) is specific or precise; 
(c) has not been made public; and 
(d) if it were made public would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of any securities. 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, securities are “price-affected securities” in relation to inside information, and 
inside information is “price-sensitive information” in relation to securities, if and only if the information 
would, if made public, be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the securities. 
(3) For the purposes of this section “price” includes value. 
 
57- “Insiders”. 
(1) For the purposes of this Part, a person has information as an insider if and only if- 
(a) it is, and he knows that it is, inside information, and 
(b) he has it, and knows that he has it, from an inside source. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person has information from an inside source if and only if- 
(a) he has it through- 
(i) being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities; or 
(ii) having access to the information by virtue of his employment, office or profession; or 
(b) the direct or indirect source of his information is a person within paragraph (a). 
 
58- Information “made public”. 
(1) For the purposes of section 56, “made public”, in relation to information, shall be construed in accordance 
with the following provisions of this section; but those provisions are not exhaustive as to the meaning of that 
expression. 
(2) Information is made public if- 
(a) it is published in accordance with the rules of a regulated market for the purpose of 
informing investors and their professional advisers; 
(b) it is contained in records which by virtue of any enactment are open to inspection by the 
public; 
(c) it can be readily acquired by those likely to deal in any securities- 
(i) to which the information relates, or 
(ii) of an issuer to which the information relates; or 
(d) it is derived from information which has been made public. 
(3) Information may be treated as made public even though- 
(a) it can be acquired only by persons exercising diligence or expertise; 
(b) it is communicated to a section of the public and not to the public at large; 
(c) it can be acquired only by observation; 
(d) it is communicated only on payment of a fee; or 
(e) it is published only outside the United Kingdom. 
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almost impossible. There was a sound argument that depending only on criminal sanctions 
to regulate insider dealing was inappropriate. This argument was supported by the fact that 
there is a thin line between legitimate and illegitimate insider dealing activities. 
Criminalising insider dealing required introducing many safe-harbours and exemptions in 
order to avoid deterring legitimate market activities. Yet the strict definition, safe-harbours 
and exemptions made it almost impossible to prove an offence beyond reasonable doubt. 
The criminal sanctions were also criticized because they were directed only at individuals. 
A civil/administrative regime would require a lower burden of proof and would have the 
advantage of being applicable to issuers as well as individuals.264 
There were many shortfalls in the criminal regime prohibiting insider dealing. It may be 
appropriate to indicate that the origin of such shortfalls was the inefficiency of the criminal 
justice system in prosecuting financial crime. The government rejected introducing a 
central regulatory body and the criminal justice system failed to meet the challenges 
inherent in prosecuting insider dealing under the CJA 1993. 
The cornerstone of the difficulties in criminal prosecutions was the required standard of 
proof, which had to be beyond a reasonable doubt. The nature of the legislation, in other 
words, the legal requisites, compounded the difficulty of proving the offences beyond 
reasonable doubt. It is rationally thought that the requisites of the CJA 1993 also made it 
difficult to present an insider dealing case before a jury.265 In particular, the precedents 
reveal that the difficulties in insider dealing prosecutions were in proving that the insider 
possessed inside information, that he knew that it was inside information, and that a 
secondary insider knew that he had it from the relevant inside source. In R v Holyoak, Hill 
and Morl
266 the three defendants were employees of an accountancy company. Their 
company was an advisor to the bidders in a takeover deal. The three defendants, due to their 
profession, had access to the inside information regarding the takeover bid. They dealt in 
the target’s securities seven minutes before a takeover deal was disclosed. The next day 
they sold the securities making a profit of £13,000. The defendants pleaded that they 
thought the takeover was public information when they dealt. In spite of the circumstantial 
                                                 
264 ALISTAIR ALCOCK ‘Insider Dealing - How Did We Get Here?’ (1994) 15 Company Lawyer 67. pp.67-8 
and 72. 
265
 MARGARET COLE, Insider Dealing in the City. Speech by Margaret Cole, Director of Enforcment, FSA 
London School of Economics, 17 March 2007. 
266 R v Holyoak, Hill and Morl. Unreported case, but for explanation see MARGARET COLE, Insider Dealing in 
the City. Speech by Margaret Cole, Director of Enforcment, FSA London School of Economics, 17 March 
2007. 
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evidence, the prosecution failed to establish the defendants’ knowledge of the status of the 
information. 
In the case of Lord Advocate v Mackie,267 Mr Mackie was an analyst who had a briefing 
meeting with the chairman of a company. He advised his clients on the basis of inside 
information. Mr Mackie was convicted of counselling or procuring others to deal contrary 
to the prohibition in the 1985 Act. However, because of the required standard of proof, the 
case collapsed on appeal. It could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt exactly what was 
said at the briefing meeting. There was said to be a conflict of evidence. Even the evidence 
of the chairman of the company, who said that he told Mr Mackie of a profits warning, was 
insufficient to sustain the evidence. 
The CJA 1993 introduced difficult legal requisites in terms of the standard of proof and 
insiders’ knowledge of the information and its source. These legal requisites were added to 
the CJA 1993 because it would have been inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on 
someone who did not realize that the information he possessed was inside information. One 
real problem with the CJA was that the wider scope of liability for insider dealing actions 
has required the introduction of more safe-harbours and exceptions. It was thought from the 
beginning that a few cases would be prosecuted and that there would be more acquittals 
than previously, because in practice it is difficult to prove the elements and requisites of the 
offence beyond all reasonable doubt.268 
The introduction of insider dealing provisions in CJA 1993 was insufficient. To prevent 
insider dealing and maintain the integrity of financial markets, more reform had to be 
effected. The criminal law provisions constituted an inadequate method of addressing all 
the acts of market abuse. Rather, they were directed at the most serious cases of insider 
dealing. For a long time, the UK Government rejected recommendations to introduce civil 
law procedures. Such a position was based on the argument that insider dealing as a “public 
wrong” should be addressed by the criminal law. 
In particular, there was a demand that a central enforcement agency should be given 
authority to apply both civil and criminal penalties. This argument was supported by the 
                                                 
267 Lord Advocate v Mackie, High Court of Justiciary, Edinburgh, March 1993. The case was decided under 
the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, but it clearly supports the argument that it is difficult to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of insider dealing offence. 
268 ALISTAIR DARLING, the chief Labour Spokesman on House of Commons Standing Committee B, Fifth 
Sitting, 10 June 1993. 
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experience in the US, where the SEC has civil enforcement powers which are effectively 
utilized to prohibit insider dealing. There were demands for a more powerful regulator 
which could use civil fines to deter insider dealing.269 
The efficiency of the CJA 1993 provisions has proved to be limited by the standard of proof 
required. Other self-regulations, which were introduced to address market abuse, did not 
appear to be a deterrent either. The number of cases brought to prosecution under CJA 1993 
was low, and even so the percentage of convictions was unsatisfactory. A main cause of the 
low percentage of conviction was the standard of proof required in criminal cases. Unless 
the act and the state of mind were proved beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction would 
collapse. 
The UK authorities had a poor conviction record. During the period between 1980, when 
insider dealing was first criminalized, and 1986, when the Financial Services Act 1986 was 
introduced, the Department of Trade and Industry prosecuted five cases. Four of them were 
successful. Following the introduction of the FSA 1986, it appears that there was no 
significant improvement.270 Following the introduction of the CJA 1993, the conviction 
record was still poor. The considerably limited number of convictions reached, as appears 
in Table (2), proved that the criminal sanctions and the regulatory system were insufficient 
to deter insider dealing.271 
Table 2 Number of prosecutions and convictions for insider dealing offences, England and Wales, 1986-
1997.272 
Number of defendants prosecuted at magistrates' courts and 
convicted at all courts for insider dealing offences, England and 
Wales, 1986-1997 
Year 
Prosecutions Convictions 
1986 -- -- 
1987 1 1 
                                                 
269 MATTHEW WHITE ‘The Implications For Securities Regulation Of New Insider Dealing Provisions In The 
Criminal Justice Act’ (1995) 16 Company Lawyer 163. p.170. 
270 JOHN M. NAYLOR ‘The Use of Criminal Sanctions by UK and US Authorities For Insider Trading: How 
Can the Two Systems Learn From Each Other? Part 1’ (1990) 11 Company Lawyer 53. p.57. 
271 It is difficult to make a valid comparison between the number of successful cases and the number of traded 
securities or transactions. In any case, it is apparent that the number of successful cases is very small. See 
above heading: Is the US system pre-eminent in terms of enforcement?  
272 HOME OFFICE (UK), Home Office Court Proceedings Database, (URL) 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/freedom-of-information/released-information/foi-archive-crime/>, 
accessed on 6/11/2007. The law applicable to the prosecutions of ‘insider dealing’ for the period 1986 to 1997 
included provisions of Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 which came into force on 1 July 
1985 and provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 which came into force on 1 March 1994.  The 
convictions in each year in the table may include those proceeded against in earlier years. 
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1988 -- -- 
1989 11 2 
1990 3 2 
1991 8 2 
1992 -- 2 
1993 2 2 
1994 2 2 
1995 2 -- 
1996 1 -- 
1997 -- -- 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
In 1997 the UK government introduced an initiative in proposing civil prohibitions on 
market abuse and delegating the FSA extra powers to impose the civil sanctions and to 
prosecute criminal offences of insider dealing. The initiative was represented by the 
Financial Services and Markets Bill.273 The promulgated Financial Services and Markets 
Act (FSMA) 2000 was intended to introduce civil offences, so that the standard of proof 
required is the balance of probabilities, which is a lower standard of proof than that 
required in criminal prosecutions.274 
FSMA 2000 introduced a ‘market abuse’ regime. The new provisions introduce civil 
penalties and enforcement procedures. FSMA 2000 also delegated authority to the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) to address the offences of misuse of information and 
market manipulation.275 
One of the shortcomings in CJA 1993 was identified as a poor record of conviction, due to 
the high level of proof required in criminal prosecutions. Another shortcoming was that the 
provisions do not cover all types of market abuse activities. Some of market abuse activities 
were covered by self-regulation. Thus, FSMA 2000 was introduced on the rationale that the 
new regime was to fill the “gap in the protections” left by the criminal provisions and self-
regulatory rules.276  
In order to maintain the integrity of financial markets it was essential that the behaviour of 
market abuse should be addressed. The insider dealing provisions under CJA 1993 do not 
                                                 
273 See genrally ANNABEL SYKES ‘Market Abuse: A Civil Revolution’ (1999) 1 Journal of International 
Financial Markets 59. Also in GLENDA DAVIES AND CHARLES ABRAMS ‘The Financial Services and Markets 
Bill in Standing Committee: The Story So Far’ (1999) 1 Journal of International Financial Markets 276. 
274 MICHAEL FILBY ‘Part VIII Financial Services and Markets Act: Filling Insider Dealing’s Regulatory Gaps’ 
(2003) 24 Company Lawyer 334. p.366. 
275 FSMA 2000, s 118. 
276 MICHAEL FILBY ‘Part VIII Financial Services and Markets Act: Filling Insider Dealing’s Regulatory Gaps’ 
(2003) 24 Company Lawyer 334. p.363. 
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address the impact of the offender’s act upon the financial markets. FSMA 2000 introduced 
the market abuse regime, which gives priority to the impact of the offender’s act upon the 
market. The objective of the new regime is to maintain the reputation of financial markets 
in the UK, thereby protecting the UK’s position as a leading international financial centre 
by maintaining its reputation “as a fair and clean place to do business”.277 
The FSMA 2000 provisions complement the former offences of insider dealing under CJA 
1993, rather than superseding them.278 The new regime delegated broader powers to the 
FSA to prohibit market abuse. This attempt appears to be filling the gap that had formerly 
existed. Another feature of complementation is that the FSA is empowered to prosecute 
insider dealing offences under CJA 1993 as well as offences of market abuse.279 Thus, 
when the FSA conducts an investigation, it has the following options:280 a) initiate criminal 
proceedings against the offenders; b) exercise the powers given to it by section 123 of 
FSMA 2000 and impose a penalty or make a public statement or take disciplinary action; c) 
take other regulatory action such as the issue of a restitution order asking the offenders to 
disgorge their illegal gains to those injured by their abusive behaviour; and d) apply to a 
court to seek an injunction, or a restitution order. 
Market abuse and insider dealing were defined in the FSMA 2000 in Pt. VIII in the original 
section 118.281 However, this section was superseded by new amendments which were 
                                                 
277 FSA, Consultation Paper No. 59, July 2000. Market Abuse: A Draft Code of Market Conduct.  paragraph 
1.1. 
278 The question which arises is whether there is the possibility of a contradiction between the two acts. There 
is also a need to explain why more than one regime aimed to address the same problem, especially ‘insider 
dealing’. A simple answer, which is inadequate in the prevailing relationship between the two acts, is that the 
new regime introduced new market abuse offences besides new insider dealing provisions. The latter are 
intended to cover a wider scope than the insider dealing provisions under CJA 1993. The difference between 
the two acts is still within the different nexus of “insider” and “inside information” between the two acts (this 
will be explained later in the thesis). See BARRY RIDER, KERN ALEXANDER AND LISA LINKLATER Market 
Abuse and Insider Dealing (London: Butterworths, 2002). p.47. 
279 FSMA 2000, ss 397 and 402. 
280 FSA HANDBOOK, Enforcement Manual (ENF), ch.14. 
281 Section 118. –  
(1) For the purposes of this Act, market abuse is behaviour (whether by one person alone or by two 
or more persons jointly or in concert)- 
(a) which occurs in relation to qualifying investments traded on a market to which this 
section applies; 
(b) which satisfies any one or more of the conditions set out in subsection (2); and 
(c) which is likely to be regarded by a regular user of that market who is aware of the 
behaviour as a failure on the part of the person or persons concerned to observe the standard 
of behaviour reasonably expected of a person in his or their position in relation to the 
market. 
(2) The conditions are that-  
(a) the behaviour is based on information which is not generally available to those using the 
market but which, if available to a regular user of the market, would or would be likely to 
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necessitated in order to implement the Market Abuse Directive282 in the UK. The changes 
were reflected in a radical amendment of the offences of market abuse under the new 
section 118 of the FSMA 2000. The amendment was adopted under The Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2005.283 
                                                                                                                                                     
be regarded by him as relevant when deciding the terms on which transactions in 
investments of the kind in question should be effected; 
b) the behaviour is likely to give a regular user of the market a false or misleading 
impression as to the supply of, or demand for, or as to the price or value of, investments of 
the kind in question;  
(c) a regular user of the market would, or would be likely to, regard the behaviour as behaviour 
which would, or would be likely to, distort the market in investments of the kind in question. 
282 Directive 2003/6/EC of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) 
[2003] OJL 96/16.  
283 The new section 118 of the FSMA 2000 determines behaviour amounting to insider dealing and market 
abuse as; 
118 Market abuse 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, market abuse is behaviour (whether by one person alone or by two or more 
persons jointly or in concert) which- 
(a) occurs in relation to- 
(i) qualifying investments admitted to trading on a prescribed market, 
(ii) qualifying investments in respect of which a request for admission to trading 
on such a market has been made, or 
(iii) in the case of subsection (2) or (3) behaviour, investments which are related 
investments in relation to such qualifying investments, and 
(b) falls within any one or more of the types of behaviour set out in subsections (2) to (8). 
 
 (2) The first type of behaviour is where an insider deals, or attempts to deal, in a qualifying investment or 
related investment on the basis of inside information relating to the investment in question. 
(3) The second is where an insider discloses inside information to another person, otherwise than in the proper 
course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties. 
(4) The third is where the behaviour (not falling within subsection (2) or (3)):– 
(a) is based on information which is not generally available to those using the market but which, if 
available to a regular user of the market, would be, or would be likely to be, regarded by him as 
relevant when deciding the terms on which transactions in qualifying investments should be effected; 
and 
(b) is likely to be regarded by a regular user of the market as a failure on the part of the person 
concerned to observe the standard of behaviour reasonably expected of a person in his position in 
relation to the market. 
(5) The fourth is where the behaviour consists of effecting transactions or orders to trade (otherwise than for 
legitimate reasons and in conformity with accepted market practices on the relevant market) which:– 
(a) give, or are likely to give, a false or misleading impression as to the supply of, or demand for, or 
as to the price of, one or more qualifying investments; or 
(b) secure the price of one or more such investments at an abnormal or artificial level. 
(6) The fifth is where the behaviour consists of effecting transactions or orders to trade which employ 
fictitious devices or any other form of deception or contrivance. 
(7) The sixth is where the behaviour consists of the dissemination of information by any means which gives, 
or is likely to give, a false or misleading impression as to a qualifying investment by a person who knew or 
could reasonably be expected to have known that the information was false or misleading. 
(8) The seventh is where the behaviour (not falling within subsection (5), (6) or (7)) :– 
(a) is likely to give a regular user of the market a false or misleading impression as to the supply of, 
demand for or price or value of, qualifying investments; or 
(b) would be, or would be likely to be, regarded by a regular user of the market as behaviour that 
would distort, or would be likely to distort, the market in such an investment, and the behaviour is 
likely to be regarded by a regular user of the market as a failure on the part of the person concerned 
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The reform of FSMA 2000 appeared to be advantageous to the market abuse regime in the 
UK. An advanced comprehensive regime was aimed at by the reform. Nevertheless, the 
reform is confusing, since market participants have to comply not only with the provisions 
of offences described in Market Abuse Directive, but also with the complex illustrations 
found in the original section 118 of FSMA 2000.284 Such confusion is against the interests 
of market participants who showed strong objection. The result was the Treasury’s decision 
to retain the ‘misuse of information’ and ‘distortion’ offences under section 118(4) and (8), 
but subject to the introduced ‘sunset’ clause under section 118(a) which means the offences 
will be abolished in July 2008. 
Regarding the scope of the new regime, the FSMA 2000 market abuse and insider dealing 
provisions extended the former provisions in two main aspects:285 
a) It extended the scope to cover unauthorised persons as well as authorised persons. 
Therefore, the new insider dealing provisions differ from of CJA 1993. The new 
provisions have a wider scope, since they are applicable not only to authorised 
persons, but also to all those who participate in certain prescribed markets.286  
b) Another apparent extension of scope is that insider dealing provisions under CJA 
1993 are applicable to corporate securities and derivatives on such securities only. 
While the market abuse and insider dealing provisions under FSMA 2000 are 
applicable to markets in commodity derivatives and financial futures. 
It is obvious that the ambit of the FSMA 2000 insider dealing and market abuse provisions 
cover a wider range of actions that that of the CJA 1993. There is another limitation in the 
CJA 1993 provisions: they are directed to offences in connection with securities only. The 
CJA 1993 provisions do not cover insider dealing in the derivatives and commodities 
markets. Securities exchange markets are at the same level of importance as other 
derivatives and commodities markets. It is not clear why the UK government provided 
more protection for securities markets. Why only insider dealing in connection with 
                                                                                                                                                     
to observe the standard of behaviour reasonably expected of a person in his position in relation to the 
market. 
(9) Subsections (4) and (8) and the definition of "regular user" in section 130A(3) cease to have effect on 30 
June 2008 and subsection (1)(b) is then to be read as no longer referring to those subsections. 
284 AVGOULEAS, EMILIOS The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). p.312. 
285 BARRY RIDER, KERN ALEXANDER AND LISA LINKLATER Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (London: 
Butterworths, 2002). p.48. 
286 The prescribed markets are those operated by the seven UK recognised investment exchanges (RIEs). 
Prescribed markets are determined under the (Prescribed Markets and Qualifying Investments Order 2001). 
 169
securities should be criminalized is a question which the UK government has not clearly 
answered. It can be argued with reason on this account that there is no convincing reason 
for retaining the CJA 1993 provisions.287 
The offences introduced by Market Abuse Directive are sufficiently broad to cover almost 
all abusive behaviour which the UK deemed it necessary to prohibit. The criminal law 
provisions attracted their share of criticism, as the offences require intent. This is difficult 
to prove and the complexity of financial crimes cannot be faced by a weak criminal justice 
system. A sound result would have been to implement Market Abuse Directive and abolish 
former insider dealing offences. CJA 1993 was adopted to implement the Insider Dealing 
Directive which is in turn is redundant, since Market Abuse Directive288 states that: “Given 
the changes in financial markets and in Community legislation since the adoption of 
Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider 
dealing, that directive should now be replaced to ensure consistency with legislation against 
market manipulation. A new directive is also needed to avoid loopholes in Community 
legislation which could be used for wrongful conduct and which would undermine public 
confidence and therefore prejudice the smooth functioning of the markets”.289 The UK 
position is criticized because the criminal law provisions are still based on a redundant 
European Directive of 1989, while the market abuse regime is based on Market Abuse 
Directive.290 The UK government would have been much more unambiguous if it had 
abolished the CJA 1993 provisions and replaced them with criminal and civil sanctions for 
offences under section 118.291 
Evaluation of the current insider dealing regulation in the UK 
The extent to which the UK government has been struggling to introduce a thorough regime 
of market abuse containing insider dealing offences is surprising. The resulting confusion 
may be explained by the fact that the UK government did not compromise by abolishing 
criminal sanctions under CJA 1993. Retaining the criminal sanctions is probably an 
indication that the UK government considers insider dealing as a public wrong and there 
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should be criminal sanctions against individuals who engage in insider dealing. It is also 
true that the UK government in retaining criminal sanctions intended to dedicate them to 
serious offences where administrative penalties do not seem to be deterrent. This is obvious 
in the following case, which was recently decided. 
In December 2004, Asif Nazir Butt was convicted of conspiracy to commit insider dealing 
in breach of section 52(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. He was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment for this offence. A confiscation order was made to the sum of £348,325 and 
he was also ordered to pay £60,000 for the prosecution costs. Four co-accuseds were also 
convicted of the same offence.292 
The facts of the case were that the applicant worked for the investment bank of Credit 
Suisse First Boston. He was in a particular position of trust. His responsibilities included 
the highly trusted task of ensuring the secrecy of dealings in the compliance department of 
the bank known as the Compliance Control Room. Because of his job, he was given 
privileged access to highly confidential inside information that was price sensitive relating 
to the status and performance of companies the bank was advising. Accordingly, as an 
experienced officer, he should have been, aware of the responsibilities arising from his job. 
It was a central requirement of his employment that he should not disclose or use the 
information he received in confidence in the course of his duty. However, Mr Asif Nazir 
engaged in using confidential inside information relating to certain companies that 
conducted business with his company. The applicant entered into spread bets on the basis 
of inside information before such information had been made public. The applicant acted in 
conspiracy with co-accuseds to implement a scheme where the actual transactions did not 
take place in the name of the main applicant. The applicant used the co-accuseds to trade 
for him through dealing accounts that they opened in their own names. They shared the 
profits between them and they were recorded by one of them on a computer. It is important 
to note that applicant was allocated nearly 80 per cent of the profits, a fact that contributed 
to his long-term imprisonment.293 
The retention of parts of the original section 118 also resulted in the current law of insider 
dealing in the UK being fragmented and in it attracting criticism for opacity and 
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repetition.294 There was a trend to maintain the UK’s position as a leading financial centre, 
which led to the introduction of FSMA 2000. The difficulty was compounded when new 
EC Directives were introduced that required changes to FSMA 2000. In this sense, the UK 
government preferred to make cosmetic changes to former Acts. This was a result of the 
government’s insistence on its original definition of market abuse to a degree that it 
retained parts of it in the amended section 118. The Treasury and the FSA insisted on 
retaining the offence of ‘misuse of information’ under a ‘sunset clause’.295 The retention of 
this offence is a clear example of the repetition of similar provisions. This trend proved 
confusing, since financial law is already a complicated area and there is no need to create 
further obstacles for market participants. 
Misuse of information 
In fact, the FSA benefited from the vagueness of the provisions and their low legal 
requisites in combating insider dealing. It is, therefore, not surprising that the FSA insisted 
on the retention of the provisions relating to ‘misuse of information’. The offence of 
‘misuse of information’ comprises behaviour based on information that which is not 
generally available to those using the market but which, if available to a regular user of the 
market, would or would be likely to be regarded by him as relevant when deciding the 
terms on which transactions in investments of the kind in question should be effected.296 
The prohibition of such behaviour could be based on a similar rationale to that of 
prohibiting insider dealing, that is, the protection of market users and putting them on an 
equal footing. All market users are in need of certain information to decide their 
transactions. Thus, misuse of relevant information that is expected to be disclosed will 
affect confidence in the integrity of the market. Market users consider it unfair when certain 
market participants use information for their own benefit before it becomes generally 
available.297 
The offence of ‘misuse of information’ was introduced in the original section 118 of FSMA 
2000. The aim was to cover a wider range of actions beyond the criminal offences of 
insider dealing. It is apparent that this offence has a similar category to the CJA 1993 
offences, but they are not identical. The FSA asserted that this category is not intended to 
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be identical to the formerly existing CJA 1993 provisions.298 This offence has a wider 
scope, since there is no requirement of a nexus to the ‘insider’; in other words, not only 
‘insiders’ are prohibited. Instead, information is misused if a regular user would, or would 
be likely to regard the information as relevant when making his decision.299 The 
information must relate to matters that a ‘regular user’ would reasonably expect to be 
disclosed to all the prescribed market participants. The difference of the type of relevant 
information to this offence is a key factor in indicating its different scope. However, it 
remains the case that this particular offence has a similar category to CJA 1993 offences. 
When section 118 was amended and new insider dealing provisions were introduced, the 
FSA insisted on retaining the offence of ‘misuse of information’ under a ‘sunset clause’. 
The ‘misuse of information’ provisions are a vital weapon in the FSA arsenal. The FSA 
depended on the provisions of misuse of information to bring a number of successful cases. 
As to the year 2007, the FSA brought eleven successful cases of misuse of information. 
This represents a better result when compared to the results of prosecuting similar acts 
under insider dealing criminal provisions. Under the latter provisions, in the period between 
1987 and 1997 there were only 13 successful convictions. 300 Following are some of the 
cases. 
Middlemiss was the Company Secretary at Profile Media Group (PMG). During the week 
beginning 22 April 2002, he was aware of the material problems relating to a subsidiary of 
PMG. He was aware that PMG’s revenues were likely to be significantly below 
expectations. On Friday 26 April 2002, Mr Middlemiss sold PMG ordinary shares. Mr 
Middlemiss did not seek permission from PMG's Chief Executive Officer. Following the 
announcement, the share price dropped significantly. By selling Profile Media Group 
shares when he did while in possession of information not generally available, Mr 
Middlemiss avoided a loss.301 Mr Middlemiss was in possession of relevant negative 
information concerning PMG. Mr Middlemiss sold the shares at a time when he knew that 
PMG's largest subsidiary was having difficulties in business performance and there was a 
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strong possibility that PMG would need to make a trading announcement. The FSA found 
that Mr Middlemiss’s behaviour amounted to ‘misuse of information’ under the original 
Section 118 of the FSMA 2000. 
Another important case related to GLG, which is based in London and is involved in hedge 
fund management. Mr Philip Jabre managed the GLG Market Neutral Fund. He was 
responsible for the investment management of designated funds and individual portfolios. 
He was empowered to make investment decisions and place orders regarding both the funds 
and portfolios. In mid-January 2003, the Japanese corporation Sumitomo Mitsui Financial 
Group Inc (SMFG) raised JPY 150 billion via a private placement of convertible preference 
shares with GSI who were pre-marketing the issue. On 7 February 2003, SMFG agreed 
with GSI to carry the role of lead manager/underwriter for a proposed public issue by 
SMFG of convertible preference shares. On February 17, the structure of the issue was 
announced on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Mr Jabre was informed of the issue on February 
11. The Chinese-walls were crossed and had given Mr Jabre advance confidential 
information on the issue and its intended structure. Between 12 and 14 February 2003, Mr 
Jabre, on behalf of the GLG Market Neutral Fund, short-sold ordinary shares in Sumitomo 
Mitsui Financial Group Inc (SMFG) to the value of $16 million. His action was ahead of 
the announcement of the issue and was based on information that was not generally 
available to those using the market.302 
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The following were also important cases of misuse of information: 
Financial Services Authority, Final Notice, Michael Thomas Davies, 28 July 2004. 
Michael Davies was an assistant accountant at the Berkeley Morgan Group (BMG). As an accountant he had 
access to the chairman’s statement containing important parts of the announcement and BMG’s interim 
results. While in possession of the information, Mr Davies purchased shares in BMG the day before the 
announcement of the interim results. Following the announcement, he sold the shares making a profit. The 
FSA considered that Mr Davies’ activity amounted to ‘misuse of information’ under the original Section 118 
of the FSMA 2000. 
Financial Services Authority, Final Notice, Arif Mohammed, 18 May 2005. 
Mr Arif Mohammed was a former PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) audit manager. Delta plc was an audit 
client of PwC. Mr Arif Mohammed as a member of the audit team became aware of confidential information 
relating to Delta plc. The confidential information was that Delta intended to sell its electrical division. He 
was told that the information was confidential and not to be discussed or disclosed. While in possession of 
this confidential information, he purchased shares in Delta. Following the announcement, Mr Arif 
Mohammed sold his shares making a profit. The FSA and the judgment of the Financial Services and Market 
Tribunal in its decision dated 29 March 2005 confirmed that Mr Arif Mohammed breached the original 
Section 118 of FSMA 2000, since his behaviour amounted to ‘misuse of information’. 
See also: 
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The FSA was satisfied that Mr Jabre had engaged in market abuse in breach of the original 
section 118 of the FSMA 2000. The FSA considered that Mr Jabre committed market abuse 
in short-selling 4,771 ordinary shares in SMFG between 12 and 14 February 2003. The 
dealings had a total value of around $16 million and were made over the three days 
following Mr Jabre’s having been informed of the new issue by GSI. The FSA decided that 
his behaviour amounted to ‘misuse of information’, and imposed on him a financial penalty 
of £750,000. Under section 118(2)(a) of FSMA, ‘misuse of information’ is behaviour that 
is based on information that is not generally available to those using the market but which, 
if available to a regular user of the market, would or would be likely to be regarded by him 
as relevant when deciding the terms on which transactions in investments of the kind in 
question should be effected.303  
All things considered, we would conclude that the UK law of insider dealing is fragmented, 
opaque and repetitive. This is because similar provisions, which are dedicated to insider 
dealing and market abuse, are repeated under the original CJA 1993, and the new Section 
(118) under the FSMA 2000. However, each of the mentioned laws is sufficiently clear if 
read separately. As we shall see in Chapter 5 in which the legal rules are analysed assuming 
that they are isolated from the wider system. 
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Structure and regulation at the Dubai International Financial 
Centre (DIFC) 
In the financial world, financial centres in the US, Europe and South East Asia have been 
recognized. In contrast, the vast region between Europe and South East Asia with its large 
population and economic potential has long been without a world-class financial centre. 
The area has its own financial needs and economic ambition, and Dubai, which is part of it, 
has a comprehensive plan for establishing itself as the regional hub on the map of 
international business. These facts facilitated the premise for establishing the Dubai 
International Financial Centre (DIFC).  
The DIFC was created as a bold step in establishing Dubai as a business hub and gateway 
for capital and investment in the region. The DIFC is a wholesale financial services centre. 
As an “onshore” financial centre, it was initiated to provide new opportunities for leading 
financial institutions to establish business in the centre. The central principle of the DIFC, 
which it is hoped will make Dubai the regional centre for the financial industry, is 
specialization in institutional finance. The DIFC will add an essential industry which is 
expected to contribute to the economic growth of Dubai, the UAE and the region as a 
whole.304 
The DIFC aims to take a vital role in the economic development of the region by realizing 
the needs of institutions and governments. It is planned that the economic role of the DIFC 
will be attained by several methods. To mention but a few: the introduction of  world-class 
financial instruments to broaden the traditional financing method provided by banks; the 
provision of investment opportunities to attract back to the region the liquidity of wealthy 
governments and individuals; contributions to planned privatizations, which will support 
economic liberalization in the region; the provision of a first-class example for the 
development of the regional stock markets; the supporting of the expansion of companies in 
the private sector, and the introduction of Islamic financial products to meet a growing 
demand for them.305 
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The innovative vision of the DIFC takes into consideration the establishment of a world-
class regulatory and transparency environment. The financial laws and regulations of the 
DIFC had to represent the “race to the top” trend, if it aimed to gain the confidence of both 
the international regulatory bodies and investments. The introduction of a legal body 
resulted in a financial centre in the Middle East with a regulatory framework benchmarked 
with the best practices of London, New York and Hong Kong. It is thought that: “there is 
no close legal precedent for what has been created here”306. This is because of the creation 
of an entirely new financial, commercial and corporate jurisdiction in Dubai which is, in 
turn, a city in the Federation of the UAE. The authorities in the UAE did not anticipate the 
development of local jurisdiction, but rather created a new one, which has extensive 
legislative, judicial and executive powers in the “free zone” area of the DIFC. Revealing 
the legal steps in the evolution of the DIFC is important to a comprehensive understanding 
of how it constitutes a separate jurisdiction. The conventional legal framework for civil and 
commercial activities in Dubai is a combination of Federal and Dubai laws. In order to 
establish the new jurisdiction in the DIFC, Federal and Dubai laws were introduced to 
exempt the DIFC from existing civil and commercial laws. The objective of the exemption 
was to provide a clean sheet on which a new legal framework could be drafted in 
accordance with best practices in the world.  
The first legal step was an amendment to the UAE Constitution Article (121), in which the 
exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Federation was extended to include the power to 
establish Financial Free Zones and determine their exemption from the laws of the 
Federation. This amendment was established for the Federation to introduce Federal Law 
No.8 of 2004, concerning the Financial Free Zones in the United Arab Emirates.307 This 
Federal law empowers each Emirate to establish its own Financial Free Zone. The most 
important initiative of the law was its exempting all Financial Free Zones from civil and 
commercial laws within the UAE. It is ascertained, though, that UAE Criminal Laws, 
Administrative Laws and Anti-Money Laundering Laws are applicable.308 This was 
followed by Federal Law No.35 of 2004, concerning the Establishment of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre309 which was dedicated to establishing the DIFC as a 
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financial free zone in Dubai. This law also determines the geographical area and location of 
the DIFC in the Emirate of Dubai. 
The Constitutional amendment and Federal laws provided the basis for new Dubai laws to 
be drawn on a clean sheet. Dubai enacted a whole body of laws to establish the DIFC, its 
bodies and their powers. A detailed review of the laws and the established bodies of the 
DIFC, with their specialties and powers, is beyond our objectives. However, it is important 
to comprehend the organizational structure of the DIFC, as follow.  
Dubai Law No.9 of 2004310 was dedicated to the induction and development of the DIFC. 
This law concedes the financial and administrative independence of the DIFC. The law also 
exempts the bodies and establishments of the DIFC and their employees from rules and 
regulations otherwise applicable in the Emirate of Dubai.311 In addition, this law sets up 
organizational bodies and their authorities in order to activate the DIFC. The most 
important bodies initiated by this law are the President of the DIFC, who is appointed by a 
Decree of the Ruler of Dubai,312 the DIFC Authority and the Dubai Financial Services 
Authority (DFSA) which is the regulatory body of the DIFC.  
Structure of the DIFC 
The President of the DIFC 
While the full legislative power within the DIFC remains with the Ruler of Dubai, he 
appoints the President of the DIFC who, in turn, has all the executive authority. All the 
institutions within the DIFC are accountable to the President.313 The president of the DIFC 
has extended powers under Dubai Law No.9 of 2004, Article 13 (2). The President of the 
DIFC is empowered to issue regulations, create any administrations, councils or entities 
deemed necessary to achieve the objectives of the DIFC, appoint members of the board of 
the DIFC Authority and the Dubai Financial Services Authority and create registries, 
including registries of real estate, security and property. 
DIFC Authority 
The DIFC Authority is set up by Dubai Law No.9 of 2004, in which its functions are also 
determined. The DIFC Authority is generally charged with administering and supervising 
the DIFC. Amongst its specialties are developing overall strategies and policies for the 
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DIFC and, in light of these policies, it also provides overall administrative services, for 
instance, assisting license applicants at various stages. The DIFC Authority is also charged 
with developing laws relating to non-financial services activities which are not the specialty 
of the DFSA. Such laws include Company Law, Employment Law and Contract Law. As 
the administrative body, the DIFC is also responsible for registering companies and 
securities in the DIFC.314 
Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) 
This body shall be specifically reviewed, since it is the most relevant to our subject. The 
DFSA is the regulatory body of the DIFC. The DFSA was established under Dubai Law 
No.9 of 2004 and mandated power as the regulator under the provisions of the Regulatory 
Law DIFC Law No.1 of 2004. Thus, as a body within the DIFC, the DFSA is exempted 
from Federal and Dubai laws including financial laws and regulations. It is also important 
to indicate that the DFSA is independent of the Securities and Commodities Authority 
(SCA) since the DFSA is charged with regulating financial services within the DIFC, while 
the SCA is charged with regulating local financial services. It is also apparent that the 
financial regulatory system in the DIFC is statutory based with a statutory independent 
body charged with regulation. 
The DFSA is the statutory regulator charged with authorizing, licensing and registering 
institutions and individuals to carry on financial and ancillary services in or from the DIFC. 
In authorizing, licensing and registering institutions and individuals to operate in the DIFC, 
the DFSA examines their compatibility to maintain the standards required of them. The 
DFSA also has supervisory functions on market activities and performs other regulatory 
and enforcement functions. It monitors regulated participants’ compliance with laws and 
regulations. To perform as a statutory regulator, the DFSA is empowered to make 
regulations and enforce them.315 
Since its establishment the DFSA has benefited from its powers to create a regulatory 
environment corresponding to the DIFC’s principles of integrity, transparency and 
efficiency. It has introduced a regulatory framework benchmarked with the best practices of 
the world’s leading financial jurisdictions. The regulations are also clearly drafted 
benefiting from the clean sheet left to regulators to fill in. In order to achieve its ambitious 
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objectives the DFSA employed a team of regulators who made the most of years of 
experience in leading international regulatory bodies.316 
DIFC Judicial Authority 
Dubai Law No.9 of 2004 provides for the formation of DIFC courts. These DIFC courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction over any action involving the DIFC or any of its bodies or 
establishments or involving DIFC based transactions and litigants.317 DIFC Judicial 
Authority is responsible for administering civil and commercial laws constituting the 
jurisdiction of the DIFC, in order to provide an independent and flexible judiciary in the 
DIFC. To provide for the details of the judicial system Law No. 12 of 2004 was dedicated 
to the DIFC Judicial Authority and the DIFC Court System. This law recognizes the powers 
of the DIFC courts, which are to be practised in an independent manner. 
Dubai International Financial Exchange Limited (DIFX) 
The DIFX is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the DIFC Authority. An exchange works under 
clear regulations; this is closely related to the subject of this thesis. The DIFX aims to meet 
the region’s need for a large and liquid securities market. In doing so, DIFX will provide a 
new option for international investors. The DIFX also aims to provide a recognized 
marketplace for issuers who wish to direct regional capital.  
The DIFX plans to provide a wide range of financial instruments to attract investors as well 
as listing institutions to the exchange. These include, equities, bonds, funds, Islamic 
(Sharia-compliant) structured products, derivatives, index products and alternative risk 
products. 
The DIFX envisioned that listings would be mainly derived from Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) by corporations already listed on other exchanges. The next stages are expected to 
bring in institutions wishing to dual list their shares on the DIFX, to benefit from the 
liquidity in the region. 
The DIFX started where others had reached in marketplace technology, by providing state-
of-the-art technology and a fully integrated electronic marketplace. The DIFX aims to 
provide market participants with an efficient and cost-effective technology infrastructure. It 
has contracted to recognized technology providers to supply an automated electronic 
trading system and clearing and settlement services. 
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The DIFX takes into consideration the importance of regulation in attracting investments to 
the market. It adopts the following regulatory principles: promoting international and 
regional investor confidence in the market, maintaining the quality and attractiveness of its 
market to issuers and investors and operating orderly markets. As indicated, the DIFX is 
regulated by the DFSA. In addition, the DIFX has its own regulations, constituted by its 
Listing Rules and Business Rules. The DIFX Market Authority is responsible for 
maintaining an informed and transparent market, whereas the DIFX Listing Authority is 
responsible for verifying applications for listing securities.  
Other bodies of the DIFC
318
 
The DIFC Registrar of Companies (ROC) is another independent body. It operates under 
the Companies Law, specializing in incorporating and registering all types of companies in 
the DIFC. 
DIFC Investments (Company) LLC (DIFC Investments) is also a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of the DIFC Authority. It has been launched under the objective of conducting activities for 
the DIFC which are non-public administration related. 
Hawkamah Corporate Governance Institute (CGI) is the first of its kind in the region. Its 
establishment targeted assisting the countries and companies of the region to implement the 
principles of corporate governance. 
The regulation of insider dealing in the Dubai International 
Financial Centre (DIFC) 
In the DIFC jurisdiction insider dealing is prohibited mainly under Articles (42) to (45) of 
Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004.319 It is challenging to holistically explain the rules 
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319 42. Insider dealing 
(1) A Reporting Entity or person in a special relationship with a Reporting Entity shall not, in the 
DIFC or elsewhere, deal in Investments of or relating to the Reporting Entity if the person possesses 
material information that: 
(a) is not generally available in the market; and 
(b) has not been disclosed to the market in accordance with this Law or the Rules. 
(2) In this Article: 
“Investments” does not include: 
(a) options to acquire or dispose of; 
(i) commodities of any kind; or 
(ii) an option to acquire or dispose of an Investment of the kind specified by 
Article 42(2). 
 181
related to insider dealing under the DIFC Law. This is because of the facts that the rules 
included complex terms, there has not been any case brought under these rules which may 
serve as judicial interpretation and that there is a scarce academic reference in the field. 
However, there is a considerable work in comparative jurisdictions which can be 
approached whenever seemed necessary. Therefore, the rules will be compared to their 
equivalent in the US and the UK in following chapters. As this chapter aims at providing 
                                                                                                                                                     
(b) rights under a contract for the sale of a commodity under which delivery is to be made at 
a future date and at a price agreed on when the contract is made; or 
(c) any right to or interest in anything which is specified by Article 42(2) (a) and (b). 
43. Providing inside information 
(1) A Reporting Entity or a person in a special relationship with a Reporting Entity shall not inform, 
other than in the necessary course of business, another person of material information that is not 
generally available in the market with respect to the Reporting Entity, before the material 
information has been disclosed to the market in accordance with this Law or the Rules. 
(2) A Reporting Entity or a person in a special relationship shall not procure another person to deal 
in Investments if that Reporting Entity or person has knowledge of the material information that is 
not generally available in the market or the material information has not been disclosed to the market 
in accordance with this Law or the Rules. 
(3) In this Article: 
“procure” includes: 
where a person induces or encourages another person by direct or indirect means. 
44. Application of provisions 
Articles 36 to 43 of this Part do not apply to conduct which occurs outside the jurisdiction unless the 
conduct affects the DIFC markets or users of the DIFC markets. 
45. Definitions of material information and special relationship for this Part 
(1) In this Part: 
“material information” means: 
(a) in relation to Investments, information that significantly affects, or would reasonably be 
expected to have a significant effect, on the market price or value of Investments; or 
(b) in relation to the affairs of a Reporting Entity, information relating to a change in the 
business, operations or capital of the Reporting Entity that would reasonably be expected to 
have a significant effect on the market price or value of the Investments in or related to the 
Reporting Entity. 
(2) In this Part: 
“a person in special relationship” means: 
(a) a person that is a director, officer, employee, affiliate, Associate or adviser of: 
(i) the relevant Reporting Entity; 
(ii) a person that is proposing to make a Takeover Offer under Part 7 for the shares 
of the Reporting Entity; or 
(iii) a person that is proposing to be involved in a takeover with the Reporting 
Entity; 
(b) a person that is engaging in or proposes to engage in any business or professional 
activity with or on behalf of the Reporting Entity or with or on behalf of a person described 
in Article 45(2) (a)(ii) or (iii); 
(c) a person that is a director , officer or employee of the entity described in Article 
45(2)(b); 
(d) a person that learned of the material information with respect to the Reporting Entity 
while the person came within Article 45(2)(a), (b) or (c); or 
(e) a person that learned of material information with respect to the Reporting Entity from 
any other person described in Article 45(2) (a), (b),(c) or (d) and knows or ought reasonably 
to have known that the other person is in such a relationship. 
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the background to these rules, it seems essential to evaluate the prospects of enforcing these 
rules in the future. This is through evaluating regulation in general at the DIFC. 
Evaluation of the DIFC regulatory system 
One of the principal methods through which the DIFC plans to achieve its economic role is 
the provision of a first-class example for the development and regulation of the regional 
stock markets. The centre’s establishment was intended to be a landmark in developing 
regulation of regional financial markets through raising regulatory standards.320 The next 
section introduces a succinct evaluation of the DIFC laws and regulations for the purpose of 
this thesis. 
The DIFC has adopted a complete body of laws beginning with Companies Law, Law of 
Obligations, Contract Law and Law of Obligations, along with Arbitration Law, Insolvency 
Law, General Partnership Law and Limited Liability Partnership Law. The jurisdiction is 
also advanced through introducing regulations that are benchmarked and continuously 
revised to implement international standards and best practices. There is a complete body of 
financial regulations. In addition, both the DIFC and the DFSA are actively introducing and 
amending regulations. In this respect, it is important that the DIFC and the DFSA put into 
place the core legislation and they both continuously conduct detailed self-assessment of 
the regulatory regime against the international best practice standards.321 
The DFSA has been successful in establishing and developing a first-class regulatory 
regime. This can be seen by the international recognition it received in a short time, 
especially from International Organization of Securities Commissions. The DFSA was 
accepted as an “IOSCO signatory”; this position is only permitted after rigorous assessment 
of the applicant’s legislative and regulatory regime. An accurate assessment of the DFSA 
was conducted over five months by a specialist team from four countries and the 
assessment went to further consideration before the final approval of the IOSCO. It is worth 
noting that the DFSA is the only regulator in the Gulf Council Countries and the Arab 
World to be admitted as a signatory. IOSCO signatories represent the world’s recognized 
                                                 
320 LINA SAIGOL AND WILLIAM Wallis ‘Dubai Finance Centre Aims to Lift Standards in Middle East’ 
Financial Times, July 07, 2006. 
321 DFSA, Consultation Paper No. 42, January 2007. Proposed Enhancements to the DFSA Rulebook to Meet 
International Best Practice Standards. 
 183
financial jurisdictions including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore.322 
Recently the DIFC and its regulator the DFSA have received a highly positive assessment 
from the International Monetary Fund.323 The report included a detailed assessment of the 
DFSA’s observance of the objectives and principles of securities regulation developed by 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The report commented 
that: 
 
The DFSA has established a very impressive set of laws, regulations and rules and 
policies and procedures for regulation… It has demonstrated a willingness and 
capacity to vigorously enforce its authority and carry out its regulatory mandate… 
The DFSA has shown a commitment to bring action against those in violation of the 
law and its rules…324 
 
One issue that needs to be scrutinized is that the jurisdiction of the DIFC is based on 
English common law; while the conflict with the UAE jurisdiction is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, we need to know to what extent this affects the characteristics of the rules 
relating to insider dealing. This discussion may also provide an answer for the comparison 
between the UAE, UK and US insider dealing regulations. 
The UAE Constitution provides that Islamic jurisprudence shall be a major source of 
legislation. The legal system of the UAE is based on the advantages of Shari-ah 
jurisprudence and the great Arab legal scholars of the tenth to thirteenth centuries.325 
Nevertheless, the moderate Shari-ah jurisprudence does not contradict the country’s 
promulgation of laws representing the public welfare. The UAE has developed a legal 
system which preserves the advantages of Shari-ah jurisprudence and simultaneously 
introduces laws which reflect the need of modern time. Thus, the codification of laws in the 
UAE has made use of emerging modern Arab nations, especially Egypt, which in turn base 
their laws on French jurisdiction and the Napoleonic Code. The introduced laws reflected 
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the political and business needs of the country to sustain its independence, oil wealth and 
economic policy. The legal system also utilized tribal and customary laws and reflected the 
UAE’s legal contributions resulting from its special needs.326 
The important consideration in legal codification in the UAE is its adoption of Franco-Latin 
jurisdiction through importing laws from the Egyptian legal system. This is in addition to 
preserving a mixture of legislative sources. Egypt at the time was an advanced legal system 
influencing newly formed systems in Arab countries. 
In comparative studies, the compared laws can be from two or more different jurisdictions, 
as is the case in this thesis. Scrutinizing an issue from various perspectives constructs a 
positive comprehension of such an issue; this is the principle of comparative study. The 
proper objective of a comparative researcher is to conduct an analysis of different 
jurisdictions’ responses to the same legal problem. If the study discovers that one of the 
jurisdictions provides a better solution for the legal problem, it reaches its objectives by 
making proposals for the improvement of the other system.  
The law of the UAE is based on the characteristics of Franco-Latin law, while the UK and 
the US are countries of Common Law. When comparing the two jurisdictions in relation to 
a legal issue, the general characteristics of the two jurisdictions may be important. Thus, in 
general, it is perceived that a Common Law jurisdiction deals primarily with a legal 
problem through judicial precedents, since codification is not one of its characteristics. A 
Franco-Latin system is perceived as responding to a legal problem by legislation and 
codification, since judicial discretion and interpretation are limited. Generally, one criterion 
for differentiating between the two jurisdictions is “codified and non-codified”.327 Another 
important criterion is “predictability”, which, in turn, is closely related to the criterion of 
“codified and non-codified”. In this relation jurisdictions differ in their preference for a 
detailed rule or wide discretion, imperative law or judicial empiricism, law or equity and 
statutory literalism and the spirit of the statute.328 
We think that the generalizing concepts of the different characteristics of jurisdictions must 
be dealt with cautiously, especially in the area of this thesis, ‘insider dealing’. This is for 
two reasons: first, the fact that a Common Law jurisdiction deals with a legal problem by 
preferring judicial precedent over detailed codification. This may be of little use when the 
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problem is dealt with by statutes. Insider dealing is dealt with by statutes, as Philip R. 
Wood points out: 
When it comes to statutes, states have very different ideas on the degree of detail 
which is needed. A few examples will suffice… In the United States, a prohibition 
on conflicts of interest by trustees as bondholder representatives elaborated itself 
expansively into a prescriptive list full of busy detail, but Luxembourg, Japan and 
Britain merely outlaw “conflicts of interest” and leave it to reasoning and decided 
case law to fill this out. In the United States, the criminal offence of insider dealing 
was developed by case-law from a ten-line general anti-fraud section, whereas by 
contrast the European Union decided that the matter should properly be dealt with 
in Directive approximately 1000 per cent longer. Given this range of response on 
the same point, generalisations about national characteristics are unsafe.329 
 
It is well known that currently in every branch of the common law there is considerable 
statutory intervention.  This brings the essential question regarding the difference between 
‘statute’ and ‘code’, which is still undecided clearly. That is to say while the code 
represents the “default” provision in civil law, is the role of “statute” in common law 
jurisdictions similar to that? The classical view in common law is that statute and case law 
are two distinct bodies of law and their application does not result in combination between 
them. In this respect statute and case law act as “oil and water”. In other words, statute is 
considered to be necessitated by a certain legislature policy, but the “default” principle is 
still that of common law. However, there is a sound argument that the “oil and water” 
approach should be reconsidered and even rejected. In the UK the role of statute should not 
be underestimated. There are increasing number of laws and statutes derived from the 
European Community. The majority of the EU members have civil law jurisdictions in 
which code represents the default provision. Therefore, it is reasonably argued that the 
difference between code and statute is not as fundamental as it appears.330 On this account 
it can be said that in the UK the regulation of insider dealing is reached by promulgating 
laws and statutes to implement EU directives. To respect the principles of implementation 
and harmonization, the effect of insider dealing statutes on developing common law has to 
be similar to the effect of code in the European civil law jurisdictions.331 
The second reason is that though it is true that the legal system of the UAE is based on the 
characteristics of Franco-Latin jurisdiction, its financial markets and regulation system are 
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based on the UK experience. The latter is particularly supported in the laws of the Dubai 
International Financial Center (DIFC) which are based on best practices in London, New 
York and Australia. In more than one law it is stated that failing to find a provision in DIFC 
enacted laws and any other agreed jurisdiction the laws of England and Wales are 
applicable. 
The legal jurisdiction of the centre is based on English Common Law while the jurisdiction 
of law in the UAE is a civil law jurisdiction based on Egyptian and French law with some 
aspects of Shari‘a law. In the interviews, members of the DFSA were asked whether this 
causes any difficulties. It could be tolerable for pragmatic business objectives to adopt a 
common law jurisdiction in the limited free zone area of the DIFC. As one interviewee 
said: 
Capital markets flourished in circumstances where there is good law and 
consistency in the application of the law. There has not been in the UAE generally 
and in Gulf Council countries a well-understood international law that international 
clients could comply with. The jurisdictions vary from Gulf country to Gulf country 
and within the UAE generally. In order to attract capital back into these markets 
there needs to be a system of law that is easily understood and consistent with other 
systems in other jurisdictions around the world and can easily be applied…332 
 
The issue of the constitutional amendment was raised, which allowed exempting free zones 
from the civil and commercial laws of the federation. The jurisdiction of the DIFC 
functions within the boundaries of its limited geographical area. As an interviewee 
indicated: 
 
…because we operate as a free zone, so we operate within the boundaries of our 
zone. We are just a centre of excellence. We are aligned with other international 
financial centres. If you look at them, you find that they based on common law, e.g., 
New York, London, Singapore and Hong Kong, which are the four major financial 
centres in the world. Our jurisdiction is based on common law, which means that 
investors that already trading at that kind of market are ready to meet this standard, 
the legal regime and the rules and regulations that we also impose in our centre. For 
an investor it is easy to come and invest here. The same is true for big financial 
institutions that will be trading in London and New York. They kind of know the 
regime. That is why we adopted the common law system in the centre.333 
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In fact, a comparison between the general characteristics of the jurisdiction could be 
misleading for the purpose of this study. To be more specific, the provisions of Company 
Law, Law of Obligations, Contract Law and the Law of Obligations in the DIFC could be 
different from their equivalent in the UAE jurisdiction. However, financial market 
regulation and the rules aimed at regulating insider dealing are in most jurisdictions very 
similar. As an expert interviewee thought: 
 
Many of the laws that apply in most sophisticated capital markets have many 
similarities. For example, your securities law and collective investment law are not 
dissimilar. Your corporate governance requirements, for example, are not 
dissimilar. They are common from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. There might be some 
discrete differences, but in the main, most of the laws are very similar. Thus, firms 
and individuals who are actually in the market are mostly comfortable with this sort 
of legislation.334 
 
Another important point is the nature of the rules directed to regulate insider dealing. It is 
right that such rules have the characteristics of criminal provisions and sometimes of civil 
provisions. However, the current trend is to delegate the regulator the power to enforce 
these rules. This means that the rules aimed at regulating insider dealing have the 
characteristic of administrative provisions. In fact, where the supervisory administrative 
regimes have similar characteristics, the resulted administrative rules will be similar, even 
though the larger jurisdictions are different. This view is supported by an expert whose 
opinion was as follows. 
 
In fact, I think that when it comes to primary legislation, it does not matter much. 
When there are differences, for instance, if you compare between the regulation of 
insider dealing and enforcement in UK, US and Germany. I think you find a lot of 
similarity. In fact, you might find indeed different approaches in how to deal with 
an actual case. You might find differences in secondary legislation. I think the 
differences are marginal. I think it comes in fact to the effectiveness of the 
supervisory regime. You rarely look at the court to report a problem. If there is a 
problem, it is ensuring the prevention of insider dealing or the spread of inside 
information. How do you do that and who is closest to the source of information? 
That is naturally, I would argue, the financial services regulator who imposes 
certain restrictions…335 
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Therefore, it can be argued that the rules directed to insider dealing from common law 
jurisdictions to civil law jurisdictions have many similarities. This will be discussed in 
more depth when comparing the rules directed to insider dealing in the UAE, the US, the 
UK and the DIFC. 
It is also important to investigate to what extent the DIFC laws and regulations have been 
tested. On the whole, it is still thought that the laws and regulations of the DIFC have not 
been truly tested. The International Monetary Fund report indicated that:  
 
Because the DIFC and DFSA were established very recently and because activity 
within the DIFC is still new and somewhat limited, it was difficult to assess in-
depth the effect of the new regulatory structure in practice.336 
 
As Habib Almulla, former MP (Member of the Federal National Council) and former 
Chairman of the Dubai Financial Services Authority said: 
 
The particular problem is that there is no actual activity in the centre. More 
precisely, there is a limited volume of trading and it is incomparable to the local 
markets in the UAE. Thus, it can be said that there is activity regulated by no law 
(he means local markets) and there is law regulating no activity (he means DIFC). It 
is also right that the laws and regulations of the DIFC have not been examined 
except to a certain level.337 
 
Indeed, in certain principal areas the law has been adequately tested. In other areas, such as 
the regulation of insider dealing, obviously the law has not been tested. That is due to the 
limited volume of trading especially in the secondary market. We introduce some reasons 
for the limited business in the DIFC and some instances in which the law was tested. 
Since it opened in September 2004, the DIFC, applying the related regulations, licensed and 
authorized leading financial institutions to establish business in the centre. In this respect, it 
can be said that the licensing and authorization provisions in the Company Law and its 
underlying regulations, for example, have been tested. 
The Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX) has succeeded in attracting almost 
50% (by value) of all sukuk (Islamic bonds) listed on exchanges worldwide. The listing of 
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sukuk revealed the strength of the DFSA regime and the regulation related to collective 
investment funds and Islamic financial instruments.338 
In another important area, the DIFC insolvency provisions were tested in the recent case of 
Forsyth Partners Global Distributors and Forsyth Partners (Middle East). The DIFC Court 
of the First Instance has announced the first insolvency proceedings in the DIFC and 
liquidators have been appointed.339 
However, in general, there are considerations in regards to testing the laws and regulations 
of the DIFC. One probable reason for that is that in certain areas the business in the DIFC is 
underscoring. This is especially true in relation to attracting Initial Public Offerings and 
attracting listings in the DIFX. This is the reason behind the limited volume of trading in 
both the primary and secondary markets. One reason for this is the legal separation between 
the DIFC and the rest of the UAE. The legal separation and the underlying restrictions on 
business has been an area that has showed deficits that have hampered the business. There 
are some limits on activities created by the operation of Art.4 of the Financial Free Zones 
Law. The first restriction introduced by Art.4 has had the most hampering effect. It states, 
“Importantly, these entities shall not deal in the UAE Dirham and shall not take deposits 
from the UAE markets”. It is because of this restriction that the DIFC laws prohibit those 
who offer banking services from dealing in UAE Dirham .340 This restriction is 
compounded by the fact that the DIFC is a wholesale financial centre, which required 
another restriction on investment business, banking business and trust services to ensure 
that they do not conduct their business with or for a retail customer.341 
The DIFC is not only a separate jurisdiction to the rest of the UAE, but it is also separated 
from the UAE currency and financial policy (the currency of the DIFC is the US Dollar). 
The DIFC authorized firms are not allowed to conduct business in the local currency, they 
are not allowed to sell to retail investors and they are not allowed to take deposits from the 
local market. This restricts the money flow into the DIFC from the local economy of the 
UAE. Because of the restrictions on business rules, DIFC authorized firms, at least 
theoretically, cannot even offer investment products to investors in Dubai, though, in 
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reality, it is difficult to enforce these restrictions. Some speak of evading the rules by 
informal meetings with small groups. This is a predictable result, since a large percentage 
of the liquidity in the region’s financial markets is from private individual wealth. 342 
According to the restriction on business rules in the DIFC, investment banks are under 
strict restrictions when selling securities in the UAE. While according the UAE law only a 
licensed bank or financial intermediate can promote and sell securities after obtaining a 
prior approval of the central bank, in practice as long as the offeror is not targeting 
unsophisticated retail customers then the UAE Central Bank does not strictly pursue the 
issuers’ compliance with the restrictions. That is probably because the Central Bank pays 
more attention to protecting inexperienced retail investors than to protecting experienced 
wholesale investors.343 
The separate legal jurisdiction and the restrictions on business rules proved to be hampering 
the business of the DIFC. This has been the case in initial public offerings, which were 
heavily reliant on retail investors. Selling securities to such investors directly or indirectly 
could have been against the restriction rules. Therefore, the regulators from both sides 
entered negotiations to reach a compromise. The solution was to allow intermediating 
brokers locally registered in the UAE to sell the initial public offering from the DIFC.344 
The DIFC handicapped itself by choosing the difficult option of a separate jurisdiction and 
the restrictions from the rest of the economy of the UAE. This is thought to be an obstacle 
to firms wishing to do business in the DIFC; it also affects the growth of the volume of 
trading in the primary as well as the secondary market. One reason for these restrictions is 
the structure of the UAE, with different legislation at the federal level (UAE) and the local 
level (Dubai). The separate jurisdiction and restrictions on business rules are, in fact, 
compromises reached between Dubai, and the federal law and federal regulators. As an 
interviewee pointed out: 
Dubai is a place that is very visible on the international scene. Dubai is so much out 
there in the global market. It is investing outwards and trying to attract capital; it is 
trying to improve its laws and regulations. The problem is that this is a federal 
system. Not everything can be done by Dubai alone; it has to be done at federal 
level. So, the banking system is very much behind the international banking system. 
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It is still underdeveloped, even though it is improving slowly, but there is a long 
way to go before it matches one of the international banking systems.345 
One of the main reasons why Dubai opted to establish a separate jurisdiction is the failure 
of attempts to reform laws and regulations at federal level. Attempts to introduce 
amendments to federal law may take several years and may collapse due to legislative 
bureaucracy. It was appropriate to benefit from the experience of other jurisdictions. The 
best solution would have been to move the whole jurisdiction closer to recognised 
jurisdictions, in a way similar to what was planned by Qatar. However, it was impossible to 
exempt Dubai from the federal legislation. The alternative bold idea was to establish the 
DIFC with a completely separate jurisdiction. As Habib Almulla accurately pointed out, 
“Part of the solution is better than no solution”.346 
As a consequence of this decision, another area that shows shortcomings in practice is the 
relationship between the DFSA, as the regulator of the DIFC, and the Ministry of Economy 
and Commerce, the Central Bank and the SCA, as the regulators of financial services in the 
UAE.347 The authorities and responsibilities of the three federal regulators in practice, to all 
intents and purposes, are in contradiction of the law. This is impeding the progress of 
finance and financial markets in the UAE. Yet the most complicated area is the relationship 
between the DFSA and the federal regulators. In practice, cooperation is weak and the only 
memorandum of understanding on information sharing was reached in October 2005 
between SCA and the DFSA. Otherwise, the relationship between the DFSA and the 
federal regulators has not improved much. This has been evident in the difficult work 
between the DFSA and the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, as well as the significant 
discrepancy between the DFSA and the Central Bank. The approaches are just very 
different. The DFSA endeavours to raise the level of financial services regulation to 
international standards. On the other hand, the federal regulators are handicapped by the 
mindset against reform in developing countries.348 
There have always been voices demanding a single sophisticated stock exchange in the 
UAE instead of a number of small exchanges. Currently, there are the Dubai International 
Financial Exchange, Dubai Mercantile Exchange, Dubai Financial Market, Abu Dhabi 
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Securities Market and the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre. It was thought a merger 
between the Abu Dhabi and Dubai markets would be beneficial for the economy. However, 
the local governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubai own the majority of the two markets, and 
therefore, all suggestions regarding a merger have been brought to an end by political 
bureaucracy. A more feasible suggestion would be for a merger between Dubai 
International Financial Exchange and Dubai Financial Market. The DFM is a much more 
active exchange than is the DIFX and a merger would provide the best of both. In June 
2006, it was suggested that DIFX was planning to merge with the DFM. However, this was 
considered to be impossible given the different levels of regulation at the exchanges.349 The 
suggestion of a merger has been revived following the recent incorporation of Dubai 
Bourse Holding, which is a DIFC incorporated holding company that holds the 
government’s shares in the DFM and the DIFX. The issue of a merger surfaced again, but 
the difficult area is again the different levels of regulation. As an interviewee from the 
DFSA said: 
 
Now, the interesting aspect of that is should there subsequently be a merger of these 
two markets. If that were the case, how would those entities be brought together? 
Where will the entity sit and where will the market be? Who would regulate the 
market how would insider trading activities on that market be regulated. What 
would be a good law and what would be a perceived law? How would we regulate a 
conduct by an individual outside the jurisdiction of the DIFC?350 
 
Another point that should be emphasized is the wholesale nature of the DIFC. Thus, its 
laws and regulations should be interpreted taking into consideration that they are generally 
directed to wholesale sophisticated and institutional customers. Considering it a wholesale 
jurisdiction, the DIFC clearly states that the individual will not be afforded the retail 
customer protections and compensation rights that may generally be available to them in 
other jurisdictions.351 
The fact that the DIFC is a wholesale centre could also result in regulations being principle-
based and less descriptive, since the targeted sophisticated investors, unlike the retail 
                                                 
349 CROMPTON, SIMON op. cit. 
350 ANONYMOUS 2, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
351 The DFSA Rulebook, Conduct of Business Module, part 1- restrictions on business, 3 investment business 
and banking business. Guidance 1. 
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investors, are expected to have the necessary knowledge or at least be capable of hiring it in 
order to comply with the regulations. As an interviewee from the DFSA pointed out: 
It is also because we are a wholesale centre; we do not require such equal law 
(descriptive law), because we do not have to protect retail investors. Things may 
change in the future when we decide to allow retail investors; we will have to 
provide for a number of protections and disclosures in relation to these individuals, 
which is why it has been easier for us to have principle based regulation.352 
 
Therefore, the notion that comes to mind is that the DIFC provides less protection for retail 
investors and its laws and regulations are less descriptive. This is thought to be reflected in 
the rules aimed at regulating insider dealing. However, such a notion could be misleading. 
In fact, when discussing the rules directed at insider dealing and timely disclosure, it can be 
argued with reason that the DIFC regulations are considerably clearer and more descriptive 
than are the regulations of the SCA. In addition, although the SCA regulations target retail 
investors, they do not seem to provide adequate protection for them and they are opaque 
even to legal experts. 
After the overview of the law and regulation of the DIFC and a background to its 
establishment and business, the rules directed at regulating insider dealing can be better 
comprehended. 
                                                 
352 ANONYMOUS 1, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
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A comparative perspective of the systems of the US, the UK and 
the DIFC in regulating insider dealing 
Regulatory system 
The succinct discussion of the jurisdictions included a background to the regulatory system 
in the US, the UK and the DIFC. A review of the regulatory systems in the three 
jurisdictions is significant to this comparative study. In view of the fact that each 
jurisdiction has, over a long time, built up a regulatory system that is appropriate to its 
financial policy, a detailed discussion of these systems was not included. The discussion 
aimed at investigating the main characteristics of each system, in order to offer a 
background for the roles of the regulators in insider dealing regulation. 
In principle, there are two major forms of regulatory system. The first major form is ‘self-
regulation’, the principle under which market players independently adopt rules to be 
followed, and monitor the compliance with such rules. It is apparent that this form may be 
adopted only following years of market players’ expertise, and over cumulative reactions to 
market issues. The argument in favour of self-regulation is based on the expertise and 
knowledge of market players who are thought to be better at regulation than are 
governments. SROs are compelled to introduce the necessary regulations for economic 
reasons. It is in the interest of the SROs to maintain the confidence of investors and market 
participants through regulation. This discussion revealed that self-regulation is still the 
dominant system in the US. Nevertheless, the tasks of supervising the mandatory disclosure 
of information and enforcing the antifraud provisions (which are the basis for insider 
dealing regulation) are the responsibilities of the SEC. It should be clear that the self-
regulatory system in the US is a result of the long experience the US has had in this field. 
On this basis, it can be argued that a self-regulatory system is inappropriate for an 
inexperienced country like the UAE, where the markets were established as recently as the 
year 2000. In fact, the UK abandoned self-regulation, which had long underpinned the 
financial industry. There has been evidence of deficiencies in SROs in the UK.353 
The second form of regulatory system is ‘statutory regulation’, in which a government 
directly engages in regulation by introducing binding laws and statutes for markets. A 
statutory regulating authority may be more independent and free of market competition. 
                                                 
353 See above heading: The regulation of financial markets in the UK.  
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Such a body is thought to be more efficient in writing soft law and monitoring compliance. 
In this form, the government ensures compliance with the regulation by delegating the 
necessary powers to a governmental authority. Further details of the system, such as 
statutes, the formation of a competent authority and the delegation of powers to that 
authority, are to be tailored to the needs of the country. 
In the UK, the FSA was established as a statutory regulatory body and extensive regulatory 
powers were transferred to it from SROs. In the DIFC, the DFSA as a regulator is close to 
being a facsimile of the FSA. It is apparent that the two regulators have clear 
responsibilities that are objectively stated. One main reason for establishing such a statutory 
regulatory body has been the objective of combating financial crime, including the 
investigation and prosecution of insider dealing. The SEC also as a regulator has always 
been admired for its efficiency in investigating and prosecuting insider dealing. Given this 
line of reasoning, it is prudent to say that any reform of the regulation of insider dealing has 
to consider the efficiency of the regulator in investigating and prosecuting financial crime. 
In addition, in countries like the UAE where there is more than one regulator, the 
responsibilities and objectives of the regulators should be clearly defined, avoiding any 
overlap. 
Another important point is the delegation of authority to the regulator. The regulator has to 
be an independent body with sufficient authority. An efficient regulator is one to which 
adequate authority has been delegated in order to enable it to investigate and prosecute 
insider dealing. Moreover, the recent trend, as represented by the reforms in the UK, is to 
delegate to the regulator the power to enforce civil/administrative fines to deter insider 
dealing. It is not expected that insider dealing would be deterred where the regulator is not 
sufficiently empowered to combat financial crime. In fact, the empowerment of the 
regulator to make regulations and enforce them serves another objective, specifically, the 
transfer of the extra burden of responsibility from the legislative and judiciary systems to 
the financial regulator. 
The empowerment of the regulator has to go hand-in-hand with clearly determining the 
regulatory objectives. The previous discussion has shown how the objectives of the SEC, 
FSA and DFSA are clearly determined, emphasised that combating fraud and financial 
crime is one of the main objectives. Therefore, any reform has to consider empowering the 
regulator and ensuring its objectives are clearly determined. Administrative empowerment 
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is as essential as legal empowerment. An efficient regulator should be able to dedicate 
sufficient expertise, personnel and resources. 
Clarity of regulations 
The discussion of insider dealing regulation in the US revealed the need for clarity of 
regulations. In the US, the administrative and judicial precedents have generated 
controversial interpretations of the antifraud provisions. The currently established theory of 
‘misappropriation’ appears to be an extraneous reading of the provisions. However, it 
should be understood that insider dealing regulation in the US has been formed according 
to the circumstances of the country. The interpretation of the antifraud provisions has been 
a matter of dispute between the SEC and courts at different levels. Introducing a clear 
statutory definition at federal level has been difficult in the US, because it is a large country 
with different levels of legislative authority. It is, therefore, not surprising that the US 
approach has not been embraced by other jurisdictions. It should be noted that although the 
US approach has not been ideal, the precedents in the US have influenced the regulations in 
other jurisdictions. 
In the UK, although the act of insider dealing has been clearly defined, the recent 
amendments created a fragmented and repeated area of law. This situation is also formed 
by the special circumstances in the jurisdiction. The authorities in the UK were under 
pressure to implement the EU directives. Having the provisions related to insider dealing 
scattered between the CJA 1993 and FSMA 2000 is confusing at least to the business 
world. 
The act of insider dealing while in possession of inside information should be accurately 
defined if it is to be criminalized, because it is unfair to punish someone under an obscure 
law. The unambiguous definition of insider dealing serves another end, that is to say, the 
conventionally legitimate practices in the financial industry, for instance, insider dealing 
with no knowledge of the inside information, dealing on the basis of information from 
research that is not available to all the public, disclosure of information in the normal 
course of business and so on. 
Clarity of financial regulation should not be compromised, because it is dedicated to 
business. In emerging markets, there is probably more demand for clarity of regulation, 
since there are insufficient precedents to serve as proper guidance. Accordingly, the 
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regulations at the DIFC and DFSA have been promulgated with consideration given to the 
importance of clarity and details. 
Any pertinent reform of the regulation in the UAE has to take into account the clarity of 
regulation. Detailed definitions and sufficient guidance are essential to provide certainty for 
the financial industry. The recent amendments in the UK also prove that any cosmetic 
changes have to be made accurately in order to avoid confusion. 
Criminal/civil sanctions 
A comparison between the approaches of the US and the UK reveals the practicality of 
combining more than one kind of sanction. The outline of the UK approach indicated how 
the system for a long time depended on criminal sanctions. This was a main reason for the 
limited number of successful prosecutions. Introducing a civil/administrative regime in the 
FSMA 2000 was a response to the evidently limited successful criminal prosecutions that 
brought into question its impact on deterring insider dealing. On the other hand, in the US 
approach, administrative powers have made the difference in deterring insider dealing; such 
powers included the authority to impose a civil penalty and to order the disgorgement of 
profits. 
Civil/administrative fines are advantageous because of the lower burden of proof than for a 
criminal prosecution. In addition, an administrative regime can also be imposed on legal 
persons, as will be discussed in following chapters. Administrative sanctions are not 
confined to fines; there can be other sanctions such as invalidating licenses, disqualifying 
an individual, disgorgement of profits and so on. 
It seems that the current trend in many jurisdictions is to depend on an administrative 
regime to deter insider dealing and market abuse. It can be observed that in many 
jurisdictions, there is agreement that an administrative regime is more efficient than a 
criminal regime. This is also the case in the DIFC, which has an administrative regime 
against market misconduct. 
Sanctions should be regarded as the last resort. Since prevention is better than cure, there 
also should be preventive measures besides the criminal and administrative sanctions. We 
discussed the position in the US of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 in Section 16(b), 
which was dedicated to discouraging insider dealing through disclosure. Obligating issuers 
to make a timely disclosure of inside information is a practical measure to keep insider 
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dealing to a minimum. In fact, it is according to this rationale that modern financial market 
regulations have extended the obligations of timely disclosure. 
There are other essential measures that should be introduced to discourage insider dealing 
in order to maintain a transparent and informed market. It is important to obligate financial 
institutions to have in place arrangements that ensure the confidentiality of inside 
information, for example, Chinese walls.  
International standards 
At the present time, the national jurisdiction of any country is expected to implement 
standards adopted internationally or regionally. The objective of such standards can be 
either to reach legal/economic harmonization or even to function as optional guidance for 
jurisdictions. If we are to consider the EU directives as mandatory standards, we can say 
that the regulation of insider dealing in the UK has reflected a kind of international 
standard. In this case, implementing the standards has been obligatory and aimed at 
reaching legal/economic harmonization. On the other hand, the optional benchmark to 
international standards aims at gaining the confidence of investors. The laws and 
regulations of the DIFC have been promulgated taking into consideration the establishment 
of a world-class regulatory environment. There is apparently a trend of regulatory 
competition or the so-called ‘race to the top’ between jurisdictions. Implementation of 
international standards in this case aims at providing an orderly market in order to attract 
investments. 
The experience of the US and the UK in many areas has been internationally influential and 
considered as best practice. This is not to say that the regulation of insider dealing in the 
two countries has no faults. It has been indicated that the antifraud rules in the US, although 
being the first of their kind, have not been embraced by other jurisdictions. 
One area that needs to be decided by officials in the UAE is whether there should be a plan 
to move financial regulation in the country closer to international standards. In the limited 
area of the DIFC, there is undoubtedly a plan to provide a world-class regulatory 
environment. 
It should also be clear that this comparative study would not argue that the UAE 
jurisdiction should implement best practices in the world. It is rather to reach reasonable 
recommendations for reform of the UAE law. On the basis that the applied study aimed at 
indicating certain problematic areas and the comparative study aimed at looking at the 
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experiences of other countries, it can be said that insider dealing regulation in the UAE is 
behind the expectations of investors. The current regulatory environment in the UAE local 
markets is scrutinized in a number of areas. The applied study indicated there was an 
underachievement in investor confidence, market informativeness, transparency and 
disclosure, clarity of regulations and so on. Thus, regardless of the aim to bring the 
regulatory system closer to international standards, financial market regulation in the UAE 
should be reasonably improved to provide a better environment for investments.354 
The policy of regulation 
the policy of regulating insider dealing was indicated in Chapter One. The discussion 
revealed the dispute regarding the rationale underlying the regulation of insider dealing. 
Seemingly, one of the more convincing arguments was that insider dealing on the basis of 
material non-public information should be regulated because it has a negative effect on the 
market. However, in many jurisdictions, the answer to why there is a need to regulate 
insider dealing is still not clear-cut. There was a discussion of the attitude of the SEC 
towards insider dealing. The ‘disclose or abstain’ rule invented by the SEC is based on the 
premise of market informativeness, which means that all investors should have access to 
the information. Nevertheless, courts in the US rejected this reading in favour of reading 
Rule 10b-5 under fiduciary duties. There has been a discrepancy regarding the policy of 
regulation. On the other hand, It was indicated how the EU Directives clearly state the 
rationale underlying the regulation of insider dealing. In brief, the EU directives justified 
the regulation of insider dealing to ensure the integrity of financial markets and to enhance 
investor confidence in those markets. 
One observation from this discussion is that in jurisdictions similar to that of the UK, the 
clear determination of the policy of regulation is thought to help the regulator and the 
courts to enforce the law since the purpose of the law is clear, while in the US, the courts 
disagreed with the SEC and could not find in the legislative history that supports a wide 
application of Rule 10b-5 to prohibit tippees, for instance. Another observation is that some 
precedents in the US should be read in the light of the dispute regarding the policy of 
regulation. Some judicial precedents in the US were decided on the basis of fiduciary duties 
or even on the basis of misappropriation theory. The law of fiduciary duties and the 
                                                 
354 See above heading: A summary of the results of the applied study.  
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misappropriation of information have not developed in the same manner in other 
jurisdictions. 
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Introduction 
While chapter four provided a ‘macro-comparison’ approach to the regulation of insider 
dealing, there needed to be a ‘micro-comparison’ approach to the particular rules relating to 
insider dealing. There are various functions of comparative law. The aim is to build up 
recommended new rules for the UAE law through looking at the advantages and 
disadvantages of the laws compared. 
The comparative discussion of the systems in outline in chapter 4 aims at exploring the 
background and the nature of the systems. This chapter constitutes a comparative legal 
study, but it has a specific methodology and objectives. 
The second and third chapters aimed at demonstrating that insider dealing as a problem 
exists in the local markets of the UAE. The thesis attempted to prove that there are 
regulatory shortcomings in financial markets in the UAE. A background to the evolution of 
financial markets and their current regulatory situation was provided in the second chapter. 
The applied study, in its turn, supported the proposition that there are regulatory 
shortcomings in local financial markets. The most obvious of these are shortcomings in 
transparency, disclosure of information, protection of the market and investors, and 
regulating insider dealing. Thus, it can be said that insider dealing is a problem in the UAE 
markets, as it is a problem in any other market whether developed or emergent. The 
problem is universal, because in any market which facilitates trading, information plays a 
vital role in directing prices to be fair. There are always instances in which ‘insiders’ have 
access to ‘inside information’ which is not available to other investors. The result is that the 
problem of insider dealing is ‘universal’. That is notwithstanding that the nature and degree 
of the problem varies from one market to another. It is acknowledged that the function of 
the law is to provide a solution to the ‘legal problem’ and that this could be achieved in 
different legal systems by different means. The solutions found by different legal systems 
can be similar if the ‘legal problem’ is ‘universal’. This implies the existence of ‘universal 
principles of law’, which are formulated into different terminology in different 
jurisdictions.355 
The proposition that there could be ‘universal principles of law’ can also be supported by 
the findings of the applied study. The results of this show that investors think that the 
                                                 
355 RALF MICHAELS ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ Duke Law School Working Paper Series 
Paper 26, Year 2005. p.8. 
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following are respectively the most important regulatory principles: ‘financial markets 
should be transparent and issuers should make timely disclosure of any inside information’; 
‘investors in financial markets should be put on an equal footing and their rights should be 
protected’; and ‘there should be an implementation of international standards of regulation 
in the local financial markets of any country’. 
On this basis, it can be argued that there is similarity between the principles underlying the 
regulation of insider dealing in different jurisdictions. That is because the problem of 
insider dealing is ‘universal’. However, it remains true that there are differences between 
jurisdictions in relation to the rules adopted to regulate insider dealing. Comparative law is 
the appropriate methodology to compare the different means found by different 
jurisdictions to respond to the same problem. In fact, comparison is one of the most 
important scientific approaches. It is difficult to imagine how a national legal system could 
be improved without shedding light on its shortcomings through comparison.356 
It seemed appropriate to determine the ‘function’ to be fulfilled by the comparative study 
which serves the purpose of this chapter. In other words, according to the functional 
method of comparative law, there are specific functions to be served by a comparative 
study. For the purposes of this study, it appears that the “building of a system” is the most 
important function. The poor drafting of regulations in the UAE have been discussed 
earlier.357 This was a result of the drafters ignoring comparative law as a practical method 
of introducing a better law, which simultaneously serves better the needs of the national 
system. The “building of a system” is the main function to be served by the functional 
comparison in this chapter. It is clear that evaluating and criticising the comparative 
systems are the way in which appropriate solutions can be reached.358 
The following parts will identify the crucial functions to be fulfilled in an effective system 
of regulation of insider dealing. This is especially important in answering the central 
questions regarding the regulation of insider dealing: the definition of an insider; the 
definition of inside information; the definitions of related concepts and the regulation of 
timely disclosure.    
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Part 1 Insider 
The definition of an ‘insider’ 
…The problem of the regulation of insider dealing has taken several stages in 
developed jurisdictions. In the first stage, an insider was only one who possesses 
inside information due to his status or profession. Then the net was widened; the 
relatives were included as insiders. In the last stage, the term included all those who 
possess inside information.  How did they possess it? From a friend, overhearing it 
in a café? From someone who by the nature of his employment (for example an 
electrician) heard the information?  He is not from the company but is an insider. 
Widening the concept of the insider in several stages should be represented in your 
thesis in a way which reflects the legislative development of this point. The harm in 
this act does not depend on whether the insider is someone from the company. 
Q – What about the SCA regulations of this point? 
A – Under the SCA regulations only those who possess information because of their 
status or profession can be insiders. There is another Article…which states that a 
person cannot derive personal benefit for himself or someone else, but we cannot 
say that relatives can be included in this Article… But if we widen the net to the 
third stage, it will include those insiders due to their status, profession, relatives and 
anyone else. 
Q – What do you think about the limited nature of the rules in the SCA? 
A – There should be a wider net for determining insiders, especially in our societies. 
In our culture, information is disclosed easily. Also, in companies in this country 
individuals have positions on several boards of directors. At the same time they are 
investors in securities. The information is easily passed and everyone can deal on 
the basis of it. It is also easy to evade the rules if they are limited. An insider can 
deal in his wife’s or children’s accounts if they are not included in the regulation. 
He can also deal in the account of his company, or pass the information to a friend 
and then share the profits. This can be found here more than anywhere else. The 
nature of relationships in this society determines that there is insider dealing in this 
country. 
…  
There is certainly insider dealing activities. It is also because a lot of the companies 
in this country have a family characteristic, in spite of their transformation into 
public companies. Member of the board of directors can be relatives. This makes it 
easy to pass information from one person to another. 
… 
Q – If the developed countries widened the definition of an insider step by step, 
should we also widen it gradually? 
A – Not necessarily.  We take several stages.  We should begin where the other has 
arrived. There were loopholes in the legislation in other countries; we do not have to 
make the same mistakes.359 
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In order to provide certainty in the rules regulating insider dealing, there has to be a clear 
definition of the elements in the action of “insider dealing”. The most important elements 
are “insider” and “inside information”. It is no exaggeration to say that the definition of 
these two terms is the core point of the problem of studying the law of insider dealing. 
As regard the definition of an ‘insider’, it is apparent that the US model revealed the 
complexity and, at the same time, the desirability of defining the term.  The problem of 
determining an ‘insider’ in the US regulation was discussed in depth in chapter four. The 
discussion will not be repeated in this chapter, except to indicate how case law solved 
similar problems intended to be solved by statutes. It is the US experience which put other 
jurisdictions on the right track, leading them to introduce statutory definitions. Yet, 
introducing a statutory definition, while it meets the need for legal certainty, raises a 
number of other legal problems which could be faced in practice. The term ‘insider’ does 
not present a problem until one comes to evaluate the statutory definition of it. 
In general, securities laws appear to be divided into two approaches. Legal definitions of 
what constitutes an ‘insider’ for the purpose of prohibiting insider dealing are based on 
either a ‘person connection’ approach or an ’information connection’ approach. The 
‘person connection’ approach defines an insider by depending on the criterion of the 
relationship of the person to the issuer of the securities.  In contrast, the ‘information 
connection’ approach considers any person who possesses inside information relating to the 
issuer as an insider, regardless of his/her relationship to the issuer.360 It may appear that 
subjecting all those who possess inside information to the ‘information connection’ 
approach will leave no loophole in legislation. However, such a broad definition may be 
unfair, since people who are without proper knowledge of the status of the information may 
be subjected to the prohibition. In other words, the ‘person connection’ approach takes into 
consideration the means of accessing inside information, and usually distinguishes between 
the ‘primary insider’ and the ’secondary insider’ for the purposes of requiring a certain 
degree of knowledge of the information for each category (as will be explained).  
Therefore, it seems that a ‘person connection’ approach is appropriate in defining an 
insider, through differentiating between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ insiders. It can be said 
that, in general, the US, UK and DIFC regulations all adopt a ‘person connection’ approach 
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in defining an insider. That is, insiders are determined by a connection of one kind or 
another to the source of information. However, the recent trend in the regulation of insider 
dealing has been one of widening the definition of insiders in order to avoid any loopholes. 
This involves adopting a definition with elements of both approaches. 
Widening the concept of ‘Insider’ 
The classic notion of an insider is that where a director of an issuer obtains from a board 
meeting material information which will have a significant effect on the price of the 
issuer’s securities, and then deals in the related securities on the basis of the information he 
possesses before it is made public. In this case, the director exploits his position and takes 
advantage of the inside information that he learnt by virtue of his position. The director 
may also encourage another person to deal on the basis of inside information or disclose the 
information to that person. The director also exploits his position in such circumstances, 
and he knows that the other person is likely to deal on the basis of inside information 
because he is advantaged over other uninformed dealers. The situation is no different where 
the insider aims to avoid a loss, not to make a profit. The director takes advantage of inside 
information and it does not matter whether he uses it to make a profit or to avoid a loss, 
since in both cases he is advantaged over other uninformed dealers. The term ‘insider’ was 
traditionally used to indicate those who were ‘inside’ a corporation and thus had access to 
‘inside information’, for example, directors, employees and major shareholders. However, 
this traditional notion, based on general legal provisions, departed a long time ago. The 
currently consistent rationale of regulating insider dealing is the maintenance of a fair and 
transparent market, the maintenance of investor confidence in the market and putting 
investors on an equal footing in terms of information. This is one of the main premises of 
the thesis. It is not the current position in the US, but the abandoned ‘disclose or abstain’ 
rule was based on this premise. The notion that the philosophy on which regulating insider 
dealing is based results in the scope of the regulation has been discussed. Where the central 
justification is protecting the informative nature of the market, this is represented as a 
departure from the traditional concept of regarding insider dealing as a breach of fiduciary 
relationships. 
This classic example had been influential in attempts to prohibit insider dealing. It is 
supported by attempts to attach fiduciary obligations to the insider under common law. In 
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addition, Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 in the US makes it clear 
that the classic notion is dominant.361 
The classic concept appeared to be limited in posing a deterrent prohibition to insider 
dealing. In practice, it is not only directors who discover inside information. Rather, it is 
true that many other persons can be deemed insiders, since they have regular access to 
inside information, sometimes more than the directors themselves. If directors, officers and 
employees are prohibited from insider dealing, they can indirectly benefit from the 
information by passing it on to others. Why then, should prohibition not be widened to 
encompass other persons who are likely to have access to inside information and to use it? 
It is this point which presented the difficulty in the US, when Rule 10b-5 was broadly 
interpreted to prohibit ‘corporate outsiders’ from insider dealing. 
 The response to this problem has been to introduce into statutory definition two groups of 
insiders, ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ insiders. It is crucial to evaluate to what degree 
comparative law succeeded in fulfilling the function of defining an insider under these two 
main categories. The comparison is between the following laws: the CJA 1993, UK, the 
FSMA 2000, UK, the Markets Law 12 of 2004, DIFC and reference to the US case law. 
It is challenging to explain the laws of the DIFC. This is because of the complex terms in 
these laws and the fact that academic references in the field are scarce. However, there has 
been considerable work in comparative jurisdictions, and this can be approached whenever 
appropriate. 
Primary insiders 
To define insider dealing, it is essential to define the central word, namely “insider”. For 
the purpose of simplifying the discussion, ‘primary insiders’ can be divided into ‘traditional 
insiders’ and ‘access insiders’. ‘Traditional insiders’ are those who, because of their status, 
are more likely to possess inside information. ‘Access insiders’ are those who, because of 
their function, profession or activities, have a relationship with the issuer which makes 
them likely to have access to inside information. 
Traditional insiders 
Jurisdiction Related legal rules  
UK CJA 1993, Section 57(2)(a)(i) 
…a person has information from an inside source if and only if-  
                                                 
361 Explained in-depth in Chapter four, see heading: The regulation of insider dealing in the US  
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(a) he has it through-  
(i) being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of 
securities; 
UK FSMA 2000, Section 118B(a) and (b) 
…an insider is any person who has inside information- 
(a) as a result of his membership of an administrative, management or 
supervisory body of an issuer of qualifying investments, 
(b) as a result of his holding in the capital of an issuer of qualifying 
investments, 
DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (45)(2)(a) 
 …a person that is a director, officer, employee, affiliate, Associate or 
adviser of: 
(i) the relevant Reporting Entity; 
(ii) a person that is proposing to make a Takeover Offer under 
Part 7 for the shares of the Reporting Entity; or 
(iii) a person that is proposing to be involved in a takeover 
with the Reporting Entity; 
US Case law. 
 
In the UK, the law of insider dealing is fragmented. Under the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 
2000, there is a dual definition of ‘insider’ and ‘inside information’. It is proper to compare 
the insider dealing provisions under the new Section 118 of the FSMA 2000 with the 
provisions under the CJA 1993. The most important criteria for comparison are in the area 
of the scope of the definitions of ‘insider’ and ‘inside information’. Nevertheless, initially it 
can be said that the two definitions of ‘insider’ under the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 are 
in most instances similar. The definition of the ‘primary insider’ category, especially, is 
very similar under both statutes. The reason for the similarity is that the two definitions of 
‘primary insider’ (those of the CJA 1993 and of the FSMA 2000) were the result of the 
implementation of two similar European definitions of the term.  The definition of ‘primary 
insider’ under the CJA 1993 is derived from implementing Article 2(1) of the Insider 
Dealing Directive.362 On the other hand, the definition of ‘primary insider’ under the FSMA 
2000 is derived from the related definition in the Market Abuse Directive. The definition 
under the Market Abuse Directive is the pertinent one.  In turn, this directive listed insiders 
                                                 
362 Directive 89/592/EEC coordinating regulations on insider dealing (Insider Dealing Directive) [1989] OJ 
L334/30.  
Article 2(1): 
Each member state shall prohibit any person who:  
- by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer,  
- by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or  
- because he has access to such information by virtue of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties,  
possesses inside information from taking advantage of that information… 
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in Article 2(1).363 It appears that under both the Insider Dealing Directive and the Market 
Abuse Directive the list of ‘primary insiders’ is almost identical. Consequently, the list of 
‘primary insiders’ under the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 is also almost identical.364 The 
main difference is the addition of a new means of access to inside information, which is ‘by 
virtue of criminal activities’. The addition is directed to prevent the involvement of 
organised crime and terrorist groups in financial markets in order to conceal their illegal 
activities and direct the profits to their activities.365 
That the two definitions of ‘primary insiders’ in the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 are very 
similar, however, is not to argue that they are identical. The CJA 1993 stated “director, 
employee or shareholder” as ‘primary insiders’. On the other hand, the UK implementation 
of the Market Abuse Directive in this area was “verbatim or copy out”.366 Therefore, it 
stated the same definition of the related directive as the one appearing in the above table. 
‘Traditional insiders’ under the CJA 1993 are directors, employees or shareholders, while 
under the FSMA 2000 they are members of an administrative, management or supervisory 
body, or shareholders. It seems that the only confusion is whether under the FSMA 2000 
“members of an administrative, management or supervisory body” encompasses all the 
directors and employees. It might be said that there could be cases which cannot be 
considered as being in an administrative or management position, for example a printer or a 
representative.  However, as will be explained, the category of ‘access insiders’ 
encompasses all the employees of the company who, by virtue of their employment, 
possess inside information.367 Therefore, there is no loophole in considering an employee as 
a ‘primary insider’. 
                                                 
363 Market Abuse Directive, Article 2(1)… 
The first subparagraph shall apply to any person who possesses that information: 
(a) by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer; or 
(b) by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer; or 
(c) by virtue of his having access to the information through the exercise of his employment, profession or 
duties; or 
(d) by virtue of his criminal activities. 
364 See KAREN CONNOLLY ‘European Union: Implementing Measures under the Market Abuse Directive’ 
(2002) 4 Journal of International Financial Markets 99.  
365 Market Abuse Directive, Recitals 17 and 14. 
366 JANE WELCH, MATTHIAS PANNIER, EDUARDO BARRACHINO, JAN BERND AND PHILIP LEDEBOER 
‘Comparative Implementation of EU Directives (I) – Insider Dealing and Market Abuse’ (2005) City 
Research Series, Number Eight, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law. 
367 MICHAEL ASHE ‘The Directive on Insider Dealing’ (1992) 13 Company Lawyer 15. p.17. 
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Both the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 confer automatic insider status on individuals who 
may have inside information by virtue of their status. Thus, amongst the primary insiders, 
there are those who have traditionally been considered as more likely to possess inside 
information because of their status or relationship to the issuer. But the CJA 1993 also 
confers the same automatic status on employees, irrespective of their position, since it is not 
a condition that they occupy a position which could reasonably be expected to gain them 
access to inside information. In this sense, it might be that under this provision an office 
cleaner who comes across inside information could be regarded as an insider for the 
purposes of this act, without regard to his position.368 The position of both acts is that 
automatic insider status is also conferred on the shareholders of the issuer’s securities, 
irrespective of the percentage of their shareholding. There is no lower threshold for the 
shareholding and no requirement of a controlling shareholding; although in practice the 
larger shareholder is more likely to have access to inside information, and to therefore be an 
insider. 
In the US, as was discussed in-depth earlier, it was not difficult to attach responsibility to 
‘traditional insiders’. The basis of responsibility was the relationship of directors, officers 
and controlling shareholders to the issuer, which gave rise to fiduciary duties. In the US it 
was acknowledged that such individuals breach their fiduciary duties when dealing on the 
basis of inside information. In addition, Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
1934 is dedicated to the prohibition of unfair use of information by any director or officer, 
or by a shareholder with more than 10% of the shares. It is apparent that this section was 
based on the classic notion that considers ‘insiders’ as those who have a relationship to the 
issuer.369 
In the DIFC, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (45) (2) provides a definition of “a person 
in a special relationship”. The definition of this term is equivalent to defining an ‘insider’. 
Insiders can be divided into two categories, ‘primary insiders’ and ‘secondary insiders’, as 
most of the recognized jurisdictions determine. 
Contrary to the position in the UK, it is difficult to say that there is a category of 
‘traditional insiders’ in the DIFC. It is apparent that the DIFC law attempted to adopt a 
wide definition of ‘primary insiders’. In the DIFC, a director, officer, employee, affiliate, 
                                                 
368 KEITH WOTHERSPOON ‘Insider Dealing: The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1994) 57 
The Modern Law Review 419. p.425. 
369 The law of the US was explained in-depth in Chapter four, see heading: The regulation of insider dealing 
in the US  
 211
associate or adviser of the relevant reporting entity can be an insider. Directors and 
employees are the classic examples of insiders. This rule, nevertheless, expands classic 
insiders to include affiliates, associates or advisers. The question that arises is whether it is 
necessary to confer affiliates, associates or advisers the same status as directors in terms of 
being considered insiders. It is acknowledged that in reality there are complex relationships 
of ownership and control between corporations. It is difficult to imagine that there can be 
an ‘issuer’ or a ‘reporting entity’ which has no relationship of any kind  either to a 
subsidiary, a holding, a group of companies or a business associate. However, attempting to 
introduce all the particular situations in which a person can be considered an insider is not 
achievable in law. In other words, the DIFC law would have been much clearer if insiders 
were categorized under a breadth criterion. 
The above-mentioned legal problem can be simplified using the following example.  A 
person (A) was the secretary of company (1). (A) was aware of the material problems 
relating to company (2) a subsidiary of company (1) because of the relationship between 
the two companies which normally resulted in a flow of information between them. (A) 
was in possession of relevant negative information concerning company (2).  He sold the 
shares of company (2). Following the announcement of the negative information, the share 
price dropped significantly. By selling the shares when he did while in possession of 
information not generally available (A) avoided a loss.370 According to the facts of this 
case, (A) possessed inside information relating to the subsidiary company, not to the 
controlling company employing him.  If this case had been decided under the DIFC law, 
(A) would be considered an insider, because he is an affiliate or associate of the source of 
the information. However, in the UK (A) would be more easily considered an ‘access 
insider’, because he accessed inside information by virtue of his employment. This means 
that the two laws fulfill the same function. However, the criterion under the UK law seems 
to be sufficiently broad and much easier for business to comply with.  The DIFC law 
divides insiders into complicated sub-categories. 
The definition of an insider is made more complicated by DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, 
Section (45) (2) by indicating the situation in a takeover. According to this article, the 
following are considered as having the same status of “director” as the issuer: under (a) (ii) 
                                                 
370 The facts of this example are, to a certain degree, similar to those of the case; FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY, Final Notice, Robert Middlemiss, 10 February 2004. pp.2-5. The case was decided under ‘misuse 
of information’ rather than ‘insider dealing’ provisions. 
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a director, officer, employee, affiliate, associate or adviser of a person that is proposing to 
make a takeover offer for the shares of the reporting entity, or, under (iii), proposing to be 
involved in a takeover with the reporting entity. It is acknowledged that in takeovers there 
is material market information which should not be exploited by insiders to deal for their 
own benefit. However, it can be questioned whether this rule makes it easier to attach 
responsibilities to those who have access to material takeover information. 
This provision is comparable to the American case in 1980, Chiarella v. United States371, 
where a printer handling corporate takeover bids deduced the identities of the companies 
and dealt in their stock without disclosing information about the takeovers. The financial 
printer was prosecuted on the grounds that he used information regarding tender offers and 
a merger, and bought stocks in the targeted companies.  The Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction, holding that dealing on the basis of material non-public information is not in 
itself a breach of anti-fraud provisions and the printer was not obliged to a duty of 
disclosure to the target shareholders. Due to the legal loophole, the instant response of the 
SEC to Chiarella was its adoption of Rule 14e-3 under Section 14(e) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act 1934.  This rule was designed to prohibit insiders of the offeror and the 
target companies from revealing material information about a tender offer to those who are 
expected to trade on the basis of such information.  The rule also prohibits those ‘outsiders’ 
who possess material information regarding a tender offer by another person from dealing 
in the target company’s securities. 
In the US, the adoption of Rule 14e-3 was necessary to avoid a legal gap. The question 
arises whether it was essential for the DIFC law to dedicate a category to defining insiders 
to inside information relating to takeovers. The DIFC law attempts to encompass directors, 
officers, employees, affiliates, associates or advisers of the offeror or a company involved 
in takeover. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how these groups of insiders possess inside 
information other than by virtue of their employment, profession or duties. In the UK, 
under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, the definition of insider in 
Section 1(5) included a specific category of insiders who are contemplating takeovers in a 
particular capacity. When this act was replaced by the adoption of the CJA 1993, the 
specific category of takeover insiders was abandoned. However, those contemplating 
takeovers were within the scope of ‘access insiders’ in the definition under the CJA 
                                                 
371 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
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1993.372 Thus, it could be argued that those who possess inside information relating to 
takeovers could be encompassed within the category of ‘access insiders’. Again, the more 
broadly based category of ‘access insiders’ is easier for the regulator and businesses to 
comply with. 
It could be a valid justification that introducing descriptive categories of insiders under the 
DIFC was necessary because there were no legal or judicial precedents. However, this aim 
was not achieved by the law. On the contrary, the DIFC law, by dividing insiders into 
particular sub-groups, narrowed the scope of insiders.  This will be discussed under 
‘secondary insiders’. 
One difficulty in defining insiders is that of defining the way in which they possess inside 
information. In the UK, under the CJA 1993, the first category of insider, the ‘traditional 
insider’ possesses inside information if he “has it through being” a director, employee or 
shareholder of an issuer of securities. The problem here is that the law seems to require a 
causal link between the individual’s being in the specific position and his/her possession of 
inside information. If (A) was a window cleaner who had inside information while cleaning 
the issuer’s windows, it could be claimed that he gained the information ‘incidentally’ 
while he was cleaning rather than “through being” an employee.373 Another potential 
loophole is seen in this example: if an employee (A) heard inside information out of the 
hours of his duty, would it be possible to say that he had it “through being” an employee of 
the issuer? It is, therefore, thought that the requirement of “has it through being” could be a 
loophole in the law.374 
The FSMA 2000 replaced the phrase ‘through being’ with ‘as a result of’. Thus, an insider 
is a director, employee or a shareholder who possess inside information “as a result of” his 
being such. It could be argued that it is still not clear why the law should require a certain 
way in which an insider might have inside information. This is especially so in relation to 
primary insiders who are most likely to possess inside information and are, in most cases, 
supposed to know the status of the information. 
                                                 
372 BRENDA HANNIGAN ‘Regulating Insider Dealing – The EEC Dimension’ (1989) 4 Journal of International 
Banking Law 11. p.12. 
373 MICHAEL ASHE ‘Who is an Insider?’ in BARRY RIDER AND MICHAEL ASHE (Eds.) The Fiduciary, the 
Insider and the Conflict: a Compendium of Essays (Dublin: Brehon Sweet & Maxwell, 1995). p.77. 
374 M. STAMP AND T. JAGGERS ‘United Kingdom’ in M. STAMP AND T. JAGGERS (eds.) International Insider 
Dealing (Old Woking: City & Financial Publ., c2005). pp.199-20. 
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The above-mentioned difficulty seems to be avoided in the DIFC law. When the rules were 
combined, the prohibition against a director would be read as follows: “a director of the 
relevant reporting entity shall not deal in investments of or relating to the reporting entity if 
the person possesses material information”. It is apparent that in the DIFC it is not required 
that the primary insiders possess inside information “by virtue” of their position, 
employment…etc. It means that their merely being in the determined categories, and in 
possession of information, is sufficient for them to be regarded as primary insiders. There is 
no requirement of a causal link between their being in such a position and their possession 
of the inside information. This means that primary insiders are under a duty of care to 
assess the information in their possession. This is also expected to avoid a loophole in the 
following example. (A) is a director who had access to inside information due to his 
position. (A) revealed the inside information in a café conversation and (B), who was an 
employee of the same issuer, overheard the information. In this case, it can be said that (B) 
did not access the inside information by virtue of his employment. However, it is not clear 
that (B) would benefit from any loophole under the DIFC law, because there is no 
requirement of a certain way in which he should gain the information. His/her mere 
possession of the information is sufficient to consider him/her an insider. 
 
Access insiders 
Jurisdiction Related legal rules 
UK CJA 1993, Section 57(2)(a)(ii) 
…a person has information from an inside source if and only if-  
(a) he has it through-  
… 
(ii) having access to the information by virtue of his 
employment, office or profession; 
 
UK FSMA 2000, Section 118B(c) and (d) 
…an insider is any person who has inside information- 
… 
(c) as a result of having access to the information through the exercise 
of his employment, profession or duties, 
(d) as a result of his criminal activities, or 
DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (45)(2)(b), (c) and (d) 
(b) a person that is engaging in or proposes to engage in any business 
or professional activity with or on behalf of the Reporting Entity or 
with or on behalf of a person described in Article 45(2) (a)(ii) or (iii); 
(c) a person that is a director, officer or employee of the entity 
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described in Article 45(2)(b); 
(d) a person that learned of the material information with respect to 
the Reporting Entity while the person came within Article 45(2)(a), 
(b) or (c); or 
US Case law. 
 
Another important category of ‘primary insider’ is that of those who do not have a 
relationship with the issuer, but have a connection because of the services they provide.  
This group includes lawyers, accountants and investment bankers who have an important 
role in making decisions for the issuer, and therefore have access to material information. 
In some circumstances they are expected to have knowledge of the materiality of the 
information and to be subject to the temptation to use it. For purposes of explanation, this 
group is called ‘access insiders’. It is crucial to note that under statutory definition, which 
widens the scope of insiders, ‘access insiders’ need not have a connection or a relationship 
with the issuer when they have access to inside information relating to the issuer.375 This is 
the trend in the statutes.  They moved from the old concept that an insider should have a 
connection with the company and adopted a rather wider definition of the term insider. 
The US experience revealed the degree to which it is difficult to hold “access insiders” 
liable in the absence of a statute clearly defining them as insiders. It was considered a 
victory for the ‘misappropriation theory’ in defining Rule 10b-5 when the Supreme Court 
considered O’Hagan as an insider in the case of United States v. O’Hagan.376 In fact, 
O’Hagan would easily be considered an “access insider” under UK law. It was not so easy 
to attach responsibility to him in the US. O’Hagan was a partner in Dorsey and Whitney, a 
law firm which represented Grand Metropolitan PLC with regard to a potential tender offer 
for the Pillsbury Company’s common stock. O’Hagan did no work in the representation but 
learned of the potential deal. He dealt in options in Pillsbury stock and made a profit when 
Grand Met made public its tender offer and the price of Pillsbury stock rose considerably. 
O’Hagan argued that his conduct did not amount to fraud because he owed no fiduciary 
duty to Pillsbury. It is clear that this point was the difficulty faced by the SEC and courts in 
the US. The Supreme Court rejected his contention and upheld his conviction. The Court 
                                                 
375 KEITH WOTHERSPOON ‘Insider Dealing: The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1994) 57 
The Modern Law Review 419. p.425. 
376 UNITED STATES v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996). In the Supreme Court United States v. 
O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 2211 (1997). 
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adopted misappropriation theory to attach responsibility to a corporate “outsider” who 
violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.377 
Contrary to the US law, the UK adopted a statutory definition of an insider. The scope of 
insiders is wider in a statutory definition, which is based on the rationale of justifying the 
regulation of insider dealing on informational advantage, rather than on the relationship 
between the insider and the issuer. Thus, the CJA 1993 expands the group of primary 
insiders to include ‘access insiders’, who have access to the information by virtue of their 
employment, office or profession. This provision is expected to include lawyers, bankers, 
auditors, consultants and professionals who may have access to inside information. The 
FSMA 2000 introduced a similar list of ‘access insiders’. However, the term ‘by office’ 
was replaced by the term ‘by duties’. It can be said that in both cases the provision directed 
to access insiders is sufficiently broad to include public employee who may have access to 
inside information by virtue of their official ‘office’ or ‘duties’. In both cases it is expected 
that the same function will be fulfilled.  This is to encompass public servants who may have 
access to inside information by virtue of their ‘office’ or ‘duties’.378 
The main difference between the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 lists of ‘primary insiders’ 
is the addition of a new means of access to inside information, which is ‘by virtue of 
criminal activities’. Introducing this new means of access was necessary to implement the 
Market Abuse Directive.379 It is thought that the addition is directed to preventing the 
involvement of organised crime and terrorist groups in financial markets, in order to 
conceal their illegal activities and direct the profits to these activities. It is also possible that 
this addition is intended to encompass instances of theft of information or any other 
criminal activities aimed at gaining access to inside information.380 It is acknowledged that 
there are significant concerns regarding terrorist groups’ involvement in the financial 
                                                 
377 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 2211 (1997). at 2209. 
378 KEITH WOTHERSPOON ‘Insider Dealing: The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1994) 57 
The Modern Law Review 419. pp.425-6. 
379 Market Abuse Directive, Recital 14: 
This Directive meets the concerns expressed by the Member States following the terrorist attacks on 11 
September 2001, as regards the fight against financing terrorist activities. 
Recital 17: 
As regards insider dealing, account should be taken of cases where inside information originates not from a 
profession or function but from criminal activities, the preparation or execution of which could have a 
significant effect on the prices of one or more financial instrument or on price formation in the regulated 
market as such. 
380 AVGOULEAS, EMILIOS ‘EC Securities Regulation, a Single Regime for an Integrated Securities Market: 
Harmonised We Stand, Harmonised We Fail? Part 2’ (2007) 22 Journal of International Banking Law and 
Regulation 153. p.154. 
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system. Although there is involvement of organised crime and terrorist groups in the 
financial system, but confronting their concealment of illegal activities and the financing of 
their activities is the function of anti-money laundering laws.381 It is difficult to imagine 
that this sub-section will fulfill its ambitious functions such as confronting terrorist 
activities. Moreover, the addition of this sub-section could also be criticized if the aim was 
to confront theft of information, since in relation to the latter it should be confronted by 
criminal law policy. In brief, there seemed to be a confusion in the aims of the regulation of 
insider dealing when ‘as a result of his criminal activities’ was added as a means of access 
to inside information. 
The facts of the following case show how an insider could access inside information ‘as a 
result of his criminal activities’. Mr David Isaacs was an experienced private investor.  He 
had no connection to Trafficmaster plc and used internet bulletin boards to exchange 
information. He had an acquaintance who was an employee of Trafficmaster. Trafficmaster 
held an internal management meeting in which minutes were produced and distributed 
internally. The minutes included important information regarding certain transactions 
entered into, or to be entered into, by Trafficmaster. Mr Isaacs visited his acquaintance’s 
house. He saw and memorized the minutes while his acquaintance was out of the room. Mr 
Isaacs posted the information on an internet bulletin board. He also purchased shares in 
Trafficmaster.382 
In the above case it was argued that Mr Isaacs had access to the information ‘as a result of 
his criminal activities’. It is apparent that he had access to the information without the 
consent of his acquaintance. He also breached the privacy of his acquaintance and accessed 
private information. However, it might be difficult to decide that his action was a criminal 
activity. Is it to be decided under the criminal law provisions? What if a criminal court 
acquitted him of committing any criminal activity? This hypothesis reveals the degree of 
difficulty which could be faced when arguing that an insider has inside information ‘as a 
result of his criminal activities’. It is also ironic that catching ‘criminal insiders’ is 
attempted by the FSMA 2000, rather than by the criminal provisions under the CJA 1993. 
                                                 
381 It is indicated that the Market Abuse Directive was adopted in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001, which made the international community reconsider combating financing terrorism. The 
UAE, in its turn, adopted a whole body of laws and regulations to combat money laundering and financing 
terrorism. 
382 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, Final Notice, David Isaacs, 28 February 2005. pp.3-6. The FSA found 
that Mr Isaacs’ behaviour in terms of dissemination of information relating to Trafficmaster fell within the 
scope of the original Section 118(1)(b) and 118(2)(a) of the FSMA 2000. His actions in disseminating 
information on the internet amounted to a ‘misuse of information’. 
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In any case, it can be argued that that having access to inside information ‘as a result of his 
criminal activities’ could be encompassed by the ‘secondary insider’ category. He “has 
inside information which he has obtained by other means and which he knows, or could 
reasonably be expected to know, is inside information”.383 
In the DIFC, ‘access insiders’ are categorized under (b) a person that is engaging in or 
proposes to engage in any business or professional activity with or on behalf of the 
Reporting Entity or with or on behalf of a person described in Article 45(2) (a)(ii) or (iii); 
under (c) a person that is a director , officer or employee of the entity described in Article 
45(2)(b) and under (d) a person that learned of the material information with respect to the 
Reporting Entity while the person came within Article 45(2)(a), (b) or (c). 
One advantage of sub-section (b) is that it is accurately drafted to include not only “a 
person that is engaging in”, but also a person that “proposes to engage in”. The engagement 
could be either in business or professional activity. The latter could be a professional 
activity by a law or accountancy firm, where such firms and their directors and employees 
could have access to material information. 
It is advisable that sub-sections (b) and (c) should be read jointly. Sub-section (c) states that 
“a person that is a director, officer or employee of the entity described in (b)”, while sub-
section (b) states that “a person that is engaging in or proposes to engage in any business 
or professional activity…” Sub-section (c) indicates that sub-section (b) determines entities 
(meaning corporations) which are in a business or professional relationship with the issuer. 
The problem is that sub-section (b) states a person rather than an entity. One possible 
justification is that a ‘person’ under the DIFC laws may include a corporation.384 However, 
Article 45(2) does not determine when a ‘person’ is considered a natural person and when a 
‘person’ is considered a corporation. It is confusing that a ‘person’ under sub-section (b) is 
indicated as a corporation, whereas the same term a ‘person’ under sub-section (c) is 
indicated as a director, officer or employee. 
Another category of insiders is defined under sub-section (d) a person that learned of the 
material information with respect to the Reporting Entity while the person came within 
Article 45(2)(a), (b) or (c). It is difficult to understand who the target of this rule is. It may 
                                                 
383 This will be discussed below, see heading: Secondary insiders (tippees). 
384 “Person” has the meaning given in Article 1 of Schedule 1 to the Regulatory Law 2004, which states that: 
“a person includes any natural person, body corporate or body unincorporate, including a company, 
partnership, unincorporated association, government or state”. 
 219
be that the drafter wanted to avoid any loophole which allowed persons who learned of the 
material information to exploit it. There seems to be a repetition of the formerly determined 
categories of insiders. Sub-section (d) states: “a person that… while the person came within 
Article 45(2)(a), (b) or (c)”. If the person already came under the former sub-sections he is 
viable to be an insider.  Then why should another sub-section repeat the same? 
It is not overstating the case to say that the wording of sub-sections (b), (c) and (d) are 
closer to being a puzzle than to being clear legal rules. It is probable that these sub-sections 
attempt to encompass a category equivalent to ‘access insiders’. It is apparent that the law 
attempted to describe complex circumstances which exist in real life and result in insiders 
having access to inside information. It can be seen as an advantage that the law recognised 
the complex relations of “business or professional activities” that exist in reality. However, 
it is apparent that the law is dividing insiders into complicated sub-groups. This makes the 
rules difficult to interpret, and even more difficult for businesses to absorb. The drafters 
could have made it easier if they had adopted a rule similar to that of the UK (the FSMA 
2000) which specifies “…persons who possess ‘inside information’ by virtue of their…(b) 
as a result of having access to the information through the exercise of his employment, 
profession or duties”. The UK law captures a wide scope of insiders. It probably 
encompasses all those who might be considered ‘access insiders’. It is difficult to justify 
why the DIFC law attempts to show that there should be a kind of a relationship between 
the ‘access insider’ and the issuer. 
It appears that the DIFC definition of the insider is based on the principle that there should 
be a kind of a connection between the insider and the source of information. In other words, 
it is apparently a ‘person connection’ definition. This approach can be criticised for more 
than one reason. It is appreciated that in other jurisdictions, like the US and the UK, the 
definition was widened in more than one stage. However, the DIFC should have learned 
from such jurisdictions the importance of adopting a reasonably wide definition. In 
addition, the DIFC insider dealing rules come under “part 8: prevention of market 
misconduct”, which indicates that the rules aim to protect the market and investors through 
maintaining an informative market. If the aim is to protect the market and investors through 
maintaining an equal access to information, it is difficult to see why the law restricts the 
scope of insiders. If the ‘access insider’ possessed inside information because of his 
employment, profession or duties and he dealt in the market, the harm is perceived and it 
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does not matter whether there was a direct or indirect relationship between him and the 
issuer. 
In the UK, one problem which may be faced is this: does the law require a certain way in 
which “access insiders” have the inside information? The problem is that the CJA 1993 
requires that ’access insiders’ have inside information “by virtue” of their employment, 
office or profession. On the other hand, the FSMA 2000 requires that ‘access insiders’ have 
inside information “through the exercise” of their employment, profession or duties. An 
example is that of a waiter who overhears inside information from directors while he is 
taking their orders. The question is whether the waiter is considered an access insider. The 
waiter has the information because of doing his work and the fact that there is no need for 
access insiders to have a business or professional relationship with the issuer is taken into 
account.385 Is there a requirement of any other ‘functional link’ between the individual’s 
employment and the issuer of the securities to which the information relates? Under the 
CJA 1993, it seemed a convincing argument that there is a need for such a link, provided 
that the Commission in the final text of the Directive386 replaced the phrase ‘in the exercise 
of’ with the ‘by virtue’ requirement.387 Thus, under the CJA 1993, the waiter’s having 
inside information by merely exercising his employment is not sufficient to consider him an 
insider. The term ‘by virtue’ indicates that there should be a ‘functional link’ to the issuer. 
The problem is that the FSMA 2000 encompasses ‘access insiders’ who have inside 
information even “through the exercise” of their employment, profession or duties. It is, 
however, not clear whether the change means that there is no need for a ‘functional link’ 
between the “employment, profession and duties” and the access to the information. It is 
also not clear whether the change is directed to encompassing instances similar to that of 
the waiter. It could be maintained that the existence of a kind of ‘functional link’ is 
important to hold someone as an ‘access insider’ who is a ‘primary insider’ rather than as 
‘secondary insider’. To simplify this, it does not seem reasonable to consider the waiter as a 
‘primary insider’, which places him on the same level of responsibility as the director of the 
issuer. On the other hand, it seems fair to consider an employee of an accountancy firm 
who had access to inside information as a ‘primary insider’, because of his ‘functional link’ 
                                                 
385 KEITH WOTHERSPOON ‘Insider Dealing: The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1994) 57 
The Modern Law Review 419. p.426. 
386 The Insider Dealing Directive which was implemented in the UK by adopting CJA 1993. 
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with the issuer. If there was no requirement for any ‘functional link’ the street cleaner and 
the director of the issuer would be on the same level of responsibility.  This is seen as an 
unfair result. 
It should be noted that the circumstances in which the waiter had inside information would 
make him a secondary insider, as will be explained. The difficulties arising from the ‘by 
virtue’ requirement indicate the sensitivity needed to draft a definition of an insider to 
include all potential categories. 
 
Secondary insiders (tippees) 
Jurisdiction Related legal rules 
UK CJA 1993, Section 57(2)(b) 
…a person has information from an inside source if and only if-  
(b) the direct or indirect source of his information is a person within 
paragraph (a). 
 
UK FSMA 2000, Section 118B(e) 
…an insider is any person who has inside information- 
(e) which he has obtained by other means and which he knows, or 
could reasonably be expected to know, is inside information. 
DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (45)(2)(e) 
(e) a person that learned of material information with respect to the 
Reporting Entity from any other person described in Article 45(2) (a), 
(b),(c) or (d) and knows or ought reasonably to have known that the 
other person is in such a relationship. 
US Case law. 
 
There are situations in which individuals, who are not in a relationship with the issuer and 
do not have access to inside information by virtue of their employment or profession, 
nevertheless receive inside information. In some circumstances they either know it is inside 
information or it that it comes from an inside source, or they know both. This category is 
called ‘secondary insiders’ and is distinguished from ‘primary insiders’. The distinction 
between the two categories (primary and secondary) is usually not found in the words of a 
statute. However, statutes usually differentiate between the two groups for a legal reason: to 
prove the possession of inside information. Primary insiders generally have access to inside 
information from its source as part of their relationship to the issuer. They are presumed to 
know the materiality of the information and should know the consequences of dealing on 
the basis of it. Thus, it is appropriate for the law not to introduce a strict requirement in 
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regard to ‘primary insiders’, such as to prove their possession of the particular inside 
information or to prove their knowledge of the information. As explained earlier388 the 
more prerequisites there are for the law to prove knowledge and intention the more it will 
be difficult to prove cases of insider dealing. It therefore seems to be fair if ‘primary 
insiders’ are assumed to have access to inside information.389 On the other hand, ‘secondary 
insiders’ usually have no relationship to the source of information, and therefore it is not 
fair to assume they have knowledge of it. 
In the US, the challenge for the law had been to find a ground for attaching liability to 
individuals who possess inside information and can exploit it in a similar manner to 
primary insiders. One method by which the law attempted to extend liability to such 
circumstances was necessitating a relationship between the source of the information and 
the tippee. Inside information must be obtained by virtue of this relationship. This has been 
the trend in the US, where extending fiduciary relationship in the light of the ‘disclose or 
abstain rule’ was a method of holding tippees liable. To achieve this, the notion of fiduciary 
relationship was extended beyond the ordinary concept. In the US, the function of including 
‘secondary insiders’ used to be fulfilled by the ‘disclose or abstain rule’.  This was so in the 
case of In re Cady Roberts & Co.390 In this case, the secondary insider was a broker who 
was given inside information by a partner. However, the current position in the US is that 
‘secondary insiders’ are held liable because their dealing while in possession of material 
non-public information is “misappropriation”, as was the case in United States v. 
O’Hagan.391 (For an in-depth explanation see heading: ‘Misappropriation’ theory. p.147.) 
In the UK, while the definitions of ‘primary insiders’ were similar under both the CJA 1993 
and the FSMA 2000, the definitions of ‘secondary insiders’ were different. Under the CJA 
1993, provided primary insiders are directors, employees or shareholders of the issuer, in 
addition to those who access inside information by virtue of their employment, office or 
profession, a secondary insider is someone who has inside information directly or indirectly 
from a primary insider. 
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This definition of secondary insiders under the CJA 1993 is mostly based on a ‘person 
connection’ criterion. This means that a person’s possession of inside information is not 
sufficient to consider him an insider.392 Under the CJA 1993 there is no requirement of a 
relationship between the tippee and the insider source. However, the CJA 1993 adopted a 
restrictive determination of ‘secondary insiders’. This approach was adopted under 
considerations of fairness, since it seemed necessary to restrict the scope of people who 
could be liable to criminal sanctions. Provided that there is no requirement of a relationship 
between the tippee and the inside source; there must be a requirement of knowledge of the 
source of information. This restrictive approach is clear in Section 57(1) of the CJA 193, 
which states that “For the purposes of this Part, a person has information as an insider if 
and only if- (a) it is, and he knows that it is, inside information, and (b) he has it, and 
knows that he has it, from an inside source” (my italics). Thus, the CJA 1993 requires that 
the secondary insider must know that he has inside information, and that he has it from an 
inside source. In fact, these prerequisites were thought to be almost impossible to prove, 
and consequently the effectiveness of the CJA 1993 was questioned.393 
A difficulty arose in regard to the following question: what is the precise knowledge of the 
inside source required to hold the tippee liable according to the CJA 1993? The answer is 
that the act in its spirit is ambiguous in this area. On one hand, the CJA 1993 attempted to 
capture a wide scope of secondary insiders by requiring a wide criterion. That is the “direct 
or indirect” source of the secondary insider’s source of information is a primary insider. 
This results in the proposition that even if the information was passed indirectly (from 
primary insider to tippee to sub-tippee) the last sub-tippee is liable, since his ‘indirect’ 
source of information is a primary insider. This also suggests that the CJA 1993 catches 
instances in which the information is passed through electronic means to conceal the 
identity of the informant. On the contrary, the CJA 1993 requiring the secondary insider to 
know that he has the information from an inside source restricts the scope of insiders. This 
problem was faced under the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, where Lord 
Lowery interpreted the word ‘knowingly’ in Section 1(3)(a) and 2(1)(b) as meaning that in 
order to hold a tippee liable he must know the identity of his informant.394 However, this 
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comment has been criticized as over-restrictive. It does not seem to be just that the law 
requires a secondary insider to know the identity of his informant.  Such a requirement is 
over-restrictive and unnecessary.395 It also appears that Lord Lowry’s comments cannot be 
correct under the CJA 1993, because such an interpretation confines the scope of the 
legislation.  The CJA 1993 aims to include even sub-tippees whose indirect source of 
information is a primary insider.396 To explain this, it seems unnecessary to require tippees’ 
knowledge of the identity of the insider source, since this is a perverse reading of the ambit 
of the act which attempts to include sub-tippees.  It would be difficult to require that even 
sub-tippees know the identity of the inside source. This is also supported by the 
government’s consultation paper, stating that “It is not proposed that the secondary insider 
need know exactly which primary insider was the source, but instead that he should know 
only that it came from a primary insider”.397 
Secondary insiders’ knowledge of the inside information and the source of information is a 
component of the intention required by the CJA 1993. It has been suggested that the act 
would have been better depending on tippees’ knowledge of the specific quality of 
information received, rather than on their knowledge of the source of information.398 
Nevertheless, requiring the knowledge of the specific quality of inside information may 
also be interpreted as a restrictive reading of the provision. It seems, therefore, that the best 
solution would be to introduce an objective criterion.  To give an example, a requirement 
should be included that the secondary insider (the tippee) knows, or ought reasonably to 
have known, the position of the inside source. An advantage of this will be fewer 
impediments to proving the secondary insider’s knowledge. 
The FSMA 2000 under Section 118B defines secondary insiders for the purpose of this act. 
It introduces a general definition of secondary insiders under (e). This definition is 
consistent with the Market Abuse Directive in terms of differentiating between primary and 
secondary insiders.  A secondary insider would only be considered to be so if he knows, or 
                                                 
395 TAKIS TRIMIDAS ‘The House of Lords Rules on Insider Trading’ 52 The Modern Law Review 851. p.855.  
396 KEITH WOTHERSPOON ‘Insider Dealing: The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1994) 57 
The Modern Law Review 419. p.426. 
397 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, The Law on Insider Trading: A Consultative Document 
(December 1989). para 2.28. 
398 KEITH WOTHERSPOON ‘Insider Dealing: The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1994) 57 
The Modern Law Review 419. p.427. 
 225
ought to know, that he possesses inside information.399 It is also noted that this is the only 
distinction.  Otherwise, primary and secondary insiders are all subject to the same 
prohibitions on dealing, disclosing and recommending.400 
It is clear that the new definition of insiders under the FSMA 2000 has widened the 
interpretation of the term.  The most important aspect is the wider scope of secondary 
insiders. In determining this, what is considered is the person’s possession of inside 
information; whether he knows or could be reasonably expected to know that it is inside 
information. Thus, the new Section 118, by implementing the Market Abuse Directive, 
dispenses in most cases with the requirement of intention as an element of the offence. The 
requirement of intention in criminal regimes has led to profound difficulties in proving such 
intention, a consequence of which has been an ineffective regime. The FSMA 2000 
dispenses with the strict requirements of knowledge and intention in the CJA 1993, which 
in Article 57(1) states that “For the purposes of this Part, a person has information as an 
insider if and only if- (a) it is, and he knows that it is, inside information, and (b) he has it, 
and knows that he has it, from an inside source”.  Under the new regime, judicial and 
regulatory authorities are not required to prove that the person has knowledge that he has 
the information from an inside source. As regards the knowledge of the status of the 
information, the FSMA 2000 differentiates between primary and secondary insiders. For 
reasons of fairness, it seems appropriate that ‘primary insiders’ should be at a higher level 
of liability than ‘secondary insiders’. This is as a result of their being more likely to have a 
relationship with the issuer or to manipulate their position. Therefore, primary insiders are 
expected to observe a higher level of care not to be involved in insider dealing. The Market 
Abuse Directive provided a ‘safe harbour’ for secondary insiders, so they may be acquitted 
if they prove that they did not know and that they did not have to know that they were in 
possession of inside information.401 On the other hand, Articles 2 and 3 of the Market 
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Abuse Directive do not mention this defence for primary insiders. Thus, the defence of lack 
of ‘actual knowledge’ is not available to primary insiders.402 
The FSMA 2000, in Section 118B(e), implemented the definition of ‘secondary insiders’ 
from the above-mentioned directive. However, it appears that the wording of Section 
118B(e) is advantaged in one area. It defines a secondary insider as a person who has inside 
information and who “…knows, or could reasonably be expected to know, [that it] is inside 
information”. From this wording it can be said that the legal criterion of determining 
‘knowledge’ is that of ‘a normal or reasonable person’. Thus, “…the competent authorities 
should consider what a normal and reasonable person would know or should have known in 
the circumstances”.403 
Secondary insiders are defined under the DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, 
Section (45)(2)(e), a person that learned of material information with respect to the 
Reporting Entity from any other person described in Article 45(2) (a), (b),(c) or (d) and 
knows or ought reasonably to have known that the other person is in such a relationship. 
This is an important provision, since it may have a wide scope in spite of its being drafted 
under one single sub-paragraph. This category in most of the recognized jurisdictions is 
called ‘secondary insiders’. It should be noted that the secondary insider who learns of 
material information must know or ought reasonably to have known of the status of the 
other person. 
This rule is similar to the UK’s Section 118B (e) of the FSMA 2000 in one aspect: the two 
definitions differentiate between primary and secondary insiders in terms of the degree of 
knowledge required. However, they are different in terms of the type of knowledge 
required. Under the FSMA 2000, the knowledge required is in relation to the status of the 
information, whereas under the DIFC law the knowledge required is in relation to the status 
of the tipper. 
In fact, a more careful reading of the DIFC law reveals that it requires knowledge not only 
of the inside source, but also of the status of the primary insider and his relationship. This is 
indicated by the wording of the rule: “a person that learned of material information with 
respect to the Reporting Entity from any other person described in Article 45(2) (a), (b),(c) 
or (d) and knows or ought reasonably to have known that the other person is in such a 
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relationship”.   Therefore, it could be said that the DIFC law requires secondary insiders to 
have knowledge in relation to specific facts regarding the status of their informants. This 
could be problematic when the regulator or the judiciary attempts to prove a case against a 
secondary insider.  
Apparently, this is the most inconsistent legal rule in the DIFC regulation of insider 
dealing. This rule is unnecessarily over-restrictive. The DIFC adopted a wide definition in 
determining insiders, and this seems to be the general approach in Article 45. Nevertheless, 
the scope of secondary insiders is restricted under Article 45(2) (e) by two means. The first 
restrictive means is that it states “a person that learned of material information with respect 
to the Reporting Entity from any other person described in Article 45(2) (a), (b),(c) or 
(d)…”.  The rule exclusively determines those from whom a secondary insider learns of the 
information. The rule does not expressly indicate the way in which information is learned 
“directly or indirectly”. Thus, the wording of the rule proposes that those who indirectly 
learn of the information are not liable. It appears that only those who leaned of material 
information directly from primary insiders are liable to be secondary insiders. In other 
words, sub-tippees could not be held liable under this rule. If (A) is a director who passed 
the information to (B) and the latter passed the information to (C), suppose that (B) is not 
described in Article 45(2) (a), (b),(c) or (d).  In this case, (C) would not be regarded as a 
secondary insider. This is because the wording of the rule suggests that he would only be 
liable if he learned of the information from the determined categories. The second 
restrictive means is that the rule requires the secondary insider to know the relationship of 
the primary insider to the issuer. It states that: “knows or ought reasonably to have known 
that the other person is in such a relationship”. This is compounded by the fact that 
primary insiders are divided into complicated categories under Article 45(2) (a), (b), (c) or 
(d). It seems unrealistic to require knowledge of such a complicated relationship. 
This gives rise to a problem similar to that faced in the UK under the Companies Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985.  Here, Lord Lowery interpreted the world “knowingly” in 
Section 1(3) (a) and 2(1) (b) to the effect that in order to hold a tippee liable he must know 
the identity of his informant.404 The DIFC law seems to be on the same level of restricting 
the scope of the ‘secondary insider’, since it requires knowledge of the relationship of his 
informant. It would have been acceptable that the secondary insider know or ought to know 
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the status of the information, rather than the status of the primary insider. The secondary 
insider should be required to act with care towards the information in his possession. 
One advantage of the DIFC law is that it is adequate that the secondary insider ‘learned’ of 
material information. The use of ‘learned’ seems to be advantaged to the use of ‘obtained’, 
which is still used in the UK in the FSMA 2000. The term ‘obtained’ is problematic when 
interpreted. It may imply that the secondary insider has to make an effort to acquire the 
inside information. This may leave a loophole, as in the following example. (A), an 
employee of the company, is a primary insider. He discusses with (B), a client of the 
company, inside information. It can be contended that (B) did not ‘obtain’ the information, 
because he made no effort to purposely have it. 
In the UK, the FSMA 2000 states that a secondary insider is someone who has ‘obtained’ 
by other means the inside information. Interpreting the term ‘obtain’ takes us back to the 
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 in the UK. This problem was faced in the 
following case. A merchant bank acted as a financial adviser for the issuer. The appellant 
contacted the merchant bank because he was planning to acquire a controlling share in the 
issuer. However, the issuer agreed to another offer. An employee of the bank informed the 
appellant of the agreement when the information had still not been made public. The 
appellant dealt in the shares of the issuer making a profit. He was charged with insider 
dealing and prosecuted because he was a secondary insider or tippee. He dealt on the basis 
of inside information which he had acquired from a person connected with the company.405 
The difficulty arose in relation to the way in which the appellant received the information.  
He did not pursue, nor did he make an effort to have, the information. The legal problem 
was in interpreting the term ‘obtained’. The appellant was acquitted on the basis that 
‘obtained’ literally meant ‘to procure as a result of purpose and effort’. The judge’s opinion 
was that the accused did not make an effort to acquire the information, but rather the 
information was passed to him. Nevertheless, the Attorney General referred the questions 
of law to the Court of Appeal. The latter held that the word ‘obtained’ had a wider meaning 
than ‘acquired by purpose or effort’.406  The House of Lords affirmed the interpretation of 
the Court of Appeal. The decisions of the Court of Appeal and the House of the Lords were 
both based on purposive interpretation. That is to say, the objectives and not the letter of the 
                                                 
405 Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1988), [1989] 2 W.L.R. 195. The case was under sections 1(4)(a), 
1(3) and 9(b) of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. (Repealed). 
406 Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1988), [1989] 2 W.L.R. 195. See TAKIS TRIMIDAS ‘Acquisition of 
Inside Information and Inelegant Insiders’ (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 156. 
 229
Act should be considered in determining the scope of the term insider. Lord Lane of the 
Court of Appeal reasoned the judgment that: “…if one construes the key word ‘obtained’ in 
the light of the purpose behind the Act, the construction must in our judgment be that it 
means no more than received”.407 It is on this basis that the use of ‘learned’ in the DIFC 
law seems to be better than to the use of  ‘obtained’, which is still used in the UK in the 
FSMA 2000. 
 
* Building of rules 
In conclusion, The US regulations have not introduced a definition of an insider, the UK 
definition is confusing and fragmented into the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000, and the 
DIFC definition unnecessarily divided insiders into complicated categories. However, it can 
be said that the FSMA 2000 in the UK provides the best definition of an insider in terms of 
clarity and dealing with the potential practical problems of the application of the law. 
Borrowing from the FSMA 2000, and benefiting from the advantages of the CJA 1993 and 
the DIFC law, a clear definition of an insider can be recommended for the UAE law. 
The CJA 1993 confers insider status on traditional insiders: ‘director, employee or 
shareholder’. The wording of the CJA 1993 seems clearer than that of the FSMA 2000 
which determines traditional insiders as members of an ‘administrative, management, or 
supervisory body’. We prefer the wording of the CJA 1993. We would recommend a draft 
rule to encompass traditional insiders as any ‘director, employee or shareholder’. 
Both the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 appear to require insider’s possession of the inside 
information ‘because of’ their status’. In other words, there is apparently a requirement of a 
link between their status and their possession of the inside information. One advantage of 
the DIFC regulation is that it is not necessary to show a way in which traditional insiders 
possess the inside information. Their merely being in a position such as director or 
employee, and being in possession of information, is sufficient for them to be insiders. We 
would recommend in a draft rule avoiding showing a way in which traditional insiders 
possessed the inside information. We would avoid requiring that a person has the inside 
information “through being” or “as a result of” his being a director. 
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On the basis of the above discussion, we would recommend the following rule in which we 
clearly indicate traditional insiders and do not require a way in which they should possess 
inside information. 
An insider is any natural person who has inside information who: 
- is a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of investments.408 
 
In the US it has been a complicated problem to hold access insiders liable in the absence of 
a statute clearly defining them as insiders. 
Considering the determination of ‘access insiders’, using sufficiently broad criteria is better 
than dividing insiders into complicated sub-groups, as is the case in the DIFC regulation. 
The DIFC law’s determination of access insiders is unnecessarily complicated and difficult 
to interpret. It is not necessary to determine special cases such as persons who have access 
to takeover information or that the person is an associate of a subsidiary company, as long 
as such cases are covered by the general provisions. Thus, we would recommend 
categorising insiders under broad criteria. 
In the FSMA 2000, the addition of ‘by virtue of criminal activities’ as a category of access 
insiders seems to be unnecessary. As was explained, it is difficult to imagine that this 
addition would have an impact in confronting terrorist activities or the theft of information. 
In the UK, the FSMA 2000 used “through the exercise of their employment, profession or 
duties”. This is thought to indicate that there should be a link between the “employment, 
profession or duties” and the access to the inside information. It was explained earlier why 
we would prefer the use of “through the exercise”. 
On the basis of these conclusions of the comparative study we would recommend the 
following rule to encompass “access insiders”. 
An insider is any natural person who has inside information who: 
- has access to the inside information through the exercise of his employment, profession or 
duties. 
 
In determining the category of ‘secondary insiders’ we find that the CJA 1993 has certain 
deficiencies. One shortcoming is that it introduced strict requirement of intention, and 
knowledge of the inside information and the inside source. The FSMA 2000 determination 
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of secondary insiders is superior. It does not require intention and knowledge of the inside 
source of information. 
One gross shortcoming of the DIFC law is that it requires the secondary insider’s 
knowledge not only of the inside source, but also of the status of the primary insider and his 
relationship to the issuer. 
In the two previously suggested rules on ‘insiders’ we did not introduce any requirement of 
intention. There is also no requirement to show that ‘primary insiders’ knew the status of 
the inside information, since they are expected to exercise a higher level of care. 
In encompassing ‘secondary insiders’ we prefer to show that he/she “knew or ought 
reasonably to have known it is inside information”. This will provide a safe-harbour for 
secondary insiders if they did not know and they did not have to know the status of the 
information. 
The use of ‘learned’ in the DIFC law seems to be superior to the use of ‘obtained’, which is 
still used in the UK in the FSMA 2000. The latter is likely to raise difficulties of 
interpretation. 
Taking into consideration these conclusions from the comparative study, we would 
recommend the following draft rule. 
An insider is any natural person who has inside information who: 
- learned of the inside information by other means and knows or ought reasonably to have 
known it is inside information. 
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Part 2 inside information 
The definition of ‘inside information’ 
…A definition is essential, because it determines everything else. There is no 
definition of inside information… 
Comment – There is also more than one term used. ‘inside information’ and ‘non-
public information’. 
Answer – Yes, that is right, it is problematic. Taken simply, the information should 
be non-public and can affect the price of the issuers’ securities if disclosed. These 
are the two main conditions.409 
 
Q – It is difficult to imagine how the current law could be applied. Inside 
information and insiders are mysterious. 
A – Yes, I agree, there is no definition.410 
 
Jurisdiction Related legal rules 
UK CJA 1993, Section 56 “Inside information”, etc. 
(1) For the purposes of this section and Section 57, ’inside information’ 
means information which- 
(a) relates to particular securities or to a particular issuer of securities 
or to particular issuers of securities and not to securities generally or 
to issuers of securities generally; 
(b) is specific or precise; 
(c) has not been made public; and 
(d) if it were made public would be likely to have a significant effect 
on the price of any securities. 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, securities are ‘price-affected securities’ in 
relation to inside information, and inside information is ‘price-sensitive 
information’ in relation to securities, if and only if the information would, if 
made public, be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the 
securities. 
(3) For the purposes of this section ‘price’ includes value. 
UK FSMA 2000, Section 118C Inside information 
(1) This section defines ‘inside information’ for the purposes of this Part. 
(2) In relation to qualifying investments, or related investments, which are 
not commodity derivatives, inside information is information of a precise 
nature which- 
(a) is not generally available, 
(b) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of the 
qualifying investments or to one or more of the qualifying 
investments, and 
                                                 
409 MITHKAL OBAIDAT, Legal Advisor, Abu Dhabi Securities Market, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, 
Interview (2). 
410 TOJAN AL SHURIDEH, Legal Consultant, Securities and Commodities Authority Interview Transcript. See 
Appendix 6. 
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(c) would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect 
on the price of the qualifying investments or on the price of related 
investments. 
(3) In relation to qualifying investments or related investments which are 
commodity derivatives, inside information is information of a precise nature 
which- 
(a) is not generally available, 
(b) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more such derivatives, and 
(c) users of markets on which the derivatives are traded would expect 
to receive in accordance with any accepted market practices on those 
markets. 
(4) In relation to a person charged with the execution of orders concerning 
any qualifying investments or related investments, inside information 
includes information conveyed by a client and related to the client's pending 
orders which- 
(a) is of a precise nature, 
(b) is not generally available, 
(c) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of qualifying 
investments or to one or more qualifying investments, and 
(d) would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect 
on the price of those qualifying investments or the price of related 
investments. 
(5) Information is precise if it- 
(a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected 
to come into existence or an event that has occurred or may 
reasonably be expected to occur, and 
(b) is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the 
possible effect of those circumstances or that event on the price of 
qualifying investments or related investments. 
(6) Information would be likely to have a significant effect on price if and 
only if it is information of a kind which a reasonable investor would be likely 
to use as part of the basis of his investment decisions. 
DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (42) Insider dealing 
(1) A Reporting Entity or person in a special relationship with a Reporting 
Entity shall not, in the DIFC or elsewhere, deal in Investments of or relating 
to the Reporting Entity if the person possesses material information that: 
(a) is not generally available in the market; and 
(b) has not been disclosed to the market in accordance with this Law 
or the Rules. 
Section (45)(1) 
In this Part: 
‘material information’ means: 
(a) in relation to Investments, information that significantly affects, or 
would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect, on the 
market price or value of Investments; or 
(b) in relation to the affairs of a Reporting Entity, information relating 
to a change in the business, operations or capital of the Reporting 
Entity that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect 
on the market price or value of the Investments in or related to the 
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Reporting Entity. 
US Case law. 
 
Information plays a vital role in the mechanisms of financial markets. The availability of 
information to all investors is very important in order to maintain an informed and efficient 
market. It is crucial to distinguish between two types of the information, ‘public 
information’ and ‘inside information’. It is logically legitimate for everyone to use public 
information. In contrast, inside information is the core of the problem of the regulation of 
insider dealing. Therefore, a clear definition of inside information is vital. Such a definition 
ought to draw the line between public information which can be used by everyone, and 
inside information which is at the centre of various regulatory requirements such as the 
regulation of insider dealing and timely disclosure. 
‘Inside information’ is a concept which is as crucial as that of the ‘insider’. The flow of a 
substantial amount of information through the internal structure of a company, as well as in 
the market, is a normal event. For the purpose of regulating insider dealing, ‘inside 
information’ should be distinguished from ordinary information. This objective is 
approached by different methods in various jurisdictions. As has been indicated, the US 
approach in regulating insider dealing is one of the SEC’s and courts’ expansive definition 
of Rule 10b(5). The determination of ‘insider’ and ‘inside information’ has been reached 
through jurisprudential theories directed at constructing a basis for liability. In the UK, 
there are two definitions of inside information under Section 56 of the CJA 1993411 and 
Section 118(C) of the FSMA 2000.412 In the DIFC, the definition of inside information may 
not attract much discussion because it is more direct and simple than that of the insider. In 
brief, there have been various requirements in different jurisdictions for a piece of 
information to be considered as ‘inside information’ or ‘material non-public information’. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of explanation these requirements can be divided into two 
main elements of inside information: ‘non-public’ and ‘material’. 
The definition of inside information under the FSMA 2000 is similar to the Market Abuse 
Directive’s definition. A general ‘primary’ definition is introduced in addition to two 
                                                 
411 In Implementation of the Insider Dealing Directive, Article 1(1): ‘Inside information’ shall mean 
information which has not been made public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of 
transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, which, if it were made public, would be 
likely to have a significant effect on the price of the transferable security or securities in question. 
412 Section 118(C) is a verbal implementation of Article 1(1) of the Market Abuse Directive. Therefore, it is 
not necessary to write the related Article in the Directive. 
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special ‘complementary’ definitions directed at commodity derivatives and persons charged 
with execution of orders. The general ‘primary’ definition will be compared to the 
definitions in the CJA 1993, and the US and DIFC laws. The other two special 
‘complementary’ definitions will be discussed separately. 
Material information 
In the UK, there are two definitions of inside information, under the CJA 1993 and the 
FSMA 2000. Looking at Section 56(1) of the CJA 1993 and Section 118C(2) of the FSMA 
2000, it is apparent that four general characteristics are required for a piece of information 
to be ‘inside’. For the purposes of this discussion, we think that three of the requirements 
can be categorized under the general requirement of the ‘materiality’ of the information. 
These requirements are: specific and precise413 or precise414; related; and price sensitive. 
Specific or precise information 
The CJA 1993 uses the two terms. They are thought to be used as a mixture of the Insider 
Dealing Directive’s use of the term ‘precise’415 and the addition of the term ‘specific’ by 
the UK government. It appears that the term ‘specific’ was introduced because the UK 
government was aware that the use of the term ‘precise’ alone would be interpreted as only 
‘narrow, exact and definitive’.416 
It is important to observe that the two terms were not meant to be synonymous. 
Interpretation could be derived from examples drawn from the Standing Committee. The 
Economic Secretary provided the example of someone who knew that a takeover would 
occur; this kind of information is specific inside information, while details of the offer price 
would be considered precise information.417 The Economic Secretary also indicated that if a 
chairman had said, ‘Our results will be much better than the market expects or knows’, this 
would not be considered precise information because the exact results of the company had 
not been disclosed. However, the Minister considered the information as specific because 
the chairman would have disclosed something about the company’s results.418 
                                                 
413 Under the CJA 1993. 
414 Under the FSMA 2000. 
415 The Insider Dealing Directive, Article 1(1) “Inside Information shall mean information which has not been 
made public of a precise nature…”. 
416 KEITH WOTHERSPOON ‘Insider Dealing: The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1994) 57 
The Modern Law Review 419. p.421. 
417 House of Commons Standing Committee B, Fifth Sitting, 10 June 1993, cols 173-175. 
418 House of Commons Standing Committee B, Fifth Sitting, 10 June 1993, cols 174. 
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It is noticeable that Section 118C (5) of the FSMA 2000 replaced the term ‘specific or 
precise’, used in the CJA 1993, with the term ‘precise’. The question arises as to whether 
there is a distinction between the two expressions. If the term ‘precise’ is considered to 
have a narrower scope than ‘specific’, does omitting ‘or specific’ narrow the definition 
employed in the CJA 1993? Arguably, information under the FSMA 2000 must be both 
‘precise’ and ‘specific’. However, Section 118C (5) of the FSMA 2000 defines ‘precise 
information’ as that which: (a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be 
expected to come into existence or an event that has occurred or may reasonably be 
expected to occur; and (b) is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the 
possible effect of those circumstances or that event on the price of qualifying investments 
or related investments. It is clear that under the FSMA 2000’s ‘precise’ includes even 
information indicates “circumstances [which] may reasonably be expected to come”. It is, 
therefore, unlikely that the term ‘precise’ has a narrow interpretation. Returning to the 
example of the Economic Secretary,419 if a chairman had said ‘Our results will be much 
better than the market expects or knows’. It is clear that the chairman’s statement under 
Section 118C (5) of the FSMA 2000 indicates circumstances reasonably expected to come. 
It is therefore ‘precise’ information. 
The opinion of the FSA is important in clarifying the meaning of ‘precise information’. The 
FSA thinks that there may be information which is not ‘wholly specific or precise’, but is 
still ‘relevant’.420 In the case of Arif Mohammed v. FSA,421 the Financial Services and 
Markets Tribunal held that a piece of information is ‘precise’ even if there is no certainty 
but only a serious possibility that the event referred to will occur. Mr Arif Mohammed was 
a former PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) audit manager. Delta plc was an audit client of 
PwC. Mr Arif Mohammed, as a member of the audit team, became aware of confidential 
information relating to Delta plc. The confidential information was that Delta intended to 
sell its electrical division. He was told that the information was confidential and not to be 
discussed or disclosed. While in possession of this confidential information, he purchased 
shares in Delta. Following the announcement, Mr Arif Mohammed sold his shares making 
a profit. The FSA found that he breached the original Section 118 of the FSMA 2000, since 
his behaviour amounted to ‘misuse of information’. Mr Arif Mohammed appealed to the 
                                                 
419 House of Commons Standing Committee B, Fifth Sitting, 10 June 1993, cols 173-175. 
420 FSA, Consultation Paper No. 59, July 2000. Market Abuse: A Draft Code of Market Conduct. para 6.22. 
421 Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, Arif Mohammed and the FSA, March 2005. 
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Financial Services and Markets Tribunal. He raised the point that: 
A primary plank in the Applicant’s argument is that the information in his 
possession was not “specific and precise”. He accepts that he was aware of a 
possible sale, but says that he did not know until it happened that it would or was 
likely to happen. He argues that it was the details relating to the disposal that were 
relevant, cash to be received, terms and conditions, profit to be received by the 
vendor which would have determined whether the transaction would be 
favourable to Delta, and therefore result in a rise in the share price.422 
 
However, the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal responded that: 
However as the Tribunal has found, at the end of November when he purchased 
the shares, though he did not have the details of the proposed deal, the Applicant 
was fully aware that the sale process was ongoing. The Tribunal is satisfied that 
this information was in itself specific and precise. The Applicant knew what other 
market users could only guess at, namely that Delta was in fact in the train of 
selling its electrical division, even if there was always the possibility that the sale 
might not go ahead, and uncertainty as to how, if it did, it would affect the share 
price.423 
 
Requiring the specific or precise nature of information is aimed at excluding rumours and 
untargeted information from the purposes of the Act. Thus, rumour or speculative gossip 
should not be regarded as inside information.424 While this appears to be a matter of logic, a 
more problematic issue concerns inferences and conclusions which could be drawn from 
knowledge of inside information. In the Australian case of Ryan v.Triguboff425 it was held 
that inside information must have ‘an existence of it own quite apart from any process of 
deduction’ and ‘not merely that it [the information] is precisely definable but that its entire 
content can be precisely and unequivocally expressed and discerned’.426 The approach in 
Ryan is rather restrictive in regard to inferences. It does not seem that this would be the 
approach in the UK, especially as Section 118C(5) of the FSMA 2000 defines “precise 
information” as that which: (a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be 
expected to come into existence or an event that has occurred or may reasonably be 
                                                 
422 Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, Arif Mohammed and the FSA, March 2005. p.16. 
423 Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, Arif Mohammed and the FSA, March 2005. p.16. 
424 JANNE HAYRYNEN ‘The Precise Definition of Inside Information’ (2008) 23 Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 64. p.66. 
425 Ryan v.Triguboff [1976] 1 NSWLR 588. 
426 ibid., p.596, per Lee, J. 
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expected to occur. It is therefore, reasonable to say that it is no longer required that the 
entire content of the information should be discernable. 
Under both the US and DIFC laws there is no particular requirement that the information 
should be specific or precise. However, we would argue that the general requirement for the 
information to be ‘material’ is sufficient. Such an argument can be supported by the 
definition provided for ‘precise information’ by the FSMA 2000 in the UK. Section 118C 
(5) of the FSMA 2000 defines “precise information” as that which: (b) is specific enough to 
enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect … on the price of qualifying 
investments. This is similar to the requirement that the information should be ‘material’. It 
is clear that this definition of ‘precise’ is equivalent to the requirement that the information 
is ‘material’. 
The requirement for information to be ‘specific or precise’ is dealt with differently in the 
US. It appears that the specificity of information is part of the general requirement for 
information to be ‘material’. The source of this requirement in the US is case law. TSC 
Industries Inc. v. Northway Inc., is considered a precedent in determining ‘material 
information’. In this case, the US Supreme Court decided that the determination of 
materiality requires delicate assessments of the inferences a reasonable investor (in the facts 
of the case a reasonable ‘shareholder’) would draw from a given set of facts and the 
significance of those inferences to him.427 This means that inside information includes 
those inferences which a reasonable investor would reach from facts in his possession. The 
issue of materiality, according to this judgment, is a question of fact and it is judged by an 
objective criterion which is a reasonable investor. Thus, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur the 
US Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that this approach does not prohibit an insider 
from trading on the basis of the conclusions he has reached with the benefit of greater 
powers of analysis or a superior experience of financial issues.428 
Related information 
One of the issues in determining inside information is that of distinguishing it from general 
information and knowledge which is not within the purpose of the regulation. The 
requirement of particularity lies in the relation of information to issuers, securities and 
                                                 
427 TSC Industries Inc v. Northway Inc (1976) 426 US 438, at 449. 
428 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), at 848-849. 
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sectors as a whole. In the UK, both the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 require information 
to be related to particular securities or to a particular issuer of securities. 
It is argued that the CJA 1993 attempted to encompass in the definition information which 
relates to a particular sector. That is to say, information is still inside if it relates to a 
particular sector ‘issuers of securities’, even if it does not relate to a specific issuer or 
security.429 An example of this is a proposed new tax on a particular sector which may have 
effects on all the companies in the sector. However, this seems to be drawing an ambitious 
target for the regulation of insider dealing. It is not possible to regulate dealing on the basis 
of information relating to a whole sector. To provide an example, because of his profession 
a banker knows that the banking sector will report significant losses and he sells the 
securities he owns in a related bank. In this example, the information relates to a particular 
sector, ‘issuers of securities’, but it is difficult to imagine prohibiting people from using it. 
This is supported by the fact that there has been no case brought against anyone who has 
dealt on the basis of information related to a whole sector. 
Information which relates to an issuer includes that which arises from inside the issuer, 
such as information about financial changes in the profits of a company. However, there are 
circumstances in which information may arise from outside the issuer, but which still 
relates to it. The classic example of this is a takeover bid where the information of tender 
offers arises from outside the issuer, but still relates to it.430 In the same way, information 
relating to securities may be internal as well as external.  
In the UK, under the CJA 1993, it is not important whether the information is from an 
inside source of the issuer or securities as long as it relates to it. Section 60(4) of the CJA 
1993 states that:  
…information shall be treated as relating to an issuer of securities which is a 
company not only where it is about the company but also where it may affect the 
company’s business prospects. 
 
This means inclusion of information which is not related to an issuer, but is likely to have a 
significant effect on the price of its securities. Thus, if company A introduces a new project 
which makes company B’s project out of date, this is information about company A which 
                                                 
429 B. RIDER AND M. ASHE Insider Crime: The New Law (Bristol: Jordans, 1993). p.30. 
430 B. RIDER AND M. ASHE loc.cit. 
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is also related to company B’s business prospects. An insider in company A is not allowed 
to deal in the securities of company B.431 
Under the FSMA 2000, the regulation covers information relating ‘directly or indirectly’ to 
the issuer or the securities. The FSMA 2000 in covering ‘information relating indirectly’ 
fulfils the same function as Section 60(4) of the CJA 1993. 
In the DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (45) (1) covers material 
information: (a) in relation to Investments; and (b) in relation to the affairs of a reporting 
entity. Seemingly, one shortcoming is that the law did not explicitly include information 
which ‘indirectly’ relates to the securities or the issuer. It can be said that a thorough 
reading of the provisions indicates that there should have been an explicit covering of 
indirectly related information. Under the definition of the insider it was indicated that 
insiders who possess inside information relating to a takeover are encompassed. In addition, 
the definition covers insiders who possess inside information because of an indirect 
business or professional relationship. In fact, information in these circumstances can be 
originated outside the issuer, but can, nevertheless, be related to it. To give an example, (A) 
is a lawyer who advises company (B) concerning entering a major contract.  The contract 
would affect the business of company (C).  (A) dealt in the securities of (C) while in 
possession of the information. In this example, although (A) is considered to be an insider, 
depending on the language of the law, he may defend his liability on the basis that the law 
does not expressly encompass information which indirectly relates to the issuer. 
The above problem was confronted in the US using a different method. The problem of the 
source of information arose when there was adoption of misappropriation theory as a 
ground for liability. In Chiarella v. United States432, the information about tender offers 
arose from outside the issuer, but it was related to it. Although the Supreme Court declined 
the conviction, the case triggered the emergence of misappropriation theory. The adoption 
of the theory was essentially directed at prohibiting ‘outsiders’ or ‘temporary insiders’ from 
insider dealing. However, the emergence of misappropriation theory necessitated a re-
examination of the meaning of ‘inside information’. The preliminary erroneous assumption 
was that the original ‘source’ of the information must also be the issuer of the securities 
                                                 
431 MATTHEW WHITE ‘The Implications For Securities Regulation Of New Insider Dealing Provisions In The 
Criminal Justice Act’ (1995) 16 Company Lawyer 163. p.165. 
432 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
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subjected to insider dealing.433 Misappropriation theory premises ‘outsider’ trading liability 
on an obligation owed to the source of information. There is no requirement of an 
obligation owed to the issuer of securities. Thus, it is more accurate to say that 
misappropriation theory makes it irrelevant whether the securities issued by the source of 
information are subjected to trading.434 
Following the Supreme Court’s rejection of the conviction in Chiarella, the SEC 
introduced Rule 14e-3 under Section 14(e). The rule prohibits dealing on the basis of 
information regarding tender offers, which, as a matter of fact, relates to the issuer even if it 
is not the source of the information. In this regard, the rule seems to be introducing a basis 
for regarding information which arose outside the issuer, but is related to it, as viable to be 
inside information. 
Price sensitive information 
Inside information is only relevant to regulation if it is price-sensitive. The hypothetical 
criterion is this: if the information were made public it would be likely to have a 
‘significant effect’ on the price of the securities. While it is acknowledged that an 
exhaustive or precise definition of price sensitivity is far from reached, the CJA 1993 
statutory definition is merely that of general terms, which in turn can be effective by 
providing more space for judicial discretion in order to meet practical problems. The CJA 
1993 does not provide further guidance for courts, which may adopt a ‘reasonable investor’ 
test. However, market conditions prevailing at the time of the alleged action should be 
considered in the course of determining price sensitivity.435 The language of the FSMA 
2000 is very similar to that of the CJA 1993. It states that: “…would, if generally available, 
be likely to have a significant effect on the price of…”. Thus, it is proper to say a 
‘reasonable investor’ test would be applied under the FSMA 2000. 
The hypothetical question of price sensitivity can be relatively clear if the insider dealt prior 
and close to the time when the information was made public, as it was in the US case of 
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Inc., where evidence of price sensitivity of the information was 
obvious and was reflected on the market price.436 However, the impact of the information 
                                                 
433 JOHN W. BAGBY ‘The Evolving Controversy over Insider Trading’ (1986) 24 American Business Law 
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434 ibid., p.592. 
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on the market price depends on various variables such as liquidity and investors’ behaviour; 
a fact which makes it difficult to assertain that a price change was caused by the 
information. Therefore, in the US case of SEC v. Bausch and Lomb Inc., it was held that the 
drop in a company’s share on disclosure of information was insufficient evidence of the 
price sensivity of that information, because of the fact that a substantial decline in the same 
share was common in its recent history and there were other causes for the decrease in the 
share price.437 
The court may take into account whatever factual matters are present in a case. The 
defendant’s purchase of a security when he does not have a history of securities trading, or 
where there is a higher level of trading by a defendant with a trading history, is considered 
as functional circumstantial evidence.438 
It can be said that the price sensitivity requirement is similar in the US to that in the UK. 
The test of ‘materiality’ which is adopted in the US constitutes answering a problem similar 
to ‘price sensitivity’. Materiality is an objective question, concerning the significance of the 
information to a reasonable investor. As in the case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc.,
439 information is material where there is 
… a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact 
would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable 
shareholder. Put it another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor 
as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.440 
 
The leading case in the area of determining inside information, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co., adopted the same test and makes it clear that information matters in “situations which 
are essentially extraordinary in nature and which are reasonably certain to have a 
substantial effect on the market price of the security”.441 
In the DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (45) (1) states 
“…information that significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected to have a 
significant effect, on the market price or value of…”. It is apparent that the wording of this 
section is very similar to that of the FSMA 2000 in the UK. 
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The DIFC law states that “…[it] would reasonably be expected to have a significant 
effect…”, whereas the FSMA 2000 states that “…[it] would, if generally available, be 
likely to have a significant effect…”. It should be indicated that one advantage of the 
FSMA 2000 and the DIFC laws is that they cover information whose effect is foreseeable. 
If it was reasonably expected that the information would have a significant effect (a 
reasonable investor test) it does not matter if the effect did not occur in reality for one 
reason or another. What is important is the ‘materiality’ of the information. 
It is worth noting that economic analysts have suggested that the microeconomic theory is 
to determine when information is material. In economic theory, information is material 
when it produces a market response and allows the investor depending on it to obtain 
excess returns. From this point of view, because of the economic nature of the securities 
market, the materiality of information is objectively decided when depending on the 
financial theory.442 The courts pay little attention to the economic foundations of securities 
markets, and do not systematically attempt to determine the economic materiality of 
information. To some extent the courts are justified in not dedicating time and effort to 
controversial scientific findings. 
Non-public information 
One of the important characteristics of inside information is that it has not been made 
public. It is logical that public information can be used by everyone. The core of the 
problem of insider dealing is the existence of non-public information which is not in the 
public domain, and hence insiders to the information could use it to gain an advantage over 
others. Disseminating non-public information into the public domain is the function of the 
disclosure system. Thus, it can be said that disclosure is the main device which 
distinguishes between non-public and public information. Considering information non-
public for the purpose of prohibiting insider dealing is primarily dependent on the 
disclosure rules. In modern marketplace regulation the two issues are harmonized. If the 
information was disclosed according to the marketplace regulation, it should be 
acknowledged by the same regulation that the disclosed information is public and not 
relevant for the purposes of insider dealing regulation. The applicable disclosure rules and 
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procedures should be considered in the inquiry of information being made public. This 
means that information is public if it is disclosed according to the disclosure rules. 
In practice, there appears to be a difference between the information being available to the 
public and being available to market participants and investors. For the purposes of 
informing the market, it is more practical to disclose the information on the screen of the 
stock exchange than in the local newspaper. This practical need is recognised in developed 
jurisdictions, which are moving towards requiring issuers to follow a special process for the 
disclosure of information (for example, through a specialised news agency or the stock 
exchange). However, there are still jurisdictions which require only the disclosure of inside 
information, without requiring the disclosure to a specific news agency or to the stock 
exchange. In such jurisdictions it could be difficult to decide whether the disclosure made 
the information available for all the investors, and consequently to consider the information 
public. The difficulty arises because the disclosure of information to an agency not 
specialized in financial markets may be ineffective in covering all the investors. Therefore, 
it takes time for the market to absorb the disclosed information, but such time can be kept 
to a minimum by requiring disclosure through a specialized news agency or the stock 
exchange. This means that information will be directly disseminated by using modern 
technology (for example, on the Internet or on screens in stock exchanges). 
Nevertheless, even if there are specific requirements of disclosure, there is still a 
probability that insiders with prior knowledge of the disclosed information will be 
advantaged over other investors. Insiders may deal on the basis of disclosed information 
before the market absorbs it, thereby making a profit or avoiding a loss. The language of 
the legislation must make it certain in terms of when the insider may deal in the related 
security following a disclosure being made. In the absence of certainty in the legal 
language, there have been attempts to interpret the terms ‘not public’ and ‘not generally 
available’. The interpretation of such terms may provide contradictory conclusions, which 
again lead to uncertainty. For example, the term ‘not public’ was said to be different from 
‘not generally available’.  
In the US, information should be non-public for the purposes of the regulation of inside 
dealing. The leading authority, which provides a clear determination of the concept of 
material non-public information, is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur. 443 In this case, it was 
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decided that the purchase or sale of securities is not allowed if it is “on the basis of material 
inside information concerning the results of Texas Gulf Sulphur drilling in Timmins, 
Ontario, while such information remained ‘undisclosed’ to the investing public generally or 
to the particular sellers”. 444 From here, it is clear that the essential condition of non-public 
information is that it is undisclosed. 
In the US, the mere disclosure of the information to the public is not sufficient.  There 
should be absorption by the market of the disclosed information. This interpretation goes 
even further, and argues that the fact that information has appeared on the stock exchange 
ticker is insufficient to consider it public and allow insiders to deal on the basis of it.445 The 
authority is the US case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.446 In this case, an employee who 
took advantage of several hours prior knowledge and was able to ‘beat the news’ was held 
to be liable. The court’s decision was that, even following a press conference in which the 
information was disclosed, insiders are not allowed to deal on the basis of such information 
unless the market absorbs it. In this case, the court found the employee liable because the 
information “had not been effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to ensure its 
availability to the investing public.447 
In the UK there are two definitions of inside information, under the CJA 1993 and the 
FSMA 2000. The CJA 1993 uses the term ‘has not been made public’, while the FSMA 
2000 uses the term ‘not generally available’. The term ‘non-public’ was replaced by the 
term ‘not available generally’. It is essential to compare the two terms. A reasonable 
opinion is that the term ‘generally available’ is used as a term which is distinct from ‘made 
public’ to emphasise that the important factor is that of availability to market participants, 
rather than to the public at large.448 Whether the two terms are synonymous or not is still a 
question without a clear answer. This apparent confusion resulted from the use of the term 
‘inside information’ in two different acts, with two different definitions for the same term. 
However, comparing the definitions brought under the acts, it can be said that the two terms 
refer to the same thing. 
                                                 
444 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), at 840. 
445 MICHAEL ASHE ‘Insiders at the Starting Blocks’ (1993) 14 Company Lawyer 153. p.154. 
446 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), at 840. 
447 ibid., at 853, n 17. 
448 BARRY RIDER, KERN ALEXANDER AND LISA LINKLATER Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (London: 
Butterworths, 2002). p.85. 
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In the original draft of the Criminal Justice Bill, the UK government intended to leave the 
interpretation of the term ‘has not been made public’ to the courts. However, as a result of 
pressure from the Opposition and City and professional groups, the government introduced 
amendments in the form of guidance which was not exhaustive on when information is 
‘made public’.449 Section 58(2) of the CJA 1993 states that information is regarded as made 
public in four circumstances.450 
The definition of inside information under the FSMA 2000 is a verbal implementation of 
Article 1(1) of the Market Abuse Directive, but there is one insignificant difference. In the 
Market Abuse Directive, inside information is defined as ‘non-public’ information, while 
the FSMA 2000 uses the term ‘not generally available’ to define inside information. The 
FSMA 2000 offers no definition of the term ‘not generally available’. An explanation 
comes under the Code of Market Conduct,451 which defines ‘generally available 
information’.452 
                                                 
449 House of Commons Standing Committee B, Fifth Sitting, 10 June 1993, cols 182. 
450 The Criminal Justice Act 1993; Section 58: 
(1) For the purposes of section 56, “made public”, in relation to information, shall be construed in accordance 
with the following provisions of this section; but those provisions are not exhaustive as to the meaning of that 
expression. 
(2) Information is made public if- 
(a) it is published in accordance with the rules of a regulated market for the purpose of informing 
investors and their professional advisers; 
(b) it is contained in records which by virtue of any enactment are open to inspection by the public; 
(c) it can be readily acquired by those likely to deal in any securities- 
(i) to which the information relates, or 
(ii) of an issuer to which the information relates; or 
(d) it is derived from information which has been made public. 
(3) Information may be treated as made public even though- 
(a) it can be acquired only by persons exercising diligence or expertise; 
(b) it is communicated to a section of the public and not to the public at large; 
(c) it can be acquired only by observation; 
(d) it is communicated only on payment of a fee; or 
(e) it is published only outside the United Kingdom. 
451 The FSA was delegated powers to adopt the Code of Market Conduct under the FSMA 2000 Section 119: 
“(1) The Authority must prepare and issue a code containing such provisions as the Authority considers will 
give appropriate guidance to those determining whether or not behaviour amounts to market abuse…”. 
452 Code of Market Conduct, 1.2.12. 
“In the opinion of the FSA, the following factors are to be taken into account in determining whether or not 
information is generally available, and are indications that it is (and therefore not inside information): 
(1) whether the information has been disclosed to a prescribed market through a regulatory information 
service or RIS or otherwise in accordance with the rules of that market; 
(2) whether the information is contained in records which are open to inspection by the public; 
(3) whether the information is otherwise generally available, including through the Internet, or some other 
publication (including if it is only available on payment of a fee) or is derived from information which has 
been made public; 
(4) whether the information can be obtained by observation by members of the public without infringing 
rights or obligations of privacy, property or confidentiality; and 
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Looking at the two definitions, it is clear that the definition of ‘generally available’ 
provided by the Code of Market Conduct employs many of the guidelines contained in the 
CJA 1993 Section 58.  This, in turn, defines the term ‘made public’ for the purposes of 
criminal offences. In summary, there is a main condition under which the information is to 
be considered as ‘made public’ or ‘generally available’, which is ‘information published in 
accordance with the rules of a regulated market’. 
Where information is published according to the requirements of a regulated market and to 
inform investors and their advisors, the information is regarded as ‘made public’ or 
‘generally available’. The problem which arises here is when, as a matter of fairness, 
information should be regarded as made public. Such a problem is due to the fact that the 
market needs time to absorb the information, which means that insiders could take 
advantage of previous knowledge and deal immediately after disclosure. According to the 
wording of the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000, information enters the public domain at the 
time of disclosure; but there is no specific requirement that the information should be 
absorbed by investors, or should be reflected in the market price of securities.453 
Some argue that such a chance for insiders “represents a contravention of the spirit, if not 
the letter of the law”.454 They see this as unfairly allowing insiders to escape liability and as 
a shortcoming of the regulation of insider dealing. However, a more rational view is that 
not requiring the absorption of the information by the market has the advantage of clarity. It 
would be difficult to decide when the market absorbs the news to allow insiders to deal.455 
In fact, the market may never fully absorb the information, since the market price depends 
on other variables. This view is supported by an experienced practitioner.456  He thinks that 
if we are to consider information after disclosure and prior to market absorption as ‘inside 
information’, anyone who has read the information could be regarded as an insider, and 
could not deal until the market absorbs the information. This leads to results contrary to 
normal market practices, where investors wait for the disclosure and make their investment 
decision as soon as they receive the information. Everyone should have the right to use the 
                                                                                                                                                     
(5) the extent to which the information can be obtained by analysing or developing other information which is 
generally available.” 
453 KEITH WOTHERSPOON ‘Insider Dealing: The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1994) 57 
The Modern Law Review 419. p.424. 
454 MATTHEW WHITE ‘The Implications For Securities Regulation Of New Insider Dealing Provisions In The 
Criminal Justice Act’ (1995) 16 Company Lawyer 163. p.165. 
455 B. RIDER AND M. ASHE Insider Crime: The New Law (Bristol: Jordans, 1993). p.34. 
456 ALISTAIR ALCOCK ‘Inside Information’ in BARRY RIDER AND MICHAEL ASHE (eds.) The Fiduciary, the 
Insider and the Conflict: a Compendium of Essays (Dublin: Brehon Sweet & Maxwell, 1995). p.87. 
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disclosed information. It is therefore inappropriate to require investors not to use the 
disclosed information until the market absorbs it and the price of the securities moves. 
The CJA 1993 Section 58, as well as the Code of Market Conduct, indicates three 
secondary conditions under which the information is considered to be ‘made public’ or 
‘generally available’.  Information contained in records which, by virtue of any enactment, 
are given to inspection by the public is considered ‘made public’ or ‘generally available’. 
The aim of such records is to make the information public and the public has a statutory 
right of access. Some of the examples drawn are those of: information recorded with the 
Registrar of Companies, information of a patent grant published in the Patent Office 
Register and information in publications such as in the Official Gazette.457 
Under the CJA 1993 Section 58, information readily acquired by those likely to deal is 
considered to be public. When information can be readily acquired by market professionals, 
it is likely that this has already been used and is reflected in the market price. It is thought 
that this defence is offered to market professionals, such as market makers who are ‘likely 
to deal’. On the other hand, it is not envisaged that a director could defend himself by 
claiming that the information had been available.458 
Under the Code of Market Conduct, for the purposes of the FSMA 2000 information is 
‘generally available’ if it is available through the Internet or some other publication 
(including if it is only available on payment of a fee). 
Another condition which is common to both the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 is that of 
information derived from information which has been made public. On the face of it, it 
seems a tautology that information is public if it is derived from public information. 
Nevertheless, expert analysis of public information, in the light of expert knowledge in the 
financial industry, may result in conclusions that have not been made public. Considering 
derived information (such as the results and conclusions of studies) as ‘public’ or ‘generally 
available’ information aims at protecting analysts, since the derivation of information from 
public information is part of a financial analyst’s job.459 The worth of the analyst is 
assessed by his creative advice to market makers and clients. Therefore, it is to the benefit 
of financial industry to protect analysts, as long as they derive their information from 
information which has been made public. 
                                                 
457 House of Commons Standing Committee B, Fifth Sitting, 10 June 1993, cols 184. 
458 ALISTAIR ALCOCK ‘Inside Information’ in BARRY RIDER AND MICHAEL ASHE (EDS.) The Fiduciary, the 
Insider and the Conflict: a Compendium of Essays (Dublin: Brehon Sweet & Maxwell, 1995). p.87. 
459 ibid., pp.87-88. 
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The same problem emerged in the US case of Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Inc. The situation 
is described thus: 
A skilled analyst with knowledge of the company and the industry may piece 
seemingly inconsequential data together with public information into a moasaic 
which reveals material non-public information. Whenever managers and analysts 
meet elsewhere than in public, there is a risk that analysts will emerge with 
knowledge of material information which is not publicly available.460   
 
An extreme example in which a piece of analytical information was considered to be 
material non-public information was the case of US v. Carpenter.461 The inside information 
was that of a forthcoming column of one of the most influential columnists on the Wall 
Street Journal. Although the information appeared to be analytical, the Second Circuit 
decided that the information was material non-public information. From my point of view, 
it does not seem appropriate to extend the law of insider dealing to cover such extreme 
examples. Considering the results of studies as inside information will add unnecessary 
barriers to the important role of financial analysts. 
The CJA 1993 stated the not exhaustive four circumstances where information is regarded 
as having been made public. In addition, Section 58(3) stated circumstances where 
information may be treated as having been made public (See footnote 450). This provision 
aims to give analysts and professionals guidance where uncertainty arises in regard to the 
status of information, which in turn discourages advice and dealings. It is also guidance for 
the courts to decide, according to the facts of each individual case, whether information 
should be treated as having been made public.462 Looking at examples drawn at the 
Committee stage may reveal the purpose of this section. The Economic Secretary gave the 
example of an analyst who discovers price sensitive information in an obscure journal. 
Such information may be treated by the court as having been made public, despite the fact 
that it has not actually been made public.463 This is also the case where information is 
communicated to a section of the public and not to the public at large.  
The Minister gave an example where information can be acquired only by observation; a 
factory chimney smoking at night is an indication that it was working overnight. Such 
                                                 
460 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Inc, 635 F 2d 156 (2d Cir 1980) at p. 165. 
461 UNITED STATES v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), on appeal 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
462 KEITH WOTHERSPOON ‘Insider Dealing: The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1994) 57 
The Modern Law Review 419. p.423. 
463 House of Commons Standing Committee B, Fifth Sitting, 10 June 1993, cols 184. 
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information may be treated as made public.464 Information published outside the country 
may also be treated as having been made public. Yet, if information were published in an 
obscure newspaper outside the country, it is unlikely to be considered as having been made 
public. On the other hand, if information were published in a widely-distributed newspaper 
outside the country, it would be more likely to be regarded as public.465 
In the DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (42) requires the information 
to be ‘not generally available in the market’ and ‘not disclosed to the market’ in accordance 
with related regulations. There is no guidance or further explanation to these requirements. 
However, in spite of being simple, it appears that the wording of these requirements is 
direct and not expected to raise difficulties. The requirement that the information is not 
generally available is comparable to the requirement under the FSMA 2000 in the UK. Yet, 
the DIFC law adds ‘not generally available in the market’. It can be said that this addition 
makes it clear that what is important is the availability of the information in the market, 
rather than to the public at large. The DIFC law also requires the information to be ‘not 
disclosed to the market in accordance with this Law or the Rules’.466 This is the most 
important requirement.  It acknowledges the disclosure of the information in accordance 
with the applicable rules as the line separating ‘public’ and ‘non-public’ information. 
Market information 
In brief, market information is that relating to the orders of trading, market price, volume of 
trading, number of traded securities or any other information which originates in the market 
in relation to the securities. Such information, while not related to the issuer’s financial, 
business or capital status, nevertheless affects the price of the securities. It appears 
straightforward to consider such information as inside information if the above definition of 
inside information is applicable. Thus, any ‘market information’ could easily be considered 
as inside information if it is ‘material’ and ‘non-public’. 
The FSMA 2000 introduced a special definition of inside information which is related to 
the concept of market information. The main departure in the FSMA 2000 definition of 
inside information is that it is more complex in nature than that of the CJA 1993. In 
                                                 
464 House of Commons Standing Committee B, Fifth Sitting, 10 June 1993, col 184. 
465 ibid., col 183. 
466 The ‘Law’ refers to DIFC, Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004. The ‘Rules’ refers to legislation made 
by the DFSA and are binding in nature. 
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particular, there is the introduction of three definitions to complement the Market Abuse 
Directive. The ‘general’ definition of inside information under Section 118C (2) is 
applicable to all persons in possession of inside information (except persons charged with 
the execution of orders) and in relation to all financial instruments (except derivatives on 
commodities). 
The second special definition of inside information under Section 118C (4) is directed 
towards covering intermediate or executing brokers or any other person ‘charged with the 
execution of orders’. It is clear that this definition aims to prohibit ‘front-running’. Front-
running can be defined as a situation when a person charged with the execution of orders 
takes a position in the market (that is, he deals) to take advantage of upcoming orders from 
the customer of which he is aware.467 
It seems reasonable to question whether the general definition of inside information would 
be sufficient to embrace cases of “persons charged with execution of orders”. In fact, the 
UK law verbally implemented the related special definitions of inside information in the 
Market Abuse Directive. However, other European countries, especially Spain and the 
Netherlands, were silent and did not introduce a special definition of inside information in 
relation to “persons charged with execution of orders”. It was expected that in these 
jurisdictions the general definition of inside information would be sufficient. The legal 
grounds would be that information regarding client orders, which is in the possession of 
persons charged with executing orders, would be regarded as information “relating to the 
securities”.468 An example would be that of a shareholder who put an order to sell a large 
volume of securities which may have affected the price of the security. The broker, while in 
possession of the information and before executing the order, dealt in the securities for his 
own account. Then he executed the order, the price of the security changed and he made a 
profit. In this case, the information in relation to the order could be considered as 
information related to the securities, or so-called “market information”. In fact this is the 
position in most of the jurisdictions. 
                                                 
467 Market Abuse Directive, Recital 19. 
468 JANE WELCH, MATTHIAS PANNIER, EDUARDO BARRACHINO, JAN BERND AND PHILIP LEDEBOER 
‘Comparative Implementation of EU Directives (I) – Insider Dealing and Market Abuse’ (2005) City 
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The act in the above example is called ‘front-running’. This act had been identified as a 
prohibited act before the adoption of the Market Abuse Directive. In FSA v. Morgan 
Grenfell, the final notice issued by the FSA imposed a fine on Morgan Grenfell and Co Ltd 
because of the purchase by its traders of shares that they knew a client intended to buy later 
the same day. The broker company failed to comply with obligations of protection of a 
client’s confidential information and management of conflict of interests. The FSA found 
that Morgan Grenfell failed to comply with the FSA Principle for Business 6 (Customer’s 
Interests) and 8 (Conflicts of Interest). It should be noted that this case was decided under 
the original Section 118 of the FSMA 2000. Morgan Grenfell used information which was 
not generally available, but it did not face charges of market abuse. However, this is 
thought to be changed after the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive. The special 
definition of inside information dedicated to prohibiting front-running would have a new 
impact. A broker’s trade on the basis of not generally available information about the trades 
by its client is, in a way, similar to Morgan Grenfell, and is likely to constitute insider 
dealing.469 
Other provisions which were dedicated to front-running could be found in MAR 1.4.27 
(Market Conduct Sourcebook [UK, the FSA]). This rule prohibits front-running of 
customer orders. This type of action was not dealt with in former insider dealing 
provisions. One related provision is contained in paragraphs 2 to 4 of Schedule 1 of the 
CJA 1993, which was dedicated to the special defence of ‘market information’ available for 
market makers. Under this section a market maker has a defence if he shows that it was 
reasonable for him in his position to deal on the basis of market information, such as 
negotiations for the sale of a large block of shares.470 It appears that even this defence 
would not have covered front-running by all those in the market, since it is not reasonable 
for a broker in such a position and capacity to use such a defence. In other words, a reverse 
reading of this provision indicates that front-running and the misuse of market information 
is covered by the CJA 1993. 
 
                                                 
469 ANDREW HENDERSON ‘Financial Services Authority v. Morgan Grenfell in the Light of the Market Abuse 
Directive’ (2004) 19 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 310. p.312. 
470 KEITH WOTHERSPOON ‘Insider Dealing: The New Law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1994) 57 
The Modern Law Review 419. p.431. 
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* Building of rules 
In the US, the definition of inside information has not been as difficult as that of the insider. 
In the DIFC, although the definition of inside information is simple, it is straightforward 
and clearer than the definition of the insider. Only in the UK have the CJA 1993 and the 
FSMA 2000 attempted to thoroughly state the necessary characteristics of inside 
information. It can be said that both the CJA 1993 and FSMA 2000 in the UK provide the 
best definitions of inside information. The DIFC law is also simple and clear. Borrowing 
from the CJA 1993 and FSMA 2000, and benefiting from the DIFC law, a clear definition 
of inside information can be recommended for the UAE law. 
In defining inside information, we would maintain that there are two main requirements of 
a piece of information if it is to be distinguished as inside information. These are that it is 
material and non-public. Therefore, we would recommend the following rule: 
Inside information is information which is: 1- material, 2- non-public. 
 
One advantage of both the CJA 1993 and FSMA 2000 in the UK law is that they explicitly 
state and provide definitions of ‘material’: that the information should be precise, related 
and price-sensitive. 
We prefer the FSMA 2000 definition of precise information. We would prefer defining 
‘precise’ as stating that “precise information is that which indicates an event that has 
occurred or may reasonably be expected to occur”. 
There should also be a requirement that the information ‘relates directly or indirectly to the 
investments or to the issuer of the investments’. This function was clearly fulfilled by the 
CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000. 
We would argue that it is unattainable to cover information which relates to a whole 
industry. Such information can be general, and it is not possible to prohibit people from 
using general information. 
We prefer using a ‘reasonable investor test’ to decide price sensitivity. This can be 
achieved by the use of the following wording “…would, if generally available, be likely to 
have a significant effect on…”. 
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Consideration should be given to the circumstances in which market information is inside 
information. In such cases, anyone who has access to the inside information is an insider, 
including those who are charged with the execution of the order. However, we would argue 
that the general definition of inside information should encompass market information. We 
think that such information is encompassed by the general definition, because it “relates, 
directly or indirectly to the investments”. 
On the basis of the above-mentioned conclusions, we would recommend the following rule: 
 
Information is material if it: 
- is precise information which indicates an event or circumstance that has occurred or may   
reasonably have been expected to occur; 
- relates, directly or indirectly, to the investments or to the issuer of the investments; 
- would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect on the market price or 
the value of the related investments. 
 
 
The main test in distinguishing public from non-public information should be the disclosure 
of the information in accordance with the disclosure rules. It is essential to recognise the 
link between the regulation of insider dealing and timely disclosure. Thus, we would 
recommend the following rule: 
Information is non-public if it is: 
- not generally available; 
- has not been disclosed in accordance with any laws and regulations applicable in the 
country. 
 
There are circumstances in which information should be considered public. Only under the 
CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000, were such circumstances clearly determined. Information 
should be considered public if it is disclosed in accordance with the laws and regulations of 
markets, if the information is otherwise generally available, if it is derived by analysing or 
developing other information which is public and if the information can be obtained by 
observation. 
On this basis we would recommend the following rule: 
Information shall be considered public if: 
- it is disclosed in accordance with any laws and regulations applicable in the country;  
- it is otherwise generally available; 
- it is derived by analysing or developing other information which is public. 
- it can be obtained by observation. 
 
 255
Part 3 related concepts 
Prohibited activities 
There has to be clarification of the acts which are not prohibited. A precise 
perception of the act should be introduced. There has to be a clear formulation of 
the prohibited act.471 
 
The activities which may amount to insider dealing should be appropriately defined in 
legislation. The act is still called insider ‘dealing’, but in fact it is not only the activity of 
‘dealing’ which is prohibited. A description of prohibited activities must be broad enough 
to avoid loopholes allowing insiders to exploit inside information. However, it must not be 
too broad to intervene in legitimate trading activities. 
The classic notion is that insider dealing is the buying or selling of securities by an insider 
while in possession of inside information. However, the insider can pass the inside 
information to another person to allow him to deal in the securities or even to advise a third 
one. Thus, it is sound that such activity of improper disclosure must be prohibited, and 
loopholes which can be exploited must not be left. An insider may also, based on inside 
information, encourage another to deal in securities without disclosing the information to 
him. It is, therefore, also rational to prohibit other activities based on inside information, 
such as encouraging or procuring another to deal. 
In the US, it is argued that defining insider dealing would result in leaving loopholes, where 
insiders may engage in activities not covered by the statutory definition. However, we can 
say that while the definition of insider was the main difficulty in the US law, determining 
the prohibited activities has not raised any difficulties.  Encompassing the act of ‘dealing’ 
does not raise any difficulties.  The US law also encompasses the activities of ‘passing the 
information to other’ and ‘recommending on the basis of the information’. This is clear in 
the case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur. The court held Darke and Coates liable because they 
“had divulged such information to others for use in purchasing TGS stock or calls or 
recommended its purchase while the information was undisclosed to the public or to the 
sellers”.472 
                                                 
471 HABIB ALMULLA, Former MP (Member of the Federal National Council) and Former Chairman of the 
Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interview (4). 
472 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
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In the UK, the CJA 1993 embraces three types of prohibited activities. These are dealing, 
encouragement and disclosure.473 The FSMA 2000 should also have encompassed the three 
types of prohibited activities (dealing, encouragement and disclosure) in implementation of 
the Market Abuse Directive.474  However, one apparent shortcoming in the FSMA 2000 is 
that the activity of ‘encouragement’ is not clearly defined. The only possible solution is that 
such behaviour would be encompassed by sub-section 118(4) ‘misuse of information’. 
However, this sub-section does not clearly define the activity of encouragement. Moreover, 
this sub-section is subject to the introduction of a ‘sunset’ clause under Section 118(a) 
which means it will be abolished. This may amount to a gross shortcoming in the UK law 
implementation of the Market abuse Directive, which may leave a loophole for insiders to 
encourage or induce others to deal on the basis of inside information. 
In the DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004 encompasses the three types of 
prohibited activities which are dealing, providing inside information and procuring.475  In 
relation to the prohibited activity of passing the inside information to another person, both 
                                                 
473 The CJA 1993, 52 - The offence. 
(1) An individual who has information as an insider is guilty of insider dealing if, in the circumstances 
mentioned in subsection (3), he deals in securities that are price-affected securities in relation to the 
information. 
(2) An individual who has information as an insider is also guilty of insider dealing if- 
(a) he encourages another person to deal in securities that are (whether or not that other knows it) 
price-affected securities in relation to the information, knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that the dealing would take place in the circumstances mentioned  in subsection (3); or 
(b) he discloses the information, otherwise than in the proper performance of the functions of his 
employment, office or profession, to another person.  
474 Market Abuse Directive, Article 3, 
Member states shall prohibit any person subject to the prohibition laid down in Article 2 from: 
(a)disclosing inside information to any other person unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of the 
exercise of his employment, profession or duties; 
(b) recommending or inducing another person, on the basis of inside information, to acquire or dispose of 
financial instruments to which that information relates. 
475 Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, 
Article 42. Insider dealing 
(1) A Reporting Entity or person in a special relationship with a Reporting Entity shall not, in the 
DIFC or elsewhere, deal in Investments… 
Article 43. Providing inside information 
(1) A Reporting Entity or a person in a special relationship with a Reporting Entity shall not inform, 
other than in the necessary course of business, another person of material information that is not 
generally available in the market with respect to the Reporting Entity, before the material 
information has been disclosed to the market in accordance with this Law or the Rules. 
(2) A Reporting Entity or a person in a special relationship shall not procure another person to deal 
in Investments if that Reporting Entity or person has knowledge of the material information that is 
not generally available in the market or the material information has not been disclosed to the market 
in accordance with this Law or the Rules. 
(3) In this Article: 
“procure” includes: 
where a person induces or encourages another person by direct or indirect means. 
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the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 uses the term “disclose”. By comparison, the DIFC law 
uses the term “inform” to describe the act. It is difficult to see any potential difference 
between the two terms. 
An important point is that the disclosure should be otherwise that in the proper course of 
business.476 Both the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 in the UK, as well as the DIFC law, 
provide for this exemption. Nevertheless, the clearest rule is that of the FSMA 2000, which 
states: “otherwise than in the proper course of the exercise of his employment, profession 
or duties”. 
In relation to the prohibited activity of encouraging another to deal on the basis of inside 
information, only the CJA 1993 clearly uses the term “encourage”. Comparatively, the 
DIFC law uses the term “procure”, which is clarified by the law to include “where a person 
induces or encourages another person by direct or indirect means”. Thus, what is important 
is the spirit of the law in encompassing behaviour which amounts to the illegitimate use of 
inside information. 
* Building of rules 
In conclusion, apart from the shortcomings of the FSMA 2000 in prohibiting the activity of 
‘encouraging’, there is no apparent difficulty in encompassing the prohibited activities in 
all of the compared laws. It does not seem difficult to determine the prohibited activities for 
the purpose of the recommended regulation of insider dealing in the UAE. 
The DIFC law is superior in that it clearly determined the three types of prohibited 
activities. These are dealing, providing inside information and encouraging another person 
to deal. Also, the wording of the Market Abuse Directive can be used as guidance, since it 
is clear and straightforward. 
Although determining the prohibited activities does not raise any apparent difficulty, the 
UAE regulation does not fulfil this function. On the basis of the comparative perspective, 
we would recommend the following rule which encompasses the three types of prohibited 
activities. 
Any insider who has inside information shall be prohibited from: 
- dealing in related investments on the basis of the inside information; 
- disclosing the inside information to another person, otherwise than in the proper course of 
the exercise of his employment, profession or duties; 
- encouraging another person, on the basis of the inside information, to deal in related 
investments. 
                                                 
476 See below heading: Exemption of normal course of business and accepted market practices.  
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The scope of financial instruments covered by the regulation of insider 
dealing 
 
…First I want to tell you about insider dealing in the commodities market. We have 
two types of markets here in the DIFC; we have a commodities market and a 
securities market. Commodities are derivatives, so we can refer to it as the 
commodities derivatives market. The DIFX is seeking licensing to run a derivatives 
exchange where options and futures relating to financial instruments are dealt. A 
person, who trades on inside information in relation to commodities trading, would 
not be prosecuted, because there is not really an offence of insider dealing in 
relation to commodities trading. All commodities traders effectively deal on inside 
information.  They have information about the market, and they have information 
about the supply of a particular commodity and the demand for a particular 
commodity. In relation to commodities trading, there is no offence of insider 
dealing… But there can be insider trading in derivatives on securities market.477 
 
 
One essential area to be decided by the regulation is the scope of financial instruments for 
the purposes of the insider dealing provisions. Although there are differences between 
jurisdictions in this respect, what is important is clearly determining the scope of such 
financial instruments. Determining the financial instruments is a core point in determining 
the scope of the insider dealing provisions. 
In the US, for the purposes of the regulation of insider dealing, it is not required that the 
securities be traded or listed on an exchange. In other words, an insider could be held liable 
even if he dealt in the shares of a public company which was not traded or listed on an 
exchange.   In relation to the types of securities, the judicial precedents indicate that the 
regulation of insider dealing covers equity securities of all types. However, in relation to 
debt securities and options the position of the law is less clear.478 
In fact, the regulation of insider dealing was limited to covering dealings in debt securities 
and options. The narrow scope of the regulation was the result of depending on the 
fiduciary duties concept to regulate insider dealing. The duty that is owed by the insiders to 
bondholders is a contractual duty, rather than a fiduciary duty. Therefore, it could not be 
said that the insider was under a duty to disclose the information to the bondholder when he 
dealt with him, although the insider was under no fiduciary duty to the bondholder. It is 
                                                 
477 ANONYMOUS 2, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
478 EDWARD F GREENE ‘United States’ in M. STAMP AND T. JAGGERS (EDS.) International Insider Dealing 
(Old Woking: City & Financial Publ., c2005). Para.2.2.3. 
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argued that the current position, by applying the “misappropriation theory”, means that 
insiders will also be prohibited from dealing in debt securities.  Such an argument is based 
on the idea that misappropriation is a breach of duty to the source of information, rather 
than to the bondholder.479 However, it seems that this is another regulatory loophole which 
has resulted from not introducing clear statutory regulation of insider dealing. Without 
repeating the different theories and their applicability to trading in bonds, the major study 
in this specific point indicates that: 
The example of insider trading in junk bonds highlights the deficiencies of current 
doctrine. The available evidence indicates that extending the ‘disclose or abstain’ 
rule to junk bonds would increase economic efficiency. Nonetheless, current legal 
doctrine does not adequately address the problem. Governing Supreme Court 
precedent, which relies on fiduciary duty doctrine, does not cover junk bonds at 
all. In addition, although the misappropriation theory may cover some instances 
of insider trading in junk bonds, potential gaps and ambiguities remain that 
undermine the efficacy of that rule.480 
 
Another important type of financial instrument is derivatives on commodities. There has 
been controversy as to whether the regulation of insider dealing should cover dealings in 
such derivatives. In the US, the position is that insider dealing is not appropriate to 
commodities markets. In other words, it is thought that the insider dealing concepts are 
inapplicable to commodities. There is no issuer of a commodity derivative, and 
consequently it is not accurate to say that there is an inside source of information or that 
there is an insider. 
In the UK, the scope of financial instruments is different under the CJA 1993 from that 
under the FSMA 2000. Under the CJA 1993, Section 45 Schedule 2 determined securities 
to which insider dealing provisions apply as the following: shares, debt securities, warrants, 
depositary receipts, options, futures and contracts for differences.481 It is obvious that the 
CJA 1993 regulation of insider dealing covers shares and debt securities. The act therefore 
avoided a loophole which may exist in the US regulation. Thus, an insider who possesses 
                                                 
479 EDWARD F GREENE ‘United States’ in M. STAMP AND T. JAGGERS (EDS.) International Insider Dealing 
(Old Woking: City & Financial Publ., c2005). Para.2.2.3. 
480 NOTE ‘Insider Trading in Junk Bonds’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 1720. pp.1738-9. 
481 This section was adopted to implement Article 1(2) of the Insider Dealing Directive: 
“ ‘transferable securities’ shall mean: 
(a) shares and debt securities, as well as securities equivalent to shares and debt securities; 
(b) contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of securities referred to in (a); 
(c) future contracts, options and financial futures in respect of securities referred to in (a); 
(d) index contracts in respect of securities referred in (a), 
When admitted to trading on a market which is regulated and supervised by authorities recognised by public 
bodies, operates regularly and is accessible directly or indirectly to the public”. 
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inside information deals in the bonds of the related issuer rather than in its shares. The CJA 
1993 also extended the scope of the regulation to cover other derivatives on securities such 
as options, futures, contracts and rights. The act therefore avoided a loophole in the US law 
which permits an insider to escape liability by dealing in options rather than in shares. 
The FSMA 2000 has widened the scope of the financial instruments covered by the insider 
dealing provisions.482 An in-depth explanation of the financial instruments covered does not 
add to the value of our discussion. Nevertheless, it is important that under the FSMA 2000, 
insider dealing provisions cover a wider scope of financial instruments than that under the 
CJA 1993 and than that under the US regulation. Most importantly, the scope of the 
regulation is extended to cover derivatives on commodities, interest rates, foreign exchange 
and other non-securities derivatives. This attitude of the Market Abuse Directive and the 
FSMA 2000 has been criticised for more than one reason. 
The prevailing justification for the regulation of insider dealing is that it constitutes taking 
advantage of inside information. Allowing insider dealing contradicts the principle of 
maintaining a transparent and informed market and the principle of treating investors 
equally in terms of access to information. These justifications suggest that the regulation of 
insider dealing is only a preventative method to deter the exploitation and monopoly of 
material non-public information. It is also true that insider dealing and disclosure 
provisions work hand by hand to maintain an informed market. In other words, there should 
be a source of information which is normally “the issuer of the securities”. Insiders who 
possess inside information relating directly or indirectly to the issuer or the securities 
                                                 
482 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Prescribed Markets and Qualifying Investments) Order 2001, as 
amended by Regulation 10 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 
2005. Article 4 determines Qualifying Investments as “…all financial instruments within the meaning given 
in Article 1(3) of Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse).” 
In turns Market Abuse Directive, Article 1(3) states that: 
“‘Financial instrument’ shall mean: 
- transferable securities as defined in Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment 
services in the securities field (1), 
- units in collective investment undertakings, 
- money-market instruments, 
- financial-futures contracts, including equivalent cash settled instruments, 
- forward interest-rate agreements, 
- interest-rate, currency and equity swaps, 
- options to acquire or dispose of any instrument falling into these categories, including equivalent 
cash-settled instruments. This category includes in particular options on currency and on interest 
rates, 
- derivatives on commodities, 
- any other instrument admitted to trading on a regulated market in a Member State or for which a 
request for admission to trading on such a market has been made. 
 261
should be prohibited from insider dealing. On the other hand, there is no issuer of a 
commodity, of foreign exchange or other non-securities financial instruments. Therefore, it 
cannot be said that there is an issuer who is obligated to disclose the inside information to 
the market. To be more specific, it is inaccurate to say that there is an “inside source of 
information” and there are ’insiders’ who should be prohibited from insider dealing.483 
It is appreciated that there is a need to confront situations in which there is misuse of 
confidential information. Misuse of information may occur in relation to financial matters 
such as official government information, central bank decisions and commercial bank 
business.  Therefore, the Market Abuse Directive and the FSMA 2000 extended the scope 
of covered financial instruments to include non-securities financial instruments such as 
interest-rates, currency and options on currency. However, insider dealing provisions 
should have clearly determined objectives. Thus, extending the scope of insider dealing 
provisions to cover such non-securities financial instruments under the FSMA 2000 was 
criticised.484 It seems unrealistic to extend insider dealing provisions to cover all the actions 
which may constitute misuse of confidential information. Instead, the appropriate solution 
would be to introduce specialised laws and regulations under various industries such as 
public sector departments, central banks and the banking industry. It is therefore argued 
that it is not the function of insider dealing provisions to deter misuse of confidential 
information under various industries. 
Another problem with extending insider dealing provisions to cover commodity markets is 
that the nature of information in such markets is different from that in securities markets. 
As was mentioned above, there is no issuer of the commodity, and therefore there is no 
inside source of information. Also, in commodities markets there are various sources of 
information which have an influence on prices. One type of information is general relevant 
information. To give an example, weather forecasts may contain material information 
which may have an effect on the price of agricultural commodities because of the effect of 
the weather on crops. A weather forecast predicting ocean storms leading to difficulties in 
oil extraction may have an effect on the price of oil contracts.485 It is obvious that it is 
                                                 
483 INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, ISDA Comments on the Proposal for a Directive 
on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse) (London: International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, Inc., 2001). p.2. 
484 ibid., pp. 2-3. 
485 IOSCO (2003) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 
(URL)<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdfhttp://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pd
f/IOSCOPD154.pdf>, accessed on 4/12/2004. 
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difficult to determine a specific inside source of information which could be obligated to 
disclose such information. The other type of information is market information which 
relates to the signals of trading in related derivatives. Information relating to the market 
price and volume of trading may affect the price of the related derivatives on commodities. 
The difficulty is that information relevant to derivatives on commodities is different from 
information relevant to securities. Therefore, to cover commodities markets, it is necessary 
to dedicate a special definition of inside information which is relevant to trading on 
commodity markets. The Market Abuse Directive introduced a special definition for inside 
information in relation to derivatives on commodities, which was necessary to cover such 
financial instruments.486 The FSMA 2000, Article 118C (3) in implementation of the 
Market Abuse Directive, introduced a special definition of inside information in relation to 
derivatives on commodities: 
118 C Inside Information 
… 
(3) In relation to qualifying investments or related investments 
which are commodity derivatives, inside information is 
information of a precise nature which – 
(a) is not generally available, 
(b) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more such 
derivatives, and 
(c) users of markets on which the derivatives are traded 
would expect to receive in accordance with any accepted 
market practices on those markets. 
Section 118C (3) defines inside information in relation to commodity derivatives as 
information (besides other conditions) related directly or indirectly to one or more such 
derivatives. The special definition under 118C (3) also replaces the requirement of price 
sensitivity with the requirement that: 
users of markets on which commodity derivatives are traded would expect to 
receive in accordance with accepted market practices on those markets. 
This requirement is, in turn, defined in Section 118C (7): 
                                                 
486 Market Abuse Directive, Article (1) states: 
“…In relation to derivatives on commodities, ‘inside information’ shall mean information of a precise nature 
which has not been made public, relating directly or indirectly, to one or more such derivatives and which 
users of markets on which such derivatives are traded would expect to receive in accordance with accepted 
market practices on those markets”. 
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For the purposes of sub-section (3)(c), users of markets on which investments in 
commodity derivatives are traded are to be treated as expecting to receive 
information relating directly or indirectly to one or more such derivatives in 
accordance with any accepted market practices, which is- 
(a) routinely made available to the users of those markets, or 
(b) required to be disclosed in accordance with any statutory provision, market 
rules, or contracts or customs on the relevant underlying commodity market or 
commodity derivatives market. 
 
It is notable that the special definition of inside information in relation to commodities 
derivatives introduced a new requirement. This is users of the markets expecting to receive 
the information. Insider dealing could only be perceived in relation to commodity 
derivatives, such as commodity future contracts, in respect to which there is information 
which ought to be ‘disclosed’ or ‘announced’ to the related market.487 Otherwise, it is 
difficult to imagine that there could be an insider who is advantaged over other investors in 
terms of possessing inside information. As explained, it is difficult to determine an inside 
source of information in relation to commodities. Thus, Section 118C (7) attempted to 
introduce circumstances in which inside information in relation to commodities ought to be 
disclosed, but the section avoided determining certain entities responsible for disclosure. It 
is noted that the circumstances in which information is expected to be disclosed are diverse 
and difficult to determine precisely. Section 118C (7) determined very wide circumstances 
in which the information ought to be ‘disclosed’ or ‘announced’, such as where the 
information is made available routinely, due to statutory provision, market rules, or 
contracts or customs. It is clear that these are broad circumstances. This supports the 
argument that it is difficult to determine the source of the information, and consequently it 
would be difficult to determine that there is inside information in a given case. Moreover, 
the special definition of inside information eliminated the requirement of price sensitivity. 
Price sensitivity is a main characteristic of inside information. In fact, this requirement 
distinguishes it from all the other information flow in business and is not the subject of 
insider dealing provisions. It is questionable whether it is accurate to describe ‘non price 
sensitive’ information as ‘inside’, since it loses an indispensable requirement.488 
                                                 
487 EDWARD J. SWAN ‘Market Abuse Regulation and Energy Trading’ (2004) 4 International Energy Law and 
Taxation Review 91. p.92. 
488 See above heading: Price sensitive information.  
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In the DIFC, the insider dealing provisions cover a wide range of financial instruments. The 
term ‘investments’ is used to indicate the financial instrument covered by the provisions. 
‘Investments’, under the DFSA Rulebook, indicates a wide range of financial instruments: 
shares, debentures, warrants, certificates, options, units, futures, rights and interests and 
designated investments.489 What is important for this study is the exclusion of derivatives 
on commodities from the scope of insider dealing regulation. This exclusion came under 
the DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Article 42 (2): 
(2) In this Article: 
“Investments” does not include: 
(a) options to acquire or dispose of; 
(i) commodities of any kind; or 
(ii) an option to acquire or dispose of an Investment of the kind specified by 
Article 42 (2). 
(b) rights under a contract for the sale of a commodity under which delivery is to 
be made at a future date and at a price agreed on when the contract is made; or 
(c) any right to or interest in anything which is specified by Article 42 (2) (a) and 
(b). 
 
The DIFC law is an advocate of the position that there is no ‘inside information’ in relation 
to commodities. Therefore, the concept of insider dealing is not applicable to commodities 
markets. This view was confirmed in the interview: 
Interviewer: Can we discuss Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Article 42, 
please? 
Interviewee: First I want to tell you about insider dealing in commodities markets. 
We have two types of market here in the DIFC.  We have a commodities market 
and a securities market. Commodities are derivatives, so we can refer to it as the 
commodities derivatives market. The DIFX is seeking licensing to run a 
derivatives exchange, where options and futures relating to financial instruments 
are dealt. A person who trades on inside information in relation to commodities 
trading would not be prosecuted, because there is not really an offence of insider 
dealing in relation to commodities trading. All commodities traders affectively 
deal on inside information.  They have information about the market, they have 
information about the supply of a particular commodity and the demand for a 
particular commodity. In relation to commodities trading, there is no offence of 
insider dealing. However, there is an offence of market manipulation, because 
entities in the market are able to manipulate the price of commodities, depending 
on their ability to supply more products or to reduce the supply of products.  
Interviewer: In some jurisdictions attempts were made to make it an offence to 
deal in derivatives on commodities on the basis of inside information. Do you 
have any ideas about this? 
Interviewee: I am not aware of this. In the US there is no crime of insider dealing 
in relation to commodities trading, because the basis of this kind of trading is that 
                                                 
489 Determined and defined under (DFSA Rulebook, General Module A2.1.1). 
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all traders have inside information, so they actually trade on this information on a 
daily basis. 
In relation to securities trading, however, it is more proper that one can use inside 
information to manipulate the prices to a wider extent. One can also manipulate 
the market. So I think we have two offences: those of market manipulation and 
insider dealing. But there can be insider trading in derivatives on securities 
market.490 
 
In the DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004 presents a unique concept in defining 
the issuer. Under this law the investments covered by the regulation of insider dealing 
should be either of, or related to, a ‘reporting entity’. 
As regards the term ‘reporting entity’, our research indicates that this term has not been 
used to regulate insider dealing in either the US or European Union countries, including the 
UK. ‘Reporting entity’ is usually used in accountancy legislation and regulations to 
determine those entities which should prepare general purpose financial reports.  A number 
of concepts given to define the term ‘reporting entity’ have arisen. These concepts include 
the legal entity concept, which is used in the private sector, and the accountability concept, 
which is used in the public sector. The most recent idea is that reporting entities are those in 
respect of which it is reasonable to expect the existence of users dependent on general 
purpose financial reports for information which will be useful to them for making and 
evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources. Entities which are determined 
under this criterion as reporting entities should prepare general purpose financial reports in 
accordance with accounting standards.491 
The term ‘reporting entity’ is employed under Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004 to 
determine entities to which the provisions of this law are applicable. Under this law, 
‘reporting entities’ are responsible for absorbing various provisions such as listing rules, 
corporate governance, continuous disclosure and insider dealing. Answering the question as 
to the reason for using the term ‘reporting entity’, we find two apparent reasons. First, it is 
plausible to consider the wholesale nature of the DIFC, since the Dubai Financial Services 
Authority (DFSA) is empowered to determine which activities are financial services. The 
DFSA authorizes Authorized Firms and Authorized Market Institutions as the exclusive 
conductor of financial services. This mechanism ensures that market players are only 
                                                 
490 ANONYMOUS 2, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
491
 BALL IAN Definition of the Reporting Entity (Caulfield, Victoria: Australian Accounting Research 
Foundation, 1988) and AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING RESEARCH FOUNDATION Statement of Accounting 
Concepts, Definition of the Reporting Entity (January 2000). 
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institutional (and not retail) customers. The DIFC laws utilizes the term ‘reporting entity’ 
because it can be inclusive of corporations in their various stages, beginning from the time 
of filing a prospectus. Second, there are bodies under the DIFC which are not ordinary 
issuers, but are nevertheless under reporting responsibilities. Collective funds and fund 
managers are not ordinary issuers of securities. The term ‘reporting entity’ includes funds 
and fund managers. This was supported by the interviewees when asked regarding the term: 
Interviewee: It is a term that is specific to our legislation.492  
Interviewer: What is the difference between an issuer and a reporting entity? 
Interviewee: The term is used here to describe a reporting entity, because we use 
so many terms already. So if we had used ‘issuer’ it would have been too short. 
‘Reporting entities’ indicates to financial services providers that are obligated to 
report to the exchange or the regulator.493 
The reporting entity includes the issuer. A jurisdiction may state that insider 
dealing provisions only deal with issuers.  Ours is actually wider. So it captures a 
wider group of people, because the  issuer falls within the term ‘reporting 
entities’.494 
Interviewer: Does it include funds, because fund managers are not issuers? 
Interviewee: It could be the operator of a fund. Because a fund is not issued, a 
fund is managed. A fund is not an issue, but you have the issue of a unit in a 
fund.495 
  
In any case, the term ‘reporting entity’ has not been left to theoretical explanations.  Rather, 
the Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, under Schedule (Interpretation) 3- Defined 
Terms, defines it.496 It appears that a reporting entity could be an issuer who has or had 
                                                 
492 ANONYMOUS 2, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
493 ANONYMOUS 3, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
494 ANONYMOUS 1, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
495 ANONYMOUS 1, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
496 (1) Subject to (2), a person is a Reporting Entity if: 
(a) the person has or had Securities admitted to an Official List of Securities at any time; 
(b) the person has filed a prospectus with the DFSA under Article 15; 
(c) the person merges with or acquires a Reporting Entity; or 
(d) the person is declared in writing to be a Reporting Entity by the DFSA. 
  (2) A person is not a Reporting Entity if: 
(a) the person is a properly constituted government, a government agency, a central bank or other 
type of national monetary authority of a country or jurisdiction, a supranational organisation whose 
members are either countries, central banks or national monetary authorities, a public authority or a 
state investment body; or 
(b)          (i) the person previously had Securities admitted to an Official   List of   Securities; 
(ii) the person currently has no Securities admitted to an Official List of Securities; and 
(iii) the current holders of at least 75% of voting rights in the Reporting Entity have agreed 
in writing that the person is no longer a Reporting Entity; or 
(c) the DFSA so determines. 
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securities admitted to an official listing. It is also apparent that ‘reporting entity’ includes 
the person who filed a prospectus, and who may not yet be considered an issuer. 
* Building of rules 
From the above comparison, it seems that it is necessary to determine clearly the scope of 
the financial instruments and markets for the purpose of the insider dealing provisions. 
Each jurisdiction has a specific policy in determining the scope of regulation. Based on the 
ground that insider dealing is regulated to protect the market, investors and information, it 
can be said that this objective should determine the scope of the regulation. To protect the 
market and investors, a financial instrument should be admitted to trading in a market.  
Otherwise, it is not proper to argue that insider dealing has negative effects on the market. 
On this basis, the regulation can be extended to cover investments units which are not 
securities, but are nevertheless admitted to trading in a market. To protect information, 
there should be an inside source of information to maintain that there is inside information 
and insiders. Therefore, extending the regulation to cover derivatives on commodities was 
criticised because there was no inside source of information. 
It is better to leave this issue to be determined by the regulator. To protect the market and 
investors, publicly traded financial instruments can be covered. These are any financial 
instrument which is admitted to trading in a market and in regards to which there is an 
inside source of information.  Otherwise, it is not proper to argue that insider dealing has 
negative effects on the market. We would recommend that in drafting the regulation it 
seems proper to cover securities, bonds, Islamic bonds, investment units and derivatives on 
securities.  On the other hand, it does not seem appropriate to extend the scope of the 
regulation to cover derivatives on commodities, interest rates, foreign exchange and other 
non-securities financial instruments. The attitude of the Market Abuse Directive and the 
FSMA 2000 in doing so is criticised.  
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Exemption of normal course of business and accepted market 
practices 
All the rules are put in place not just to regulate a company individually; they are 
actually to facilitate business. At the end of the day, that what these rules should be 
all about. They should be assisting business.497 
 
Clearly determining the concepts of the insider, inside information, and financial 
instruments and markets covered is vital to drawing the line between legitimate and 
illegitimate dealing. It remains true that jurisdictions introduce different exemptions and 
safe-harbours in which an act would not be prohibited in spite of its being within the 
theoretical definition of insider dealing. The most important point to be observed is that the 
regulation of insider dealing should not be a barrier to business. It is acknowledged that all 
the laws and regulations of financial markets should aim to advance business, not impede it. 
In the customs of financial markets there are accepted market practices which should not be 
prohibited by the regulation of insider dealing. For if such practices are prohibited, business 
would be impeded and there would be negative effects from the regulation. Thus, under this 
sub-section two essential categories of exemptions will be concentrated on: the normal 
course of business and accepted market practices. In fact the Market Abuse Directive is the 
clearest piece of legislation for determining the circumstances which should be exempted 
from the regulation of insider dealing. In the UK’s implementation of the Market Abuse 
Directive, it is apparent that the FSA adopted rather vague criteria for assessing accepted 
market practices.498 In the US, there is also no clear determination of the exemptions. It 
                                                 
497 ANONYMOUS 2, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
498 In the UK, the related provisions were implemented by the Code of Market Conduct 1 Annex 2 Accepted 
Market Practices: 
2. The FSA will take the following non-exhaustive factors into account when assessing whether to accept a 
particular market practice: 
(1) the level of transparency of the relevant market practice to the whole market; 
(2) the need to safeguard the operation of market forces and the proper interplay of the forces of supply and 
demand… 
(3) the degree to which the relevant market practice has an impact on market liquidity and efficiency; 
(4) the degree to which the relevant practice takes into account the trading mechanism of the relevant 
market… 
(5) the risk inherent in the relevant practice for the integrity of, directly or indirectly, related markets… 
(6) the outcome of any investigation of the relevant market practice by any competent authority… 
(7) the structural characteristics of the relevant market… 
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may be that such exemptions are dispersed under various regulations.499 It is therefore not 
helpful to discuss the related rules in any further detail. 
The Market Abuse Directive required exempting the following accepted market practices 
from liability under the regulation of insider dealing:  
1) market makers pursuing their legitimate business in dealing in financial instruments;  
2) persons who dutifully execute orders on behalf of third parties;500  
3) having access to inside information relating to another company and using it for a 
legitimate public takeover bid or proposing a merger; and501  
4) dealings in accordance with the rules of stabilisation of financial instruments or trading 
in own shares in buy-back programmes.  
It is obvious that market making, brokerage, takeovers and share buy-backs are recognised 
as legitimate and accepted market practices.502 Despite being within the theoretical 
definition of insider dealing, the prohibition of such accepted practices would impede 
business. It is important to note that there are special rules which are dedicated to 
maintaining transparency in each of these market practices. These exemptions should be 
read and interpreted in accordance with the related regulations. For instance, there are 
special regulations for takeovers which ensure the bidder’s disclosure of the information. 
In the DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (48)503 introduces defences 
against liability to insider dealing. It is apparent that the exemptions to the prohibition may 
                                                 
499 One exemption under the US regulation is that of selective disclosure. See below heading: Selective 
disclosure.  
500 Market  Abuse Directive, Recital 18: 
…the mere fact that market-makers, bodies authorised to act as counterparties, or persons authorised to 
execute orders on behalf of third parties with inside information confine themselves, in the first two cases, to 
pursuing their legitimate business of buying or selling financial instruments or, in the last case, to carrying out 
an order dutifully, should not in itself be deemed to constitute use of such inside information. 
501 Market Abuse Directive, Recital 29: 
Having access to inside information relating to another company and using it in the context of a public 
takeover bid for the purpose of gaining control of that company or proposing a merger with that company 
should not in itself be deemed to constitute insider dealing. 
502 Market Abuse Directive, Recital 33: 
Stabilisation of financial instruments or trading in own shares in buy-back programmes can be legitimate, in 
certain circumstances, for economic reasons and should not, therefore, in themselves be regarded as market 
abuse. Common standards should be developed to provide practical guidance. 
503 Section 48. Defences for market manipulation, insider dealing and providing inside information 
 (1) A person shall not be found to have contravened Article 36 if the person establishes that the conduct or 
practice the person engaged in was in the performance of, and in accordance with, the price stabilisation 
requirements as prescribed in the Rules. 
(2) A person shall not be found to have contravened Articles 42 or 43 if: 
(a) the person establishes that the information was disclosed in accordance with any requirements 
under law; 
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be completely different from one jurisdiction to another. This is probably because of the 
special needs and priorities of each jurisdiction. To support our point, it is necessary to 
indicate that there should be exemptions for accepted market practices. This section 
exempts from the prohibition the following accepted market practices:  
1) a conduct or practice in accordance with the price stabilisation rules;  
2) dealing in the performance of an underwriting agreement for the investments in question; 
and  
3) dealing in the performance of the person’s functions as a liquidator or receiver.  
The second important category of exemptions from liability to insider dealing is conduct in 
the normal course of business. The Market Abuse Directive Article 2(3)504 provides a safe-
harbour where the person concluded an agreement before possessing the inside information, 
and only the execution of the dealing occurred while he possessed the inside information. 
This means that a person who had concluded an agreement, irrespective of the inside 
information which he possessed later, would not be liable to insider dealing. 
One of the most important exemptions is ‘disclosure of inside information in the normal 
course of business’. In the DIFC Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (48) 
provides a safe-harbour where “the information is given in the necessary course of 
business”. This exemption is very important, since in the normal course of business it 
should be legitimate to discuss inside information with (for instance) a lawyer or an 
accountant.  This is supported by the interviewees who said: 
Interviewee: Having the inside information is not an offence and sharing the 
information with a colleague is not an offence. Because that sharing is undertaken 
by way of business in ordinary circumstances. It is acting upon that information. 
For example, next week we are trading a particular product.505 
Interviewee: But you can only inform somebody else in the normal course of 
business. That is, if you have a lawyer or an accountant.  You can not inform your 
                                                                                                                                                     
(b) the person establishes that he reasonably believed that the material information had been 
disclosed to the market in accordance with this Law or the Rules; 
(c) the information is given in the necessary course of business; 
(d) the sole purpose of acquiring shares was to satisfy the requirement for his being qualified as a 
director or intending to become a director of a Reporting Entity; 
(e) the dealing in Investments occurred in the performance of an underwriting agreement for the 
Investments in question; or 
(f) the dealing in Investments occurred in the performance of its functions as a liquidator or receiver. 
504 Market Abuse Directive, Article 2(3): 
This Article shall not apply to transactions conducted in the discharge of an obligation that has become due to 
acquire or dispose of financial instruments where that obligation results from an agreement concluded before 
the person concerned possessed inside information. 
505 ANONYMOUS 2, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
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wife or mother and tell them “by the way, we going to be selling 50% of the 
shares in the company because the results have been really bad”.  That would 
actually be in breach of our law. But if you call your lawyer and say “I need you 
to prepare a study for me because we need to perform a certain act”. This is in fact 
what happens in companies. Then the lawyer should keep the information 
confidential.506  
 
* Building of rules 
In conclusion, it seems that the special needs and priorities of each jurisdiction are 
different. Accordingly, the exemptions to the prohibition of insider dealing are different 
from one jurisdiction to another. We are of the opinion that the normal course of business 
and accepted market practices are different from one system to another because of the 
different customary rules in each system. On this basis, it is better to leave the regulator to 
determine this issue. We recommend that there should be two broad categories of 
exemptions. These are the normal course of business and accepted market practices. 
Informing a colleague, lawyer or accountant of inside information in the normal course of 
business should not be prohibited. The same is true with accepted market practices such as 
underwriting and share buy-backs. 
 
                                                 
506 ANONYMOUS 1, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
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Chinese Walls  
Q – There are legal principles which are unacknowledged in UAE jurisdiction, but 
such principles are central to financial regulation in developed jurisdictions, For 
instance, conflict of interests and Chinese walls? How can we deal with this 
problem? 
A – There has to be a completely new law. We need a radical change in legal 
principles and understandings in these areas. There is a need for similar laws. These 
are essential principles in developed jurisdictions.507 
 
 
A simple definition is: 
 a  ‘Chinese Wall’ is the expression used to refer to an information barrier within 
the firm which is intended to ensure that information available to or known by 
certain members of the firm is not available to other members of the firm.508 
 
The details of Chinese Wall policies and procedures are to be determined by the regulator 
in the light of the nature of the business of the regulated entities. However, it is 
acknowledged that there are minimum standards to be adopted to monitor the flow of 
information. Physical segregation between various departments of a firm, by locating them 
on different floors or in different buildings, is necessary to keep to a minimum the flow of 
confidential information between these departments. An example might be where a firm 
should be obligated to physically separate an investment department which is engaged in a 
takeover or an underwriting business, and a brokerage department in order to prevent the 
leaking of confidential information from the first to the second department. Besides the 
physical segregation, there should restrictions on interdepartmental communications. There 
should also be restrictions on access to files, offices, computers and databases. Other 
procedures may include written internal policies and guidance relating to the access and use 
of confidential information.509 
Chinese Walls were the initiatives of investment entities themselves, before becoming a 
statutory obligation on them.  The US case of In re Merrill Lynch,510 was the leading 
precedent which emphasised the use of Chinese Walls. In this case, Merrill Lynch was the 
                                                 
507 HABIB ALMULLA, Former MP (Member of the Federal National Council) and Former Chairman of the 
Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interview (4). 
508 CHARLES HOLLANDER Q.C. AND SIMON SALZEDO Conflicts of Interest and Chinese Walls (London 2nd: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2004). p.116. 
509 CHRISTOPHER M. GORMAN ‘Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the Problems of Insider Trading and 
Conflicts of Interest in Broker-Dealers?’ (2004) 9 Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 475. 
p.485. 
510 In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968). at 938. 
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underwriter for a public offering of bonds by the Douglas Aircraft Company. The 
underwriting department of Merrill Lynch learned of material non-public information 
constituting estimates of significant losses in the offering company. The information was 
divulged to the sales department, which in turn informed several clients. The result was that 
Merrill Lynch and its clients sold related securities and avoided a loss before the 
information was made public. The SEC, in its enforcement against Merrill Lynch, reached a 
settlement. According to the settlement, the latter adopted a Statement of Policy which 
prohibits disclosure of non-public information by any member of the Underwriting 
Division. This settlement is considered the first clear example of Chinese Walls procedures.  
It was later adopted by other broker-dealers to avoid SEC actions.511 
Chinese Walls were probably first made a statutory requirement in the US under the Insider 
Dealing and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. Section 15(f) states that:  
Every registered broker or dealer shall establish, maintain, and enforce written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed, taking into consideration the nature 
of such broker’s or dealer’s business, to prevent the misuse in violation of this 
title or the rules and regulations thereunder of material, non-public information by 
such broker or dealer or any person associated with such broker or dealer. 
 
Another example in which the US insider dealing regulations acknowledge Chinese Walls 
as a defence against liability is Rule 14e-3.512 According to Rule 14e-3(b), a company is not 
liable for insider dealing for transactions executed on its behalf if the company  
…had implemented one or a combination of policies and procedures, reasonable 
under the circumstances, taking into consideration the nature of the person’s 
business, to ensure that individual(s) making investment decision(s) would not 
violate paragraph (a) of this section…513  
 
Policies and procedures under this rule include Chinese Walls. It is clear that this sub-
section provides a safe harbour for companies against liability to insider dealing where the 
company implemented Chinese Walls. Therefore, under this rule, if (A) had access to inside 
information relating to a takeover because he is an employee in the investment department 
of company (B).  (A) passed the information to (C), an employee in the brokerage 
department of the same company (B). (C) dealt in the related securities for the account of 
the company. The company had a safe harbour if it had implemented Chinese Walls to 
                                                 
511 HARRY ACVEA Financial Conglomerates and Chinese Wall: Regulating Conflicts of Interests (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993). p.134. 
512 See above heading: SEC Rule 14e-3.  
513 SEC Rule 14e-3. Paragraph (a) relates to insider dealing on the basis of information related to takeover. 
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ensure that the information would not be passed between various departments. However, 
individuals may not benefit from this safe harbour if they have breached the internal 
Chinese Walls. 
In the UK, the FSMA 2000 in “Commentary on Sections” states that: 
Sub-section (1) enables the Authority to make rules about the disclosure and use 
of information held by an authorised person. These rules are commonly known as 
‘Chinese walls’ rules. Chinese walls are barriers in the form of procedures, 
systems, management and physical separation which firms may employ in order 
to ensure that information obtained by one part of a firm is not communicated in 
inappropriate circumstances to another part of the firm (for example, where it 
would advantage one client at the expense of another)… 
 
The Code of Market Conduct514 in rule 1.3.5 states that:  
In the opinion of the FSA, if the inside information is held behind an effective 
Chinese wall, or similarly effective arrangements, from the individuals who are 
involved in or who influence the decision to deal, that indicates that the decision 
to deal by an organisation is not ‘on the basis of’ inside information.  
 
The organisation’s decision to deal being not ‘on the basis of’ inside information means 
that there is a safe harbour against corporate liability to insider dealing. 
 
In the DIFC, DFSA Conduct of Business, Rule 6.3 states:  
6.3.1 
… 
(2) Where an Authorised Firm has knowledge of a conflict or a material interest, 
it must manage that interest by: 
(a) establishing and maintaining effective Chinese Walls to restrict the 
communication of that knowledge; 
… 
6.3.2 
When a COB Rule applies to an Authorised Firm that acts with knowledge, the 
Authorised Firm will not be taken to act with knowledge for the purposes of that 
Rule as long as none of the relevant individuals involved on behalf of the 
Authorised Firm acts with that knowledge as a result of a Chinese Wall 
arrangement established under Rule 6.3.1 (2). 
 
In addition, the Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (49) provides a Chinese 
Wall defence for corporations against liability to insider dealing: 
                                                 
514 The FSA was delegated powers to adopt the Code of Market Conduct under the FSMA 2000 Section 119: 
“(1) The Authority must prepare and issue a code containing such provisions as the Authority considers will 
give appropriate guidance to those determining whether or not behaviour amounts to market abuse…”. 
 275
49. Chinese wall arrangements 
A person does not contravene Articles 42 or 43 by dealing in Investments at 
any time because of material information in the possession of a director, 
officer or employee, if: 
(a) the decision to enter into the transaction or agreement was taken 
on its behalf by a person or persons other than a director, officer or 
employee; 
(b) it had in operation at that time arrangements that could 
reasonably be expected to ensure that the material information was 
not communicated to the person or persons who made the decision 
and that no advice with respect to the transaction or agreement was 
given to that person or any of those persons by a director, officer or 
employee in possession of the material information; and 
(c) the information was not communicated and no such advice was 
given. 
 
In an interview, a member of the DFSA, stressing the role of the company to implement 
Chinese Walls, confirmed that: 
When we find an employee using information from the firm and we find that this 
person has done wrong, we apply the criminal and civil side of the law and we 
will disqualify him from working in the centre again. If we also found that there 
was a major failure by the firm in overseeing the activity of this person, we can 
also take action against the firm.515 
 
* Building of rules 
Comparing the jurisdictions of the US, the UK and the DIFC, it appears that Chinese Walls 
have two functions in relation to the regulation of insider dealing. Chinese Walls are both a 
defence for corporations against liability to insider dealing and a practical method against 
the leak of information. First, the use of Chinese Walls could be a defence against 
companies’ liability to insider dealing, as in the case of Rule 14e-3 in the US, Rule 1.3.5 in 
the Code of Market Conduct in the UK, and the Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, 
Section (49) in the DIFC. On this basis we would recommend the following draft rule: 
A corporation contravenes the insider dealing rules if: 
1) a natural person acts on behalf of the corporation in contravention of Article 1; 
2) such natural person discharges managerial responsibilities; and 
3) the corporation did not have in operation at that time any policies or procedures to ensure 
that such natural person would not violate Article 1. Such policies and procedures include 
Chinese Walls. 
 
 
                                                 
515 ANONYMOUS 3, Dubai Financial Services Authority, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, Interviews (5), 
(6) and (7). 
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The second use of Chinese Walls is as a statutory requirement in itself. Multifunction 
financial companies which have various departments with conflicting interests should be 
obliged to implement Chinese Walls. Companies which fail to implement the required 
procedures for Chinese Walls should be made liable to penalties imposed by the regulator. 
This function of Chinese Walls is obvious in a reading of Section 15(f) of the Insider 
Dealing and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 in the US, the FSMA 2000 in 
“Commentary on Sections” in the UK, and Rule 6.3 DFSA Conduct of Business in the 
DIFC. All the aforementioned rules oblige certain companies to implement Chinese Walls 
procedures. We would recommend that the regulator should determine details of Chinese 
Walls policies and procedures. Therefore, we recommend the following draft rule: 
The SCA shall make rules commonly known as ‘Chinese Walls’ rules. The SCA shall 
determine the arrangements for Chinese Walls, such as procedures, systems, management 
and physical separation. Firms which have departments with conflicting interests shall 
employ Chinese Walls in order to ensure that information obtained by one part of a firm is 
not communicated in inappropriate circumstances to another part of the firm. 
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Part 4: the regulation of timely disclosure 
 
Q – When can information be considered public? 
A- When it is disclosed in accordance with disclosure rules. It depends on the rules 
applicable in any country. In some jurisdictions it is sufficient to disclose the 
information to the regulator or to the markets. In other jurisdictions it is necessary 
that the information reaches the public either through the media, the press or the 
internet. 
 
Q – Do you think that we have shortcoming in disclosure? 
A – Disclosure can be through the market, the SCA and the press. But in reality we 
consider disclosure to the market or the press makes the information public and so it 
cannot longer be considered inside information. In the market when we receive the 
information we convey it to the press, the investors and brokers. 
Considering the timing of disclosure, it is clear when an issuer discloses the 
information, but it can be unclear when the issuer has known of the information. An 
issuer has to disclose inside information as soon as possible. However, in reality 
there is a period of time between the moment when the issuer knew the information 
and the moment it disclosed it. This period is critical to insider dealing. 
 
Q – Are there any rules regulating selective disclosure? 
A – In application any person dealing with a company signs a non-disclosure 
agreement. An auditor is obligated by auditing laws not to disclose any information 
of a client company. Insiders are not only those who work for the issuer but also 
who has a connection to the issuer.516 
 
 
Q – What if the information disclosed in accordance with the disclosure rules? 
A – In this case it is public and it cannot be said that it is inside. But from the time 
where the information was actually present until it is properly disclosed, the 
information is considered non-public. 
This happens as follow; an internal auditor checked the financial statements and 
sends the report to the board. They in turn send it to the general meeting to decide 
the dividends in there is profit or otherwise. In the period between the times when 
the auditor reached the results until the time where it was disclosed in the general 
meeting, the information is considered non-public. 
The same is right where a company negotiates establishing a new production line. 
From the beginning of the negotiations until disclosing the contracting, the 
information is considered non-public. 
This is also a problem in our jurisdiction which is disclosing information to the 
media before an official disclosure to the regulator. This is dangerous. The media 
may publish the news inaccurately and differently from a media to another. They 
may also write it in a certain way or take parts of the information which does not 
                                                 
516 MITHKAL OBAIDAT, Legal Advisor, Abu Dhabi Securities Market, Interview Transcript. See Appendix 6, 
Interview (2). 
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reflect the real information. On contrary when the information is disclosed to the 
SCA it will disclose it precisely to the public. 
Q – There is a loophole in regulation in this area. In other jurisdictions there are 
rules applied which regulates how the issuer should deal with the media. What do 
you think? 
A - Probably yes. The problem is disclosing the information to the media. 
Sometimes there is contradiction in the news or even confusion. The next day the 
company approves or disapproves the news. From the time such news is published 
until the company officially is requested to comment, there would have been 
dealings on the basis of such news. 
…Some influents can deal and delay disclosure two or three days…517 
 
The relationship between the regulation of insider dealing and timely 
disclosure 
When studying insider dealing regulation, the concept of disclosure constantly surfaces as 
an important correlate. It is therefore hardly surprising that writers study disclosure 
whenever they study insider dealing regulation. It is still important to study the relationship 
between the rules directed to insider dealing regulation and those directed to disclosure. 
Reviewing the legislative history of insider dealing regulation in the US and the UK reveals 
that there have been confusions as to whether a rule aims to regulate insider dealing, 
disclosure or both. Studying modern securities regulation in the US and the UK also shows 
the degree to which insider dealing could be discouraged through disclosure rules. 
This part of the chapter aims at sustaining the argument that insider dealing is largely a 
financial market problem, the best solution of which is regulation. It is based on the account 
that for a transparent and informed financial market, regulation has to be improved to 
assure that. This part establishes that insider dealing regulation and disclosure rules have a 
common object of maintaining an informed market. 
Timely disclosure rules are designed to maintain a flow of inside information into the 
market to help maintain an informed and transparent market where the prices of securities 
optimally reflect the disclosed information. Disclosure rules are intended to facilitate 
business. Therefore, they have to be clearly and descriptively drafted, and underlined by 
sufficient details and guidelines. These requisites are not met by the UAE regulation. There 
is a need to develop timely disclosure rules in the UAE through comparison with the UK, 
US and DIFC rules. 
                                                 
517 TOJAN AL SHURIDEH, Legal Consultant, Securities and Commodities Authority Interview Transcript. See 
Appendix 6, Interview (3). 
 279
This part will discuss disclosure provisions contained in securities regulation, not in 
company law. It is a well established principle in company law that shareholders should 
have access to information related to the corporate. Disclosure provisions of company law 
are mainly directed at shareholders, but they are also partly directed towards potential 
investors and markets. That is why company law requires annual accounts to be publicized 
through filing at Companies House. Yet, disclosure provisions of company law are limited 
in their meeting the needs of investors and markets. It is the task of securities regulation to 
establish transparency in the market place through disclosure rules. In fact, disclosure is the 
predominant principle of securities market regulation. It is usual that prospectus rules, 
listing rules and continuous disclosure rules contain provisions aimed at informing the 
investor in decision-making. Therefore, it can be said that the function of enforcing the 
disclosure of information to potential investors and markets has been transferred from 
company law to securities regulation. This is also supported by the European Commissions’ 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts, who remark that: 
Information and disclosure is an area where company law and securities 
regulation come together. It is a key objective of securities regulation in general to 
ensure that market participants have sufficient information in order to participate 
in the market on an informed basis. Where the relevant security is a share in a 
company, the information required from a securities regulation point of view 
overlaps with information to be provided from a company law perspective.518 
 
Insider dealing may occur where there is inside information which has not yet been 
disclosed to the market. If price-sensitive information is made public, there is hardly any 
opportunity for insiders to exploit it.  It is therefore essential to encourage the disclosure of 
as much information as possible into the market, a task which is expected to be achievable 
by disclosure rules. However, in reality disclosure rules are not mainly directed to 
discouraging insider dealing. They are the best preventive correlate for discouraging insider 
dealing, but they do not render a prohibition on insider dealing unnecessary. Thus, the 
limited function of disclosure rules in discouraging insider dealing is an argument for, not 
against, explicit prohibition of insider dealing.519 
There is a common scope between rules directed to prohibiting insider dealing and 
disclosure rules. This scope has varied in the history of regulating insider dealing. Probably 
                                                 
518 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for 
Company Law in Europe (Brussels, November 4, 2002), Ch. II.3. 
519 KLAUS J. HOPT Insider Dealing and Timely Disclosure (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 
1996). p. 10. 
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the most prominent precedent in which disclosure rules and insider dealing rules were 
linked was in the US rule of “disclose or abstain”. This rule was first adopted by the SEC in 
the case of In re Cady Roberts & Co.520 The SEC adopted it to extend the scope of Rule 
10b-5 to capture those outside an issuer. The SEC reasoned that such a decision as the duty 
or obligation of corporate insiders could, in certain circumstances, be extended to those 
outside the corporation.  . The ‘disclose or abstain’ rule is in part based on disclosure and 
equality of information principles. According to this rule there can be ‘temporary’ or 
‘constructive’ insiders who possess material non-public information.  They have to disclose 
such information or abstain from dealing until the information is made public.  The SEC 
ruling in Cady was supported by a federal circuit court in the case of SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co.
521 
In this conception, the prohibition of insider dealing under Rule 10b-5 is seen as intended 
to be a part of the disclosure system. The regulation of insider dealing is a method of 
increasing the flow of information into the market. This, in turn, contributes to the 
establishment of an informed market where securities can be accurately priced. Such a 
process is crucial to the economy, since an informed market contributes to the efficient 
allocation of capital resources. The issuer is in a position which allows monopoly 
information to be generated inside it. But, as regards disclosure, the issuer has more 
incentives to disclose positive rather than negative information. Insiders may also evade 
disclosure of information if they can exploit it for their own benefit. Therefore, a disclosure 
system should be mandated by a regulatory body to ensure compliance with the system.522 
This is the responsibility of the SEC in the US and the FSA in the UK. 
In the context of disclosure requirements for an informed market, it is reasonable to 
question whether the ‘disclose or abstain’ rule added a significant contribution to the 
disclosure system. This rule, as interpreted by the courts and the SEC in the US, makes a 
contribution to the disclosure objective through removing an incentive to delay the release 
of corporate information. That prohibition of insider dealing contributes to the disclosure 
object as a reasonable supposition. But it is easy to argue that the ‘disclose or abstain’ rule 
is an incorrect interpretation of Rule 10b-5. 
                                                 
520 In re Cady Roberts & Co. 40 SEC 907 (1961). 
521 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
522 KENNETH E. SCOTT ‘Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy’ (1980) 9 Journal of 
Legal Studies 801. 
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The ‘disclose or abstain’ rule is imbalanced and raises the question of whether Rule 10b-5 
can be read as a disclosure rule. Under the former, the company and its insiders are able to 
avoid disclosure by not trading. In other words, the rule does not state an affirmative duty 
on issuers and insiders to disclose inside information. Rather, the rule affords a choice of 
non-disclosure where there is no trading.523 In fact, historically in the US the courts and the 
SEC declined to identify an affirmative duty on issuers of publicly traded securities to make 
timely disclosure of material information. This has been the case until recent amendments. 
In the 2001 case of Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories, plaintiffs contended that Abbott 
Laboratories breached Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 by postponing public disclosure 
of material information regarding penalties on the company. However, the court of the 
seventh circuit stated that: “Much of plaintiffs’ argument reads as if firms have an absolute 
duty to disclose all information material to stock prices as soon as news comes into their 
possession. Yet that is not the way the securities laws work. We do not have a system of 
continuous disclosure. Instead firms are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as 
bad news) unless positive law creates a duty to disclose”.524 
It is difficult to read the insider dealing provisions as disclosure rules, because that sends 
confusing message in terms of who is obliged to disclose inside information. It does not 
seem appropriate to oblige insiders to disclose inside information. The issuer, not the 
insider, should be perceived as the entity responsible for disclosure. Disclosure is not an 
automatic release of information into the market. Rather, there are certain procedures to be 
followed in disclosing information and there are exempted circumstances in which the 
commercial interests of the issuer are protected. Only the issuer should be compelled to 
disclose inside information in accordance with the disclosure rules. Therefore, it was 
inevitable to amend the position in the US. This was through recognising affirmative duty 
on issuers to make timely disclosure.525 
The above discussion attempted to represent the distinction between the rules of insider 
dealing and of timely disclosure. It is proper that insider dealing regulation and disclosure 
                                                 
523 KENNETH E. SCOTT ‘Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy’ (1980) 9 Journal of 
Legal Studies 801. pp. 811-2. 
524 Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories, 269 F.3d 806. 809-811. (7th Cir. 2001). 
525 This was through Section SOX § 409, amending Section 13(1) of the Securities Exchange Act: “Each 
issuer reporting under section 13(a) or 15(d) shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such 
additional information concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer, in 
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rules have a common object of maintaining an informed market. This does not mean that 
the rules prohibiting insider dealing should be read as affirmative disclosure rules. It is 
more accurate to say that disclosure principles are the basis of securities regulation. And 
while rules prohibiting insider dealing and disclosure rules overlap in support of the 
aspirations underlying securities regulation, they differ in the roles they play in achieving 
the goals of the disclosure system. Insider dealing regulation principally has a preventive 
function. This is to remove an incentive to delay disclosure and exploit inside information. 
On the other hand, disclosure rules have a protective function, since they are designed to 
maintain a flow of information in order to help maintain an informed market where the 
prices of securities best reflect the disclosed information.526 
Timely disclosure of inside information 
A company might be subjected to various disclosure obligations. In the stage of 
establishing a company, raising capital or promotion, promotional disclosure obligations 
are encountered. The company also encounters continuous disclosure obligations which 
aim to provide sufficient information for all those dealing with it. Promotional and 
continuous disclosure is usually governed by the requirements of company law. Securities 
market regulation may overlap with the requirements of company law in regard to 
promotional and continuous disclosure. Nevertheless, for financial markets, timely 
disclosure is the most important factor. This kind of disclosure is essential for the pricing of 
securities, since it involves information which is reasonably considered to have an effect on 
the price of securities. Securities market regulation aspires to maintain a transparent and 
informed market. It is vital to release as much relevant information as possible into the 
market to ease making investment decisions. Therefore, securities market regulation 
requires issuers to adopt a timely disclosure policy for all information which is reasonably 
expected to have an effect on the price of their securities.527 
Recent years have experienced rapid progress regarding timely disclosure requirements. 
This has been due to the response of leading financial markets to financial scandals, as was 
the case in the US. The cases of Enron and WorldCom called into question the reliability of 
corporate financial disclosure. Enron and WorldCom were the main examples of scandals 
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of corporation’s hiding their true financial conditions from creditors and shareholders. This 
resulted in a bubble in their securities prices. The inability of these corporations to meet 
their financial commitments forced them to restate their big losses. This resulted in 
bankruptcies and considerable losses in the financial industry in the US. The Federal 
Government responded to the scandal by introducing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, 
imposing significant responsibilities on corporate management, auditors and attorneys. This 
act provides safeguards to ensure the reliability of financial reports and statements.528 The 
SEC implementing Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 introduced the first rule obligating issuers to 
disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional information concerning 
material changes in order to protect investors and the markets.529 
Another reason for introducing more strict disclosure requirements has been the need to 
meet international standards. This has been the case in the UK’s implementation of the 
Market Abuse Directive.530 The FSA, in its Handbook, included Disclosure Rules which, in 
turn, had been determined primarily through the implementation in the UK of the Market 
Abuse Directive. The issuer disclosure requirements, through the Market Abuse Directive, 
were aimed at preventing market abuse and insider dealing by ensuring that the market was 
informed through prompt and fair disclosure of information.531 
Securities market regulation has rapidly developed more rigid timely disclosure 
requirements in recent years. There are currently explicit requirements in the regulations 
regarding the “disclosure and control of inside information”. Recognized securities 
regulation comprehends the importance of inside information, and therefore imposes many 
regulatory requirements on it. In this regard, there are two issues which need to be 
explained: firstly, the developments in the concept of inside information in securities 
market regulation; secondly, the concept of inside information is important as many 
regulatory duties derive from it. 
                                                 
528 P.N. SAKSENA AND MARK A. FOX ‘Accounting Fraud and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’ (2004) 8 International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 244. For more in-depth information see JOHN ARMOUR AND JOSEPH 
A. MCCAHERY After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and 
the US (Oxford: Hart, 2006). 
529 See footnote 525. 
530 Directive 2003/6/EC of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) 
[2003] OJL 96/16. In particular Article 6(1) “Member states shall ensure that issuers of financial instruments 
inform the public as soon as possible of inside information which directly concerns the said issuers”. 
531 MAURICE BUTTON A Practitioner’s Guide to the Financial Services Authority Listing Rules (London: City 
and Financial Publishing, 2005/2006). p.140. 
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In regard to the concept of inside information, the definition of inside information has been 
discussed,532 revealing the importance of determining the scope of the definition. The scope 
of the definition of inside information must be broad enough to ensure the primary 
objective of maintaining an informed and transparent market. On the other hand, the scope 
of the definition must not be so broad as to be an obstacle to research, analysis and use of 
public information. In this chapter, it should be added that securities market regulation is 
increasingly adopting a single definition which applies to the general obligation of 
disclosure and the prohibition on inside dealing and market abuse. To illustrate this, in the 
UK the previous Listing Rules required the disclosure of non-public, price-sensitive 
information, while the new Disclosure and Transparency Rule (DTR) 2.2.1R533 requires 
issuers to disclose as soon as possible any inside information. The definition of inside 
information in Section 118C(2) applies to both the disclosure obligations and the offences 
of insider dealing and market abuse. This approach makes it easier for issuers to meet the 
regulatory obligations. More importantly, the adoption of a single definition of inside 
information emphasizes the relationship between different obligations covering inside 
information.534 
The adoption of a single concept of inside information confirms the relationship between 
the “positive” continuing obligation of timely disclosure and the “negative” prohibition on 
insider dealing. In this perception, the central concept is inside information and there must 
be a single definition for it. The positive obligation to promptly, clearly and accurately 
disclose inside information maintains an informed market and, peripherally, prevents 
insider dealing. In contrast, the absence of clear obligations in regard to the disclosure and 
control of inside information increases the opportunities of the leak of inside information 
and insider dealing. 
Recognized jurisdictions are progressively acknowledging the purpose of rules directed to 
the disclosure and control of inside information. Such declarations are helpful in 
comprehending the disclosure requirements. The FSA Handbook DTR 2.1.3G confirms the 
purpose of the rules directed to the disclosure and control of inside information by issuers. 
                                                 
532 See above heading: Part 2 inside information.  
533 The FSA Handbook under the Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules (DTR) contains legal rules 
abbreviated by DTR number R, as well as guides abbreviated by DTR number G. The latter are not legal rules 
and are interpreted as mere non-obligatory guides. 
534
 MARSH, JONATHAN A Practitioner’s Guide to Inside Information: Managing the Regulatory Risks (Old 
Woking: City and Financial Publication, c2006). p.6. 
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It is clear that one objective of the rules is to prevent insider dealing.535 In the FSA 
Handbook DTR 2.1.1G, it is also clear that the disclosure rules are related to insider 
dealing.536 
The regulation of the ‘disclosure and control of inside information’ 
Securities markets regulation should contain rules directed to oblige an issuer to protect and 
disclose inside information. Hence, this will contribute both to the maintenance of an 
orderly market of the issuer’s securities, and to the prevention of insider dealing and leak of 
inside information.  
In the UK, under DTR 2.2.1R of FSA Handbook, 
An issuer must notify a Regulatory Information Services (RIS) as soon as possible 
of any inside information which directly concerns the issuer. 
 
Under the previous regime, the requirement was to disclose ‘information which was not 
public knowledge and which, if known, would lead to a substantial movement in the price 
of its listed securities. Therefore, it is apparent that the new rule makes it clear that the 
issuer is required to disclose inside information. 
The disclosure obligation in DTR 2.2.1R implements Section 397 of FSMA. Under this 
section, an issuer is prohibited from dishonest concealment of material facts. Thus, there is 
a positive duty to disclose inside information under the FSA Handbook Disclosure Rules 
and Transparency Rules. The issuer’s failure to comply with such a duty may give rise to 
dishonest concealment of material fact under Section 397 FSMA.537 
It should also be noted that there are other rules which the FSA can depend on to prevent 
any misleading disclosure. Thus, not only is disclosure of inside information important, but 
                                                 
535 It is stated that “The purpose of this chapter is to: 
(1) promote prompt and fair disclosure of relevant information to the market; and  
(2) set out specific circumstances when an issuer can delay public disclosure of inside information and 
requirements to ensure that such information is kept confidential in order to protect investors and prevent 
insider dealing.” 
 
536 “An issuer should be aware that matters that fall within the scope of this chapter may also fall within the 
scope of: 
(1) the market abuse regime set out in section 118 of the Act; 
(2) section 397 of the Act relating to misleading statements and practices; 
(3) Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 relating to insider dealing; and 
(4) the Takeover Code.” 
537 MAURICE BUTTON A Practitioner’s Guide to the Financial Services Authority Listing Rules (London: City 
and Financial Publishing, 2005/2006). p.144. 
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also that disclosure should be clear, not misleading or deceptive. The FSA reached a vital 
decision depending on Listing Rules in the case of Shell as follows: 
The FSA fined the Shell Transport and Trading Company (STT) the Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company (RDP) and the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies (Shell) £17 
million for committing market abuse and breaching the listing rules. Shell announced false 
or misleading information regarding reserves throughout the period 1998 to 2003. The size 
of the penalty indicates the seriousness of the misconduct by Shell. It made false or 
misleading announcements, despite warnings from 2000 to 2003 that its proved reserves, as 
announced to the market, were false or misleading. It did not correct the misleading 
information until a series of announcements between 9 January and 4 May 2004, that the 
company announced the re-categorization of the equivalent of 4,470 million barrels of oil 
which is approximately 25% of Shell’s proved reserves. Shell failed to meet its obligations 
of maintaining adequate systems and controls to estimate its reserves and report correct 
information. Following Shell’s first announcement regarding the re-categorization of 
proved reserves on 9 January 2004, the market price of STT’s shares fell from 401p to 371p 
(7,5%). The market capitalization of STT declined on the same day by approximately £2,9 
billion.538 
The FSA found that, by reason of their behaviour, STT and RDP had failed to take all 
reasonable care to ensure that the information it announced regarding its proved reserves in 
the period 1998 to 2003 were not misleading, false or deceptive. The FSA found that this 
behaviour amounted to breach of the Listing Rules 9.3A and 17.2A (applicable at the 
time)539 which provide that listed issuers:  
must take all reasonable care to ensure that any statement or forecast or any other 
information it notifies to a Regulatory Information Service or makes available 
through the UK Listing Authority is not misleading, false or deceptive and does 
not omit anything likely to affect the import of such statement, forecast or other 
information. 
 
The FSA considered that Shell had also breached the original Section 118(2)(b) of the 
FSMA 2000. Because of the false or misleading information announced by Shell regarding 
                                                 
538 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, Final Notice, The “Shell” Transporting and Trading Company, p.l.c. 
(“STT”) and The Royal Dutch Petroleum Company NV (“RDP”), 24 August 2004. pp.1-9. 
539 ibid., p.13. 
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its proved reserves, a regular user of the market was, and was likely to have been, given a 
false or misleading impression as to the price or value of UK listed Shell shares.540 
Andrew Procter, Director of Enforcement at the FSA, said:  
The FSA views timely and accurate disclosure to shareholders and markets as 
fundamental to maintaining the integrity of the UK’s financial markets. The size 
of the penalty in this case reflects the seriousness of Shell's misconduct and the 
impact it had on markets and shareholders.541 
It is apparent that the same function of obligating issuers to make timely disclosure of 
inside information is fulfilled by the US law542 and the DIFC law543. 
Legal uncertainty and providing examples 
The rules of timely disclosure give rise to a number of legal problems, just as is the case in 
the rules relating to insider dealing. One important issue which needs to be solved by 
timely disclosure rules is the legal uncertainty regarding “information to be disclosed”. This 
issue arises due to requests by practitioners and market players for clarification of the kind 
of information to be disclosed, and therefore clarification of the responsibilities of issuers. 
While such a request is explicable, it is difficult to fulfil because of the generality and 
uncertainty of legal rules. The best solution to avoid legal uncertainty appears to be the 
introduction of a list of examples. Nevertheless, a wide list might be required in order to 
                                                 
540 ibid., p.11. 
541 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, Press Release, FSA fines Shell 17,000,000 for market abuse, 24 August 
2004. 
542 See footnote 525. Also the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)542 in its Listed Company Manual 
promulgates the following rule: 
202.05 Timely Disclosure of Material News Developments. 
A listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or information which might 
reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for its securities. This is one of the most important and 
fundamental purposes of the listing agreement which the company enters into with the Exchange. 
543 Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, promulgates the following rule: 
23. Publication and reporting of continuous disclosures. 
(1) A Reporting Entity shall make disclosures to the market in the circumstances prescribed by the 
OSR. 
(2) Without limiting the generality of Article 23(1), the OSR shall prescribe the circumstances in 
which the following types of information shall be disclosed: 
(a) financial information; 
(b) any material information which may have an effect on the market price or value of the 
Securities; and 
(c) any material change which occurs in relation to a Reporting Entity. 
The DFSA, in turn, under the Offered Securities Rules (OSR) communicated the following rule: 
8.2.1 (1) A Reporting Entity must make timely disclosure of Material Information, including the relevant 
matters set out in App. 2, in accordance with this chapter. 
(2) A Reporting Entity must ensure that its disclosure is complete, true, plain and not misleading, false or 
deceptive 
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give examples of the most important, as well as the infrequent, ‘information to be timely 
disclosed’.544 
In response to the uncertainty, NYSE, in its Listed Company Manual, gives a few 
examples, rather than an exhaustive list of relevant information.545 
 
In the UK, DTR 2.2.1R of FSA Handbook makes it clear that ‘inside information’ is to be 
disclosed.546 This rule states that the issuer must disclose “…inside information which 
directly concerns the issuer”. Thus, inside information which indirectly concerns the issuer, 
which is relevant for the purpose of insider dealing prohibition, is not relevant for this 
rule.547 
                                                 
544 KLAUS J. HOPT Insider Dealing and Timely Disclosure (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 
1996). pp.11-2. 
545 Rule 202.06 states: Annual and quarterly earnings, dividend announcements, mergers, acquisitions, tender 
offers, stock splits, major management changes, and any substantive items of unusual or non-recurrent nature 
are examples of news items that should be handled on an immediate release basis. News of major new 
products, contract awards, expansion plans, and discoveries very often fall into the same category. 
Unfavorable news should be reported as promptly and candidly as favorable news. Reluctance or 
unwillingness to release a negative story or an attempt to disguise unfavorable news endangers management's 
reputation for integrity. Changes in accounting methods to mask such occurrences can have a similar impact. 
546 Inside information is defined in Section 118C FSMA.   
547 The FSA Handbook offers guidance on how to identify inside information as follows: 
DTR 2.2.3G 
Information is inside information if each of the criteria in the definition of inside information is met. 
DTR 2.2.4G  
(1) In determining the likely price significance of the information, an issuer   should assess whether the 
information in question would be likely to be used by a reasonable investor as part of the basis of his 
investment decisions and would therefore be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the issuer's 
financial instruments (the “reasonable investor test”). 
(2) In determining whether information would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of financial 
instruments, an issuer should be mindful that there is no figure (percentage change or otherwise) that can be 
set for any issuer when determining what constitutes a “significant effect on the price of the financial 
instruments”, as this will vary from issuer to issuer. 
DTR 2.2.5G 
The reasonable investor test requires an issuer: 
(1) to take into account that the significance of the information in question will vary widely from issuer to 
issuer, depending on a variety of factors such as the issuer's size, recent developments and the market 
sentiment about the issuer and the sector in which it operates; and 
(2) to assume that a reasonable investor will make investment decisions relating to the relevant financial 
instrument to maximise his economic self interest.3 
DTR 2.2.6G 
It is not possible to prescribe how the reasonable investor test will apply in all possible situations. Any 
assessment should take into consideration the anticipated impact of the information in light of the totality of 
the issuer's activities, the reliability of the source of the information and other market variables likely to affect 
the relevant financial instrument in the given circumstances. However, information which is likely to be 
considered relevant to a reasonable investor's decision includes information which affects: 
(1) the assets and liabilities of the issuer; 
(2) the performance, or the expectation of the performance, of the issuer's business; 
(3) the financial condition of the issuer; 
(4) the course of the issuer's business; 
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Timely disclosure in the DIFC is regulated by the DFSA in the Offered Securities Rules 
(OSR), Rule 8.2.1 (1).   A Reporting Entity must make timely disclosure of Material 
Information, including the relevant matters set out in (App.2)548 in accordance with this 
chapter. 
It is not stated in the OSR that material information relevant for the purpose of timely 
disclosure is the same as that relevant for prohibiting insider dealing. Nevertheless, because 
the same term is used, it appears to be acceptable that the definition of material information 
introduced in Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, is relevant for the purpose of timely 
disclosure.549 
As to the second clause of Rule 8.2.1 (1), “including the relevant matters set out in (App.2) 
in accordance with this chapter”, the term including appears to indicate that the relevant 
matters in (App.2) are non-exhaustive examples of events that require disclosure by the 
Reporting Entity. 
The OSR, unlike the regulation in the UK or US, has taken a further step, through the 
introduction of an extensive list of events in which a reporting entity is required to disclose 
information. The list also mentions the specific requirement in each event and the time in 
which requirement should be fulfilled. According to the table provided in (App.2), on the 
occurrence of an event in the “events” column, a Reporting Entity must make a type of 
disclosure in accordance with the “requirements” column and the “time” column.550 The list 
appears to be introducing non-exhaustive examples of situations where information 
amounts to ‘material information’, but such a list is perceived to be valuable for Reporting 
Entities in meeting their obligations. This is a bold idea in providing extensive guidance in 
a jurisdiction where there is no established customs or precedents which help issuer to 
become compliant with the rules. 
Issuer’s responsibility of identifying inside information 
It should be noted that it is the issuer’s responsibility to identify ‘inside information’, and 
therefore meet its obligations of disclosing and controlling it. Modern securities markets 
regulations state clearly that issuers have to establish adequate procedures to comply with 
                                                                                                                                                     
(5) major new developments in the business of the issuer; or 
(6) information previously disclosed to the market. 
548 See Appendix 7: A copy of part of (App2) of the DFSA Rulebook Offered Securities Rules (OSR). 
549 Material information is defined under Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Article (45). Definitions of 
material information and special relationship for this Part. 
550 See footnote 548. 
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their obligations. Thus, if the issuer has not taken the necessary measures to monitor 
changes in the circumstances, it is not a defence for an issuer that it was not aware of the 
inside information. 
The UK, the FSA Handbook makes it clear that identifying inside information is the 
responsibility of the issuer.551In the DIFC, the OSR in App. 7 Guidance 4 follows a similar 
line to the FSA.552 
Also, the FSA Handbook in Listing Principle 2 requires listed companies to establish and 
maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable them to comply with their 
obligations. An issuer may comply with such a requirement by appointing a committee 
specialized in implementing and monitoring the issuer’s disclosure procedures. The issuer, 
in establishing a disclosure system, should ensure that it monitors circumstances where a 
disclosure obligation arises and can decide whether particular information amounts to 
inside information. 
 
When to disclose inside information 
It is acceptable that an issuer needs a small delay in order to prepare a clear statement for 
disclosure. However, regulation does not allow for a longer time than necessary to prepare 
for disclosure. In other words, there is usually a short time during which disclosure should 
be made. 
In the US, the NYSE Listed Company Manual, in rule 202.05, requires material 
information to be “quickly” disclosed into the market. 
In the UK, an issuer is required to disclose inside information “as soon as possible” to a  
Regulatory Information Service (RIS). Under the previous regime, an issuer was required to 
disclose price-sensitive information “without delay”. The FSA has declared that it considers 
that the change from “without delay” to “as soon as possible” would not mean that an issuer 
is allowed to take a longer time to disclose inside information into the market. Thus, 
                                                 
551 DTR 2.2.7G 
An issuer and its advisers are best placed to make an initial assessment of whether particular information 
amounts to inside information. The decision as to whether a piece of information is inside information may be 
finely balanced and the issuer (with the help of its advisers) will need to exercise its judgment. 
DTR 2.2.8G 
The directors of the issuer should carefully and continuously monitor whether changes in the circumstances 
of the issuer are such that an announcement obligation has arisen under this chapter. 
552 …The Reporting Entity is itself best placed to determine whether information is liable to lead to 
substantial movement in the price of its Securities, as what constitutes Price Sensitive Information will vary 
widely according to circumstances. 
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precedents under the previous regime in regard to when to disclose inside information are 
still relevant.553 
In particular, the leading FSA enforcement decision interpreting the term “without delay” is 
the public censure of Marconi Plc in April 2003. The applicable rule in the case then was 
paragraph 9.2C of the previous FSA Listing Rules. Accordingly, the FSA decided that 
Marconi failed to make an announcement “without delay” of a change in its expected 
performance for the half-year ended 30 September 2001 and the full-year ended 31 March 
2002. The expected change in Marconi’s performance had been approved by Marconi’s 
chief executive and chief financial officer on the afternoon of 2 July 2001. Yet, an 
announcement was not made until after the market close on 4 July 2001, following its 
discussion at a board meeting. The delay of the announcement had a considerable effect on 
the market price of Marconi’s securities on the 5 July 2001; there was a 54 per cent fall in 
its share price. The FSA judged that Marconi did not meet the requirement of disclosure 
“without delay”. In its consideration, once the change in expected performance had been 
agreed on the afternoon of 2 July 2001, the issuer should have immediately taken the 
necessary action to move forward its board meeting to a time no later than the afternoon of 
3 July 2001. This would have allowed it to disclose the information into the market by, at 
least, the evening of 3 July 2001. The FSA’s enforcement decision in the Marconi case 
reveals an interpretation of the term “without delay”. This line of judgment is still relevant 
under the new regime, as the FSA clearly stated that this is also the case under the new 
disclosure rules. 
In its decision in the Marconi case, the FSA emphasized the importance of timely 
disclosure of inside information. The case indicates that an issuer is allowed a small delay 
in order to prepare a clear not-misleading statement. But the FSA will investigate the steps 
taken to make an announcement, if it is clear that a timely disclosure is required. The case 
indicates that the FSA gave Marconi approximately 24 hours to make a disclosure. This 
might be an indication of the time during which disclosure must be made. But is should be 
noted that in its decisions the FSA  takes into consideration the circumstances surrounding 
each individual case.554 
                                                 
553 FSA June 2004 Consultation, Paragraph 4.51. 
554 MAURICE BUTTON A Practitioner’s Guide to the Financial Services Authority Listing Rules (London: City 
and Financial Publishing, 2005/2006). pp.145-6. 
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The position in the UK can be compared to that in the DIFC. In the latter, the DFSA’s OSR 
in App. 2 introduced an extensive list of events in which a reporting entity is required to 
disclose information. According to the table provided in App. 2, on occurrence of an event 
in the “events” column, a Reporting Entity must make the type of disclosure in accordance 
with the “requirements” column and the “time” column. In regard to the “time” column, a 
reporting entity must disclose price-sensitive information “without delay”. It is clear that 
most of the disclosure requirements in App. 2 must be fulfilled “without delay”. Only in 
some events,  such as in disclosing information in respect of a new director within 7 days of 
appointment, does App. 2 allow for a longer time. 
The term “without delay” is not defined by the OSR. It is not clear, in the absence of 
precedents, what “without delay” means. It can be supposed that the FSA’s line of 
reasoning in Marconi is appropriate here. This is supported by the fact that the same term is 
used, and that the jurisdiction of the DIFC is based on the legal system of England and 
Wales. 
Holding announcement 
In practice not all events are clear and can be immediately announced. Where there is an 
unexpected and significant event, the issuer needs more time to elucidate the situation. 
Otherwise an immediate announcement might cause false, non-detailed or misleading 
disclosure. Allowing issuers to make a holding announcement seems to be the best solution 
in such situations. 
The FSA Handbook in DTR 2.2.9G allows holding announcement.555 The same is right in 
the DIFC.556 
                                                 
555 (2) If an issuer is faced with an unexpected and significant event, a short delay may be acceptable if it is 
necessary to clarify the situation. In such situations a holding announcement should be used where an issuer 
believes that there is a danger of inside information leaking before the facts and their impact can be 
confirmed. The holding announcement should: 
(a) detail as much of the subject matter as possible; 
(b) set out the reasons why a fuller announcement cannot be made; and 
(c) include an undertaking to announce further details as soon as possible. 
 
556 App. 7 under the OSR provides guidance 5, which states: 
Reporting Entities must disclose Price Sensitive Information without delay. In practice, a short period before 
announcing Price Sensitive Information is permitted where a Reporting Entity is affected by an unexpected 
event and the Reporting Entity needs to clarify the situation so that any information released is accurate and 
not misleading. Where there is a danger of information leaking out in the meantime, the Reporting Entity 
should make a holding announcement giving an outline of the subject matter of the announcement, the 
reasons why a full announcement cannot yet be made and undertaking to give a full announcement as soon as 
possible. 
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Delaying disclosure of information 
There are circumstances in which an issuer needs a dispensation from the disclosure 
requirement. Exempting an issuer from a disclosure requirement should be limited to 
circumstances where such disclosure prejudices the issuer’s legitimate interests. Given that 
there are different interests of issuers, investors and the market, there should be a regulatory 
balance of such interests and a clear exemption from the disclosure obligation. This would 
avoid misunderstanding and abuse of the exemption.557 
In the US, it is established that both the SEC and the courts have accepted the principle of 
temporarily withholding material information from the market if there are legitimate 
business interests, given that neither the issuer nor insiders exploit such information in 
trading.558 
This is supported by the leading case Texas Gulf Sulphur, where the Second Circuit 
affirmed that: 
 
We do not suggest that material facts must be disclosed immediately; the timing 
of disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the corporate officers 
entrusted with the management of the corporation within the affirmative 
disclosure requirements promulgated by the exchanges and by the SEC.559 
 
In the UK, an issuer is allowed to delay disclosure of inside information in limited 
circumstances under the FSA Handbook.560 The FSA Handbook makes it clear that an 
issuer’s legitimate interests in this framework include matters in negotiation and impeding 
developments. Its emphasis is on circumstances where the viability of the issuer is in 
danger, or where immediate public disclosure jeopardizes the outcome of negotiations. This 
does not mean that an issuer is allowed to delay disclosure of the fact that it is in financial 
difficulty. The FSA directed that issuers should distinguish between an event which gives 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
557 KLAUS J. HOPT Insider Dealing and Timely Disclosure (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 
1996). p.15. 
558 LOUIS LOSS AND JOEL SELIGMAN (eds.) Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (New York 5th ed.: Aspen 
Publishers, c2004). pp. 950-1. 
559 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968). 
560 DTR 2.5.1R: 
An issuer may, under its own responsibility, delay the public disclosure of inside information, such as not to 
prejudice its legitimate interests provided that: 
(1) such omission would not be likely to mislead the public; 
(2) any person receiving the information owes the issuer a duty of confidentiality, regardless of whether such 
duty is based on law, regulations, articles of association or contract; and 
(3) the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of that information. 
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rise to an obligation to disclose inside information under DTR 2.2.1R (e.g., the loss of an 
important contract) and subsequent events in which the issuer may be allowed to delay 
disclosure (e.g., attempts to re-negotiate the contract).561 
 
In the DIFC, the laws and regulations fulfil the same function of allowing issuers to delay 
disclosure in certain circumstances. It is clear that impeding and strategic developments can 
be withheld from disclosure, benefiting from the disclosure exemption provisions. Where 
there is a risk of breach of confidence, information must be disclosed. Thus, the disclosure 
exemption provisions in both the UK and the DIFC are likely to have a similar effect.562 
Selective disclosure 
Allowing selective disclosure in limited circumstances is another example of recognizing 
the propriety of preserving issuers’ legitimate interests in the regulation of modern 
securities markets. For a long time, it has been ascertained that an issuer may not 
selectively disclose inside information, for example, to one or a few financial analysts or 
institutional investors.563 
                                                 
561 FSA June 2004 Consultation, Paragraph 4.53. 
562 Markets Law,  DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Article (24) states: 
24. Disclosure exceptions 
(1) Where in the reasonable opinion of a Reporting Entity the disclosure required by the Offered Securities 
Rules made pursuant to Article 23 would: 
(a) be unduly detrimental to the interests of the Reporting Entity; or 
(b) disclose commercially sensitive material, 
the Reporting Entity need not make the disclosure but shall immediately file with the DFSA a confidential 
report together with written reasons for non-disclosure. 
The OSR, Rule 8.3 states: 
8.3 Disclosure exceptions 
8.3.1 (1) A Reporting Entity who intends not to disclose information it would, but for Article 24(1) of the 
Markets Law 2004, be required to disclose under this chapter must notify the DFSA by written notice setting 
out: 
(a) a confidential report setting out the relevant information that it would, but for Article 24(1) of the 
Markets Law 2004, be required to disclose under the Rules; and 
(b) the reason why the Reporting Entity believes on reasonable grounds that the relevant information 
would fall within the grounds prescribed under Article 24(1) of the Markets Law 2004. 
Also, App. 7 under the OSR provides guidance 9, which states: 
Article 24 of the Markets Law 2004 provides exemptions to the requirement to provide disclosure of Price 
Sensitive Information, where disclosure would be unduly detrimental to the interests of the Reporting Entity 
or Listed Fund or where the information to be disclosed is commercially sensitive. Reporting Entities should 
ensure that any such information is kept confidential within the Reporting Entity. In these circumstances, the 
Reporting Entity should deliver without delay to the DFSA a notification requesting non-disclosure as set out 
in Rule 8.3 of the Offered Securities Rules. 
In App. 2, a reporting entity is required to disclose price-sensitive information without delay in relation to: 
1(c) (c) impending or strategic developments or matters in the course of negotiations where there is reason to 
believe that a breach of confidence has or is likely to occur in relation to Price Sensitive Information. 
563 LOUIS LOSS AND JOEL SELIGMAN (eds.) Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (New York 5th ed.: Aspen 
Publishers, c2004). p.951. 
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In the US, in Dirks the Supreme Court noted that:  
“The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring... a broad dissemination to the 
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or group”.564  
 
Thus, under the previous regime in the US, a selective disclosure may amount to a “tip” 
actionable under insider dealing prohibition in Rule 10b-5.565 
However, arguments regarding the legitimacy of selective disclosure have continued. There 
were concerns about many issuers’ making selective disclosure of material information to 
securities analysts and institutional investors, before disclosing the same information to the 
public. In such cases, the recipients of material information can exploit that information at 
the expense of other informed investors. Such practices of selective disclosure have 
considerable effects on insider dealing. Both actions are detrimental to a transparent and 
informed market where investors have equal access to information. Yet, in the US, while 
insider dealing and tipping were prohibited by the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws, the regulation of selective disclosure was not clear.566 Selective disclosure 
persisted as an issue until the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RFD) by the SEC in 
2000.567 
RFD, nevertheless, allows selective disclosure in limited circumstances. Rule 100(b) (2) 
states that general Rule 100(a) does not apply to a disclosure made to a person who owes a 
duty of trust and confidence, to a person who agrees to maintain the disclosed information 
in confidence, to an entity whose business is in credit rating or in connection with a 
registered securities offering. 
In the UK, the FSA Handbook also establishes a general rule that disclosure should not be 
selective, but should rather be to the public in general.568 
                                                 
564 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.12 (1983). 
565 LOUIS LOSS AND JOEL SELIGMAN (eds.) Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (New York 5th ed.: Aspen 
Publishers, c2004). p.951. 
566 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release No. 43154. 
567 Rule 100 of RFD establishes that the general rule is: 
Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material non-public information 
regarding that issuer or its securities to any person described in paragraph (b) (1) of this section, the issuer 
shall make public disclosure of that information as provided in Rule 101(e)… 
 
568 DTR 2.5.6R 
Whenever an issuer or a person acting on his behalf or for his account discloses any inside information to any 
third party in the normal exercise of his employment, profession or duties, the issuer must make complete and 
effective public disclosure of that information via a RIS, simultaneously in the case of an intentional 
disclosure and as soon as possible in the case of a non-intentional disclosure, unless DTR 2.5.1 R applies. 
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However, when an issuer is allowed to delay public disclosure of inside information under 
DTR 2.5.1R, it may be selectively disclosed to another person, providing that the other 
person owes the issuer a duty of confidentiality.569 Selective disclosure to another person 
must be in the normal course of the exercise of his/her employment, profession or duties.570 
The guidance introduces the idea that an issuer may, depending on the circumstances, be 
justified in disclosing inside information to the mentioned non-exhaustive categories. 571 
The guidance, however, indicates that selective disclosure to any or all of the above-
mentioned persons may not be justified in all circumstances.572 The issuer should also 
consider that the wider the group of selective disclosure the greater the likelihood of a leak 
which raises a duty of public disclosure.573 
In the DIFC, the function of regulating selective disclosure is fulfilled under OSR.574 
                                                 
569 DTR 2.5.7G(1). 
570 DTR 2.5.7G(2). 
571 DTR 2.5.7G(2). 
572 DTR 2.5.8G. 
573 DTR 2.5.9 G. 
(a) the issuer's advisers and advisers of any other persons involved in the matter in question; 
(b) persons with whom the issuer is negotiating, or intends to negotiate, any commercial financial or 
investment transaction (including prospective underwriters or places of the financial instruments of the 
issuer); 
(c) employee representatives or trade unions acting on their behalf; 
(d) any government department, the Bank of England, the Competition Commission or any other statutory or 
regulatory body or authority; 
(e) major shareholders of the issuer; 
(f) the issuer's lenders; and 
(g) credit-rating agencies. 
574 SRO Article 8.2.3 states: 
(1) A Reporting Entity must not disclose any information it is required to disclose by Rule 8.2.1 to any other 
person prior to the market disclosure in accordance with Rule 8.2.1(3) of such information, except in strict 
confidence to: 
(a) its advisors, underwriters, sponsors or compliance advisers; 
(b) the custodian of the Listed Fund to which the information relates; 
(c) the agent employed to release the information; 
(d) Persons with whom it is negotiating with a view to effecting a transaction or raising finance, 
including prospective underwriters or sponsors of an issue of Securities, providers of finance or loans 
or the placement of the balance of a rights issue not taken up by shareholders; 
(e) the DFSA or another Financial Services Regulator where such disclosure is necessary or 
desirable for the regulator to perform its functions; 
(f) a Person to whom the Reporting Entity discloses information in accordance with a lawful 
requirement; or 
(g) a Person to whom the information is disclosed in the necessary course of the business of the 
Reporting Entity. 
(2) A Reporting Entity must advise such recipients, except the DFSA, in writing, prior to them receiving the 
information, that the information is confidential and that they and any person privy to the information should 
not deal in the relevant Securities, or any other related Investment, before the information has been made 
available to the market. 
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It is clear that in the three jurisdictions one essential condition for permitting selective 
disclosure is that the recipient should owe a duty of confidentiality to the issuer. Selective 
disclosure as a general rule is prohibited, and is only exceptionally permitted in limited 
circumstances. Where selective disclosure is permitted, there appears to be a safe-harbour 
of the prohibition from disclosing inside information. The DIFC, Rule 8.2.3 (2) indicates 
that the issuer must advise recipients not to deal in the relevant securities, depending on the 
information. In the UK, DTR 2.6.4G recognized that if a permitted recipient of inside 
information breaches his duty of confidentiality, the issuer may not be responsible for the 
breach. Thus, the regulation of selective disclosure is another example of the common 
scope between disclosure and insider dealing regulation. 
A discussion regarding the disclosure of important information from financial or securities 
research is essential. Such information is supposed to be material and price-sensitive. 
However, in some jurisdictions it is considered, with reason, that such information is not 
inside information. This is because the information in these cases is generated outside the 
issuer by the analyst or the researcher. It is irrational to consider a person as an insider to 
his own thought; the law cannot regulate a person’s relationship to his own thought. This is 
an important issue, which was formerly thought to comprise insider dealing through 
disclosure of inside information. Probably the most appropriate way to deal with this issue 
is to prohibit the inappropriate disclosure of research information.575 
The named article was implemented by FSA's Code of Practice of Approved Persons 
(APER). The FSA also reached the following important decision: 
Mr Casoni was a research analyst working for Citigroup’s Global Equity Research 
(Citigroup) in London. He was head of a team specializing in the Italian leasing sector. His 
area of coverage included the Italian bank Banca Italease (BI). On 9 January 2006, Mr 
Casoni began the process for attaining approval of his research on BI, planning to publish 
his findings on 20 January. Between the date when he began the process for gaining 
approval and the expected date of publication, Mr Casoni selectively disclosed details of his 
research to certain clients of the firm regarding the valuation methodology and the target 
                                                 
575 Thus, Article 6(5) of the Market Abuse Directive states: 
Member states shall ensure that there is appropriate regulation in place to ensue that persons who produce or 
disseminate research concerning financial instrument or issuers of financial instruments and persons who 
produce or disseminate other information recommending or suggesting investment strategy, intended for 
distribution channels or for the public, take reasonable care to ensure that such information is fairly presented 
and disclose their interests or indicate conflicts of interest concerning the financial instrument to which that 
information relates. Details of such regulation shall be notified to the Commission. 
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price. On one occasion even he told a client the planned date of publication. Citigroup 
published the research at 17.40 on 23 January with a buy recommendation at the target 
price of €39 per share; BI's price at the time was €25.70.576 
The FSA fined Mr. Casoni on the ground of failing to observe proper standards of market 
conduct while carrying out his role as an Approved Person. Mr. Casoni’s activity amounted 
to a breach of Principle 3 of the FSA's Statement of Principles for Approved Persons, 
which states “An approved person must observe proper standards of market conduct in 
carrying out his controlled function”. It is worth noting that the Statements of Principle 
issued under section 64 of the FSMA 2000 are stated in the FSA's Code of Practice of 
Approved Persons (APER).577 Section 64 of the FSMA 2000 states “The Authority may 
issue a statement of principle with respect to the conduct expected of approved persons…”.  
An approved person is a person in relation to whom the FSA has given its approval under 
section 59 of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements) for the performance of a 
controlled function. 
Margaret Cole, FSA Director of Enforcement, indicated that:  
…Mr. Casoni failed to observe proper standards of market conduct by deliberately 
disclosing his valuation methodology, his recommendation and target price to 
external parties prior to its publication. By doing so Mr. Casoni allowed the 
recipients the opportunity to pre-empt the conclusions of the published research 
ahead of the rest of the market.578  
 
Control of inside information 
As mentioned before, modern securities market regulation recognizes issuers’ legitimate 
interests in delaying disclosure and selective disclosure. Thus, there are situations where an 
issuer is allowed by the regulations to keep inside information confidential until the proper 
time for its disclosure. Such situations include the development of a new product, 
preparation for redundancy, the negotiation of a contract or preparation for a takeover. It is 
therefore logical to oblige the issuer to control inside information in order to minimize the 
                                                 
576 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, Final Notice, Roberto Chiarion Casoni, 20 March 2007. 
577 ibid., p.3.  
578 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, Press Release, FSA fines analyst for market misconduct, 20 March 
2007. 
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possibility of an unauthorized leak of it. In this regard, the UK579 and DIFC580 rules are 
similar.  
 
* Building of rules 
In conclusion, the UK rules under the FSA Handbook and the DIFC rules are clear and 
detailed. In building new rules of timely disclosure for the UAE law we should depend 
considerably on these two systems. 
We explained that insider dealing regulation and disclosure rules have the common object 
of maintaining an informed market. The more inside information is made public, the less 
opportunity for insiders to exploit such information. In recent years, the jurisdictions of the 
US and the UK have rapidly developed more rigid timely disclosure requirements. In the 
jurisdictions of the US, the UK and the DIFC there is an affirmative duty on issuers to 
make timely disclosure of any material non-public information. 
One conclusion from the comparative study is that the kind of information which must be 
made the subject of timely disclosure rules is ‘inside information’. Therefore, the definition 
of ‘inside information’ reached above should also be relevant for the purpose of timely 
disclosure. 
Different terms were used to indicate the time within which an issuer should make the 
disclosure. We would suggest that the terms ‘quickly’, ‘without delay’ and ‘as soon as 
possible’ all indicate that an issuer should not take more than the shortest reasonable time 
necessary for meeting the procedures of disclosure. We prefer using ‘as soon as possible’. 
On the basis of the above-mentioned conclusions, we would recommend the following draft 
rule for reform of the UAE regulation: 
                                                 
579 In the UK, the FSA Handbook states: 
DTR 2.6.1R 
An issuer must establish effective arrangements to deny access to inside information to persons other than 
those who require it for the exercise of their functions within the issuer. 
580 In the DIFC, the OSR states: 
Guidance: 
12. Reporting Entities should have a consistent procedure for assessing whether information is Price Sensitive 
and should clearly identify those within the Reporting Entity who are responsible for the communication of 
this information to the market. 
13. Reporting Entities should put in place arrangements for maintaining the confidentiality of Price Sensitive 
information before announcement. This should include adequate training for Employees in the handling, 
distribution and announcement of Price Sensitive information as appropriate. Reporting Entities should guard 
against the risk of Price Sensitive information seeping into the market domain, through leaked internal 
briefings or via trade journals for example. Where the Reporting Entity considers that this is likely to occur, 
an announcement should be made. 
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An issuer shall make disclosure to the market of any inside information which directly 
concerns the issuer as soon as possible.   
 
We indicated that the DIFC introduced an extensive list of events in which an issuer is 
required to disclose information. This idea would be useful if introduced into the UAE 
jurisdiction, where there are no established customs or precedents. We would recommend 
that the SCA should provide a similar list of examples to that of the DIFC. We would 
recommend the following rule: 
The SCA shall provide a list of examples in which an issuer is required to disclose 
information. 
 
The UK and DIFC regulations are similar in relation to fulfilling the following functions; 
the issuers’ responsibility to identify inside information, when to disclose, the holding 
announcement, and the deployment and control of inside information. 
We explained the importance of clearly stating that the issuer is responsible for identifying 
inside information. The issuer should establish a system to monitor changes which give rise 
to an obligation of timely disclosure. We would recommend the following rule: 
The issuer shall be responsible for continuously monitoring whether changes in the 
circumstances of the issuer are such that a disclosure obligation has arisen.  
 
The regulations of the UK and the DIFC allow issuers to make a holding announcement 
where there is an unexpected event and the issuer needs more time to clarify the situation. 
We would recommend the following rule for reform of the UAE law, which is inspired by 
both the UK and the DIFC rules: 
Where there is an unexpected and significant event, a short delay may be acceptable if it is 
necessary to clarify the situation. Where there is a danger of information leaking out in the 
meantime, the issuer should report a holding announcement to the market giving an outline 
of the subject matter of the announcement. 
 
In the regulations of the US, the UK and the DIFC it is an established principle to exempt 
an issuer from a disclosure requirement if such disclosure is against the legitimate interests 
of the issuer. However, there are important issues to be considered in allowing issuers to 
delay disclosure. We recommend the following draft rule, in which a delay of disclosure is 
allowed without compromising the public interest: 
(1) Where it is reasonably expected that the disclosure required by Article 1 would: 
      (a) be unduly detrimental to the legitimate interests of the issuer; or 
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      (b) disclose commercially sensitive material, 
the issuer can apply to the SCA, for non-disclosure and a confidential report of the subject 
matter, together with written reasons for non-disclosure. 
(2) the SCA has the authority either to permit non-disclosure or to require disclosure, taking 
into consideration that: 
     - non-disclosure would not be likely to mislead the public; 
     - disclosure of financial difficulties shall not be delayed; 
     - the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of that information. 
 
We explained the background on which the US has recently introduced new rules to 
regulate selective disclosure. The same function is fulfilled by the UK and the DIFC 
regulations. It is acknowledged that in the normal course of business there is usually 
selective disclosure of information to, for example, a strategic investor. However, the 
following recommended rule is to ensure that such selective disclosure is regulated:  
Whenever an issuer or a person acting on his behalf selectively discloses any inside 
information to a third party in the normal course of business, the issuer shall make 
disclosure of that information to the market: 
   - simultaneously in the case of an intentional disclosure; and  
   - as soon as possible in the case of a non-intentional disclosure. 
 
An issuer should be obligated to control inside information against any leak. This function 
is fulfilled by the UK and the DIFC rules. We would recommend the following rule: 
An issuer must have in operation procedures or systems to deny access to inside 
information to persons other than those who are authorised to have access to such 
information. 
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Conclusion 
The applied study, especially through the qualitative method of interviews, has found that 
central issues and terminology need to be clarified in order to ensure the clear regulation of 
insider dealing. These are: insider, inside information, prohibited activities, the scope of 
financial instruments covered by the regulation of insider dealing, exemptions and Chinese 
walls. 
This chapter is built on the propositions that the earlier chapters highlighted the 
shortcomings in the regulation of insider dealing in the UAE, and that comparative law is 
the appropriate method in any reform. This chapter should also be read in the light of 
Chapter 4, which explains the background to the jurisdictions compared. 
This chapter has attempted to compare the specific rules directed to the regulation of insider 
dealing in the US, the UK and the DIFC. The comparison has discussed in-depth how each 
jurisdiction responds to the most important of the above-mentioned issues.  The functional 
comparison used resulted in building rules recommended for jurisdiction in the UAE. The 
building of rules has been through identifying the shortcomings to be avoided in the 
compared jurisdictions, as well as the advantages to be emphasised. It is on this basis that 
the author drafted the recommended rules, benefiting directly or indirectly from the 
experiences of the compared jurisdictions. In respect of the US law, it was concluded that it 
is not sensible to leave the above-mentioned issues to be determined by case law, 
notwithstanding that it has paved the way to the introduction of clearer rules in other 
jurisdictions. A lesson to be learned from the US law is that leaving the regulation to be 
interpreted by the judiciary is unsuitable, especially for a jurisdiction such as the UAE with 
no precedents in insider dealing. On the other hand, introducing clearer rules in the UK and 
the DIFC solves most of the related issues. Nevertheless, we have indicated the advantages 
and disadvantages of each jurisdiction. The most important criteria on which we made the 
comparison are clarity of rules, their appropriateness to business and potential difficulties in 
application. 
Under each part of this chapter we introduced recommended draft rules. We also explained 
how the draft rules represent the results of the comparative study. In the next chapter, the 
draft rules will be introduced as recommendations for the reform of the UAE law. 
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Chapter 6: recommendations 
Introduction 
This chapter contains reasoned recommendations for reform of the UAE law and regulation 
of insider dealing. These recommendations will be supported by the principal results 
reached from each of the preceding chapters. They will also be maintained by the sustained 
findings of the thesis. This is probably because of the realistic and practical approach of the 
thesis that requires concluding with sound recommendations. In the light of both the 
applied and comparative legal methods of the thesis, recommendations for UAE regulatory 
reform would be a productive result for the thesis. 
A researcher may have certain ideas before conducting the research. By the end of the 
research such ideas develop into their final shape. Research is like a factory which receives 
raw materials and processes them into useable products. It may be considered as a method 
which supports hypotheses. Such hypotheses can be easily supported if they are logical. 
The role of the research, then, is not only to supporting hypotheses but also to demonstrate 
both their strengths and weaknesses. 
In fact, this thesis was commenced with limited initial thoughts and hypotheses. However, 
intensive reading, investigation and analysis has helped to build an organized body of ideas. 
Thus, the results of this thesis could not be limited to the initial ideas and hypotheses, but 
rather  they contain the whole body of supporting ideas. The effort made in discussing 
theories, collecting information, comparison and analysis is capable of forming the basis for 
reasonable results and recommendations. 
Although the precise subject of the thesis is the regulation of insider dealing, in practice as 
well as in theory it is difficult to separate this subject from the wider subject of the 
regulation of financial markets. What applies to the whole applies to the parts. The precise 
subject could not be separated from its wider scientific background. Thus, it is apparent that 
the process of the thesis depended on the generalities of financial market regulation, 
without escaping from the specialties of the precise subject. Along the same lines, the 
results and recommendations of the thesis are divided into the general area of financial 
market regulation and the precise area of insider dealing regulation. The recommendations 
cannot be separated because financial market regulation constitutes one indivisible unit. 
 The results and recommendations of the thesis can be divided into the following main 
areas: 
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Academic 
The thesis raised the question of theorizing about the regulation of insider dealing. An 
attempt has been made throughout the thesis to build the ideas on a clear line of reasoning. 
The thesis attempted to adopt a clear approach to the subject, as different readings of the 
same problem may lead to different results. On this basis, throughout the thesis the main 
premise has been that insider dealing is against the principle of equal access to information 
in financial markets. The thesis asserted the proposition that insider dealing is largely a 
marketplace problem. Insider dealing is therefore a main issue which should be dealt with 
by financial market regulation in any jurisdiction. The proposition of ‘equal access to the 
information’ provides a valid ground for the regulation of insider dealing. It is also 
compatible with the principles of market transparency and the ethical consideration that 
insider dealing is unfair. It is on this basis that the thesis, adopting this approach, has found 
its own path. One of the more important results is that the regulation of insider dealing 
complements disclosure rules.  
There are still controversies regarding the justifications behind the regulation of insider 
dealing. This thesis preferred a pragmatic approach, an approach which is also apparent in 
most of the jurisdictions of the world. That is, if in practice there is a need to regulate 
insider dealing, it should be regulated to protect interests such as investors’ rights to equal 
access of information, transparency of the market and market efficiency. This can be 
considered one of the results of the thesis. 
Another important academic point is in regard to the applied study. It was noted that there 
was a general lack of research and studies in the UAE in the area of financial markets. It 
was challenging to conduct an empirical study in an area which had rarely been 
investigated. The results of the applied study should therefore be read within the limits of 
time, resources and a lack of earlier studies. Nevertheless, it can be said that the applied 
study is one step in the right direction. There should be a body of research and studies in 
the field of financial market regulation. Only this can help in comprehensively 
understanding the real situation. The thesis therefore recommends that the authorities in the 
UAE give much more consideration to applied studies in the field of financial market 
regulation. 
Another point which should be given attention is the methodology of the thesis. The thesis 
has combined an applied study and a comparative legal study. The two different 
methodologies helped in investigating the real problem and then looking for an appropriate 
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solution. Academics in the UAE may still not be familiar with combining social science 
and legal methodology. This thesis recommends adopting socio-legal methodology for any 
academic work in the field, in order to reach more practical results. 
It is also recommended that financial market regulation be introduced as a module in law 
schools in the UAE. This will ensure more specialists in the field, and consequently more 
academic contributions. 
Reforms to financial regulation in the UAE 
It cannot be denied that the UAE (and especially Dubai) has introduced many economic 
and regulatory reforms to the financial system. The emerging markets of the country need a 
longer time to absorb the rapid and continuous changes in the financial world. This is not to 
say, however, that the situation could not be better. There are many fundamental shortfalls 
which act as barriers to any further reform. 
We recommend that the authorities in the UAE establish a commission which specialises in 
improving the financial regulatory system. The main modus operandi of the commission 
should be reforming the national legal system.  This should be achieved by shedding light 
on its shortcomings through a comparison with other developed jurisdictions, international 
standards and best practices. 
It is not an overstatement to say that the real difficulty faced by the researcher was 
examining the background of the comparative systems. It should be an invaluable 
recommendation, even if the only achievement of the thesis was to enable officials to 
identify the proper criteria for finding the appropriate jurisdictions from which to benefit. 
This thesis recommends three such criteria: the general characteristics of the jurisdiction, 
the main characteristics of the regulatory system and the characteristics of the rules relating 
to insider dealing. 
Chapter 4 of the thesis looked at the US, the UK and the Dubai International Financial 
Centre (DIFC) explaining the background to and nature of the systems of each. The chapter 
concluded with important results from the comparative systems.581 To avoid repetition, the 
important lessons from the comparative perspective can be summarised as: 
- It appears that each jurisdiction has, over a long time, built up a regulatory system 
that is appropriate to its financial policy. The US has built up its self-regulatory 
                                                 
581 See above heading: A comparative perspective of the systems of the US, the UK and the DIFC in 
regulating insider dealing.  
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system as a result of several decades of experience and precedents. Therefore, this 
thesis recommends that a self-regulatory system is inappropriate for an 
inexperienced country like the UAE, where the markets were established as recently 
as the year 2000. 
- The regulator in the UAE is the SCA.  This is a statutory body facsimile of the FSA 
in the UK and the DFSA in the DIFC. It is apparent that the FSA and the DFSA as 
regulators have clear responsibilities and objectives. In the UK, extensive regulatory 
powers were transferred to the FSA. One main reason for establishing such a 
statutory regulatory body was to maintain an orderly and transparent market, and 
combat financial crime.  This included the investigation and prosecution of insider 
dealing. The thesis recommends that the SCA’s responsibilities and objectives 
should be clear, especially the aforementioned two objectives. 
- The DIFC, as a separate jurisdiction, has its own underachievement. There should 
be co-operation between the DIFC and the financial regulators in the UAE. 
Providing that one goal of establishing the DIFC is raising the level of regulation in 
the country, there should be practical steps to achieve this goal; for example, 
establishing a joint-committee specialised in looking at how the UAE jurisdiction 
could benefit from the DIFC. 
- The recent trend in the regulation of insider dealing is to delegate to the regulator 
the power to enforce civil/administrative fines to deter insider dealing. This is 
apparent in the reforms in the UK. It is also apparent in the US system, where 
combining more than one kind of penalty has been efficient in combating insider 
dealing. For a long time, the UK system depended on criminal sanctions.  These 
were thought to be a main reason for the limited number of successful prosecutions 
of insider dealing. Therefore, the UK government adopted a civil/administrative 
regime through the FSMA 2000 as a more practical weapon to deter insider dealing. 
The DIFC also has an administrative system to deter market misconduct and insider 
dealing. It can be said that the current trend in regulation is to establish an 
empowered administrative system in order to deal with insider dealing and market 
abuse. The practical reason underlying such a trend is that proof in a 
civil/administrative case in easier than in a criminal case. It can be observed, 
especially from the UK experience, that an administrative regime is more efficient 
than a criminal regime. Therefore, the thesis recommends introducing a 
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civil/administrative system to deal with insider dealing and other market 
misconduct. An administrative regime in which the regulator has powers to impose 
civil penalties on insider dealers is believed to be more practical. Adequate 
authority should be delegated to the SCA in order to enable it to introduce rules, 
supervise markets, and investigate and prosecute insider dealing. 
- One important lesson of studying insider dealing regulation in the US is the 
importance of clarity of regulation. The breadth of the antifraud provisions in the  
US, and the administrative and judicial precedents, have resulted in controversial 
theories attempting to prohibit insider dealing. The act of insider dealing while in 
possession of inside information should be accurately defined for more than one 
reason. One reason is that it is unfair to punish someone under an obscure law. 
Another reason is that to differentiate between illegal and legal insider dealing 
which is not on the basis of inside information. Financial regulations are supposed 
to be clear and detailed because they are dedicated to business. Looking at the 
regulations at the DIFC and DFSA, it is apparent that there is consideration given to 
the clarity, detail and guidance. In emergent markets such as those in the UAE, 
there should be an emphasis on clarity, detail and guidance of regulation, since there 
are insufficient precedents to serve as proper guidance. Therefore, this thesis 
recommends that any reform of regulation in the UAE must take into account the 
clarity and detail of regulation. Bringing detail and sufficient guidance under the 
rules is essential in order to provide certainty to business. 
- The national jurisdiction of any country should give consideration to implementing 
standards adopted internationally or regionally. Officials in the UAE should decide 
whether there should be a plan to move financial regulation in the country closer to 
international standards. The thesis recommends that, regardless of a plan to 
implement international standards and best practices, the regulation of financial 
markets in the UAE should be improved to meet the expectations of investors. 
- It is important that the law explains why there is a need to regulate insider dealing. 
One lesson of comparing the UK and the US regulations is that a clear 
determination of the policy of regulation helps the regulator and the courts to 
enforce the law benefiting from the clarity of the purpose of the law. This thesis, 
therefore, recommends that the SCA should introduce a policy underlying the 
regulation of insider dealing. 
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Reforms to the SCA in the UAE 
The SCA is a modern regulator and its establishment was a great step in reforming the 
financial system of the UAE. It is undeniable that the SCA has introduced fundamental 
reforms into the regulation of financial markets. However, our discussion and applied study 
have articulated that there are certain areas in which there may be underachievement. 
One problem which needs to be resolved is determining the authorities and responsibilities 
of different financial regulators in the UAE. The authorities of the SCA should be clearly 
determined and distinguished from those of the financial markets. There should be a clear 
determination of the relationship between the SCA, the Central Bank of Union and the 
Ministry of Economy. The authorities and responsibilities of each should be clear. In 
particular, more powers need to be delegated to the SCA.582 
There should be amendment of the establishing law which is Federal Law No.4 of 2000 and 
implementation of Cabinet Resolutions. Redrafting of these laws is essential in order to 
avoid the apparent repetition of the objectives and powers of the SCA. The Cabinet should 
introduce detailed regulation to implement Federal Law No.4 of 2000. More powers, such 
as powers to introduce rules and investigation and enforcement powers, should be clearly 
delegated to the SCA. 
The SCA should develop its own regulatory policies. In particular, this thesis recommends 
that: 
- The SCA should introduce a complete body of regulations. As discussed in Chapter 
2, there is a need to detail regulations and guidance. The rules and regulations 
should be clearly drafted, introducing definitions of the main terms and providing 
sufficient guidance. The current regulations do not clearly cover all areas of 
financial services; for example the regulation of funds. There should also be 
consideration given to cross-sector regulation. For example, merchant banks, in 
spite of being significant participants in financial markets, are not covered by the 
regulations of the SCA. In particular, the SCA should utilize its powers to 
promulgate and enforce regulations. These powers were delegated to the SCA by 
Federal Law No. 4 of 2000. In the case that such powers are insufficient or the SCA 
is not clearly empowered, there should be amendments to the aforementioned law to 
                                                 
582 See above heading: The law of securities markets in the UAE.  
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improve the SCA. Officials in the UAE should take into consideration recent 
developments in other jurisdictions. In the UK, the FSA was established as a 
regulator with extensive powers to regulate cross-border financial services. Also the 
DFSA in the DIFC is a modern regulator. It has extensive powers to introduce and 
enforce regulations.583 
- The SCA should clearly determine its goals and the regulatory policies and tools to 
achieve its goals. In particular, there should be an emphasis on the enforcement 
tools which the SCA is empowered to use to achieve goals and regulatory policies. 
The SCA should not be lenient on breaches in the marketplace. In order to maintain 
orderly markets, it is important to have a regulatory body which has a clear law 
enforcement policy. The SCA should be stringent and transparent in enforcing the 
laws and regulations. The applied study supports the assumption that there are 
concerns about the SCA’s efficiency.584 The SCA should benefit from the DFSA in 
the DIFC which, in spite of being recently established, succeeded in gaining 
international recognition. The success of the DFSA should be an incentive for other 
regulators to raise the level of regulation closer to international standards. 
- The SCA should draft clear rules relating to insider dealing and timely disclosure. It 
should apply more rigid controls on issuers breaching timely disclosure rules. The 
SCA should introduce realistic methods of measuring the time issuers take in 
meeting the obligations of timely disclosure. Issuers’ disclosure of their quarterly 
results should not be appraised as an achievement. The real challenge is in 
obligating issuers to meet their continuous obligations, especially those of making 
the timely disclosure of any material non-public information. The mechanism in 
which the SCA works has not been efficient in separating the markets from the old 
corrupt situation (where there was no disclosure at all) and adopting a new 
transparent system. There is no prospect of further development if monopolising 
and concealing material information from shareholders and investors continues.585 
                                                 
583 This is discussed above in-depth. See heading: The regulation of financial markets in the UK, and heading: 
Structure and regulation at the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC).  
584 See above the discussion under Figure 23. 
585 See above heading: Shortfall in the enforcement of the timely disclosure and insider dealing regulation.  
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Reforms to the regulation of insider dealing and timely disclosure 
It has been asserted that there should be reforms to the regulatory system as a whole, and to 
the way in which the SCA functions. Any amendments to the rules would be insufficient if 
there were no reforms to the wider system. 
It is also important that different rules overlap in support of the aspirations underlying 
financial market regulation. They differ in the roles they play in achieving the goals of the 
regulatory system. One important result of the thesis is that the timely disclosure of inside 
information is the main protective tool against insider dealing. The more inside information 
there is disclosed into the market, the less the chance for insiders to exploit such 
information. 
Some areas may require cross-sector regulation. That is, regulating the same issue in more 
than one sector (for example, banking, investment banking or stock markets). One 
important such issue is the Chinese Walls procedure. For such procedures to be effective, 
they must be implemented in cross-sector regulations. 
It should also be noted that the jurisdiction of the UAE is not familiar with some legal 
concepts considered conventional in other jurisdictions. Timely disclosure may be one of 
these legal concepts. But the clearest example is the concept of Chinese Walls, which is  
non-existent in UAE jurisdiction. Therefore, introducing such rules may be considered a 
primary change. That is not to say that such changes are unattainable. Some of our 
recommendations represent primary changes, to the jurisdiction in the UAE. However, it is 
easy to introduce such changes through soft law, if it deemed practical to face insider 
dealing. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis provided a functional comparison between the rules directed to the 
regulation of insider dealing and timely disclosure in the jurisdictions of the US, the UK 
and the DIFC. The functional comparison aimed at building up recommended new rules for 
the UAE law through looking at the advantages and disadvantages of the comparative laws. 
The ‘function’ of the comparative study was the “building of a system”. The poor drafting 
of regulations in the UAE has been discussed earlier (in Chapter 2).586 The comparative 
legal study served as a practical method of introducing a better law, which at the same time 
meets the needs of the national system. Depending on evaluating and criticising the 
comparative laws in Chapter 5, we can recommend the following draft rules; 
                                                 
586 See above headings: Insider dealing regulation in local financial markets in the UAE; and The regulation 
of timely disclosure in the UAE.  
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The regulation of insider dealing 
Article 1: prohibited activities 587 
Any insider who has inside information shall be prohibited from: 
- dealing in related investments on the basis of the inside information; 
- disclosing the inside information to another person, otherwise than in the proper 
course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties; 
- encouraging another person, on the basis of the inside information, to deal in related 
investments. 
Article 2: the definition of an insider 588 
An insider is any natural person who has inside information who: 
- is a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of investments; 
- has access to the inside information through the exercise of his employment, 
profession or duties; 
- learned of the inside information by other means and knows or ought reasonably to 
have known it is inside information. 
 
Article 3: the definition of inside information 589 
(1) Inside information is information which is: 
1) material; 
2) non-public. 
 
(2) Information is material if it: 
- is precise information which indicates an event or circumstance that has occurred or 
may   reasonably have been expected to occur; 
- relates, directly or indirectly, to the investments or to the issuer of the investments; 
- would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect on the market 
price or the value of the related investments. 
 
(3) Information is non-public if it is: 
- not generally available; 
- has not been disclosed in accordance with any laws and regulations applicable in the 
country. 
 
(4) Information shall be considered public if: 
- it is disclosed in accordance with any laws and regulations applicable in the 
country;  
- it is otherwise generally available; 
- it is derived by analysing or developing other information which is public. 
- it can be obtained by observation. 
 
Article 4: the definition of investments590 
                                                 
587 Borrowed from or inspired by Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Sections 42-43. A result of the 
discussion under heading: Prohibited activities.  
588 Borrowed from or inspired by the FSMA 2000 Section 118B and Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, 
Section (45)(2). A result of the discussion under heading: The definition of an ‘insider’.  
589 Borrowed from or inspired by CJA 1993 Section 56, FSMA 2000 Section 118C and Markets Law DIFC 
Law No.12 of 2004 Section (42) and (45). A result of the discussion under heading: The definition of ‘inside 
information’.  
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For the purpose of Article 1 ‘investments’ shall be determined by the SCA.591 
 
Article 5: exemptions 
An act which is considered by financial markets’ customs as being in the normal course of 
business or an accepted market practice shall be exempted from the prohibition in Article 1. 
The SCA shall provide examples for such accepted acts. 
 
Article 6: corporation’s liability to insider dealing 592 
A corporation contravenes this part if: 
1) a natural person acts on behalf of the corporation in contravention of Article 1; 
2) such natural person discharges managerial responsibilities; and 
3) the corporation did not have in operation at that time any policies or procedures to ensure 
that such natural person would not violate Article 1. Such policies and procedures include 
Chinese Walls. 
 
Article (General): Chinese Walls 593 
The SCA shall make rules commonly known as ‘Chinese Walls’ rules. The SCA shall 
determine the arrangements for Chinese Walls, such as procedures, systems, management 
and physical separation. Firms which have departments with conflicting interests shall 
employ Chinese Walls in order to ensure that information obtained by one part of a firm is 
not communicated in inappropriate circumstances to another part of the firm. 
  
The regulation of timely disclosure 
Article 1: timely disclosure of inside information 594 
An issuer shall make disclosure to the market of any inside information which directly 
concerns the issuer as soon as possible. 
 
Article 2: examples595 
The SCA shall provide a list of examples in which an issuer is required to disclose 
information. 
 
Article 3: issuer’s responsibility for identifying inside information 596 
                                                                                                                                                     
590 A result of the discussion under heading: The scope of financial instruments covered by the regulation of 
insider dealing.  
591 We would recommend that in drafting the regulation it seems proper to cover securities, bonds, Islamic 
bonds, investment units and derivatives on securities.  On the other hand, it does not seem appropriate to 
extend the scope of the regulation to cover derivatives on commodities, interest rates, foreign exchange and 
other non-securities financial instruments. 
592 Borrowed from or inspired by Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section (49). A result of the 
discussion under heading: 
Chinese Walls.  
593 Borrowed from or inspired by the FSMA 2000 in “Commentary on Sections” and Markets Law, DIFC 
Law No.12 of 2004, Section (49). A result of the discussion under heading: 
Chinese Walls. 
594 Borrowed from or inspired by the UK rule DTR 2.2.1R of FSA Handbook. A result of the discussion under 
heading: Timely disclosure of inside information.  
595 A result of the discussion under heading: Legal uncertainty and providing examples.  
596 Borrowed from or inspired by the UK rule DTR 2.2.7G of FSA Handbook and the DIFC rule, the OSR, 
App. 7 Guidance 4. A result of the discussion under heading: Issuer’s responsibility of identifying inside 
information.  
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The issuer shall be responsible for continuously monitoring whether changes in the 
circumstances of the issuer are such that a disclosure obligation has arisen under Article 1. 
 
Article 4: holding announcement 597 
Where there is an unexpected and significant event, a short delay may be acceptable if it is 
necessary to clarify the situation. Where there is a danger of information leaking out in the 
meantime, the issuer should report a holding announcement to the market giving an outline 
of the subject matter of the announcement. 
 
Article 5: delaying disclosure 598 
(1) Where it is reasonably expected that the disclosure required by Article 1 would: 
(a) be unduly detrimental to the legitimate interests of the issuer; or 
(b) disclose commercially sensitive material, 
the issuer can apply to the SCA, for non-disclosure and a confidential report of the subject 
matter, together with written reasons for non-disclosure. 
(2) the SCA has the authority either to permit non-disclosure or to require disclosure, taking 
into consideration that: 
- non-disclosure would not be likely to mislead the public; 
- disclosure of financial difficulties shall not be delayed; 
- the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of that information. 
 
Article 6: selective disclosure 599 
Whenever an issuer or a person acting on his behalf selectively discloses any inside 
information to a third party in the normal course of business, the issuer shall make 
disclosure of that information to the market: 
- simultaneously in the case of an intentional disclosure; and  
- as soon as possible in the case of a non-intentional disclosure. 
 
Article 7: control of inside information 600 
An issuer must have in operation procedures or systems to deny access to inside 
information to persons other than those who are authorised to have access to such 
information. 
 
* Concluding remark 
For the recommended draft rules to function there needs to be a background of an efficient 
regulatory system. The regulation of insider dealing and timely disclosure should not be 
read as a remote issue. Thus, reforms to the system should not be limited to amendments to 
the legal rules. The comparative legal study has discussed in depth the background to each 
                                                 
597 Borrowed from or inspired by the UK rule FSA Handbook in DTR 2.2.9G and the OSR, App. 7 Guidance 
5. A result of the discussion under heading: Holding announcement.  
598 Borrowed from or inspired by the UK rule DTR 2.5.1R of FSA Handbook and Markets Law,  DIFC Law 
No.12 of 2004, Article (24). A result of the discussion under heading: Delaying disclosure of information.  
599 Borrowed from or inspired by the US Rule 100 of RFD, the DIFC, SRO Article 8.2.3 and the UK rule 
DTR 2.5.6R of FSA Handbook. A result of the discussion under heading: Selective disclosure.  
600 Borrowed from or inspired by the UK rule DTR 2.6.1R of FSA Handbook and the DIFC, SRO Guidance 
12-13.  
Control of inside information.  
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of the comparative jurisdictions before discussing the rules relating to insider dealing. The 
aim was to emphasise the importance and the influence of the wider system in any 
regulation. On the other hand, the recommended draft rules are based on the extensive 
discussion in Chapter 5. 
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Conclusion 
It is appropriate to add concluding remarks with regard to what this thesis has attempted to 
achieve and how far it has succeeded in doing so. The thesis introduced its own specific 
topic. It attempted to contribute to the body of knowledge in the regulation of insider 
dealing. It was necessary that the thesis attempted to be consistent in its approach, 
methodology and objectives. A proper criterion for assessing the thesis would be to look at 
the consistency in what we planned and what we actually achieved. 
Discussing the limitations of the thesis is a corollary to its evaluation. It is reasonable to 
critique the limitations of the thesis as well as its strengths. As in any other work, this 
treatise has been conducted by an individual researcher who has had limited time and 
financial resources. In regard to the applied study, it would have been invaluable to 
measure the ‘cleanness’ of the UAE financial market, and the effects of  SCA regulation on 
the efficiency of the market and share prices. However, such ambitious goals were outside 
the limits of this work. The applied study should be considered as a limited scale study, 
though a step in the right direction. With regard to the comparative legal study, it would 
have been ambitious to look at systems in other countries (such as Arab countries) the 
systems of which are similar to that of the UAE. However, lack of sufficient academic 
resources is an obstacle to studying such systems. Also, the systems of these countries have 
similar shortcomings to that of the UAE. The systems of some Asian countries would have 
represented ideal models for reform in developing countries. But studying such 
jurisdictions presents language obstacles. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the DIFC represents 
a model of best practices around the world, including Hong Kong and Singapore. Another 
potential limitation could lie in the exclusion of topics related to the regulation of insider 
dealing. The thesis indicated the powers given to the regulators in different systems to 
supervise, monitor and investigate insider dealing and other market misconduct. Detailed 
discussions of such powers and the procedures of supervision and investigation were 
excluded from this study. Discussions of some practices which are similar to insider 
dealing such as market abuse were also omitted. 
To discuss what the thesis has achieved, an example will be taken from daily life. If any 
one of us, either individually or through a corporation, is investing an amount of money in 
a market, either directly or indirectly through an intermediate or a fund, there are priorities 
which we will consider. We want to receive information regarding the corporation and the 
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market to which we are directing our money. We do not want such information to be 
monopolised by those who are inside the corporation. We do not want to be misled by 
those who manage the corporation. We want our rights to be protected. We do not want 
someone else to be advantaged over us. We do not want the market to be controlled by 
criminal activities which benefit certain wrongdoers at the expense of others. This is what 
has been argued in this thesis. In academic language, it is clear that the protection of the 
legitimate interests of different market participants is essential to maintaining an orderly 
and transparent market. The government intervenes in the markets by a system of 
regulation and a regulatory body empowered to enforce such regulation. 
In a developing country with emerging financial markets such as the UAE, there should be 
continuous evaluation of the regulatory system. This thesis is dedicated to the issue of 
insider dealing. Some would probably argue that such regulation is not one of the 
regulatory priorities. However, it can be said that, if seen from the point of view that one 
function of such regulation is to remove an incentive to delay disclosure, the regulation of 
insider dealing is a priority. One feature of the informal and unregulated over-the-counter 
markets in the UAE was the monopoly of information by those inside the corporations. 
Access to material information was only possible for insiders, their relatives and friends. 
Introducing formal financial markets and the SCA in the year 2000 was a turning point in 
the history of financial markets. The formal regulatory system has placed an emphasis on 
establishing a regulatory framework which ensures the SCA’s supervision over markets 
and brokers in particular. The regulation of securitization, IPOs and listing, and the 
continuous obligations of issuers can be described as underachieving. Emphasis has been 
given to basic obligations such as the disclosure of quarterly financial results. The system 
has shown weakness in regulating insider dealing and other market misconduct. There is 
hardly any achievement in this regard. It is logical therefore to evaluate the regulatory 
system and highlight areas of underachievement, one of which is the regulation of insider 
dealing. 
When constructing this thesis, consideration was given to the issues arising during the 
discussion. Thus, the initial structure was as flexible as possible in order to include any new 
issue emerging during the discussion. The inclusion or exclusion of related issues depended 
on their appropriateness to the purposes of the thesis. 
The thesis has had its own approach to the problem. To be precise, the rationale for the 
regulation of insider dealing is that it is against ‘equality of information’. This was the 
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conclusion in Chapter 1, which discussed the policy of the regulation of insider dealing. 
The second chapter aimed at investigating the history and evolution of financial markets 
and their current regulatory situation. The third chapter broached the problem of insider 
dealing in the local markets in the UAE. Through the applied study, the chapter attempted 
to support the argument that there are regulatory shortcomings in local financial markets. 
The most obvious of these are shortcomings in transparency, disclosure of information, 
protection of the market and investors, and regulating insider dealing. Following this, the 
thesis provided a legal comparison to generate reasonable recommendations for the reform 
of the UAE system through looking at the advantages and disadvantages of the comparative 
laws. Chapter 4 provided a ‘macro-comparison’ approach to the regulation of insider 
dealing. The discussion of comparative systems in this chapter aimed at exploring the 
background and the nature of the systems. Chapter 5 provided a comparative legal study, 
but it had a specific methodology and objectives. This chapter provided a ‘micro-
comparison’ approach to the particular rules relating to insider dealing and related issues. 
Thus, the core body of the thesis is divided into an applied study and a comparative legal 
study. The considerations and lessons raised by the academic discussion of the thesis are 
represented in the recommendations. The overall results of the thesis are designed as 
recommendations for reform of the UAE regulations. If we were reasonably accurate in our 
investigation of the shortcomings of the UAE system, and in the comparative study which 
indicated lessons to be learned, the recommendations will be invaluable.  
At the end of the thesis, I should indicate that I spared no effort in conducting this thesis. 
My personal underlying aims, besides fulfilling submission requirements, were to further 
my knowledge in the field and to produce a piece of academic writing which would be a 
substantial contribution to the libraries in the UK and the UAE. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: original questionnaire (Arabic) 
نBCDEFا.  
vZ_YZا ÆZا ضnÈZ kmروnÉZا ت_awlZا ·tZ Æy ةادأ ه ن_sY§ا اÊه:  
ناplZا :®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ Ësop¦ : v ÌارYآrZا k£رد ¾spZ k¯وnzأ ،v¦ار_a[ا نu_wZ ةد_YZا سورrZاو نر_Zا نu_Zا v kارد
نu_Zا.  
اÆ¯_Z :v{wZا nx ra مZاrx.  
فnZا :يرورد تnyور.  
kla_tZا :ةrYZا kgwZا v nYآإ kla_£.  
kspaiZا ةnYZا :2005 -2008.  
  
نأ Æs¯ ن_sY§ا ·a بو_tYZا ®sآر_Zا ®a £رأ:  
Í vwlZا ÆZا ضnÈZ ءارÎا س_s¨ ه ن_sY§ا ®a ضnÈZا.  
ءارÎا ÌÊه مrYm r¨ Æ¯_Zا ل_tZا ¸u v ىn½أ ث_yأ v وأ ÌارYآrZا kZ_ر v.  
ÆZا ®a ء_¢Yu[ا rly ت_u_sZا فÊs و Í vwlZا ÆZا ضnÈZ _¢aاrYا و  ت_awlZا ³wx ظ_wZ Ñlو v _a لÊs Æ¯_Zا.  
أ kmأ nآذ نود ®a ء_{ ³Ya ب_u[ا v ÓZا ÔwYm كر_Zا و kmر_sY½ا ÆZا v kآر_Zاب_. 
 
 ةIJKLا)1:(  
 ®a م_¨رe_y ksZ_YZا تار_lZا s¦n¦ كر_Zا ®a بw¤Zا)1 ( ³Zإ)5 ( Ë¨nZا نgm Æsy ،كر_Zا nou v _¢Ysهأ ¯ ÔZذ و)1 (
 Ë¨nZا و ksهأ nآ­Z)5 (s¦nYZا ¸py م_¨رeا v¨_y و ksهأ ¾¨­Z. 
ا يرr`a مiwm نأ و ks_Z_y ل_Zا قاأ ËY¦ نأ ty kmأ ®x يرZا ح_`jy ksZ_Zا قاروe
kpwla nsÖ kmnه£ ت_awla. 
 
vuu_Zا وأ vsopYZا ¾½rYZا نود w¤Zاو ضnlZا ىZ ل_Zا قاأ Ësop¦ كnYm نأ tm.  
kpwlZا nsÖ kmnهtZا kawlZا ³wx ء_py ¾a_lYZ_y ®slw¤wZ m §أ tm.  
Zا مr¨ ³wx ®mnYZا نgm نأ tmË¢¨¯ km_¯ ËY¦ نأ و ةاو_.  
kZوrZا v ksZ_Zا قاeا Ësop¦ v ksZوrZا nsm_lZا Ós¤¦ ËYm نأ tm.  
 
 ةIJKLا)2:( 
 ³wx Ó¤p¦ _¢uأ ىnm vYZا ت_swZا ر_Ym نأ كر_Zا ®a بw¤Zا ،k¶{_pZا قاeا v kl×_Zا ت_swZا ®a kxa vwm _s
 kswZا ksZ_Zا قاeاةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا kZود v. 
 
 قاeا v ks_Zا ماrluا. 
 
 kZد_lZا ksZا ¸gl¦ § Ë¢eا ر_lأ. 
 
 لa nsÖ رZا  ح_`[ا ىYa. 
 
 ®mnYZا ®sy k¨n¦ ك_pه. 
 
 kmlZ نØnlYm § kpwlZا nsÖ ت_awlZا نwÈYm ®mÊZا ®slw¤Zا. 
 
  v Ëg¦ ك_pه ¸sZZ_`Zا ضر_l¦. 
 
 ®mnYZا ر_آ ¾¨ ®a kZ¢y قZ_y xYZا ®gm. 
 
 kØاو nsÖ koueاو ®suاZا. 
 
 ®mرnÉYZا ®mnYwZ vura Ùml¦ ك_pه ¸sZ. 
 
 قZا ËsopYy k`YZا ksagZا ت_¤wZا ت__`Y½ا ®sy حØو مrx و بر_É¦ ك_pه. 
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 ةIJKLا)3.(  
 كر_Zا ®a بw¤ZاÌnou k¢£و rsm¹YZ تr£و نإ ت_swl¦ kmأ Ygm ËÚ ®aو ،ةدrlYZا تار_sZا ®Ø ®a r¯او ر_sY½ا ³Zإ nsm نأ. 
 
1 ( ³wx اsZ Ëه ®mÊZا ®mnYZا v¨_Z لد_x nsÖ Ìر_Yxا ®gm kpwlZا nsÖ kmnهtZا kawlZا ³wx ء_py ·w¤Zا ¾a_l¦ نأ rYl¦ ¾ه
؟kawlZا ¸u ³wx عzا 
  Ó¦ا_a_¦. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦............................................................................................................................:.........................................  
2 (Zا ¾a_lYZ نأ rl¦ ¾ه؟ل_Zا قاأ v ks_Zا ³wx ksw تاnsÚ¹¦ ®slw¤ 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦............................................................................................................................:.........................................  
3 (؟ل_Zا قاأ v ®mnYZا kÚ ³wx ksw تاnsÚ¹¦ ®slw¤Zا ¾a_lYZ نأ rYl¦ ¾ه 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦......................................................................:............................................................................................... 
4 (؟ل_Zا قاe kmد_`Y¨[ا ksZ_lZا ³wx ksw تاnsÚ¹¦ ®slw¤Zا ¾a_lYZ نأ rYl¦ ¾ه 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦....:.................................................................................................................................................................  
5 (؟kZوrZا د_`Y¨ا ³wx ksw تاnsÚ¹¦ ®slw¤Zا ¾a_lYZ نأ rYl¦ ¾ه 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا § ÜwY½ا §و. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦............................................................................................................................:......................................... 
6 (wx ksw تاnsÚ¹¦ ®slw¤Zا ¾a_lYZ نأ rYl¦ ¾ه؟ksZ_Zا قاeا ³Zإ kZsZا بÊ£ ³ 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦............................................................................................................................:......................................... 
7 (؟ksZ_Zا قاeا ³Zإ ksp£eا تار_Y[ا بÊ£ ³wx ksw تاnsÚ¹¦ ®slw¤Zا ¾a_lYZ نأ rYl¦ ¾ه 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦......................................................................:............................................................................................... 
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8 (؟kpwlZا nsÖ kmnهtZا kawlZا ³wx ء_py ®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ ·pa tm Ñuأ rYl¦ ¾ه 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦.......:.............................................................................................................................................................. 
9 (؟ksZ_Zا قاeا kouأ و ®suا¨ Ómnz ®x ®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ ·pa ن_ga[_y Ñuأ rYl¦ ¾ه 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦............................................................................................................................:......................................... 
10 (nsm_lZا ع_¦ا نأ rYl¦ ¾ه ؟ksZ_Zا قاeا v ks_Zا ىYa ·nZ يروnØ ksZ_Zا قاeا Ësop¦ v ksZوrZا 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦.......................................................................................................:.............................................................. 
11 ( kZود v ksnZا nsÖ Ë¢eا ق ر_s¢uا ³Zإ تدأ vYZا ب_eا ®Ø ®a vه قZ_y xYZا و ®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ نأ rYl¦ ¾ه
 م_lZا Üs v ةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا1998؟ 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 و Ó¦ا §ÜwY½ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦............................................................................................................................:......................................... 
12 (ه قZ_y xYZا و ®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ نأ rYl¦ ¾ه ksZ_Zا قاeا v Ë¢eا ر_lأ v kx_ ر¢ ³Zإ تدأ vYZا ب_eا ®Ø ®a v
 م_lZا v ةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا kZود v kswZا2005  م_lZا v د_Zا s`YZا ËÚ ®a و2006؟ 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦...............:...................................................................................................................................................... 
13 (rta _sZ_¯ k¤Zا ةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا kZود v kswZا ksZ_Zا قاeا kouأ و ®suا¨ نأ rYl¦ ¾ه ل_Zا قاأ رهr¦ ·pZ km
؟¾YZا v 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦............................................................................................................................:......................................... 
14 (؟ةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا kZود v kswZا ksZ_Zا قاeا v ®mnYZا قZ km_¯ ك_pه نأ rYl¦ ¾ه 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦........................................................:............................................................................................................. 
15 (؟ةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا kZود v kswZا ksZ_Zا قاeا v ح_`[ا و ks_Zا ىYa ·ر tm Ñuأ rYl¦ ¾ه 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
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 Ó¦ا. 
  §و Ó¦ا §ÜwY½ا. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦............................................................................................................................:......................................... 
16 ( ®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ ·pZ vZ_Zا نu_Zا نأ rYl¦ ¾ه؟Ós¨دو Øاو ةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا kZود v kswZا ksZ_Zا قاeا v 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦................................................................................................................:..................................................... 
17 ( ®a ل_l ¾gy Ó¤a ةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا kZود v kswZا ksZ_Zا قاeا v ®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ ·pZ vZ_Zا نu_Zا نأ rYl¦ ¾ه
؟k`YZا ksagZا ت_¤wZا ¾¨ 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦............................................................................................................................:......................................... 
18 (Ya ·ر Ómnz ®x ®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ ·pa ن_ga[_y Ñuأ rYl¦ ¾ه kZود v kswZا ل_Zا قاأ kouأ v ح_`[ا و ks_Zا ى
؟ةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦..................................................................................................:................................................................... 
19 (؟ةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا kZود v kswZا ل_Zا قاأ v ®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ ·pa v kZ_l ks×_ptZا kylZا و kآ_Zا نأ rYl¦ ¾ه 
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
  ÜwY½ا_a_¦. 
Óswl¦............................................................................................................................:.........................................  
20(  نود ®a ksZ_a kaاnÖ Ós¤Yy ·wZاو ksZ_Zا قاروeا k¶sه Ùm¦ نأ rYl¦ ¾ه xYZا عدر v ksZ_l nآأ نgs ks×_p£ kآ_a
؟®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ و قZ_y  
 _a_¦ Ó¦ا. 
 Ó¦ا. 
 ÜwY½ا §و Ó¦ا §. 
 ÜwY½ا. 
 _a_¦ ÜwY½ا. 
Óswl¦...............................................................................................................:...................................................... 
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Appendix 2: translation of the questionnaire (English) 
Questionnaire. 
This questionnaire is a method to collect necessary data for the following research: 
Title: The Regulation of Insider Dealing: A Comparative Legal Study Towards Recommendations for 
the UAE Law. (PhD Thesis). 
Researcher: Mr. Abdulsalam Albelooshi. 
Supervisor: Mr. Robert Drury. 
University: University of Exeter, the United Kingdom. 
 
I ask for your participation, since; 
The questionnaire aims to measure attitudes only for the purpose of research. 
All the information provided by you in the interview will be used for research purposes and will be 
secured in the privacy of the researcher's home office and that any audio tapes of my conversations 
with the researcher will be erased following the end of the research. 
Your participation in this study is, of course, voluntary. You have the right to choose not to participate 
or to withdraw from the study at any time without giving any reasons.  
 
Section (1): 
The respondent is asked to rank 5 principles of financial market regulation in order of importance. 
They are to give 1 as the most important principle, 2 as the next most important principle, and so on. 
 
 Financial markets should be transparent and issuers should       make timely 
disclosure of any inside information. 
 Financial markets should be controlled only by economic factors, not by 
regulations. 
 Insiders should not be allowed to use inside information for their own benefit. 
 Investors in financial markets should be put on an equal footing and their rights 
should be protected. 
 There should be an implementation of international standards of regulation in the 
local financial markets of any country. 
 
Section (2): 
The respondent is asked to select from ten negative aspects of financial markets which they thought 
were applicable to the local markets in the UAE. 
 
 The market is not transparent. 
 
 Share prices do not reflect the true value. 
 
 The level of timely disclosure is inappropriate. 
 
 There is prejudice between investors. 
 
 Insiders are not punished for insider dealing. 
 
 Conflict of interests is uncontrolled. 
 
 The market can be easily abused by bigger portfolio investors. 
 
 The laws and regulations are not clear. 
 
 There is no civil remedy for plaintiff investors. 
 
 There is uncertainty and conflict between the powers of the different authorities 
regulating financial markets. 
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Section (3): 
The respondent is asked to choose one amongst multiple choices. Then she/he may provide any further 
comments supporting his/her choice or presenting further opinion. 
 
1) Do you think that insider dealing is unfair to other investors who do not have access to inside 
information? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
2) Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on transparency in financial markets? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
3) Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on investor confidence in financial markets? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
4) Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on the economic efficiency of financial 
markets? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
5) Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on the economy of the country? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
6) Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on attracting liquidity into the financial 
markets? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
7) Do you think that insider dealing has negative effects on attracting foreign investment into the 
financial markets? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
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8) Do you think that insider dealing should be prohibited? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
9) Do you think that the problem of insider dealing can be dealt with by financial market regulation? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
10) Do you think that adopting international regulatory standards is necessary to advance the 
transparency of the local financial markets in the UAE? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
11) Do you think that insider dealing and other market abuse contributed to market deterioration in the 
summer of 1998 in the UAE unofficial securities market? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
12) Do you think that insider dealing and other market abuse contributed to the bubble in 2005 
followed by the sharp correction in 2006 in the local financial markets in the UAE? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
13) Do you think that the current regulation is sufficient to avoid further deterioration in the local 
financial markets in the UAE? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
14) Do you think that the investors’ rights are protected in the local financial markets in the UAE? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
15) Do you think that transparency and disclosure should be developed in the local financial markets in 
the UAE? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
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 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
16) Do you think that the current law prohibiting insider dealing in the local financial markets in the 
UAE is clear? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
17) Do you think that the current law prohibiting insider dealing in the local financial markets in the 
UAE is practically enforced by the authorities? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
18) Do you think that insider dealing can be prevented by raising the level of transparency and 
disclosure in the regulations? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
19) Do you think that a criminal trial and punishment is effective in deterring insider dealing? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
20) Do you think that fines administered by the Securities and Commodities Authority would be more 
of a deterrent to insider dealing than a criminal punishment? 
 Strongly agree. 
 Agree. 
 Neither agree nor disagree.  
 Disagree. 
 Strongly disagree. 
Comments:…………………………………………………………………………...……………………  
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Appendix 3: original letter of consent (Arabic) 
Ës¯nZا ®¯nZا ا Ëy 
Ýmر_YZا/  
عØZا :ÆZا v كر_a kاa Ê½e kZ_ر.  
rsZا/ )...........................................................................................مnYZا.(  
،Ñ¦_آnyو ا k¯رو Ëgswx مZا  
rly _aأ:  
Zا v kآر_wZ ks×rZا ÔYاa ³wx ngZا ¾mity ÔZ Ñ£¦أ vuÞ ÔYآر_a نإ Æs¯ ،ÆZا ضnÈZ _¢mn£أ vYZا تy_
Ñاrهأو vwlZا ÆZ_y Ôa_Yهاو Ôsxو ىra ³wx لr¦.  
 ³wx فnZاو ،ةrYZا kgwZا v nYآا kla_ty نu_Zا kswgy ÓYwaو ،vyد kag¯ ¾¨ ®a ÆlYa ÌارYآد Z_z _uأ
rsZا ه ÆZا/ يرورد تnyور.  
y عzا ³wx نg¦ نأ £رأ نgYZ vZ_YZ_yو ÆZا k¤Z kÉmnlZا ط¤Zا زnm يÊZاو kZ_nZا ÌÊ¢y ÓnZا ÆZا ¼w
 عØa ل¯ ورrm ÆZا نأ ³Zإ ns{أ دr`Zا اÊ¢yو ،ÆwZ Ô×اnÚإو ÔYآر_a ksهأ ىry عzا ³wx"®slw¤Zا ¾a_l¦ "‘insider 
dealing’  رopa ®a"نر_Zا نu_Zا "pZ k¯وnz¹آ Æ¯_Zا Ñarm kgwZا v nYآا kla_£ ®a نu_Zا v ÌارYآrZا k£رد ¾s
ةrYZا.  
rsZا ÆZا ³wx فnZا ®a kZ_ر _ًÉmأ kZ_nZ_y Óna/  kla_ty نu_Zا kswgy ksmرrYZا k¶s¢Zا ®a يرورد تnyور
 kmروnÉZا ت_awlZا ·£ v ÑYsZو©aو Æ¯_Zا kmr£ ت_Ú[ ÔZذو ،ةrYZا kgwZا v nYآاÆwZ.  
 نإ ،تy_Zا ءاn£إ v _¢swx فر_lYZا ÆZا ت_s¨½أ ·stZ _ًsxاna نآ¹ vuإ ËgZ rآؤأ vuÞ ص`Zا اÊ¢yو
 vZا¯ kwy_Zا rY¦ نأ ·¨YZا ®aو ،ل_tZا v Ôxzاو Ô¦n½ ³wx ةrpYZا Ô×ارâ ءاryإ Ómnz ®x نgY ÆZا v ÔYآر_a
¯ ®a Ñuأ ÔZÊآ rآؤأو ،kx_ Ü`u ،ب_ا kmأ ءاryإ نود ®a kwy_Zا ء_¢Yuا ¾¨ ã¨و يأ v ب_u[ا وأ kwy_Zا v kآر_Zا مrx Ô
 ·s£ نأ rآؤأ vuإ _آ ،ÔZذ ³wx ãاو اذإ §إ ÔYs`Z قn¤YZا ËYm ®Z ®gZو ÌارYآrZا kZ_ر v nu ¾a نg¦ r¨ kwy_Zا ä×_Yu
Zا ضnÈZ مrYY _¢y vuدوiY vYZا ءارÎا §إ ÔZا¨أ ®a س_Y¨[ا وأ Ôا nآذ ËYm ®Zو ،ىn½أ k¢£ kme _¢mn¦ ËYm ®Zو Í Æ
 ل_¯ v و ®sn¤wZ r¢tZاو ã¨Zا nm _a _ًs¦ kwy_Zا ¾stYZ ÔYاa ³wx ل`Zا v Öرأ vuأ _آ ،ÔZÊy ÔYاa Ê½أ rly
 ،kwa_آ kwy_Zا ky_YgZ n¤Øا vpuÞ v¦`Zا ¾stYwZ ÔYlu_a ،kwy_Zا ®a ء_¢u[ا rly kl£اnZا rpx لا¨أ kmأ فÊ¯ وأ nssÈ¦ Ôu_ga_yو
¢y åY¯ا vYZا kmnZا k£رد ¸py _¢y ظ_Y¯[_y vaاiYZا ·a v¦زy نgY kwy_wZ ksuوnYgZ[ا ت_wZا و قاروeا نأ ³Zإ _ًÉmأ ns{أ _
¢Yuا rly ت_wZا ÌÊه ®a ¼wYZا ËYs Ñuأو ،ÆZا ت_wa v¨_y ل_tZا v ءاnZا ءارâ ·£ ³Zإ فr¢¦ تy_Zا نإ ،ÆZا ء_
 ةروnØ ³Zإ ns{أ vuÞ ÔZÊZو ،¾lZا راnأ ³wx عz[ا ¸sZو ل_tZا اÊه v Ëg¦n½و ËgYynt¦ ®a ®mrsYa kxوna kmn¤y
Ñuأ ³Zإ ةر_{[ا ·a ،kwy_Zا ÌÊه ءاn£Þy ÔZ m _¢Z ·Y¦ vYZا k¢tZا م_ou نأ ®a rآ¹YZا  v ةر¤½ kme ضnlY¦ نأ ·¨YZا nsÖ ®a
 ÓwlY¦ kw¶ا وأ ks`{ kw¶ا kmأ ®ÉY¦ ®Z kwy_Zا و ،kmد_`Y¨[ا وأ ksuu_Zا وأ ks_sZا ks¯_pZا ®a ءا ÆZا v ÔYآر_a ل_¯
س_pZا ka_lZ ةnاYZا ت_awlZ_y ÓwlYm _s §إ _¢sZإ vYp¦ vYZا k¢tZ_y.  
أ vuÞ ،دr`Zا اÊ¢mوvwm _a ¾آ وأ ءi£ ³wx ÔYاa ³wx ل`Zا دو:  
□ ÆZا v vYآر_a و يرود ksه¹yو ÆZا ¼wy ع¤Øا ³wxو ÆZا ®a ضnÈZا Ëwxا _uأ.  
□ ÆZا v vYsوو vا nآذ ®a ·u_aأ §.  
□  ÌارYآrZا kZ_ر v ءارÎا ÌÊه مrYm r¨ و ،kwy_Zا v v×ارâ ®a ¸Ym r¨ Æ¯_Zا نأ Ëwxا _uأ v وأ
ل_tZا ¸u v ىn½أ ث_yأ.  
□  Ñuأو ،Í ÆZا ضnÈZ _¢aاrYا و ت_awlZا ³wx ظ_wZ Ñlو v _a لÊs Æ¯_Zا نأ Ëwxا _uأ
ÆZا ®a ء_¢Yu[ا rly ت_u_sZا  s.  
□  kmأ nآذ نود ®a ã¶{ ³Ya ب_u[ا v ÓZا ÔwYaا vuأ و kmر_sY½ا ÆZا v vYآر_a نأ Ëwxا _uأ
ب_أ.  
  
nmrYZا و ماnY¯[ا Ó×_ vpa ¾¦و.  
rsZا/ v{wZا ra مZا rx.  
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Appendix 4: translation of letter of consent (English) 
Letter of Consent. 
Dear…………………………. 
 
I am a PhD student at the School of Law, University of Exeter, United Kingdom under the 
supervision of Mr. Robert Drury. I am conducting research to fulfil the requirements for obtaining a 
PhD in law and am sponsored by the Government of Dubai. 
A letter from my supervisor, Mr Robert Drury from the School of Law, University of Exeter, 
is also enclosed to verify my accountability and reliability. 
 I would like you to examine the enclosed summary of the study. It is concerned with the 
subject of ‘Insider Dealing’ from a ‘comparative legal’ approach and is entitled “The Regulation of 
Insider Dealing: A Comparative Study towards Recommendations for the UAE Law”. The summary 
aims to provide an overall insight into the study and highlights the role and importance of your 
participation. 
In this respect, I would like to ask your permission to conduct an interview with you.  I assure 
you this would be conducted under strict ethical research principles. In the interview (which would be 
expected to take approximately half an hour) you may wish to provide opinions based on your expertise 
and insight. 
Your participation in this study is, of course, voluntary. You have the right to choose not to 
participate or to withdraw from the study at any time without giving any reasons. The results of the 
research study may be published, but your name will not be used unless you consent.  I give you my 
assurance that all the information provided by you in the interview will be used for research purposes, 
without conveying it to any third party.  It would save both time and effort for us both if the interview 
could be tape or digital recorded. Otherwise, I will have to transcribe it.  Following the interview, you 
will be given the opportunity to review the transcripts or recordings and you may ask for alterations to 
and omissions from your statement. The transcripts will be kept in the privacy of the researcher's home 
office and any audio materials containing conversations with the researcher will be erased following 
completion of the research. Your identity and quotations from the interview will only be mentioned in 
the research if you give your permission. Each interview will be identifiable only by a random number, 
and the link between this number and the identity of the interviewee will be kept only in a confidential 
file in the possession of the researcher and will not be disclosed. The interviewing aims to generate 
accessible information from your insights and experience, not to access confidential information 
illegitimately. I would be grateful if you would confirm that your organisation will allow you to take 
part in the interview. If you agree to participate in this study, there are no foreseeable political, legal or 
economic risks or discomforts. The interview will not involve any self-incrimination or disclosure of 
confidential information regarding yourself or the entity to which you belong. In this regard, you have 
the right to consent or not to any of the following. Please tick all of the following boxes to which you 
agree and leave those to which you do not agree. 
□ I understand the purpose of the research being conducted as I have an overview 
of the study and the role of my participation. 
□ I agree to be identified in the research by name and position. 
□ I understand that excerpts from my written transcripts and tape-recorded verbal 
communications with the researcher will be studied and may be quoted in a PhD 
thesis and in future papers, journal articles and books that will be written by the 
researcher. 
□ I understand that transcripts on paper, and tape recordings and digital files, will 
be secured in the privacy of the researcher's home office and that any audio tapes 
of my conversations with the researcher will be erased following the end of the 
research. 
□ I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, and that I may withdraw 
my permission to participate in this study without explanation at any point up to 
and including the interview. 
Yours………, 
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Appendix 5: questionnaire numerical scores 
Section (1): 
The respondent is asked to rank 5 principles of financial market regulation in order of importance. 
They are to give 1 as the most important principle, 2 as the next most important principle, and so on. 
 Total numerical 
score. 
Rank  
1- Financial markets should be transparent and issuers should       make 
timely disclosure of any inside information. 
336 1 
2- Financial markets should be controlled only by economic factors, not by 
regulations. 
543 5 
3- Insiders should not be allowed to use inside information for their own 
benefit. 
519 4 
4- Investors in financial markets should be put on an equal footing and their 
rights should be protected. 
387 2 
5- There should be an implementation of international standards of 
regulation in the local financial markets of any country. 
420 3 
 
Section (2): 
The respondent is asked to select from ten negative aspects of financial markets which they thought 
were applicable to the local markets in the UAE. 
Negative aspects 
1- The market is not transparent. 
2- Share prices do not reflect the true value. 
3- The level of timely disclosure is inappropriate. 
4- There is prejudice between investors. 
5- Insiders are not punished for insider dealing. 
6- Conflict of interests is uncontrolled. 
7- The market can be easily abused by bigger portfolio investors. 
8- The laws and regulations are not clear. 
9- There is no civil remedy for plaintiff investors. 
10- There is uncertainty and conflict between the powers of the authorities regulating financial 
markets. 
 
Percentage of the 
negative aspect to 
other negative 
aspects 
Total number of respondents Numerical score Negative aspects 
number 
13% 156 111 1 
13% 156 117 2 
9% 156 84 3 
7% 156 63 4 
13% 156 111 5 
5% 156 45 6 
16% 156 138 7 
6% 156 57 8 
11% 156 96 9 
7% 156 66 10 
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Section (3): 
The respondent is asked to choose one amongst multiple choices. Then she/he may provide any further 
comments supporting his/her choice or presenting further opinion. 
(Strongly 
agree) 
Numerical 
score 
(Agree) 
Numerical 
score 
(Neither agree or 
disagree) 
Numerical score 
(Disagree) 
Numerical 
score 
(Strongly 
disagree) 
Numerical score 
Question 
number  
87 51 6 6  1 
78 54 18 3  2 
60 72 9 6 6 3 
45 51 42 9 6 4 
42 45 42 15 9 5 
45 66 24 15 3 6 
57 51 39 6  7 
54 63 15 18  8 
69 45 18 18 3 9 
93 54 6   10 
78 30 27 9 6 11 
54 66 18 15  12 
12 39 42 45 15 13 
15 21 36 60 21 14 
102 45 3   15 
3 45 45 51 9 16 
15 30 54 51 3 17 
39 87 21 6  18 
30 78 27 18  19 
48 45 18 24 18 20 
 
Non-respondent numerical 
score 
Total numerical score  
Question number  
6 150 1 
3 153 2 
3 153 3 
3 153 4 
3 153 5 
3 153 6 
3 153 7 
6 150 8 
3 153 9 
3 153 10 
6 150 11 
3 153 12 
3 153 13 
3 153 14 
6 150 15 
3 153 16 
3 153 17 
3 153 18 
3 153 19 
3 153 20 
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Appendix 6: interviews transcripts  
Interview (1) 
Transcript translated from Arabic. 
Interviewee: Abdullah Al Yabhoni, Listed Companies Department, Head Section, Listing and Compliance, Abu 
Dhabi Securities Market. 
Place and date: Abu Dhabi, August 2007. 
INTERVIEWER: What problems do you have in disclosure? 
INTERVIEWEE: I will give you an example, press releases. You know that journalists seek for exclusive news 
about companies. The same is right with international news e.g. Reuters. When a board of a company meets to 
discuss an upcoming project, they cannot disclose it prior to approval as finalised reliable information. It is like a 
ship with thousands of people on board. The captain cannot announce his next stop, unless he in no doubt of his 
decision. Journalists find insignificant information regarding a company. We contact the company to scrutinize and 
they tell us that this is an unapproved future project. They say that it is a piece of news and not official press 
release. This insignificant information is inefficient. 
We have our own way in surveillance of member of boards of companies. We watch their dealings. We also see if 
there is a question mark delay in disclosure from any company. 
If you have a look on corporate governance, the way it was initiated in Europe and was transferred to the US. 
Enhancing transparency and disclosure was the main principle. Corporate governance obligates public companies 
to disclose all the available information as soon as possible. 
The most important people as insiders are member of the board of directors. Then comes the executives and the 
financial, administrative and operations directors. These are the key factors who we consider as insiders. The 
others like the office boy have nothing to do with insiders. You cannot put five thousands employees in a company 
as insiders. You cannot watch all of them. If you want to watch keep a list of those who receive the information 
first. Major people like financial, executive, operations and factory directors. 
INTERVIEWER: Do you have a problem with selective disclosure or the way insiders deal with the press? 
INTERVIEWEE: In this point, if there is trivial news does not affect the company, like Aldar PLC announced 
completion of stage one in a project. This is not important information, it only means that they will begin the next 
stage of the project. Even if a member of the board, an executive or a financial director announces this, we do not 
pay attention to it. This is not important for the investor. For investor it is important to know about a strategic joint 
venture, profits and losses or major project, not a project that is in progress. For example, if a company announces 
a real state project, the investor wants to know its price, not the type of lighting or roads. Investors do not care 
about trivial information.  
The information has to be material. We do not evaluate information in the press. We are concerned with 
information that has effects on the price of the securities. For example, if an issuers securities book value is 10 
DHS and the company is thinking to split the security. In similar circumstances, the board of directors has to meet 
and they have to compliant with our regulations. We introduced a 3 step rule for a press release. First, the board 
has to send us a report and the schedule of the meeting and we make it originally public. If the board meeting was 
simultaneous with trading time, we bring trading on the security to a halt. Second, following the meeting, both the 
proposed and the approved schedule along with the approved decisions has to send to us. In turn, we scan all the 
documents, publish it on the internet and send it to other branches and brokers. It is useful to compare between the 
proposed and the approved schedules. We can find in there is any difference or anything is deleted. The same 
procedure is applied when there is a general meeting. They have to notify us of the proposed date and schedule. 
Following that they have to notify us of the approved decisions. 
We have a watch system for all companies and their board of directors. When members of board of directors and 
other executives deal in the securities of their own company, they have to take our permission. They have to send a 
request which will be checked by the Market Control Department. In the department they verify his personality 
and his company. The important thing that the department verifies the company’s status in terms of its financial 
statements or any obligations pending. In case of any incompliance we refuse to give permission to dealing. The 
checking does not take a long time.  
Shareholders of more than 5% do not have to seek permission to deal. However, they dealings appear on the 
system, because such dealing are important. There dealings represent important information. If someone buys 
more than 5%, it means that he is confident about the company’s status and earnings. 
A permission is required only if a member of the board of directors deal in the securities of his own company. 
There should be a question mark. Why is he buying? Why is he selling? Take the worst scenario, a company might 
be insolvent, the insider sells all his securities and other shareholders lose the next day. 
We should work for narrowing the gap of information between board of directors and other investors. Information 
hold by the board should reach the investor as soon as possible. This is not an easy task. 
INTERVIEWER: What about timely disclosure? 
INTERVIEWEE: In the new website, all the disclosures and insiders appear. Any news reaches us will be 
published on the internet. When an insider deals, we anonymously publish it. ‘Insider dealing- buy or sale- 
volume- number of securities’, all that appears as a sticker on the website. This website is under construction and 
when finished will be open to public.  
 
Interview (2) 
Transcript translated from Arabic. 
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Interviewee: Mithkal Obaidat, Legal Advisor, Abu Dhabi Securities Market. 
Place and date: Abu Dhabi, August 2007. 
INTERVIEWER: At the beginning, I am not sure who is responsible for applying the rules of insider dealing, is it 
the Securities and Commodities Authority or the financial markets themselves. 
INTERVIEWEE: In regards to responsibility it is shared. If you have a look on the legal rules regulating insider 
dealing in the Federal Law No.4, it gives authority to the SCA. It means that the SCA regulates insider dealing. 
Now the SCA watches all the dealings in the financial markets and the same is done by the markets themselves. 
Suppose that Abu Dhabi Securities Market or Dubai Financial Market suspected of an activity to be insider 
dealing, its role is limited by reporting the case to the SCA. The SCA in turn completes the investigation alone or 
in corporation with the market. The SCA has the authority investigate and it has the authority to apply 
administrative penalties. 
There are two Articles which regulates insider dealing in the Federal Law No.4, namely Articles (37) and (39). 
Article (37) states…………… Article (39) states……………… 
In regards to the punishment, it varies from an administrative punishment to a criminal punishment. The SCA 
decides whether it gives a warning, imposes a fine up to 100,000 DHS. It can also withdraw the permission of an 
accountable broker. In addition, they can halt trading in the accountable company’s securities. In terms of the 
criminal punishment, Article (41) states that……….  
INTERVIEWER: When I study these Articles, it is helpful to know where they come from. Are they adopted 
from another country’s law? 
INTERVIEWEE: I do not know the source of these Articles. I have an insight in the Jordanian and Egyptian 
laws, and I can say they are not the source of these Articles. Probably the best countries in financial regulation in 
Arab World are Jordon, Egypt and Kuwait. 
INTERVIEWER: The reason I asked this question is that I think there is confusion between two systems, which 
are self-regulation and statutory regulator. Do you agree with me that Abu Dhabi and Dubai markets still have 
extensive authorities over listing and disclosure? 
INTERVIEWEE: I agree. In UAE law there is a great overlap between the responsibilities of the SCA and the 
markets. This issue needs to be radically resolved by a federal law, which should segregate between the role of the 
SCA and that of the markets. In listing, if the SCA adopted its own requirements for listing a security, what is the 
role of the markets in listing? The same is right with the rules of dealing. Regulators are supposed to have a 
supervisory role, while markets are supposed to have an executive role. This does not mean that the markets have 
no supervisory role, since dealings take place in the market and should be watched. The markets should have the 
authority to issue soft rules. But in the UAE the markets issued rules photocopied from the SCA rules. Thus, there 
is duplication in the market rules. 
INTERVIEWER: There is overlap in responsibilities. 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, there is overlap, and this is known by the SCA and the markets. 
INTERVIEWER: What can be a proposed solution? 
INTERVIEWEE: A solution can be through a proposed federal law which should clearly segregate between the 
role of the SCA and that of markets. If we cannot do this, we can adopt a memorandum of understanding which 
distinguishes the responsibilities and authorities. From a legal point of view the last solution is partial. A 
memorandum has no power equivalent to the law in front of a court. From my point of view, their should be an 
amendment to the federal law in this regard. 
INTERVIEWER: Do you think that more authorities should be delegated to the SCA or to the markets? 
INTERVIEWEE: In the areas of listing and dealing which are the specialities of the markets, the authority to 
regulate should be delegated to the market. Except rules adopted by the SCA and applicable to the whole country. 
Such general rules can support fair play between the markets. The regulatory and supervisory role should be in the 
hand of the SCA which also should be efficient. An efficient regulator means efficient markets. 
INTERVIEWER: Is the SCA efficient at the present? 
INTERVIEWEE: No, I honestly tell you and record it. 
INTERVIEWER: One problem is that we have little experience in these issues. 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, in the UAE we have only seven years experience. There is also a draft law which can 
resolve these issues. There is a vast area in the financial markets needs to be regulated. 
INTERVIEWER: I have some comments on the Articles regulating insider dealing. There is no definition for 
‘Inside information’. 
INTERVIEWEE: A definition is essential, because it determines everything else. There is no definition of inside 
information… 
INTERVIEWER: There is also more than one term used. ‘inside information’ and ‘non-public information’. 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, that is right, it is problematic. Taken simply, the information should be non-public and can 
affect the price of the issuers’ securities if disclosed. These are the two main conditions. 
Also the Article states: “a person may not deal on the basis of non-public information…”. If someone discloses the 
non-public information and does not deal on the basis of inside information, he will not be accountable under this 
Article. This is not unacceptable. 
If we required “achieving a benefit for himself or for another” as a condition to accountability. If someone receives 
the information from an inside source and then discloses it to a third party is also not accountable under this 
Article. The law should hold accountable those who discloses the inside information and those who act for the 
benefit of others. 
INTERVIEWER: There is also no definition of the ‘insider’. 
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INTERVIEWEE: Yes, there should be a definition of the ‘insider’, ‘inside information’ and ‘prohibited 
activities’. There should also be guidance under the adopted definitions. 
INTERVIEWER: When can information be considered public? 
INTERVIEWEE: When it is disclosed in accordance with disclosure rules. It depends on the rules applicable in 
any country. In some jurisdictions it is sufficient to disclose the information to the regulator or to the markets. In 
other jurisdictions it is necessary that the information reaches the public either through the media, the press or the 
internet. 
INTERVIEWER: Who should be considered an insider? 
INTERVIEWEE: Any one who possesses inside information due to his status. If someone is an accountant he 
may possesses inside information which is not known to his financial director, general director and board of 
directors. There is other information which is possessed by the top of the hierarchy, but not for the bottom. The 
insider is who possesses information due to his status or profession and this is different than the dealer on the basis 
of inside information. The external financial auditor and the legal advisor can also possess inside information. 
Contractors with the issuer may sign a non-disclosure agreement because they may have an insight on inside 
information. These points are not made clear in the UAE law. 
INTERVIEWER: Is the criminal punishment appropriate? 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, imprisonment from 3 months to 3 years and fine from 100,000 to 1,000,000 DHS. I 
disagree with fine of this kind. I agree with the minimum fine, but there should be no maximum fine. I would 
prefer that the fine be double the profit made or the lost avoided by the insider. If someone made a profit of 20 
million and was fined 1 million, he would not be deterred.  
INTERVIEWER: It is difficult to prove insider dealing in front of a criminal court. So, is a criminal punishment 
efficient? 
INTERVIEWEE: The problem is that there are no specialized courts in commercial or economic cases. In some 
countries there are specialized courts in securities. 
INTERVIEWER: The case of market abuse in Dubai Islamic Bank securities collapsed, is that because it is 
difficult to be proved? 
INTERVIEWEE: The case of market abuse is different than insider dealing. The case was of artificial dealings to 
affect the price of a security. The problem in this case was in the lack expert witnesses. The court of first instance 
in Dubai found the accused guilty without referring the case to an expert committee. In the court of appeal the case 
was referred to an expert committee. The committee’s opinion was that the accused did not violate the law and the 
court acquitted them. 
It is difficult to prove a case of insider dealing. Dealers use various accounts and names. If a member of the board 
of directors possessed inside information, it is very unusual that he will use the information to deal in securitises, it 
is more probable that he will passes the information to a friend. 
INTERVIEWER: There are administrative penalties in some countries to deter insider dealing. 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, this depends on the decision of the SCA. It can impose a fine. However, from my point of 
view, insider dealing should be criminalised. It causes immense harm to the economy and the investors. It also 
causes harm to the reputation of the market and the country. 
A proposed administrative penalty should be harsh enough to deter insider dealing. A fine should be multiple of 
the profit made or the lost avoided in order deterring insider dealing. 
INTERVIEWER: Do you think that the international standards are implemented in the UAE regulations? 
INTERVIEWEE: In general it can be said that the international standards are implemented. However, we need to 
have more precise regulations and more efficient enforcement. There are many developed countries from which 
experience we can benefit. There are also international organizations like the IOSCO which provides a lot of 
details through working papers, rules and principles. 
INTERVIEWER: Do you think that we have shortcoming in disclosure? 
INTERVIEWEE: Disclosure can be through the market, the SCA and the press. But in reality we consider 
disclosure to the market or the press makes the information public and so it cannot longer be considered inside 
information. In the market when we receive the information we convey it to the press, the investors and brokers. 
Considering the timing of disclosure, it is clear when an issuer discloses the information, but it can be unclear 
when the issuer has known of the information. An issuer has to disclose inside information as soon as possible. 
However, in reality there is a period of time between the moment when the issuer knew the information and the 
moment it disclosed it. This period is critical to insider dealing. Such period of time cannot be identified without 
investigation. 
INTERVIEWER: Are there any rules regulating selective disclosure? 
INTERVIEWEE: In application any person dealing with a company signs a non-disclosure agreement. An 
auditor is obligated by auditing laws not to disclose any information of a client company. Insiders are not only 
those who work for the issuer but also who has a connection to the issuer. 
 
Interview (3) 
Transcript translated from Arabic. 
Interviewee: TOJAN AL SHURIDEH, Legal Consultant, Securities and Commodities Authority. 
Place and date: Abu Dhabi, August 2007. 
INTERVIEWER: If you would like to speak without interfering. 
INTERVIEWEE: Looking at you proposal, you looking at the subject from several angels. We can start speaking 
about the policy of regulating inside dealing. 
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There should be a legal definition in the introduction of your thesis. Then, you can discuss when this act is 
legitimate and when it is illegitimate. After that, you can look at loopholes such as proofing and civil or criminal 
punishment. 
The problem of the regulation of insider dealing has taken several stages in developed jurisdictions. In the first 
stage, an insider was only one who possesses inside information due to his status or profession. Then the net was 
widened; the relatives were included as insiders. In the last stage, the term included all those who possess inside 
information.  How did they possess it? From a friend, overhearing it in a café? From someone who by the nature of 
his employment (for example an electrician) heard the information?  He is not from the company but is an insider. 
Widening the concept of the insider in several stages should be represented in your thesis in a way which reflects 
the legislative development of this point. The harm in this act does not depend on whether the insider is someone 
from the company. 
INTERVIEWER: What about the SCA regulations in this point. 
INTERVIEWEE: Under the SCA regulations only those who possess information because of their status or 
profession can be insiders. There is another Article…which states that a person cannot derive personal benefit for 
himself or someone else, but we cannot say that relatives can be included in this Article… But if we widen the net 
to the third stage, it will include those insiders due to their status, profession, relatives and anyone else. 
INTERVIEWER: What do you think about the limited nature of the rules in the SCA? 
INTERVIEWEE: There should be a wider net for determining insiders, especially in our societies. In our culture, 
information is disclosed easily. Also, in companies in this country individuals have positions on several boards of 
directors. At the same time they are investors in securities. The information is easily passed and everyone can deal 
on the basis of it. It is also easy to evade the rules if they are limited. An insider can deal in his wife’s or children’s 
accounts if they are not included in the regulation. He can also deal in the account of his company, or pass the 
information to a friend and then share the profits. This can be found here more than anywhere else. The nature of 
relationships in this society determines that there is insider dealing in this country. 
I agree with you in the last point which you will reach it at the end of the research. It is difficult to proof such an 
act, although it can be easy to find substantiations that the act was committed. This is the most difficult case to be 
proved amongst the market misconduct. 
There is certainly insider dealing activities. It is also because a lot of the companies in this country have a family 
characteristic, in spite of their transformation into public companies. Member of the board of directors can be 
relatives. This makes it easy to pass information from one person to another. 
Insider dealing is a crime in developed countries and should be considered so. In the SCA regulations it is also 
considered a crime. 
INTERVIEWER: If the developed countries widened the definition of an insider step by step, should we also 
widen it gradually? 
INTERVIEWEE: Not necessarily.  We take several stages.  We should begin where the other has arrived. There 
were loopholes in the legislation in other countries; we do not have to make the same mistakes. 
INTERVIEWER: Should the prohibition be at a federal level? 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, there has to be a federal law issued to criminalise insider dealing. The definitions should 
also be contained in the federal law. 
INTERVIEWER: Did you make any proposals? 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, we have a proposal for amendments to the federal law. It contains a definition of the 
insider. It also prohibits insider dealing. 
The other important point is the definition of material information. A lot of jurisdiction differed in preferring 
‘inside information’ or ‘material information’. I think that material information is different than inside information. 
Inside information should be material information. A piece of information should be material and non-public to be 
considered as inside information. Not any information that is non-public can be material. 
Material information affects the price, the reputation of the issuer, increases or decreases the volume of trading. 
Any such information is called material. There can be a lot of instances of the materiality of the information. Yet 
the common thing is that the information affects negatively or positively the price and the volume of trading. This 
is the common characteristic in all the instances like profits, losses, fire in the company, a new major contract, new 
production line, expansion plan or a strategic investor entering. All these instances are events or news, but are 
material because they can affect the price or the volume of trading of the securities. 
If the rule states that the information may affect the price, in the financial law ‘may’ is most probably to happen. If 
there is news that a company negotiating the establishment of new product line, the other day prices of securities 
will directly increase. We say that it can affect, but from the view point of the investors it does affect. 
In law we introduce a test of normal person or investor in the normal circumstances. But in reality investors 
directly respond to information. Especially short term investors who do not wait for the dividends. Long term 
investors may have another strategy they may think that even if there is difficulty in the company it will be solved. 
They may even prefer dividends over quick speculation. The kind of investors is also determining. 
All the definitions of material information in any jurisdiction try to introduce a test. The main point is that material 
information affects the price and volume of trading of the security. 
Materiality is one condition of inside information. 
When is information considered to be non-public? It is supposed that information is considered public when it 
reaches the public. 
Inside information is information that is material and non-public at the same time. There can be non-public 
information which is not material. For example, a member of the board or an executive member is leaving. 
Investors may be not concerned about this event. 
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INTERVIEWER: This can be material. 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, it can be in other countries where they differentiate between the capital and the 
management. However, in our systems who has the capital will be directly a member of the board and he will have 
authority on the company. The importance of efficient management is unobserved. In other jurisdiction investors 
are concerned with the management and it is material event if a director is leaving a company. In our jurisdiction 
there is no distinction between the capital and the management. Major shareholders control the company, 
forgetting that there are other minor shareholders. 
INTERVIEWER: What if the information disclosed in accordance with the disclosure rules. 
INTERVIEWEE: In this case it is public and it cannot be said that it is inside. But from the time where the 
information was actually present until it is properly disclosed, the information is considered non-public. 
This happens as follow; an internal auditor checked the financial statements and sends the report to the board. 
They in turn send it to the general meeting to decide the dividends in there is profit or otherwise. In the period 
between the times when the auditor reached the results until the time where it was disclosed in the general meeting, 
the information is considered non-public. 
The same is right where a company negotiates establishing a new production line. From the beginning of the 
negotiations until disclosing the contracting, the information is considered non-public. 
This is also a problem in our jurisdiction, which is the disclosure of information to the media before an official 
disclosure to the regulator. This is dangerous. The news may be published inaccurately and differently from one 
section of the media to another. It may also be written in a certain way, or a part of the information which does not 
reflect the whole may be given. On contrary when the information is disclosed to the SCA it will disclose it 
precisely to the public. 
INTERVIEWER: There is a loophole in regulation in this area. In other jurisdictions there are rules applied 
which regulates how the issuer should deal with the media. What do you think? 
INTERVIEWEE: Probably yes. The problem is disclosing the information to the media. Sometimes there is 
contradiction in the news or even confusion. The next day the company approve or disapproves the news. From the 
time such news is published until the company officially is requested to comment, there would have been dealings 
on the basis of such news. 
INTERVIEWER: This is a fruitful area for manipulation. 
INTERVIEWEE: There should be obligation on the media to obtain such information only from the regulator. 
Therefore, there will be one official source of the regulatory information. The markets also should pass the 
information to the SCA not to publish it to different recipients. 
In fact the journalists try to reach the information. They take words on the tongue of directors and executives. 
Everyone writes the information as he perceived it. There may accurate reporting only through the regulator. It is 
different when we say a company intends than the company looks to. Negotiation is different from contracting. 
It is difficult for the SCA to intervene in the work of the media. They should have code of ethics. This type of 
news may affect the economics of the country. They should take information from reliable sources. 
INTERVIEWER: In other jurisdictions there are regulatory news agencies. 
Yes… 
INTERVIEWER: Researchers and analysts also should not be allowed to misuse the information. 
INTERVIEWEE: In the proposed law, all the analysts, researchers and advisors have to obtain a license from the 
SCA to conduct such activities. They will be required to prove their qualification and experience. 
INTERVIEWER: Researchers also should not be allowed to selectively disclose the information. 
INTERVIEWEE: In research there is either selling advice to a certain client. In this case the investor takes the 
decision to buy or sale. The decision is not taken by the financial advisor. There also can be a service where the 
advice is contained in research, studies and recommendations. In this case it should be states that it is only advice. 
It also should be declared that the researcher has no direct or indirect interest in the securities under study. What 
happen in this country is that advisors recommend buy or sale while they are dealer in the same securities. Or they 
may act for the benefit of a company. There is conflict of interests in these actions. 
In the analyst or researcher takes the investment decision he will be an investment manager… 
… 
INTERVIEWER: There is a gap in laws in this field, there is no law regulating funds for example. 
INTERVIEWEE: The reason is that we have emerging markets. The SCA and markets were established in 2000. 
There had been unofficial dealing in securities of public companies from long time ago. People used to deal in 
securities in face to face dealings, where they sign contracts. The same way is still used in IPOs… The legal 
regulation came in a late stage. 
In the same way the French bourse was established. Dealers used to deal in contracts of securities in a cafe. The 
regulation has taken several stages. 
The law regulates transactions between individuals which mean that transactions may exist before the law… 
The subjects of funds, financial advisors and financial managers were regulated by a Central Bank law. This law 
was introduced in 1970s. 
In the new law the SCA has obtained all these authorities which were transferred from Central Bank to the SCA. It 
has the authority to regulate the services of funds, financial advisors and financial managers. It also has the 
authority to regulate IPOs following the transfer of authority from the Ministry of Economics to the SCA… 
… 
INTERVIEWEE: You have to make it clear when the act of insider is legitimate and when it is not… 
We a have a procedure where the insider has to obtain a permission to deal in the securities of his company. If he 
possessed inside information, but obtained a permission and dealt in the securities. It will be easier for the SCA to 
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discover that he dealt on the basis of the information. The permission does not mean that the dealing was 
legitimate, on contrary it is a procedure for watching insider dealing. 
There is also a procedure where insiders are not allowed to deal in a certain period prior and after the disclosure of 
financial statements… In this case dealing is never allowed and there is no permission given… 
There is also a procedure where trading will be brought to a halt when a public or a board meeting takes place. So 
information does not leak causing distresses dealers. 
Theses are soft law procedures where the doubt is deleted. 
((Soft law may be more efficient than the main prohibition and enforcement. If anything is barred it will be by the 
soft law. Prevention is better than cure)) 
It is always in any law following a period of application, the shortcomings are discovered. The vision of the first 
law expires and then a new vision for several years should be placed… 
Each time the regulator in any new law demands for more authorities… 
INTERVIEWER: There is contradiction in the SAC rules in defining inside information. 
INTERVIEWEE: They referred to ‘unpublished information’ and ‘undisclosed information’. In the proposed law 
we use ‘inside information’ and there is also a definition. 
INTERVIEWER: Would you tell me from which jurisdiction have you compared the proposed law, please? 
INTERVIEWEE: In fact it has been a comparative study between several jurisdictions. Each part is compared to 
a different jurisdiction. For example in regards to IPOs we benefited from those jurisdictions were they regulated 
it. In consideration to funds, we only delegated authority to the SCA to regulate it because it is wide area with so 
many details. There are only basic definitions in relation to fund… in relation to other financial services… 
INTERVIEWER: It is difficult to imagine how the current law could be applied. Inside information and insiders 
are mysterious. 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, I agree, there is no definition. 
There are two factors; information which is not published or not disclosed and insider who possesses the 
information due to his status. 
They used ‘or’ between the two terms. It means the two terms are synonyms. 
Disclosure usually is done to the SCA or the markets who in turn discloses the information to the public. 
But I think that the two terms are in fact different. Disclosed information is not necessarily public information. The 
information may be disclosed to the SCA and yet not made public. In relation to material information there is a 
certain procedure where the issuer has to release it to the press. Non-disclosed in a narrower circle than non-public. 
In other jurisdiction they state to inside information synonym of which is confidential information. As I remember 
this is in France and the US. Confidential means that it has not been disclosed even to the regulator. But most of 
the jurisdictions use inside information. 
There is no definition of the insider… 
Insider is only who possess inside information due to his status… 
In disclosure requirements, there is also a rule prohibiting insider dealing. Board of directors, employees… 
INTERVIEWER: Have you got an idea about DIFC? 
INTERVIEWEE: The laws of the DIFC are different from that of the UAE jurisdiction. It is a free zone and 
treated like being outside the UAE jurisdiction… 
… 
I think that it should be inside the national jurisdiction… 
INTERVIEWER: Have you any cases of insider dealing. 
INTERVIEWEE: There is insider dealing activities in all the markets. However, the case must reach a level 
where a prosecution can be sustained. 
Some jurisdictions found that it is difficult to prove a criminal case, they turned to administrative penalties. 
If there is no significant loss in the market, they usually investigate the case and apply an administrative penalty. 
There is no case of insider dealing in the UAE. Only suspicious dealings were investigated. No case was 
prosecuted, because in needs assurance that there is sufficient evidence. The SCA cannot prosecute it should pass 
the case to Public Prosecution… 
There is also an issue of expertise. It is difficult to discuss with lawyers technical points. We should give them 
legal evidence regarding the subject. 
Proving insider dealing is tricky. The difficulty is in the fact that the investigation is based on technical evidence 
taken from trading system. This is compared with the inside information. Who do you know that someone is 
dealing, etc. It is all known from the trading system, dealings, dates, orders, etc. This is all technical subjects. At 
the same time there is inside information and insider. 
Now you have got the person. The information from the system. You have got to prove that there was inside 
information. The first technical point is easy for regulators, but the difficulty is in the next point. It is especially 
difficult to prove that a tippee was the insider. 
In all the jurisdictions the ‘intention’ was assumed. 
… 
The main point is the intention to achieve a personal benefit. The objective of insider dealing is achieving a benefit 
either by making a profit or avoiding a loss. This is the difficult point; it is more difficult than proving the insider 
status and his possession of inside information. 
The insider’s knowledge of the nature of information is easy to be proved. We can know all the details in regards 
to the insider from the dealing system. We know if someone traded in any time and who is he. Volume, time, date 
of the dealings and whether they took place before or after a meeting can also be easily proved. We also know 
when the information was disclosed to the SCA. 
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It is only the link between the disclosure to the SCA and the time of dealings. Some influents can deal and delay 
disclosure two or three days. It is necessarily that the dealing is followed by disclosure. 
The date of disclosure and the date of dealings are all circumstantial not definite evidence. 
The court also scrutinizes the objective of achieving a benefit. 
INTERVIEWER: Do you think that a criminal prosecution is efficient? 
INTERVIEWEE: It is efficient if there are judges specialised in this sort of cases. He must understand the 
techniques of trading to understand the evidence… 
INTERVIEWER: Other jurisdictions found it difficult to depend on criminal prosecutions. 
INTERVIEWEE: … 
INTERVIEWER: Sometimes it is difficult to see any benefit achieved from insider dealing, e.g. tipping. 
INTERVIEWEE: This can be dealt with by introducing options, fix penalty or a penalty multiple of the profit 
made or the loss avoided… The punishment should be proportionate. 
… 
… 
Achieving a benefit is still a condition under the proposed law. 
There was a minor case where a member of a board bought securities. After a period of time he sold them before a 
disclosure being made. The problem was that the information was positive and by selling the securities in that time 
he lost a profit. How can you say that this was insider dealing… 
INTERVIEWER: There can be tipping of the inside information to a friend without a direct benefit. 
INTERVIEWEE: In this case the law requires achieving a benefit for him or for another… 
INTERVIEWER: There are economists who argue that insider dealing should not be prohibited. 
INTERVIEWEE: Justice requires that regulators are established to provide information for all investors at the 
same time and of the same quality. There should not be dissimilarity in informing. Is it fair to allow insiders to 
exploit inside information? Why should other investors lose because of them? 
INTERVIEWER: What will the rules do? 
INTERVIEWEE: They at least sustain confidence in the markets. It will not give the chance for everyone to 
exploit the situation. 
 
Interview (4) 
Transcript translated from Arabic. 
Interviewee: HABIB ALMULLA, Former MP (Member of the Federal National Council) and Former Chairman of 
the Dubai Financial Services Authority  
Place and date: Dubai, August 2007. 
INTERVIEWER: There is no clear and precise regulation of insider dealing in the local financial markets in the 
UAE. 
INTERVIEWEE: In consideration to regulation as general, there are two systems in the UAE. First, the main 
system represented in the Securities and Commodities Authority. It is dedicated to regulate the financial markets in 
the UAE which in turn are three most important markets; Abu Dhabi Securities Market, Dubai Financial Market 
and Dubai Gold and Commodities Exchange. The laws and regulations of the SCA have been issued without prior 
rigorous study. The drafting team constituted non-specialists in financial markets and securities regulation. The 
laws were issued with no comparison with the laws and regulations in financial markets in developed countries. 
This fact resulted in our not benefiting from the experiences of other jurisdictions and we wasted a chance to avoid 
the shortcomings of such jurisdictions. There are legal and judicial precedents which could have been beneficial if 
considered in drafting the new law. Introducing details of the new law should also have been considered, because 
there are no judicial precedents which can be used as directions by the courts. As a consequence, all these factors 
caused the issuing of superficial laws. 
In addition, the fact that the markets existed prior to the regulator was an extraordinary situation. In contrary to 
other jurisdictions where the regulator is initially established and in turn it authorizes the markets. Consequently, 
as a matter of fact the SCA has no actual influence on the markets. Although the SCA tried to alter the situation 
through issuing regulations, but they were issued surface without comprehensible details. Therefore, it can be said 
that the SCA has no actual influence on the markets. On this basis, when discussing insider dealing, there is no 
clear and comprehended handling of the issue. 
Second, there is anther limited system which is the Dubai Financial Services Authority the regulator of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre. In laws and regulations of the DIFC were watchfully drafted, benchmarked with 
best practices and in accordance with international regulatory standards. The laws and regulations of the DIFC 
represent a high standard equivalent to the leading international financial markets regulation. The particular 
problem is that there is no actual activity in the centre. More precisely, there is a limited volume of trading and it is 
incomparable to the local markets in the UAE. Thus, it can be said that there is activity regulated by no law and 
there is law regulating no activity. It is also right that the laws and regulations of the DIFC have not been examined 
except to a certain level. 
INTERVIEWER: Do you agree that the SCA is inefficient? 
INTERVIEWEE: The influence of the SCA is made up by the authority delegated to it by the law. Such 
authorities include adopting and enforcing regulations which aim to protect investors and the dignity of dealings. 
INTERVIEWER: It is easy to transplant best laws and regulations from other jurisdictions, but is it easy to 
enforce such laws in the UAE? Since the culture and business environment is distinct to the source jurisdiction. 
INTERVIEWEE: The most important point is determining our goal first. We have to decide whether we aim to 
establish an international financial centre or we want to be satisfied with local markets. The last are contented with 
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listing securities of local issuers and providing investment opportunities for local investors and debtors. However, 
regardless of aiming to establish an international financial hub, there should be improvement in financial market 
regulation. At least there should be obligations on public companies. Authorities should not be lenient towards 
public companies, because they invest in public’s money. 
In general, there could be gradual change by allowing periods for companies to change their standings to meet the 
new requirements. Leaving the current situation is incorrect, it should be altered. 
INTERVIEWER: Do we aim to be a financial hub in the UAE or especially in Dubai? 
INTERVIEWEE: To a certain extent there is aiming to be a financial hub. However, we have not taken serious 
steps towards this gaol. There is a trend to develop the role of regulators like the Central Bank and the SCA and to 
determine their authorities. Yet it needs a political will to achieve tangible results. 
INTERVIEWER: What made the laws and regulations of the local financial markets in the UAE backward 
especially when compared to the laws and regulations of the DIFC which also exists in the UAE? 
INTERVIEWEE: It is difficult to change a Federal Law. This comprises the difficulty in developing regulations 
and the competent regulators’ role in the UAE. Federal legislation requires considerably longer time and more 
difficult to be adopted. This is because of the complicated legislative bureaucracy and procedures. 
INTERVIEWER: There is uncertainty in the regulatory system in the UAE. In some areas it is not clear whether 
it is a self-regulatory system or a statutory single regulator system. 
INTERVIEWEE: They do not have a clear observation of the most appropriate system. There should be 
benchmark to the developed countries and adoption of the system suits the UAE. 
From my point of view, the system of a single regulator is more appropriate to the UAE, because it is a small 
federal country. The existence of more than one regulator for banks and financial markets causes overlap in 
authorities. 
In general, the system of SROs in the US is gradually changing towards ‘coding’ regulations. The fact of the 
matter is that the leading international financial markets flourished in Common Law jurisdictions, especially in 
London, New York, Singapore and Hong Kong. The European markets are incomparable to those of the US and 
the UK. To benefit from other jurisdictions, it is better benchmark to the UK system than to the French system. 
Regardless of establishing a financial hub, we need to protect investors and the dealings to an acceptable extent 
which protects the markets and economy of the country. It is not erroneous to benchmark the new laws with best 
international practices. 
INTERVIEWER: Are the rules of the SCA clear in regulating insider dealing on the basis of non-public material 
information? 
INTERVIEWEE: The regulations of the SCA does not clearly prohibit insider dealing. There is only some rules 
dedicated to brokers and boards of directors. There has to be a clear and precise definition of insider dealing. There 
has to be clarification of the acts which are not prohibited. A precise perception of the act should be introduced. 
There has to be a clear formulation of the prohibited act. 
 The law was drafted by a team of non-specialists. It is weak and surface. There was no benefiting from the 
experience of other jurisdictions. There is a legislature gap. The current law is unclear and difficult to be 
interpreted and enforced by the courts. In addition, the courts are unaware of the nature of this kind of new cases. 
It can be said that there are no legal rules accurately drafted to face the problem of insider dealing. There has to be 
administrative penalties. There have to be civil remedies. Proper authority should be given to the SCA. 
INTERVIEWER: Do you agree that specialized courts should be established to hear such new financial cases? 
INTERVIEWEE: As a general principle the judicial authority has to be respected. I disagree with removing 
jurisdiction from the general judiciary in every new situation. Removing jurisdiction from the general judiciary is 
admitting its weakness. On contrary, judiciary should be developed. 
I would prefer constituting specialized circuits in courts to hear new complicated cases. Market abuse is wider that 
insider dealing and can be dealt with in the same way. 
We have to benefit from the experience of developed countries in financial markets. We can take from one law or 
combine between more than one law to reach a law which suites us and implements international standards. We 
take the principles not the law as a whole. 
Amendments to law may take several years and may collapse due to legislative bureaucracy. It is appropriate to 
benefit from the experience of other jurisdictions. The existence of the DIFC with a completely separate 
jurisdiction is a bold idea to develop financial markets. Part of the solution is better than no solution. 
In the area of disclosure there is also a legislative gap and no clear rules. 
INTERVIEWER: There are legal principles which are unacknowledged in UAE jurisdiction, but such principles 
are central to financial regulation in developed jurisdictions, For instance, conflict of interests and Chinese walls. 
How can we deal with this problem? 
INTERVIEWEE: There has to be a completely new law. We need a radical change in legal principles and 
understandings in these areas. There is a need for similar laws. These are essential principles in developed 
jurisdictions. 
Laws and regulations of financial markets can be developed. We need political will and a clear plan towards a 
determined objective. 
 
Interviews (5), (6) and (7) 
Original interview transcript in English. 
Interviewees: Anonymous 1, 2 and 3,Dubai Financial Services Authority  
Place and date: Dubai, August 2007. 
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Interviewer: The first question is why we need an international financial centre in Dubai while we have other 
local markets. 
Anonymous 1: The reason why a separate financial market was created was that there is no financial market 
between Singapore and London that is aligned with international standards. What we do have is some local 
regional markets; none of these markets operates in accordance with international standards. So the intention of the 
ruler of Dubai was to create an international market to act as a model of best practice in the region for developed 
capital markets. Obviously, for the development of capital markets investors look at how safe in their investment, 
the rules that regulate the investment and the law that underpins the legality of the investment. How they can be 
enforced. When they look at the regional markets, unfortunately, regional legal systems are not the same that you 
will find in London, New York, Singapore and Hong Kong. The idea was to create a centre of excellence for the 
development of capital markets based on the best international models in terms of financial services regulation. We 
really act of the leader for change in the region. Because we are a model of what the regulation of financial 
services will be. Hope that by being so close to other financial centres within the region that they would also raise 
the bar to the standards that we impose on our financial services and institutions. 
Interviewer: We have a weakness in the local financial markets regulation, how can we benefit from the rules and 
regulation of the DICF? 
Anonymous 1: The DIFC was created as a financial free zone. All the commercial and civil laws of the UAE has 
been exempted. The criminal law has not been exempted, so it still applies. We have been able to create some civil 
measures to protect investors in the centre from people that are engaged in insider dealing. But we can only 
enforce civil fines for example. In relation to such crimes, the criminal element has to be reported back to Dubai 
courts through Dubai Public Prosecution who then take the criminal action it is not our business. We kind of work 
on a two peers system, we have the UAE criminal system which still applies to the centre. The UAE penal law has 
penalties relation to insider dealing, even though there are not very well developed rules as one expects in 
international level. From the civil perspective we have obviously adopted what meets international standards in 
relation to insider dealing. 
Anonymous 2: To answer your earlier question. Capital markets flourished in circumstances where there is good 
law and consistency in the application of the law. There has not been in the UAE generally and in Gulf Council 
countries a well-understood international law that international clients could comply with. The jurisdictions vary 
from Gulf country to Gulf country and within the UAE generally. In order to attract capital back into these markets 
there needs to be a system of law that is easily understood and consistent with other systems in other jurisdictions 
around the world and can easily be applied. There is an organization called IOSCO, they set benchmarks in terms 
of legal standards that they want to see implemented. These benchmarks are well established in most reputable 
jurisdictions. In those circumstances, capital is generally attracted to those markets. The purpose of establishing 
this jurisdiction is to develop our standards and legal certainty to a level equitable to reputable jurisdictions. This 
attracts capital to the market. 
Anonymous 1: I think in one side it is to attract the capital, but this is half of the side. The other half is to bring 
here the expertise to develop the capital that is here right now which is sinking. There is lot of private equity deal; 
there is adventure capital and new fund here. This is all channelling. Capital that is right now here not capital from 
other regions. There is a foreign direct investment purpose, but not as much as to develop the capital market in the 
region which has not been done yet. 
Interviewer: The legal jurisdiction of the centre in based on English Common Law while the jurisdiction of law in 
this country is civil law based on Egyptian and French law with some aspects of Shariaa law. Does not this make 
any difiiculty? 
Anonymous 1: not really, because we operate as a free zone, so we operate within the boundaries of our zone. We 
are just a centre of excellence. We are aligned with other international financial centres. If you look at them, you 
find that they based on common law, e.g., New York, London, Singapore and Hong Kong, which are the four 
major financial centres in the world. Our jurisdiction is based on common law, which means that investors that 
already trading at that kind of market are ready to meet this standard, the legal regime and the rules and regulations 
that we also impose in our centre. For an investor it is easy to come and invest here. The same is true for big 
financial institutions that will be trading in London and New York. They kind of know the regime. That is why we 
adopted the common law system in the centre. 
Anonymous 2: Many of the laws that apply in most sophisticated capital markets have many similarities. For 
example, your securities law and collective investment law are not dissimilar. Your corporate governance 
requirements, for example, are not dissimilar. They are common from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. There might be 
some discrete differences, but in the main, most of the laws are very similar. Thus, firms and individuals who are 
actually in the market are mostly comfortable with this sort of legislation. 
Anonymous 3: In fact, I think that when it comes to primary legislation, it does not matter much. When there are 
differences, for instance, if you compare between the regulation of insider dealing and enforcement in UK, US and 
Germany. I think you find a lot of similarity. In fact, you might find indeed different approaches in how to deal 
with an actual case. You might find differences in secondary legislation. I think the differences are marginal. I 
think it comes in fact to the effectiveness of the supervisory regime. You rarely look at the court to report a 
problem. If there is a problem, it is ensuring the prevention of insider dealing or the spread of inside information. 
How do you do that and who is closest to the source of information? That is naturally, I would argue, the financial 
services regulator who imposes certain restrictions e.g. Chinese walls, code of business and implementing a regime 
of best practices as regarded by IOSCO. This should be supported by a strong criminal regime and sophisticated 
investigators know how to investigate in such a case. There should be a basket of appropriate penalties available. I 
think if you drill it down to the court, it much lies in strong regulatory requirements. 
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Anonymous 2: It is important not to have just good laws and rules being placed. It is even more important that 
these rules are going to be applied and there will be a standard of regulation that is respected. The financial 
systems are built primarily on their integrity.   Once they lose their integrity you may find that there is a collapse in 
the financial system. If you look at the not-so-recent big collapses in the US during the last ten years, the effect of 
that was a disruption to the confidence in the system. So governments said about that we rebuilding that 
confidence by implementing tougher restrictions and then complying a new regulatory enforcement regime. That 
has effect of rebuilding confidence again in the system. But it also brings a very significant cost on the firms that 
are required to implement these new regulatory burdens. So governments have responsibilities to ensure this tied 
off proper balance between an appropriate standard that ensures confidence in the market and on the other hand to 
ensure that the cost is down the benefit to the people participating in the market. 
Anonymous 3: From here say I heard that it is nothing unusual still that people sitting on the local boards of 
publicly investing company here in the UAE, from board meetings where decision is made, pick up their phone 
and call someone to inform about a certain investment decision for them. It is just to share. They have no feeling of 
anything wrong with it. This how they say the market used in this region about thirty years ago. You share 
information and this is basically trading information. I think there is a longer history of these rules and regulations 
in the US or the UK. There is transition period and we come back to the question why this centre is here. To 
provide a certain period of education and setting the benchmark, this is say that governance standards, business 
ethics and Chinese walls. Governance structure within the firm has to be of a certain standard. 
Anonymous 1: I think that it needs time to change a culture and to change understanding. All emerging markets 
trade in insider dealing and market rumours. It is just because they are not sophisticated markets. It is only once the 
markets get sophisticated, and then investors, board members and companies become more aware of what are the 
regulatory requirements what the implications requirements are. You can have a lot of really good law, but if no 
one enforces these laws then they are useless. I think that when markets become more sophisticated and when you 
compete on the global financial services market, people expects you to meet those standards. If we are the DIFC 
because we claim to be a major international financial centre, if we did not enforce the standards that we have, 
investors will not come here and take it seriously. If we do it out there in Dubai that is really a local market, so 
international investors do not have such a great interest. But when you say that you want to open up the Dubai 
market, the rest of the world will be looking at you.  If there is insider dealing activity they say, ‘why are you not 
doing anything about it? You are advantaging other investors over me, so I am not going to invest my money there. 
It is the question of who you are targeting, who is your audience and where the capital coming from. On the basis 
of that you decide how strong rules and regulations are. 
Interviewer: Are the rules of the centre directed to collective investors only? 
Anonymous 1: No, we cover all sorts of financial services, insurance, banking, collective investment schemes, 
corporate finance and reinsurance. Collective investment is just one of financial services. 
Interviewer: Do you cover individual investors? 
Anonymous 1: Absolutely, an individual has to have a minimum of one million liquid networks to be able to 
qualify as compliant. 
Interviewer: As a registered person or a registered company. 
Anonymous 1: We have a registrar of companies that looks at the incorporation of all companies in the DIFC or 
the registration of foreign branches. 
Anonymous 2: Companies can incorporate in the DIFC to undertake business activities. Some of those business 
activities are regulated business activities and some of them unregulated. The unregulated activities would be 
Starbucks and some of the restaurants. The regulated activities are those which provide financial services. So, if 
you apply for providing a financial service within the DIFC, you required to hold a licence to provide that service. 
You can only get that licence by applying to be assessed against a certain benchmarks to ensure that the firm itself 
and the people working at the firm at fitting proper to carry up business activities of the license they conduct. That 
license would be to conduct business within a certain category. There are five financial services categories and in 
each category the firm is authorised to do certain activity. For our purpose the centre supervises them to ensure that 
they are complying with the law… 
Anonymous 3: When we find an employee using information from the firm and we find that this person has made 
wrong doing, we see the consequences on the criminal and civil side of the law and we will disqualify him from 
working in the centre again. If we found also the there is a major failure by the firm in overseeing the activity of 
this person, we also can take action against the firm. 
Anonymous 2: So I understand that your thesis will be looking at the effectiveness of the regulatory regime 
surrounding insider trading and market abuse. In that case you will be looking at the laws relates to insider dealing 
at the DIFC, but you also need to look at the criminal law of the UAE and its effectiveness in deterring this sort of 
misconduct. 
Interviewer: Preliminary, the subject was about insider dealing, but when I came to discuss it there was a great 
deal of looking at the regulation as general in the country. So if regulation as general is not improved, there would 
be no improvement in regulating insider dealing. 
Anonymous 1: I think there is some improvement you have to look at the regulators F code not created so long 
ago. There is continues improvement, because obviously by having a centre like the DIFC it enforce everybody 
else to raise their bar and look at what they are trying to do. Dubai may be more soured that Abu Dhabi, because 
Dubai is a place that is very visible on the international scene. Dubai is so much out there in the global market. It is 
investing outwards and trying to attract capital; it is trying to improve its laws and regulations. The problem is that 
this is a federal system. Not everything can be done by Dubai alone; it has to be done at federal level. So, the 
banking system is very much behind the international banking system. It is still underdeveloped, even though it is 
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improving slowly, but there is a long way to go before it matches one of the international banking systems. If you 
look at the US and Europe, there is a constant development. How far things happen and how effective they are that 
is a matter for you to be researched. It still an emerging market, you have to remember that. In all the emerging 
markets there is a common trend and it takes time to improve. I think the problem is not just hiring the best laws 
from, it goes down to mindset. We have local firms here that found it very difficult to implement our rules and 
regulations, because there compliance officers are not really that good. If you are compliance officer and you work 
in London for 10-15 years, compliance is in seconds you pick up the rulebook, understand what the requirements 
are and you do it. When you do not have that compliance culture, when the senior management do not have the 
compliant culture, it becomes very difficult to them to set the culture all the way from the lower level up to the 
board. So it is a mindset that you have to change. 
…Dr Saidi 
… 
Anonymous 1: Bourse Dubai is a holding company, which will own the DIFC. 
Anonymous 2: It is DIFC incorporated holding company that holds the government’s interests in the Dubai 
Financial Market and the DIFX. Now, the interesting aspect of that is should there subsequently be a merger of 
these two markets. If that were the case, how would those entities be brought together? Where will the entity sit 
and where will the market be? Who would regulate the market how would insider trading activities on that market 
be regulated. What would be a good law and what would be a perceived law? How would we regulate a conduct by 
an individual outside the jurisdiction of the DIFC? There are interesting issues that you may want to examine in 
your thesis. 
… 
Interviewer: Can we discuss Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Article 42, please? 
Anonymous 2: Our rules relate primarily to market abuse rather than insider dealing specifically. 
Anonymous 2: First I want to tell you about insider dealing in the commodities market. We have two types of 
markets here in the DIFC; we have a commodities market and a securities market. Commodities are derivatives, so 
we can refer to it as the commodities derivatives market. The DIFX is seeking licensing to run a derivatives 
exchange where options and futures relating to financial instruments are dealt. A person, who trades on inside 
information in relation to commodities trading, would not be prosecuted, because there is not really an offence of 
insider dealing in relation to commodities trading. All commodities traders effectively deal on inside information.  
They have information about the market, and they have information about the supply of a particular commodity 
and the demand for a particular commodity. In relation to commodities trading, there is no offence of insider 
dealing. However, there is an offence of market manipulation, because entities in the market are able to manipulate 
the price of commodities, depending on their ability to supply more products or to reduce the supply of products. 
Interviewer: In some jurisdictions attempts were made to make it an offence to deal in derivatives on 
commodities on the basis of inside information. Do you have any ideas about this? 
Anonymous 2: I am not aware of this. In the US there is no crime of insider dealing in relation to commodities 
trading, because the basis of this kind of trading is that all traders have inside information, so they actually trade on 
this information on a daily basis. 
In relation to securities trading, however, it is more proper that one can use inside information to manipulate the 
prices to a wider extent. One can also manipulate the market. So I think we have two offences: those of market 
manipulation and insider dealing. But there can be insider trading in derivatives on securities market. 
Interviewer: The rule is different from other rules of the UK, Europe and the US. 
Anonymous 1: …What is the difference… 
Interviewer: It uses a ‘reporting entity’, it is quite unusual to be used. 
Anonymous 1: But there is a definition… 
Anonymous 2: it is a term that is specific to our legislation.  
Interviewer: What is the difference between an issuer and a reporting entity? 
Anonymous 3: The term is used here to describe a reporting entity, because we use so many terms already. So if 
we had used ‘issuer’ it would have been too short. ‘Reporting entities’ indicates to financial services providers that 
are obligated to report to the exchange or the regulator. 
Anonymous 1: The reporting entity includes the issuer. A jurisdiction may state that insider dealing provisions 
only deal with issuers.  Ours is actually wider. So it captures a wider group of people, because the  issuer falls 
within the term ‘reporting entities’. 
Interviewer: Does it include funds, because fund managers are not issuers? 
Anonymous 1: It could be the operator of a fund. Because a fund is not issued, a fund is managed. A fund is not 
an issue, but you have the issue of a unit in a fund. 
Anonymous 2: The interesting point I take here is that insider trading provision applies to reporting entities… 
There may be individuals who are not reporting entities, who could potentially be in position to undertake insider 
dealing activities. The question is if they are excluded should they be excluded? 
Anonymous 1: No, because we have in Article 43 that he shall not provide anybody else with inside information. 
The prohibition on dealing is only on people who have direct information and then you cannot pass the information 
to anybody else. It is an offence for them to pass the information… a reporting entity or a person in a special 
relationship with the reporting entity… 
Article 43… 
Which means that the main obligation is on the reporting entity or people contact it. But you cannot ask somebody 
else to deal on the basis of that information to deal on your behalf. 
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Anonymous 2: Having the inside information is not an offence and sharing the information with a colleague is not 
an offence. Because that sharing is undertaken by way of business in ordinary circumstances. It is acting upon that 
information. For example, next week we are trading a particular product. 
Anonymous 1: But you can only inform somebody else in the normal course of business. That is, if you have a 
lawyer or an accountant.  You can not inform your wife or mother and tell them “by the way, we going to be 
selling 50% of the shares in the company because the results have been really bad”.  That would actually be in 
breach of our law. But if you call your lawyer and say “I need you to prepare a study for me because we need to 
perform a certain act”. This is in fact what happens in companies. Then the lawyer should keep the information 
confidential. 
Interviewer: Do they obligate issuers to prepare insider lists when they disclose information in the normal course 
of action? 
Anonymous 3: There is no requirement in our law for a list to be kept. But it will be good practice to keep it. 
Anonymous 1: There are also definition of what material information is and who is a person in a special 
relationship. 
Interviewer: What about important information e.g. takeover bid. Is there an obligation of keeping a list? 
Anonymous 2: Not sure. 
Anonymous 3: Internally, in that process you have for example in investment banking unit who works on a deal of 
takeover. Say that you have colleagues on the same floor who are in the private banking side. We have 
requirements to have Chinese Walls between these two units just to prevent reaching the information to the private 
banking side. ‘Your good clients tell them to buy in X there going to be  takeover on the share’. These 
requirements are also found in COB under the business rules. 
Anonymous 2: What you may also find is that a lot of our laws are principle based. They do not have the same 
level of description that you may have in some more mature jurisdictions. Where there may have been more 
instances of this kind of offence occurring and there has been more time to make imminence and to enhance the 
laws in relation to this particular offences. You on some circumstances see that our law in principle based and not 
descriptive. 
Interviewer: Would you explain ‘principled based regulation’ more, please? 
Anonymous 2: Some jurisdictions operate on a risk basis as we do. The UK at the present time is trying to move 
towards principle based approach to regulation. I think the whole intent is that it is very difficult to capture in 
descriptive terms all the range of legal and positive conduct that you need people to comply with. But it is much 
easier to provide broad principles in which you want them to adhere to and regulate on the basis of principles. 
What you find is if you are a prescriptive regulator you rulebooks just continue to grow. Until you get to a stage 
where it is almost impossible to comply with the rules because they so descriptive and on occasions they can 
conflict with each other. Principle based regulation is adopted because it is easier approach to both the users and 
the regulators. 
Anonymous 3: I read that the German regulator aim to go into principle based regulation because they want to 
reduce the number of pages to 8000. So after that exercise there will be 8000 pages of rules and guidance left 
which should support those principles… 
Anonymous 1: It is also because we are a wholesale centre; we do not require such equal law, because we do not 
have to protect retail investors. Things may change in the future when we decide to allow retail investors; we will 
have to provide for a number of protections and disclosures in relation to these individuals, which is why it has 
been easier for us to have principle based regulation. Having said that, however, it seems that in the world 
currently in the financial centres there is a trend towards more principled based regulation. The US just announced 
the creation of a single regulator which will actually combine two regulators and will be principle based regulator. 
I think the world moving to that, it remains to be seen who difficult it to implement principle is based regulation, 
and because this depends on the firms who are they are. For example in this part of the world if you ask me 
principle based regulation is difficult to implement because people do not have the culture and understanding of 
what is required. If we draw a nice principle, but if they do not know what you need to de to implement it, it 
becomes very difficult to implement it. If we have very prescriptive rules in a market that is not so familiar, people 
will say I have to do a b c and d and then I have complied with the requirement. 
Interviewer: Having guides under the rules is not contradicting with principle base regulation. 
Anonymous 1: Guidance is not binding; it only explains what the rule is. When you have a rule you need to de 
this, guide gives an example if you do it this way that will be complying with the rule. However, because it is 
guidance and it is not the rule, you can say to the regulator look I want to do it differently because it suites my 
business better to do it this way. You sit down with the supervision people and the authorization people and 
explain why you are adopting a different approach. They may say very well we are satisfied with what you do. 
Anonymous 2: Various jurisdictions deal with guidance differently. In this centre guidance accompanies the rule. 
You find in other jurisdictions that they issue policy papers they may call them different names, which actually 
provides guidance on how the rule is interpreted. 
The other thing in principle based regulation is that governments move towards principle base regulation or needs 
to be prescriptive. It is generally depends on the economic circumstances. When things are going well, 
governments have a tendency to move towards principle base regulation. When there are major economic or 
corporate collapses within the jurisdiction, the government moves to be more prescriptive. 
All the rules are put in place not just to regulate a company individually; they are actually to facilitate business. At 
the end of the day, that what these rules should be all about. They should be assisting business. 
 If they get to the stage where the cost of compliance is greater than the benefit they supply, then the rules need to 
move back. In most jurisdictions around the world the cost of compliance is too large. In jurisdictions such as our 
 342 
own at the moment, you will never here that argument. You will never find a conference where they talk about the 
cost of compliance being too large. They only say we need better rules and we need better standards. That is 
because it is an emerging market. 
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Appendix 7: A copy of part of (App2) of the DFSA Rulebook 
Offered Securities Rules (OSR) 
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Arabic 
v ،ksYmgZا ksZ_Zا قZا v kswYZا ت_¢£YZاو kmrZا تار¤YZا ،ير_`ueا ka_أ : _¢l¨او ،ksynlZا ل_Zا قاأ
_هnm¤¦ ت§_taو v vyأ v rx n¦©a ،١٩٨٤. 
 ن_sZا)٢٠/٥/٢٠٠٧ ( ³Zإ ksه_Zا ت_آnZا ح_`إ u ع_¦را ®wl¦ قاروeا k¶sه١٠٠ .% ن_sZا. 
Zاrx n`Ypa ح_Y)٣٠/١١/٢٠٠٦ ( ®a ء_¤Zا ³wx فاn{[او ¼s½nYZا ks¯ ¾u"يiآnZا " k¶sه ³Zإ
قاروeا. ن_sZا. 
 رs`¨ يrxksZ_Zا قارو­Z vyأ ق v داneا ®sه_Zا ق¯ km_¯ )vyأ : ت_ارrwZ تار_a[ا iآna
ثZاو   ،ksts¦اnY§ا٢٠٠٥.( 
 ،م Z_ د_xا ةرادإkwاYZا kspYZاو ksZ_lZا و ksynlZا ksZ_Zا قاروeا ت_رy v ت_aزe )vyأ :
٢٠٠٢.( 
 ،va_Zا اrx stuةrYZا ksynlZا تار_a[ا v ير_Y[ا خ_pZا :صnZا و ت_mrYZاو ت_aZا )ksZا سأر :
 ،ت_ارrwZ ر_Zا٢٠٠١.(  
